The Violence of Jesus and the Justice of God:

The life, death, resurrection, and Parousia of Jesus
as exemplary of non-lethal violent resistance, and the
implications for acts of protest by the subaltern

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Declaration

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Abstract of Dissertation (English)

Non-violence in personal and political life has become an unassailable pillar upon which the Christian church leans. The New Testament text, church tradition, and cultural mores converge in establishing non-violence as the pre-eminent mark of those who would be faithful followers of Christ. However, in a context where violence is embedded in the social order, the ethos of non-violence as an end goal in itself generally fails to aid the Christian, particularly the Black Christian, in the task of honouring one's dignity and the dignity of one's neighbour. With respect to the use of physical force during protest, it gags on the gnat of damaged property, and swallows the camel of degraded lives. This ethos is inconsistent with the Gospel of Jesus, which has foremost concern for the abundant life of the person. I do not assert in this project that Jesus promoted the use of force, or that Jesus opposed the use of force. I argue that the issue of the use of force was not as central to the teachings of Jesus as the tradition has made it. Ultimately, Jesus's ethics allows for either the use of force or the non-use of force; with freedom for the choice of action depending upon the person and the circumstances. Jesus's utmost concern was the internalization and assertion of one's human dignity, not as an approved of member of the citizenry, but as a child of God. The goal of this research is to shine a light on the violence that goes unnamed that is perpetrated against Black being in ways that debilitate and destroy life. Being raced as Black is to be always already violently acted upon, and also to be made a threat or perpetrator of violence by virtue of *being*. Until Blackness becomes the centre of theologies of (non)violence, such theologies will remain incomplete, and operate in complicity with the violence of the culture against Black life.

This study accomplishes several tasks. First, it examines biblical texts that are often used to establish that Jesus was principally concerned with non-violence and with the necessity of suffering. Using an honour/shame paradigm, it demonstrates the misreading of such texts, and offers an alternative understanding based upon the first century context. Such an alternative reading constitutes "good news" to those in perpetually unjust social orders that establish and maintain racialized dishonour and marginalization of many. Second, the study assesses Church history as to how non-violence has been conceived and practiced from the church's origin to the present. The research concludes that the language and idea of non-violence has been mutable. Further, the research discloses that there has never been a period when the coercive use of force has been fully delegitimized by the church. Third, having exposed scripture and tradition's de-emphasis on (non)violence, the research then considers the meaning of "violence," and uses the heuristic of Afropessimism to demonstrate the existential violence inherent to Black life. I argue that because violence functions perennially in an existential way against Black persons, the good news of the Gospel must address violence, primarily, in an existential way, such as the reading I have offered,

which privileges Jesus's concern for the dignity and self-actualization of despised persons. Relying upon Duns Scotus' metaphysics of the will, I show the nature of the impairment to Black human will/freedom/life that occurred over centuries as a result of anti-Black torture and social control. I then demonstrate, with South Africa as a case study, the ways in which forceful protest is evidence of a repairing or properly operative human will. Such protest is not a moral wrong but reflects the resilient re-animation of the impaired will of Black humanity. Such protest incarnates the healing, liberative, resurrecting, good news of the Gospel.

Opsomming van Proefskrif (Afrikaans)

Nie-gewelddadigheid op persoonlike en politieke vlak het ‘n onaantasbare pilaar van die Christelike kerk geword. Nuwe Testamentiese geskrifte, kerktradisie en kulturele norme stel saam ‘n standaard van nie-gewelddadigheid aan diegene wat getroue volgelinge van Christus wil wees. Egter, die etos van nie-gewelddadigheid as ‘n einddoel op sigself help die Christen nie juis in die algemeen nie, veral nie die Swart Christen nie, veral waar dit gaan oor die kwessie van die self en die buurman/-vrou eer. In besonder wat betref protesgeweld, verstik dit aan die muggie van beskadigde eiendom terwyl die kameel van vernielde lewens gesluk moet word. Hierdie etos pas nie by die Evangelie van Jesus nie, waar die belangrikste oorweging die oorvloedige lewe van die persoon is. Ek maak nie in hierdie projek aanspraak dat Jesus ‘n voorstander was vir die gebruik van mag, of teen die gebruik van mag was nie. Ek voer aan dat die gebruik van mag nie so sentraal in Jesus se leerstellinge was as wat tradisie dit uitmaak nie. Uiteindelik het Jesus se etiek die gebruik van sowel as die nie-gebruik van mag toegelaat; die besluit van hoe om op te tree hang uiteindelik van die persoon en die omstandighede af. Jesus se uiteindelike bekommernis was die internalisering en bevestiging van iemand se menswaardigheid, nie as ‘n vooraanstaande burger nie, maar as ‘n kind van God. Die doel van hierdie navorsing is om die lig te laat skyn op die naamlose geweld wat teen Swart wesens gepleeg word op wyses wat lewe verswak en vernietig. Om geklassifiseer word as Swart is reeds om gewelddadig behandel te word, of om as ‘n bedreiging of geweldenaar beskou te word bloot deur te *wees*. Tot die dag wanneer Swartwees die kern van teologieë van (nie)gewelddadigheid word, sal sulke teologieë onvolledig bly en kop in een mus funksioneer met die geweld van die kultuur teen Swart lewe.

Hierdie studie bereik ‘n aantal take. Eerstens word bybelse tekste ondersoek wat dikwels gebruik word om vas te stel dat Jesus hoofsaaklik betrokke was met nie-gewelddadigheid en die noodsaaklikheid van lyding. Die studie wys dat sulke tekste verkeerd gelees word en bied ‘n alternatiewe verstaan daarvan, gebaseer op die eerste eeuse konteks. Hierdie alternatiewe lees van die tekste sal mense in onregverdige sosiale omstandighede waar rasgebonde oneer en marginalisering van baie mense vasgestel en voortgesit word, beter bystaan. Tweedens assesseer die studie Christelike geskiedenis vir bewyse hoe nie-gewelddadigheid verstaan en beoefen is van ontstaan tot in die huidige tyd. Die navorsing kom tot die slotsom dat taal en die idee van nie-gewelddadigheid veranderend van aard is. Daar was ook nooit ‘n tydperk waar die gedwonge gebruik van geweld ten volle deur die kerk onwettig verklaar is nie. Derdens, nadat die skrif en tradisie se gebrek aan klem op nie-gewelddadigheid ontbloot is, fokus die navorsing op die betekenis van geweld en gebruik die heuristiek van Afro-pessimisme om die eksistensiële geweld wat deel is van die Swart betaan, te demonstreer. Ek voer aan dat aangesien geweld primêr op ‘n eksistensiële manier

teen Swart persone funksioneer, die goeie nuus van die Evangelie geweld hoofsaaklik op ‘n eksistensiële manier moet aanspreek, soos byvoorbeeld in die leesstuk wat ek aanbied, waar Jesus se besorgdheid vir die menswaardigheid en selfaktualisering van veragte mense uitgelig word. Met die gebruik van Scotus se metafisika van die wil, wys ek op die inkorting van Swart wil/vryheid/lewe deur die eeue deur middel van marteling en sosiale kontrole. Vervolgens demonstreer ek, met Suid-Afrika as ‘n gevallestudie, op watter maniere kragdadige protesaksie ‘n bewys is van ‘n herstellende of funksionerende menslike wil. Sulke proteste is nie moreel verkeerd nie, maar die veerkragtige herstel van die ingeperkte wil van Swart humaniteit. Sulke protesaksies is die genesing, bevrydend, opstanding, goeie nuus van die Evangelie.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my dad, Arthur A. Brown, Sr. An artist, an intellectual, and a casualty of the existential violence of his day. I am so grateful to have had you for the time I did. Thank you for teaching me from a young age to question the teacher and the teaching.

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1. Introduction: Theologizing Non-violence While Black

1.1. Research Problem

This project contests the scriptural, historical theological, and ethical grounds of the Christian tradition's adoption of an ethics of "non-violence," considering the history and experiences of Black persons in Western Christian contexts.

1.1.1. Background

Non-violence in personal and political life has become an unassailable pillar upon which the Christian church leans. The New Testament text, church tradition, and cultural mores converge in establishing non-violence as the pre-eminent mark of those who would be faithful followers of Christ.

The Gospels, and particularly Jesus's Sermon on the Mount,[1] are pivotal texts in forming the theology of non-violence. Jesus is depicted in the Sermon as blessing the poor in spirit, the mourners, and the persecuted, and as instructing his followers not to resist evildoers, but to "turn the other cheek," to love their enemies and to pray for their persecutors. Jesus's own life exemplifies this ideal; the blessedness of one who is poor, one who mourned, one who was persecuted, and most especially as one who sacrificed his life out of love for his enemies. As Hays states, "[From] Matthew to Revelation we find a consistent witness against violence and a calling to the community to follow the example of Jesus in accepting suffering rather

[1] Matt. 5:1-12, 38-48 (all scripture is from the NRSV unless otherwise noted): "When Jesus[a] saw the crowds, he went up the mountain; and after he sat down, his disciples came to him. 2 Then he began to speak, and taught them, saying: 3 "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 4 "Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted. 5 "Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. 6 "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled. 7 "Blessed are the merciful, for they will receive mercy. 8 "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. 9 "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. 10 "Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 11 "Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on my account. 12 Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you.….38 You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' 39 But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; 40 and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; 41 and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile. 42 Give to everyone who begs from you, and do not refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you. 43 "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' 44 But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 45 so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous. 46 For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? 47 And if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? 48 Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

than inflicting it."[2] Curtiss P. DeYoung has been even more explicit. Though accepting of resistance and protest, he concludes that, "[v]iolence is evil. Non-violence is the Way of Jesus and the more holy route to justice."[3]

Church tradition also supports a reading of scripture that promotes non-violence. Though much of church history has endorsed Christian participation in violence for the cause of war, there have been consistent voices within the church that resisted the use of coercive force and that asserted the Christian calling to pacifism and non-violence. These voices include the apostles, Tertullian, Francis of Assisi, those in the anabaptist tradition, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Those who have challenged the church's legitimation of the use of physical force have secured prominent places in the Church's memory and history. Some believe that Christian proponents of non-violence, such as those named, have secured approbation in the annals of Church history because their non-violence position is equated to Christian integrity. "Such witnesses have had a historic influence vastly disproportionate to their meagre numbers, because their vision resonated so deeply with the New Testament and because their Christian witness therefore possessed such evident integrity."[4]

Finally, the cultural mores of the late 20th century West idealized those who were committed to peace and to a social gospel that incorporated an ethos of non-violence. Those who, like Martin Luther King, Jr., refused the use of physical force and violent retaliation in the face of injustice and abuse, were bequeathed a mantle of moral purity,[5] and deemed worthy of reverence and emulation.[6] America's failure in Vietnam, the success of non-violent protest in the Civil Rights Movement, and the wave of assassinations occurring in the late sixties of prominent American public figures, coalesced in creating for the public an appetite for peace. This appetite was aptly expressed in the lyrics of a popular song, sung by half a million people

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[2] Richard B. Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation, A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics*, 1st edition (San Francisco: HarperOne, 1996), 332.

[3] Curtiss DeYoung, "From Resistance to Reconciliation: The Means and Goal of Christian Resistance," in *Resist: Christian Dissent for the 21st Century*, ed. Michael G. Long (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), 15.

[4] Curtiss DeYoung, "From Resistance to Reconciliation: The Means and Goal of Christian Resistance," in *Resist: Christian Dissent for the 21st Century*, ed. Michael G. Long (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), 15.

[5] It has been observed that Malcolm X's "by any means necessary" rhetoric, which embraced violent methods of self-actualization for Black people, bolstered support for MLK's platform of non-violence among moderate Whites.

[6] The honors expressly shown to MLK included the American Head of State granting him an audience, and his award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

in 1969 at the largest anti-war demonstration in U.S. history,[7] "All we are saying, is give peace a chance."[8]

It is within this framework of scripture, tradition, and culture, that contemporary theologies of Christian non-violence re-emerged, led by such scholars as John Howard Yoder.[9] Yoder's work reclaimed the life and teachings of Jesus as the ethical standard for Christians, argued forcefully that Jesus's life and work was not merely for personal enrichment, but for political engagement, and asserted that the most significant political engagement indicated by Jesus's life and teaching was a commitment to non-violence. The contribution of Yoder's pacifist theology and King's successful application of a theology of non-violent resistance, continue to influence theological discourse and lend support to affirmations of Christian non-violence based upon the life and teachings of Jesus.

1.1.2. Statement of the Problem

While advocacy of Christian "non-violence" is not inconsistent with the language of the biblical text, it expresses only partial truth, and it often does violence to marginalized Others.

My experience as an American in South Africa gave me cause to confront the limits of the standard Christian theology of non-violence. It was in South Africa that I realized the ways in which my theology and ethics of non-violent Christianity were treacherously limited, despite my intent to espouse a theology with a social justice orientation. On one occasion, early in my sojourn in Cape Town, a years-long student protest over the intersectional issues of decolonization, school fees, rape culture, housing, etc., resulted in a not-unusual outburst of violence. The unusual feature of this particular protest was that on this occasion students removed paintings from the walls of a university building and incinerated the paintings in a bonfire on central campus.[10] Shock and outrage was the public response. Having had Martin Luther King Jr.'s non-violent protest ethics impressed upon me all my life, shock and outrage to torched artwork was my response as well. That is, until seeing news reports of how some

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[7] Jon Wiener, "Nixon and the 1969 Vietnam moratorium," *The Nation*, January 12, 2010. http://www.thenation.com/article/nixon-and-1969-vietnam-moratorium/. (Last accessed April 14, 2016).

[8] Lennon-McCarthy. "Give Peace a Chance," (single). Apple Records, 1969 (LP).

[9] Yoder's text, *The Politics of Jesus*, has been called a Christian pacifist manifesto issued in direct opposition to Christian public intellectuals of the day, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, who espoused the idea that New Testament ethics of peace and love were impracticable in modernity.

[10] The details of South Africa's recent student protest movement, including this incident, as well as their relation to (non)violence, is discussed in the final chapter of the project.

students-- those protesting the lack of student housing—were forced to live. Two Black female students relayed how they had moved into a corrugated shack in a township. Their quarters were cramped, their lighting was poor, their environment was unsafe and ugly. They used the toilets—portable outdoor toilets set up in designated areas of the township—before dusk, as use after dark put their safety at risk. They had moved, in other words, into a housing arrangement that for millions of Black people in South Africa, was the norm.

To see these women living in a shack--while I myself was searching for affordable student housing (from the comfort a friend's beautiful home)--was to confront the kind of housing in which I, a Black female, might possibly be compelled to live; it was to confront the society that deemed such housing acceptable *for people like me*. I became viscerally aware of the ways that township life constituted an assault against one's dignity as a human being. I understood that the degradation of daily life as a Black person in South Africa was a much more nefarious violence than the burning of a painting. This research project then suggested itself.

Initially, thinking of the burning of paintings during protest, I anticipated researching the myriad ways that Jesus legitimated violence in his life and teachings, and then writing an apologetic for the use of physical violence during protest by the marginalized. Hence, the project was entitled, "The Violence of Jesus and the Justice of God," followed by instances in Jesus's life. As the research progressed, however, it became evident that there was an existing, but under-utilized, theological lens for assessing Jesus's life and teaching that might be applied to the issue of protesting the degradation of Black life in South Africa. A lens that accounted for the ambivalence of scripture with respect to the use and disuse of physical force and that showed concern for justice on behalf of the marginalized. That lens was tied to the socio-historic factor of cultural honour-shame. When the honour-shame cultural ethos was used to exegete scripture, it became clear that Jesus's actions and teachings could be viewed as rooted in his goal of securing self-actualization and dignity for his marginalized, dishonoured followers. Such a perspective has astounding relevance for those in a contemporary context enduring marginalization, including women, LGBT persons, and especially Black persons.

With this realization, the goal of the project shifted from one of establishing the violence in Jesus's life and teachings and its connection to justice, to establishing the emphasis that Jesus made upon the human dignity of the individual. What the research reveals is that, for Jesus, human dignity entails deep security in one's identity and one's truth, as beloved children of God. It entails asserting one's dignity in the face of society's attempts to humiliate. This means that protest of the subaltern, including protest that includes the use of physical force,

may be construed theologically as a means of asserting self-ness and personhood long denied, and thus an affirmation of human dignity.

The difficulty with the assertion that the use of force during protest is theologically legitimate, is the basis for the first two sections of the research, which investigates non-violence in the life and teachings of Jesus. Was Jesus as non-violent as contemporary readings of scripture depict? Is there a standard of non-violence that the church has upheld since its purest expressions during the apostolic age? Is non-violence a fundamental ethical tenet of Christian life and practice? These are some of the questions with which Parts One and Two of the research grapples. Part Three of the research then applies the lens of Black being to the study and questions whether the issues of non-violence are impacted by one being raced as Black. Because the answer is a firm, "Yes, race does matter to matters of violence and non-violence," Part Three discusses the positive metaphysical developments within the will that are reflected by forceful protest, and then discusses protest violence in the context of South Africa.

1.1.3. Contribution and Relevance

Out of the significant body of research related to the ethics of Christian non-violence,[11] as well as to the ethics of Christian engagement in war,[12] there are three prevailing assumptions with which this study will engage.

Because a key aspect of modern theological scholarship involves the notion that non-violence is the central ethic of the New Testament and the Christian faith (e.g., Richard Hays's claim that, "the normative witness of the New Testament against…violence is powerful, virtually univocal, and integrally related to the central moral vision of the New Testament texts"),[13] the project will demonstrate that scripturally and historically, the church has continually grappled with issues of violence and non-violence without consensus.

First, with regard to scripture, the project will disrupt Hays's claim of the "normativity" of non-violence in the pages of the New Testament. This normative view presumes the viewer's social location of gender, racial, and economic privilege. As Ward states, "[t]heological discourse always comes from somewhere, is spoken by someone, and is legitimated or delegitimated by some institution implicated in particular sets of social and cultural

[11] See, as representative examples of proponents of nonviolence, the work of Howard Thurman, Dorothy Day, Thomas Merton, as well as John H. Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas, Richard B. Hays, Walter Wink, and N.T. Wright.

[12] See, e.g., the work of Richard Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, Nigel Biggar, and Richard Horsley.

[13] Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament*, 315.

relations."[14] Hays's normativity, then, can be seen as a capital-controlling, Western, White, male's New Testament normativity. The conceptualization of Jesus by this specific social-economic class is not universal, nor does it necessarily resonate phenomenologically with most Christians, or humans, on the planet. Which is to say that most people do not experience life, and most Christians do not experience Jesus in the same ways as capital-controlling, Western, White, male Christians.[15] This study will show that the Western, White, male theologian's reading of the "normative" witness of the New Testament, specifically the reading of the gospel treatment of non-violence in the life of Jesus, may not be afforded presumptive privilege. On the contrary, a liberationist interrogation of the New Testament narratives of Jesus's life, death, and resurrection reveal a Jesus who views violence comprehensively as encompassing more than physical force, who sanctions physically forceful methods against those who engage in violences of various kinds, and who ultimately overcomes the violent tendencies of humanity (through violent judgment). Not only this, but the reading of scripture from the view of the marginalized reveals that where Jesus used examples that referenced physical force, his point was not about the use of force. Rather, Jesus made use of examples using physical force to make a larger point about human dignity, self-worth and valour.

Second, with respect to tradition, rather than "non-violence" being the most consistent ethical teaching of the church, it is clear from a historical theological perspective that both violence and non-violence have been sanctioned by the church. More accurate than construing the Christian imperative as one of non-violence, is recognition of the more consistent ethic of the Christian, which has been *survival with intact Christian dignity*. Where survival with dignity for Christian adherents was not feasible through use of physical force, non-violent means were employed to accomplish these ends. The converse was also true, however. Where non-violent means of transformation with dignity was not possible, the use of force was employed to accomplish the necessary end, which was human dignity. In either case, the Church's survival was a factor in the response chosen, but even where survival was not the principal goal, the intact human dignity of those in the church allowed followers to choose to forgo survival. The Christian tradition reflects consistently, not that the church has been called

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[14] Graham Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I*, Reprint edition (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 116.

[15] This is merely to acknowledge that, statistically, the majority of the world's population is outside of the West and is materially poor, thus their worldview would not likely coincide with that of Western White males. Also, statistically the majority of Christians reside outside of the West and have a tradition of faith that is experientially different than that of the capital-controlling, Western, White male. [research needed]

to refrain from violence, but that human flourishing within the culture has been a motivating concern. Also, retaining the Christian witness of Jesus and orthodox doctrine, securing the Christian faith against heretics and non-Christians, and ensuring the proliferation of the church, in whatever ways were most efficacious, were deemed the most imperative ethical warrants for Christian faith.

Third, the research demonstrates that the historic extremes of violence perpetrated against Black persons, makes the claim and assertion of dignity deeply significant to human actualization. The research demonstrates that Black beings endured existential violence through their being excised from the construction of "the human." That Black persons endured ongoing oppression and degradation that continued the existential violence against them and that resulted in the impairment of the will. Finally, that the resuscitated will, recently exemplified in South Africa through Black Consciousness building, could result in the inner force of the will's re-orientation being expressed in an outward show of physical force. I argue that the re-orientation that results in the use of physical force warrants ethical approbation, not because of the use of force, but because of the imperative good of the vivified will acting to secure its highest good.

The final chapter demonstrates the ways in which the use of force has been accepted by iconic Black South African fighters for justice, as they sought justice and self-hood for South Africa's most marginalized population. Just as these figures made legitimate use of physical force in their insistence on human dignity, so too have the student protestors of today.

1.2. Research Plan

1.2.1. Research Questions

The question that this project seeks to answer is:

> *In what ways is the "normative" conceptualization of non-violence in the Christian tradition impacted by a reading of historical theology from margins; particularly from the perspective of Blackness?*

1.2.2. Research Paradigm

This study falls within the field of systematic theology and is undertaken in the Western Cape of South Africa by a Black American woman. These facts are significant to the methodology implemented in the study and to the goals that the study seeks to accomplish.

Theory is used to determine relationships between constructs that "describe or explain a phenomenon by going beyond the local event and trying to connect it with similar events."[16] The theoretical framework, not the theory itself, is often described as a paradigm. A paradigm refers to the framework that determines the intent, motivation and expectations of the research.[17] Egon Guba expands this concept by explaining the ways in which paradigms are shaped by three basic kinds of inquiry: ontological, which asks, "what is the nature of the knowable or of reality?", epistemological, which asks, "what is the relationship between the knower (the inquirer) and the known (knowable)?", and methodological, which asks "how should the inquirer go about finding out knowledge?"[18]

The research paradigm within which this study is located is that of Critical Theory.[19] While critical theory has roots in Marxism, it is concerned less with economic ordering, and more with the political and cultural infrastructure of society.[20] Critical theory in research seeks to transform society, and to address injustice. As Geuss notes, critical theory is characterized by three theses: 1) It has special standing as a guide for human action, in that, it is aimed at producing enlightenment and bringing about liberation; 2) critical theory is a cognitive form of knowing; and 3) critical theory is "reflective" rather than "objective."[21] It uses the lens of inequality due to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other conceptions of marginality to do so.[22]

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[16] Noella Mackenzie and Sally Knipe, "Research Dilemmas: Paradigms, Methods and Methodology," *Issues In Educational Research* 16, no. 2 (2006): 193-205, citing Mertens 2005, 2.

[17] There are a number of theoretical paradigms that are utilized in social sciences and humanities research, including positivist (and postpositivist), constructivist, interpretivist, transformative, emancipatory, critical, pragmatism and deconstructivist. See, Mackenzie and Knipe, "Research Dilemmas."

[18] Egon G. Guba, The Paradigm Dialog (SAGE Publications, 1990), 18.

[19] Critical theory is identified with the Institute for Social Research, which was originally attached to Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany. Thus, critical theory also came to be associated with theorists known as "the Frankfurt School." The Frankfurt School's most prominent members included Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor Adorno (1937-1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and, later, Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). Critical theory developed in opposition to "traditional theory," which sought explanation by application of universal laws. Critical theory viewed the attempt at universalizing objectivity as "technocratic," and sought, instead, to present a subjective epistemology, grounded in "reflection." At its heart, a critical theory of society presents a criticism of ideology. See, Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2–3; James Bohman, "Critical Theory," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/critical-theory/; Stephen Eric Bronner, *Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction*, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[20] Bronner, *Critical Theory*, 2.

[21] Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory*, 1–2.

[22] Mackenzie and Knipe, "Research Dilemmas."

Like interpretivist research, critical theorization recognizes that research is not value-free. However, critical research seeks to do more than acknowledge the unavoidable values attached to the research process; it has the goal of actively challenging the way that knowledge has been interpreted in order to bring about transformation.

As Hammersley notes,

> to be critical, as a researcher, [involves] assessing public policies, institutions, and forms of social practice, not just knowledge claims, and doing this in terms of practical values, such as social welfare, justice, political liberty, or economic value. Furthermore, the critical act has been expanded to include analysing the fundamental assumptions and social contexts associated with what is being assessed, and/or taking an oppositional stance toward it.[23]

The critical research task of this project will be to interrogate what is meant by non-violence, generally; how the church has interpreted and practiced non-violence historically, and how scripture, specifically the gospel narratives of Jesus's life, have explicated the use of force theologically. Because the task of critical theory is not limited to examination, however, I will then pursue the task of transformative critical research by analysing and expanding the conceptualizations of violence that are often in operation in discussions of non-violence to show the myriad ways that violence permeates modern life, as part of accepted and proper political and social ordering. Further, I will contextualize this discussion by a focus on race and Black life, and specifically the social conditions that often result in violent protest in South Africa. Concretizing the discussion is meant to illuminate the ways that the misperception of non-violence and violence in theological discussions constitutes ongoing harm to the lives and human dignity of the marginalized, thus necessitating revision.

1.2.3. Research Methodology

Methodology is the aspect of a paradigm that emphasises the question of how the research should proceed.[24] The methodology serves as a bridge between theoretical claims and

[23] Critical theory is often itself critiqued as having as its goal support of a political agenda, which, it is argued, research should not have. Martyn Hammersley, "Should Social Science Be Critical?," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 180, https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393105275279.

[24] Thomas A. Schwandt and Emily F. Gates, "Case Study Methodology," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 5th ed. (SAGE Publications, 2017).

beliefs, so-called "grand theories" as applied to larger society, and to concrete social contexts and the relevant texts to be analysed.[25]

1.2.3.1. Research as an Act of Bricolage

Denzin and Lincoln compare the work of the researcher, and of qualitative research, to that of making a quilt. It is to become a bricoleur, engaged in bricolage. "Bricolage is 'the poetic making do'…with such bricoles—the odds and ends, the bits left over…The bricoleur is a Jack of all trades, a kind of professional do-it-yourself[er]."[26]

In attempting gain a deep understanding of the phenomenon under investigation,

> [t]he qualitative-researcher-as-bricoleur or a maker of quilts…deploy[s] whatever strategies, methods, or empirical materials are at hand…If new tools or techniques have to be invented or pieced together, then the researcher will do this. The choice of which interpretive practices to employ is not necessarily set in advance. The "choice of research practices depends upon the questions that are asked, and the questions depend on their context"…what is available in the context, and what the researcher can do in that setting.[27]

The experience of the bricoleur, and of quilt-making research, has been my own during this project. Among the tools, or patches of quilts, that have accumulated during the research are those of Black theology, feminist theology, liberation theology, post-colonial (and decolonial) theology. With respect to biblical analysis there has been historical criticism, source criticism, literary criticism, as well as hermeneutics of empire, economics, and apocalypse, among others. As the research involves interdisciplinarity and subjects with intersectional concerns, the methods used have involved the crafting of a complex quilt involving race, gender, identity, nation, class, and condition of servitude.

The methodological task necessitated, as Denzin further describes, a going between and a contextualization of the self and the subject matter.

> The researcher-as-bricoleur-theorist works between and within competing and overlapping perspectives and paradigms. [Like the] interpretive bricoleur understands that research is an interactive process shaped by one's personal history, biography, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity and those of the people in the setting. Critical bricoleurs stress the dialectical

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[25] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis* (SAGE, 2009), 23.

[26] Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Fifth (SAGE Publications, 2017), 4 (citations omitted).

[27] Denzin and Lincoln, 4.

> and hermeneutic nature of interdisciplinary inquiry, knowing that the boundaries between traditional disciplines no longer hold.[28]

The result has been a bricolage that has been cut away, measured, shaped and designed to accommodate a systematic theological aesthetic. The chief methods that serve the project have been biblical exegetical and epistemological analysis, historical theological analysis, discourse analysis, and case study. These methods will be considered as cmponents of the quilt. The biblical exegesis serves as the inner core of the quilt. The front of the quilt is the historical theological analysis, and the critical analysis and application to Black being related to non-violence functions as the back side of the quilt.

1.2.3.2. Structure of the Study

The structure of the study, i.e., the design aesthetic or pattern of the quilt, is a progression from scripture, to tradition, to experience. The project is divided into three sections, Parts 1, 2 and 3.

In Part One, scripture is interrogated. Four texts were selected for analysis that represent traditional passages that undergird the conceptualization of Christian pacifism or non-violence. These passages relate to the life, the arrest, the crucifixion, and finally to the resurrected life of Jesus. The sample passages were subjectively selected; however, they are those often regarded as supporting the claim that Jesus promoted pacifism and non-violence.

The passages to be examined are from:

1. The Sermon on the Mount from Matthew 5.
2. The arrest in the garden of Gethsemane in Matthew 26.
3. Jesus's utterances on the cross in Luke 23.
4. Jesus's words of consolation to the martyrs in heaven in Revelation 6.

Though a comprehensive exegetical biblical analysis exceeds the scope of this project, the research undertakes an abbreviated form of exegesis.

The choice of the texts was based upon the fact that most of the writing in the Gospel narratives is concerned Jesus's life, and the apex of the Gospel narratives is the occasion of Jesus's death. This would seem to dictate that either an exegesis primarily focused on passages from Jesus's life is warranted, since this garners most of the attention of scripture, or that an exegesis of texts related to Jesus's crucifixion is warranted, since the key concern of each

[28] Denzin and Lincoln, 4.

Gospel relates to this. Instead of making the choice to favour the period covering either the life of Jesus or the death of Jesus over other periods of Jesus's time on earth, in selecting passages for exegesis, I chose to take a middle way.

A repeated five-fold pattern of inquiry is made of each passage examined. The five questions posed are:

1. What is the source of the text?
2. When was the text produced?
3. Who was the author of the text?
4. Who was the author's intended audience?
5. What was the author's purpose in writing?

The exegesis serves as the inner core of the quilt. With the core constructed and complete, the patchwork of the front and the back of the quilt will be created. The front of the quilt is Part 2, the historical theological[29] analysis, while the back of the quilt, Part 3, is a patchwork of theologies from the margins that discuss violence and Black being.

Part two, the historical theological review of the history of pacifism and non-violence, relates to particular periods in the life of the church. There are four chapters, each of which considers a different period. These periods are the:

1. Apostolic church to the 4th century church
2. 4th century to the 12th century church
3. 13th century to the 19th century church
4. 20th century

The divisions in theological history reflect, generally, major shifts that occurred in the "non-violent" practical theology of the church. Generally, up to the fourth century, within the violent context of the early centuries, there was a vibrant strand of pacifist Christianity that forbade even self-defense. From the fourth century onwards to the twelfth there was a tolerance for killing and warfare, in defense of the Christian way of life, reflected in the adoption of principles of just war. From the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century a consistent strand of pacifism and non-violence philosophy/theology returned, which was embraced and adapted throughout Europe, and later exported, after a fashion, to the New World. The nineteenth and

[29] For details on historical theology, see, Alister E. McGrath, *Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian Thought*, Second (Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).

twentieth centuries reflect the continued vitality of the theologies of the previous era applied in various distinct forms.

The methodology of historical theological analysis of the various periods will proceed with a general overview of history, using texts that include contemporary scholarly compendiums concerned with relevant periods of theological history, historically significant primary literature, scholarly articles, etc.

In Part three of the research, the quilt is reversed, and the topic of analysis shifts from pacifism and non-violence to violence *per se*. The method in use is that of critical discourse analysis.

"Discourse is a way of speaking that does not simply reflect or represent things 'out there,' but 'constructs' or 'constitutes' them."[30] Not only is discourse constructive of reality, but also, discourse contributes to "both the reproduction of society and to social change."[31] Discourse that fails to account for a variety of perspectives can be said to function ideologically.[32] Further, hegemonic discourse is said to be in effect when "all alternative constructions are suppressed in favour of one dominating view."[33]

Critical discourse analysis, as Hjelm notes, does two things. "[F]irst, it focuses on power and ideology in discourse, and second, it acknowledges that there is a reality—physical and social—outside of discourse, that is reproduced and changed discursively."[34] Critical discourse analysis is a valuable tool for analysing how "discursive constructions perpetuate particular ways of thinking and practice by suppressing alternative discourses."[35]

Using the method of critical discourse analysis, the panels of the back of the quilt will be stitched together, to form a conceptual analysis of the discursive use of the concept of violence. This analysis will include use of patches of afro-pessimist theory, post-colonial theory, and psycho-social theory.

Following this discursive analysis, Part 3 will conclude by placing the quilt upon the South African bed. Using a case study, an analysis of violence will be applied to the concretized context of physically violent student protest in South Africa. This analysis will include an

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[30] Titus Hjelm, "Discourse Analysis," in *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion*, ed. Michael Stausberg and Steven Engler (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 135, (internal citations omitted).
[31] Hjelm, 135.
[32] Hjelm, 141.
[33] Hjelm, 141.
[34] Hjelm, 140.
[35] Hjelm, 142.

historic overview of violent protest, and consideration of the arguments for violent protest offered by the iconic figures of Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko, as well as counter-arguments by Allan Aubrey Boesek.

1.2.4. Research Outline

The overall structure and aesthetic of the study is as follows:

1. Introduction to the Project
    A. Research Problem
    B. Research Plan
    C. Conclusion
2. Part I: Biblical Exegesis
    A. Principles and Presuppositions of Exegesis
    B. Exegesis of Selected Texts
    C. Conclusion
3. Part II: Historical Theological Analysis
    A. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence through the Fourth Century
    B. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from Late Antiquity to the Early Medieval Period
    C. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from the Late Medieval Period to Modernity
    D. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence in Modernity
    E. SUMMARY of Conclusions from Part II
4. Part III: Theological Analysis from the Margins
    A. Violence and Black Being
    B. Violence and Human Will
    C. Violence and Protest in South Africa
    D. SUMMARY of Conclusions from Part III

1.3. Research Conclusion

The project considers scripture, history, experience, and a concrete contextual example in order to deconstruct the notion of the normativity of non-violence in Christian life and practice, particularly for those who are raced as Black. The goal is not to advance use of violence in the Christian life, but to allow the church to gain clarity, seeing violence as embedded in the culture, noticing the invisible violence that works devastating harm, and that

is incompatible with the message of the Gospel. The goal is, more importantly, to shine a light on the violence that is not named that is perpetrated against Black being in ways that debilitate and destroy life. Being raced as Black is to be always already violently acted upon, and to be made a threat of, or perpetrator of violence by virtue of being Black. Until Blackness becomes the center of theologies of (non)violence, they will remain incomplete, and operate in complicity with the violence of the culture against Black life.

Part I

Biblical Exegesis

2. Exegesis of Scripture Related to Non-violence

2.1. Introduction

An overall objective of this research project is to highlight the ways in which the conception of Jesus as principally non-violent is a misconception which functions to the detriment of those who have been characterized as the Other and marginalized because of that characterization, particularly those who are Black. The project aims to theologically unmask language and ideas that aid oppression, so that the Christian imagination might engage itself in the work of constructing social orders that not in word, but in truth, make the Kingdom of God an imminent reality.

As has been articulated by theologian Allan Aubrey Boesak, if theology is to be valuable and relevant it must be "rooted in the prophetic, covenantal tradition of Scripture."[36] Because scripture is central to Christian life and practice, particularly as it relates to prophetic transformation of culture, this research project begins by examining biblical passages that underlie the conception of a non-violence tradition of the Christian witness.

This chapter will examine four passages of scripture, each from a different period of Jesus's life. The passages exegeted include passages from the Sermon on the Mount, and passages that depict Jesus's arrest in the garden of Gethsemane, Jesus' s crucifixion, and the resurrected Jesus in the heavenly realm. The review will demonstrate that the Christian tradition has featured the theme of non-violence, when such readings, in fact, misapprehend the purpose and meaning of the texts.

This chapter will demonstrate that the Sermon on the Mount passage that adjures Christ followers to "turn the other cheek," etc., is not a message of "non-violence," as much as it is a message of asserting dignity and self-worth. The same may be said of the passage related to Jesus's arrest. His admonition to "put your sword away" is not a blanket condemnation of the use of physical force. Jesus in this scene is demonstrating his obedience to God's plan, and his self-possession of power that refuses to be threatened or shamed by the powers of the world. The specific depiction of the "sword" incident and recounting of the speech by Jesus in Matthew's text, is for the purpose of alluding to an Old Testament passage that emphasizes shame, fortitude, and God's vindication; themes which, again, relate to shame/honour, dignity, and trust in God's restoration of dignity. When it comes to the text in Luke that depicts Jesus on the cross praying, "Father forgive them," what is revealed is that the text is not an embrace by Jesus of suffering and an example of Jesus's deep love for and forgiveness of his

[36] Allan Aubrey Boesak, *Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid: The Challenge to Prophetic Resistance* (New York: Springer, 2016), 5.

persecutors. Instead, Luke presents in his passion narrative a Jesus whose suffering is not featured, but whose composure and control is. Luke conveys the message that the powers seek to hurt and humiliate Jesus, but they fail. Though Jesus suffers the pain and humiliation of crucifixion, he is possessed of such dignity in his own being, that he overcomes the dishonour of being assigned by the world the identity of a shameless outlaw. Jesus possesses honour that his persecutors do not. Finally, the passage in Revelation, that depicts Jesus consoling martyred witnesses, is also a portrayal of honour and dignity reclaimed. Just as the disgraced Jesus now lives and reigns with supreme honour of every kind, so the martyred Jesus-followers, though degraded and killed will reign with Jesus in righteousness and honour.

2.2. Principles and Presuppositions of Exegesis

The goal of the exegesis of this project is to first determine what scholars have concluded about the passages under examination, and then to formulate a more apt interpretation based upon research which incorporates an honour/shame hueristic.

2.2.1. Principles of Exegesis

The Bible, that is the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) and the New Testament, are sacred scriptures of the Christian faith that guide and shape the identity of Christian people.[37] The scriptures are authoritative for Christians because Christians have traditionally understood that God spoke through scripture and that God continues to speak through scripture.[38] But what is it that scripture says, and what is it that scripture means by what it says? The purpose of exegesis, when applied to biblical text, is to discern the answers to these questions. Exegesis is an exercise of interpretation or explanation of what is written.[39] With respect to the bible, it has been defined as "the careful historical, literary, and theological analysis of a text."[40] The goal of such analysis is the "coherent understanding of the text on its own terms and in its own context."[41]

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[37] Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Bible and Economics: The Hermeneutical Issues," *Transformation* 4, no. 3/4 (1987): 13.

[38] Wolterstorff, 13.

[39] John H. Hayes and Carl R. Holladay, *Biblical Exegesis, Third Edition: A Beginner's Handbook*, Third (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 1.

[40] Michael J. Gorman, *Elements of Biblical Exegesis: A Basic Guide for Students and Ministers*, Revised and Expanded (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 10.

[41] Gorman, 10.

2.2.1.1. Why Exegesis is Performed

Biblical texts warrant exegesis as they present specific issues related to the ways that the texts were composed. The issues that the texts present are numerous.[42] The texts are originally written in languages different from those spoken by most readers. There is a cultural gap between those who wrote the texts and readers of the texts today. There is a historical gap between the period during which the texts were written and the present day. There is multiple and/or collective authorship of the texts, which means though each author may use collective wisdom and tradition to inform a writing, taken together the authors often do not speak with one voice. Further, because the scriptures are sacred texts, our reading of them involves more than intellectual comprehension and appreciation. Reading the Bible as sacred scripture involves the beliefs and convictions of the reader. For these reasons careful attention to the texts must be paid.

These reasons also make it inevitable that those reading or studying the text will disagree with one another over their meaning. The disagreements that arise in interpreting the texts, Wolterstorff has noted, might be categorized in three ways: [43] (1) what the Bible actually says; (2) what part of what is said is authoritative for Christians; and (3) which social ethic is most faithful to what is authoritative in what the Bible says.[44] For the purposes of the texts that are under consideration in this research project, the issue of interpretation does not typically engender dispute related to the first point, what the Bible actually says. There might be slight variations to the translations of the texts, but these do not impact the ideas communicated. For this reason, linguistic exegesis is not a focus of the research. The research will instead examine, albeit briefly, Wolterstorff's second and third points of disagreement, what is authoritative and what social ethic is to be applied to the authoritative reading of the text.

Determining what is authoritative is more complex than simply accepting every line that is written as having significance to Christian belief and action. First, the complete corpus may require resolution of seemingly incompatible directives (e.g., writings exhort the work of faith alone, and also faith that is evident through works). Second, the cultural and historical gaps between the context of scripture and the present-day context may render aspects of the text inapplicable. In the New Testament

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[42] Hayes and Holladay, *Biblical Exegesis,* Third Edition, 5–12.

[43] Wolterstorff also includes a fourth point, "(4) The dispute may be grounded in disagreement as to which specific moral imperatives ought to be followed, in the light of…that social ethics which is most faithful to what is authoritative for us in what the Bible says." Wolterstorff, "The Bible and Economics," 14. I do not include this point as it is generally concerned with specific acts called for in specific circumstances, which I find to be a rather unreasonable expectation to impose upon the text in light of the vast differences between the material world of the text and that of modern readers.

[44] Wolterstorff, 14.

scriptures, with which the present research is concerned, this often includes making implicit reference to the traditions and scriptures of the Old Testament, which for technological and theological reasons have been superseded (e.g., references to rites of purification or ritual sacrifice at community temples). Third, the world view of the authors of scripture differs significantly from the modern world view and requires discernment to understand (e.g., belief in angels and demons). Though all scripture is understood to be "inspired by God and…useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness,"[45] because of the distinctiveness of the first century New Testament context within which the books were composed, some scripture is possessed of authority for belief and practice today that other texts do not possess. Thus, Wolterstorff writes of the importance of distinguishing between "what one might call *the situated biblical ethic* (or ethics), and *the authoritative biblical ethic* (authoritative for *us*, that is)."[46]

Wolterstorff's third point raises the issue of how the authoritative texts are to be constructed into an ethics. Here, as well, simple direct application of what has been deemed authoritative has limitations, most particularly in that the text does not speak directly to issues of modern life (e.g., the ethics of marriage to an artificially intelligent robot, or sharing of digital information by students outside of customary channels). An ethics must be drawn from and constructed out of the biblical text, therefore.

2.2.1.2. Why Exegesis Matters to this Project

The exegetical task is of significance to this research. First, the research re-visions the authoritativeness of the texts under consideration. Traditionally, when the texts under consideration, which relate to non-violence are examined, they are construed as supremely authoritative for belief and practice of the Christian. While the authority of the texts is not questioned by this research, the rationale for the text's authority, or the broader meaning of the texts within the corpus, is challenged. Second, the ethics that is constructed around the texts that seemingly point to directives of non-violent conduct, is also challenged. The challenge will include reference to the historical social context within which the discourse of non-violence has arisen.

2.2.1.3. Limits of the Study

The exegesis that follows constitutes an overview and sketch of the scholarship related to the passages under consideration. Specialists in the field of biblical studies will almost certainly be left wanting greater exegetical engagement, however such engagement would overwhelm the overall

[45] See, 2 Timothy 3:16.
[46] Wolterstorff, "The Bible and Economics," 14 (emphasis in orig.).

project. This section is intended to provide an introduction to a new paradigm (honour/shame) for scriptural interpretation of non-violence themes. It is meant to demonstrate the viability and ideological shift that is possible if the honour/shame paradigm is applied to texts traditionally understood to relate to nonviolence. The study is bound to intrigue, raise questions, and elicit a desire for greater engagement. However, such engagement must be postponed. In-depth biblical exegesis is an avenue for further research that has great potential for the future.

2.2.1.1. Exegetical Approaches

There are many different methods of performing exegesis of the biblical text. These include tradition-based methods, historical methods, literary methods, ideological criticism methods, and social-scientific methods, among others. The approach of this paper will be to utilize the historical-critical method, the narrative critical method, the social-scientific method, as well as ideological criticism methods offered through the lens of post-colonial criticism and Black theological traditions.

2.2.1.1.1. Historical-Critical Method

As a reaction against the dogmatic reading of scripture, theologians of the Enlightenment period of the mid-nineteenth century began to study the bible with the intent of discovering more than doctrinal formulations of substantiations of the faith. Rather they sought to uncover objective data that might establish what actually happened in the text, and/or what the author of the book intended to communicate through the writing that was produced.[47] The focus on "what the author intended" of the historical-critical method "established parameters for the Bible to be used in nondogmatic, nondevotional ways."[48]

The historical-critical method includes a range of tasks, beginning with textual criticism. Textual criticism assesses the variations found in extant copied manuscripts as a means of reconstructing the lost original documents.[49] This method attempts to get as close as possible to original text and, thus, the original meanings of the authors. However, the method has been lately criticized as a means of discerning the meaning of texts, since interpretation, or meaning making, requires more than formulaic criteria. Because external empirical evidence such as age and provenance

[47] Mark Allan Powell, ed., *Methods for Matthew*, 1 edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 5.

[48] Powell, 6.

[49] Clare K. Rothschild, "Historical Criticism," in *Methods for Luke*, ed. Joel B. Green (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10–11.

of manuscripts are imperfect conveyors of the history of the texts and their relationships to one another,[50] artful skills are required to aid interpretation. As Epps describes, these involve using

> …judgment in selecting the reading that best explains all others in a variation unit; interpretive dexterity in showing a reading's conformity to a writing's style or theology or a reading's derivation from an extraneous context; and the adroitness and sensitivity to explain how a reading has been formed or altered by church-historical pressures.[51]

Thus, textual interpretation is both art and science and may not be confined to mere identification of manuscript authenticity or cohesion.

Another task of the historical-critical method is that of source criticism. Going further than identification of manuscript integrity, source-criticism analyses the written sources of the texts examined by textual-critics.[52] It is source criticism that devised that the synoptic gospels are related, and that attempts to argue for one gospel text's reliance upon another, such s Matthew and Luke relying upon Mark. In addition to source-criticism, form-criticism is used within the historical-critical method. Form-criticism acknowledges the fact that oral tradition plays as important a role in the formation of what later became written text. Form-criticism analyses small units of the written text and attempts to trace the smaller units to historical contexts, or "settings in life," in which the forms could be observed prior to being reduced to writing.[53] Drawing together the work of both source-criticism (written) and form-criticism (oral) traditions, is the task of redaction criticism. Redaction criticism investigates the ways that New Testament authors mixed and edited source material to create their own accounts. "The changes made to their sources in both style and emphasis reveal a redactor's prejudices and predilections,"[54] providing information about the redactor as well as the document itself. Rhetorical criticism may be said to go a step beyond redaction criticism, in that "it takes the text as we have it, whether the work of a single actor or the product of editing, and looks at it from the point of view of the author's or editor's intent."[55] Rhetorical criticism analyses the ways that New Testament authors employed standard conventions of discourse to persuade an audience to believe.[56] All of these methods

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[50] Eldon Jay Epp, *Junia: The First Woman Apostle* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 12.
[51] Epp, 12.
[52] See, Rothschild, "Historical Criticism," 15–20.
[53] See, Rothschild, 20–22.
[54] Rothschild, 22–23.
[55] George A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism*, First Edition edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 4.
[56] See, Kennedy, 4–7.

combine to allow scholars to attempt to formulate what a text says and what the author of the text intended to say.

The historical-critical method is employed as the first task of the exegesis of the passages studied. For both the gospels of Matthew and Luke, and also the book of Revelation, a necessarily brief historical-critical overview is presented. The overview includes a summary of the scholarship concerning the source, dating, authorship, redaction, and reception of each book. In this way, the study begins by aiming to get at, what the text is and where it comes from.

2.2.1.1.2. Literary Criticism and Narrative Criticism

In the 1980s an analytical shift occurred in biblical studies. Scholars moved away from authorial intent of the historical-critical method, and toward a focus on the literary qualities of the text itself.[57] Language and structure took precedence over concerns about the social-historical world of the text.[58] Narrative criticism emphasized receiving the stories of the bible as stories. Questions about the narreative should be posed as with other narrative texts:

> What are the roles of characters and characterization in biblical narrative? How are scenes composed? What is the significance of repetition in the narrative texts of the Bible? What does the narrator tell the reader and what information is withheld?[59]

The unity of the final text and the power of the narrative to shape the audience were made the key emphases in narrative criticism. Reading the final compositions as a whole, rather than analysing or reading them in small sections, was an innovation. However, the emphasis upon the final composition of the text does not mean that the text may be apprehended as a "sealed container of meaning."[60] The Gospels and Acts are narratives within narratives, they include prominently external historical referents, they anticipated that there would be an effect from the writing and reading of the narratives, and they required audience response for meaning-making.[61] In short, the narratives cannot be construed as self-contained in meaning because the narratives themselves, reach beyond themselves in their composition.

Narrative compositions contain diverse elements that make them narratives. Such elements of the narrative may consist of some or all of the following:[62] 1) a sequence of events; 2) scene and

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[57] Powell, *Methods for Matthew*, 6.

[58] Joel B. Green, "Narrative Criticism," in *Methods for Luke*, ed. Joel B. Green (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75.

[59] Green, 76.

[60] Green, 82.

[61] For greter detail, see, Green, 82–92.

[62] See, Green, 95–98.

staging, the place where the action occurs; 3) time and the flow of time; 4) characterization, what we are told or shown about the persons in the story; 5) perspective—the narrator or character's point of view about what is occurring; 6) insider information, such as when the narrator reveals to the audience what the characters do not know or understand; and 7) intertextuality, which refers to "the presence of quotations, allusions, and echoes of Israel's Scriptures" in the text of the Gospels and Acts.[63] The acknowledgement of elements such as this is not meant to be absolutely methodical or exhaustive. Rather, the goal is to identify recurring elements of narratives that aid in the close reading of the text.

In this project literary analysis, and narrative criticism, are used as a second stage of exegetical inquiry, after historical-critical analysis is completed. In some instances, literary analysis accompanies social-scientific criticism of the text under consideration. The goal of the second stage of exegesis is to further present, the narrative meaning of the texts. In this section of the exegesis I seek to emphasise not the construction of the texts, but in the most "objective" manner possible, to discern the bedrock meaning of what the says, or what the author of the book attempted to communicate through its writing.

2.2.1.1.3. Social-Scientific Criticism Method

The goals of social-scientific criticism methods of biblical study are historical, in that they seek to understand the world that produced the texts under analysis.[64] They go beyond attempts to understand what the New Testament author intended and seek "seek to understand the values, institutions, social systems, and interconnected relationships that are intrinsic to the New Testament world."[65] It does this by referencing the models of social science disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, archaeology, etc. Social scientific models attempt to simplify and systematize data. "Models of social phenomena such as kinship and family, honour and shame, patronage and clientage, collectivism, social status, limited good, evil eye, purity and pollution, ritual, gender and sexuality, landscape and spatiality, ancient economies, healing and health, and social memory permit the careful examination of these issues in biblical texts in socially significant ways." Additionally, social-scientific criticism is interested in the *explanation* of social facts, and not merely their observation of description.[66] Powell explains that those using social-scientific criticism often attempt to "bridge the cultural distance between themselves and the Gospel so that they will understand it on its own terms.

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[63] Green, 98.
[64] Powell, *Methods for Matthew*, 9.
[65] Powell, 9.
66 John H. Elliott, "From Social Description to Social-Scientific Criticism. The History of a Society of Biblical Literature Section 1973—2005," *Biblical Theology Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture* 38, no. 1 (February 2008): 5.

The means…often involve comparative analysis of societies similar to those that formed contexts for Jesus and for the author of [the Gospels]."[67]

The social-scientific method is employed to explore the ways that models of honor/shame and collectivism, particularly when combined with Black and post-colonial readings of scripture, offer new insight into the emphasis that the Gospel writers placed upon honor/shame and upon equipping the marginalized to flourish in the hostile environments that they faced.

2.2.1.1.4. Black and Postcolonial Hermeneutics

Both Black Theology and Postcolonial theology share a liberative ethos and a concern for those oppressed by dominant culture. Black Theology emphasizes the oppression of Black persons based upon race, while post-colonial theology is concerned with the oppression of those whose land was formerly colonized by Western nations, particularly the formerly colonized in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Both postcolonial and Black theologies privilege the viewpoint of those who have been subordinated and dominated by those with social, political, and imperial power.[68]

Methodologically there are also similarities. Biblical postcolonial criticism interrogates colonial ideology. It seeks, first, to uncover the ways in which "colonial intentions and assumptions informed and influenced the production of the texts."[69] Second, it uses an intersectional analysis[70] to re-read biblical texts "from the perspective of postcolonial concerns such as liberation struggles of the past and present."[71] Third, it draws attention to normative (colonial) interpretations that "(re)inscribe the notion of a mystical, irrational, stagnant Orient pitched against a progressive, rational and secular Occident."[72] The objective of postcolonial criticism is to speak the truth to the powerful, but also to awaken the poor and marginalized to the truth about the powerful.[73]

These postcolonial criticism emphases align with the tasks of Black Theology.[74] Black theology arises out of the lived experiences of Black persons under conditions of anti-black racism. It insists upon Jesus's solidarity with the poor and oppressed; and gives hermeneutical privilege to

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[67] Powell, *Methods for Matthew*, 9.

[68] Powell, 10.

[69] R S. (Rasiah S) Sugirtharajah, "A Brief Memorandum on Postcolonialism and Biblical Studies," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 73 (March 1999): 4.

[70] E.g., Musa Dube's exegetical work on Exodus and the conquest narratives, as well as the Matthean narrative of Jesus's encounter with the Canaanite woman, are grounded in her specific social location as a Botswanan, Black, African, female. She puts forth a strong critique of Euro-Amerian feminist interpretations and calls for the reading of scripture by "ordinary" women of African Independent churches. See, Musa W. Dube, *Postcolonial Feminist Interpretation of the Bible* (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2012).

[71] Sugirtharajah, "A Brief Memorandum on Postcolonialism and Biblical Studies," 5.

[72] Sugirtharajah, 5.

[73] Sugirtharajah, 5.

[74] The genealogy of the Black theological tradition is presented in Part 3 of the research, *infra*.

Jesus's mission of liberation of the oppressed in the material world, and not merely in the spiritual sense. Black theology relies upon scripture, upon the creative arts (fiction, plays, essays, etc.) and upon direct lived experience as epistemological sources. The goal of Black theology is to center the experiences of Black persons and to annunciate the elevated place of concern that God has for Black people, as well as God's concern for the conditions in which Black people live.

Black and Postcolonial theology is employed in in Part 3 of the exegesis of this research. Such a reading, combined with the social-scientific critical method, seeks to center the experience of the marginalized first century audience of the Gospel accounts, as well as to draw from the contemporary life conditions of postcolonial and Black marginalized persons to gain insight into the condition of the first century marginalized.

2.2.2. Presuppositions of Exegesis

While this project does undertake exegesis of four individual texts, it is possible to observe various characteristics related to interpretation that are relevant to all the texts under consideration.

2.2.2.1. Gospels are Highly Contextual

As scholars have noted, it is important to place the texts of scripture in the context in which they were written. As far as it is possible, we must enter the world that existed at the time the text was written if we hope to understand the written and also the "hidden" texts of scripture as they are presented to us.[75] Because of the historical and cultural gaps that exist between our lives in industrialized and technologized society and the agrarian world of the New Testament, consistent effort is required to appreciate the distinctions of the ancient period of first century Palestine. As Malina and Rohrbaugh point out, if the text's reader and writer come from alien social systems, "then…nonunderstanding, or at best misunderstanding, will be the rule. Because this is so, understanding the range of meanings that would have been plausible to a first-century reader of the Synoptic Gospels requires the contemporary reader to seek access to the social system(s) available to the original audience."[76]

To that end, the general suppositions as to the social purpose and function of the Gospel accounts and the ancient context warrant identification. There are numerous suppositions that might be listed,[77] three will be highlighted here. First, the Gospels were written to an in-group; they were

[75] Bruce J. Malina and Richard L. Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, Second (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003), 9–11.

[76] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 13.

[77] See, Malina and Rohrbaugh, 15–18.

written to address a particular set of circumstances ("They were not written for all people of all times.").[78] This means that, though we read them and extract near universal relevance from texts, they were not intended to be so regarded. The specifics of the setting must be kept in mind. Second, the Gospels were written to help an in-group to make sense of their current experiences, not as proselytizing tools.[79] This means that, though the mission of the church may have included the spread of the "Gospel" or "good news," the Gospel in the first century was not the dissemination of what came to be the text of scripture. The good news was the testimony of Jesus, which was orally transmitted. The Gospels were narrative accounts of Jesus's life written to specific communities facing specific challenges. Third, the Gospels were written for third-generation Jesus-followers to communicate the experiences of the first generation of followers. "The Gospels tell of what Jesus said and did in a way relevant to third-generation Jesus group members. Second-generation writers such as Paul or James or Peter say almost nothing about what Jesus said and did."[80] The Gospels were intended to describe Jesus in a way that was relevant to particular communities of followers. Different aspects of Jesus's personhood and teaching were emphasized to different communities by each of the Gospel writers.

2.2.2.2. Gospels Embedded in Honour-Shame Context

Additional context is gleaned by accouting for the dynamic of honour/shame in first century Roman culture. It is of great significance to the exegesis of our texts, thus, will be consiered here at length.

The concept of honour/shame is fundamental to the Roman-Palestinian context of the Gospels. In the context of Roman antiquity, "[c]oncern for honour permeate[d] every aspect of public life...Honour [w]as the fundamental value."[81,] Honour was one's public reputation.[82] It was not only one's status in the community but the community's *recognition* of that status.[83] Such recognition was inconsistent, and was determined within a culture of perpetual community evaluation. The social evaluation performed as a kind of social control.[84] Honour became, then, "public acknowledgement of one's worth or social value."[85]

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[78] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 15.
[79] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 16.
[80] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 17.
[81] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 369.
[82] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 370.
[83] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 370.
[84] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 370.
[85] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 371.

> Honour determine[d] dress, mannerisms, gestures, vocation, posture, who [could] eat with whom, who [sat] at what places at a meal, who [could] open a conversation, who ha[d] the right to speak, and who [was] accorded an audience. It serve[d] as the prime indicator of social place (precedence) and provide[d] the essential map for persons to interact with superiors, inferiors, and equals in socially prescribed or appropriate ways.[86]

Thus, honour, which was determined by communal assessment, assigned and proscribed nearly all facets of the ways in which one experienced life on a daily basis. One could be *ascribed* honour or could *acquire* honour by one's actions.

2.2.2.2.1. Ascribed Honour

Ascribed honour was imputed due to one being born to an honourable social position. The concept of *dignitas* is an example of ascribed honour. *Dignitas* originates from ancient Roman notions of rank and virtue. It is a quality descriptive of persons at the highest levels in the social order, as well as the comportment or such individuals.[87] *Dignitas* was related to a man's reputation and standing, and was of "overwhelming importance."[88] *Dignitas* was not, and could not be possessed by everyone, lest *dignitas* lose its distinction.[89] Dignitas was also possible to lose, depending upon one's conduct in society, as Cicero wrote of his loss and struggle to regain his *dignitas*.[90] The average inhabitant of Rome may not have possessed *dignitas*, however he or she might have been ascribed a degree of honour based upon their family connections or position.

Another ascription of honour was through being regarded, ironically, as having positive shame. To have shame in the positive, favourable, sense was to have "sensitivity about one's reputation, sensitivity to the opinions of others."[91] To lack positive shame, on the other hand, was to be considered shameless. To be shameless was to be a "person with a dishonourable reputation beyond all social doubt, one outside the boundaries of acceptable moral life, hence a person who must be denied the normal moral courtesies."[92] Some, such as "prostitutes, innkeepers, and actors, among others,"[93] were irredeemably without honour. Such persons were deemed "shameless," in an absolute manner.[94] Thus,

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[86] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 370.

[87] John Kleinig and Nicholas G. Evans, "Human Flourishing, Human Dignity, and Human Rights.," *Law and Philosophy* 32, no. 5 (September 7, 2012): 549.

[88] J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Auctoritas, Dignitas, Otium," *The Classical Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (1960): 45.

[89] Kleinig and Evans, "Human Flourishing, Human Dignity, and Human Rights.," 549.

[90] See, J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Auctoritas, Dignitas, Otium," 46.

[91] Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology 3rd Edition*, Revised, Expand edition (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), p. 49.

[92] Malina, p. 49.

[93] Malina and Rohrbaugh, p. 372.

[94] Malina and Rohrbaugh, pp. 371–72.

again, though not explicitly recognized as an ascription of honour, the possession of positive shame functioned in exactly this way.

2.2.2.2.2. Achieved Honour

In addition to being ascribed, honour might also be *achieved*, meaning, either gained (or lost) through public success (or failure). The negotiation of honour was typically conducted through community enactments of the "challenge-riposte."

2.2.2.2.2.1. Challenge-Riposte

Challenge-Riposte was a competitive means of attaining the elusive currency of honour in the first-century Roman-Palestinian context. It was a central and public act which consisted of one person issuing a challenge to the honour of another person, and the other person answering in a way that preserved their own honour and/or issuing a greater challenge to the first person.

Challenge-riposte was pervasive and ruled many aspects of life.[95] According to Malina, whose articulation of the model of honour/shame has gained standard acceptance,[96] there are several aspects that make up the pervasive and agonistic[97] challenge-riposte culture. First, "nearly every interaction with non-family members has undertones of a challenge to honour."[98] This was due to a general consciousness and hyper-sensitivity to exchanges carrying the potential diminish one's honour.[99] Second, the mechanics of the challenge-riposte must occur: someone says or does something to someone; a decision is made by the individual (based on the public's standards) as to whether a challenge is occurring; if there is a challenge, a riposte must follow; finally, the "public court of reputation" must then evaluate the outcome of the exchange and either grant honour or grant shame.[100] Third, contests for honour only occur among those of equal social rank. "A challenge to an inferior brings shame and humiliation to the challenger. Likewise, when a challenge is issued it is accepted only if one considers the challenger worthy of respect."[101] Fourth, honour/same standards differ

[95] Moxnes, p. 21.

[96] Malina's construction of honor/shame has faced criticism, however, as Crook has noted, it has "stood the test of time" and been highly beneficial to the field of study. For critics and response to critique, see, Zeba Crook, 'Honor, Shame, and Social Status Revisited', *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 128.3 (2009), 591–611..

[97] Because honour was regarded as a limited good not available to everyone (Malina, p. 33), while the quest for honour was high, the culture's use of contests of honour to secure the limited good of honour, is regarded as "agonistic." (Moxnes, p. 21).

[98] Malina, p. 33.

[99] Crook, p. 593.

[100] Malina, pp. 33–39.

[101] Moxnes, pp. 20–21.

according to gender. "[W]hat you ought to do and what others ought to do for you are determined by the social group and entail different obligations and entitlements depending upon gender.[102]

2.2.2.2.2.1. Symbolic Representations of Honour/Shame

As da Silva has established, in addition to conceiving honour/shame in terms of ascription and achievement, the culture of honour is also mediated through symbolization of the physical body, and the "name" or reputation of the person. Placing a crown on the head of the king, and slapping the face of the prisoner, are examples of honour and dishonour being mediated through the body's treatment.[103] Placing a king on a raised throne, throwing enemies at the feet of the victor, and seating arrangements in a social gathering, such as being seated at the "right hand" of the king, are examples of the placement of bodies as communicative of honour/dishonour.[104] Garments, such as white robes, are also used to communicate the honour of the one wearing the garment.[105] The "name" is also a site of symbolic honour. Thus, "[p]raising or "sanctifying" God's name or making God's name "known" are expressions for giving God honour or spreading God's honour."[106] While speaking ill of God's name, blaspheming, is to dishonour God.

2.2.2.2.2.1. Crucifixion and Honour-Shame

Crucifixion was the ultimate in shame. Neyrey and Malina describe the inherent shame of crucifixion as being the punishment of those without honour, such as criminals and slaves.[107] It was also shameful due to the "progressive public humiliation"[108] involved in the process of crucifixion, including powerlessness, the removal of clothing, thus, nakedness, and abuse of the body.

2.2.2.2.3. Early Christian Community and Honour/Shame

For the Jewish community generally, there existed tension between the civic duty to participate in Roman practices deemed honourable by the polis, and the duty to be loyal to Jewish culture, and the Jewish customs and traditions that were deemed dishonourable in larger Roman society.[109] This tension only increased for those Jews, and later Greeks, who embraced the testimony of Jesus. To

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[102] Malina, pp. 29–30.

[103] David A. daSilva, *Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture* (Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Academic, 2000), 31.

[104] daSilva, 31.

[105] daSilva, 32.

[106] daSilva, 32.

[107] Jerome H. Neyrey, ed., *The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation* (Grand Rapids, MI: Hendrickson Publishers, 1991), 139.

[108] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 346; Neyrey, *The Social World of Luke-Acts*, 139.

[109] daSilva, pp. 38–40.

manage this tension, minority groups utilized a strategy for maintaining honour despite the lack of honour that one was able to acquire in the broader culture.

DaSilva demonstrates that the strategy for minority-groups involved three components. First, there is the fencing of the minority group's "court of reputation." The minority in-group focuses their attention "toward one another, toward their leaders, and very frequently, toward beings beyond the visible sphere ([e.g.,] God or the honoured members the group who have moved to another realm after death.)"[110] The goal was to frame the larger out-group as the "deviant body" that is out of line with the cosmic order. Second, in addition to controlling the conception of the public court of reputation for determinations of honour, the minority in-group also sought to control the *in-group* conception of honour. Thus, there is regular articulation *to* the in-group and *for* the in-group the reasons "why the approval or disapproval of outsiders does not matter to the members of the group and why it is no reflection of the group members' true honour and worth."[111] The hostility and scorn of the out-group is re-interpreted in a positive light for the in-group. "Rather than being felt as a demeaning, degrading experience, society's assaults on the group can become an opportunity to show courage or to demonstrate a person's loyalty to God, or to have his or her moral faculty exercised and strengthened."[112] The goal is to minimize the in-group's self-perception of dishonour. The third strategy employed, is for the in-group to use considerations of honour/shame to enforce proper in-group behaviour.[113] The group is encouraged to do one set of things, and to refrain from another set of things, so that they can either receive or avoid the respective honour or disgrace that results from their actions. Models of behaviour are established. "Some figures are held up as praiseworthy, with the expectation that hearers will be led to emulate that figure in the hope of being recognized themselves as praiseworthy."[114] Others were held up to serve as bad examples who should not be emulated.

For the Christian minority in-group in first century Roman-Palestine the challenges to honour were distinct. They were challenged to repudiate the gods, the lifestyle, and the world order of the context in which they lived. Additionally, they were charged to repudiate tenets of the Jewish religion and to abandon many Jewish cultural, and cultic, practices. Instead they were to hold onto the testimony of Jesus, and the belief that Jesus would return, would put an end to the rulers of the day, and would establish his own kingdom.[115]

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[110] daSilva, p. 40.
[111] daSilva, p. 40.
[112] daSilva, p. 41.
[113] daSilva, pp. 40–41.
[114] daSilva, p. 41.
[115] daSilva, p. 48.

The turn from the majority culture's belief system placed the Christians under significant threat of dishonour. Thus, the above strategies of reclaiming honour were employed. The court of reputation was fenced by early Church leaders and New Testament authors. The writers of the New Testament were "careful continually to point the members of the Christian group away from the opinion that non-Christians might form of them toward the opinion of those who would reflect the values of the group"[116]—the sole proper court of reputation for the Christians. Second, the Church leaders and New Testament authors shaped the new church's conception of honour/shame by focusing the church on God's opinion of what is honourable or shameful. The opinion of God was the most central to the Christian acquisition of honour. It was God who had the ultimate "stamp of approval" or disapproval, and God's determination would be made on the Day of Judgment.[117] "Believers are instructed to live for God's approval rather than human approval…They are to seek God's approval by their pious actions…rather than engage in these actions for the sake of human approval."[118] In addition to prayer, direct Spiritual communication, and the Hebrew scriptures, the means of knowing God's opinion of what was honourable was the affirmation of the community of believers. There was in-group reinforcement and "kinship-like" in-group commitments (including the sharing of resources) to foster solidarity; to make the in-group, rather than the broader society, the source of determinations of what was honourable and of how to attain honour. "One's fellow believers [were] the most visible and, in many senses, the most available reflection of God's estimation of the individual, and so the New Testament authors are concerned with building up a strong community of faith that will reinforce individual commitment to the group."[119] In addition to being attentive to the honourable, church leaders also emphasized the dishonour and shamelessness of outsiders. Outsiders' dishonour is found in their ignorance and inability to understand what is valuable and worthy, as well as in their dishonourable conduct, including idolatry, and vice.[120]

Finally, the New Testament church used honour/shame to enforce proper in-group behaviour. What was stressed was the special place of honour in God's eyes that the Christian enjoyed. Theirs was honour that allowed them to approach God directly in holiness and with confidence. Christians were assured that they are invited to become God's own people, adopted into God's own family, made a part of God's own household, sharing in Christ's honour.[121] Also, just as leaders "held up certain

[116] daSilva, p. 55.
[117] daSilva, p. 56.
[118] daSilva, p. 57.
[119] daSilva, p. 59.
[120] daSilva, pp. 61–65.
[121] See, 1 Peter 2:5, 9-10; John 1:12-13; Rom 8:14-17; Heb 2:10, 3:1-6, 14; 1 Peter 1:23; Rev. 1:5-6; 5:9.

believers to be honoured and shamed others, …[they] encouraged the churches themselves to create a dynamic social environment in which honouring and shaming actively supported the group's values and reinforced individual commitment to honour those values."[122] An ethos of self-regulated accountability within the in-group was meant to maintain the community.[123]

What is clear is that the New Testament church employed strategies of honour/shame, including reconfiguring the public court of reputation, in-group narration of Christian honour and non-Christian dishonour, and modeling of desireable Christian behavior, in order to combat negative shaming assessments in the larger culture, and to further the new Christians' group formation.

2.3. Exegesis of Selected Texts

A thorough exegesis of multiple passages of scripture could easily merit a full dissertation length project. Because of the constraints of this project, an abbreviated exegesis will be performed. Since the project interrogates the normativity of the concept of non-violence in the Christian tradition, texts were selected with the intent of engaging instances that have been construed as evidence of a non-violence ethic promoted by Jesus at different periods of Jesus's life. Thus, while it would have been fairly easy to draw several examples of teachings related to non-violence from Jesus's Sermon on the Mount, or from Jesus's arrest and Crucifixion, in themselves, the project sought to take a more comprehensive look at Jesus's life and teachings.

The reason for this is that challenging the *manner of thinking* about the way that texts are comprehended, rather than the specifics of the texts themselves, is the chief aim of the exegesis. My aim is to introduce a way of seeing scripture in its entirety, in such a way that the notion of non-violence is questioned. In this way the concept of non-violence, or non-physical violence, which allows for devastating violence in the lives of marginalized Others, might be deconstructed to unmask the violence that is always already present, and to point to the ways that Jesus is always at work against invisible violences that violate the marginalized. Thus, the choice of texts at different points in Jesus's life, to investigate his patterns of behaviour with respect to non-violence, was more important than addressing exhaustively the myriad texts that might be seen as depicting Jesus promoting non-violence.

One exemplary scripture relating to Jesus's life was selected (from the Sermon on the Mount). One exemplary scripture relating to Jesus's death was selected (one of the seven sayings from the

[122] daSilva, pp. 79–80.
[123] daSilva, pp. 82–83.

cross). Then, as a means of acknowledging the centrality to the Gospels of Jesus's living and of his dying, one scripture was selected that depicts Jesus's actions while living on his way to his death (from the arrest in Gethsemane). The final scripture was selected as representative of a non-violence ethics as part of Jesus's resurrected life (from a heavenly vision in John's Revelation). The passages to be considered are: Matthew 5:38-40, relating to the Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 26:52, relating to Jesus's arrest, Luke 23:34, relating to Jesus on the Cross, and Revelation 6: 9-11, relating to the heavenly vision.

As is clear, the passages selected do not relate to instances of physical violence in the Gospels. Rather, the choice was made to focus on texts that have tend to be used to support claims of nonviolence in the Gospels. This choice was made, first, because there is a range of New Testament scholarship that addresses the ambivalence of scripture with respect to Jesus's acts of, and acceptance of the use of, physical violence in scripture.[124] With abbreviated space for exegesis as part of this study, I chose to engage different texts, those that related to non-violence. Which points to the second reason for the choice of texts made. The conception of Jesus as primarily a non-violent figure is often not a result of overlooked texts related to acts of physical violence performed by Jesus, though these are often neglected or regarded as anomalous.[125] The modern church desires to maintain the image of Jesus as a non-violent figure, and supports that desire by rooting the conception of Jesus in the depictions of scripture that portray Jesus as refraining from acts of physical violence, or as counselling his disciples to refrain from acts of physical violence. The normative, and desired, conception, as Hays has voiced so adroitly, is that the non-violent witness of the New Testament "is powerful, virtually univocal, and integrally related to the central moral vision of the New Testament texts."[126] The responsive argument that is in want, then, is not one that highlights that acceptance of physical violence is present in the text's presentation of the life and teachings of Jesus. Rather, the needed argument is one that

[124] See, e.g., Michel Desjardins, *Peace, Violence and the New Testament* (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997); Pieter G.R. de Villiers and Jan Willem van Henten, *Coping with Violence in the New Testament* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Pieter G.R. de Villiers, "The Violence of Nonviolence in the Revelation of John," *Open Theology* 1, no. 1 (2015); Philip L. Tite, *Conceiving Peace and Violence : A New Testament Legacy* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004); Jeremy Punt, "Violence in the New Testament and the Roman Empire: Ambivalence, Othering, Agency," *HTS Theological Studies* 64, no. 4 (December 2008): 1633–51; Jeremy Punt, "Empire, Messiah And Violence: A Contemporary View," *Scriptura: International Journal of Bible, Religion and Theology in Southern Africa* 80 (2002): 259–74; Nigel Biggar, "Specify and Distinguish! Interpreting the New Testament on `Non-Violence'," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 22, no. 2 (2009): 164–84; Nigel Biggar, "The New Testament and Violence: Round Two," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 23, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 73–80.

[125] See, e.g., Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament*, 337"the place of the soldier within the church can only be seen as anomalous."

[126] Hays, *Moral Vision*, 315.

interrogates the conception of the non-violence of Jesus and of the text. For these reasons my choice of texts are those that are normatively read as evidence of Jesus's non-violence.

2.3.1. Jesus's Life: The Sermon on the Mount

The passage reviewed is found in Matthew's Gospel (5:38-40) and describes the period of Jesus's ministry during his lifetime on earth. The narrative depicts Jesus teaching on a mountainside during the day to a crowd that includes his disciples.

2.3.1.1. Text

Matt 5:38-40:

38 "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' 39 But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; 40 and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well;

2.3.1.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis of the Gospel of Matthew

Matthew is the first book of the New Testament, and the first recorded Gospel account. The Gospel is written in the form of historical narrative.[127] This portion of the exegesis will undertake a historical-critical analysis of the text, before engaging in narrative criticism and ending with ideological criticism.

2.3.1.2.1. Source and Dating

Stories of Jesus were retold orally before being written as letters.[128] Matthew is generally understood to have used two sources in the composition of his Gospel, Mark and Q.[129] Keener states that the sources on which Matthew relies preserve a "substantially reliable picture of Jesus;" that the tradition transmitted events carefully, with relative stability, and "quite close in time to the events described." Matthew was produced after the Jewish War, the destruction of the Temple and the break

[127] There is wide disagreement on the genre of Matthew beyond merely narrative. See, Donald A. Hagner, *The New Testament: A Historical and Theological Introduction* (Baker Books, 2012), pp. 211–12.

[128] Craig S. Keener, *The Gospel of Matthew: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2009), p. 11.

[129] There is disagreement however. Some argue that Matthew preceded Mark in dating. See, Malcolm F Lowe, "The Demise of Arguments from Order for Markan Priority," *Novum Testamentum* 24, no. 1 (January 1982): 27–36, and see also, Malcolm Lowe and David Flusser, "Evidence Corroborating a Modified Proto-Matthean Synoptic Theory," *New Testament Studies* 29, no. 1 (January 1983): 25–47, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688500011097.

with Judaism.[130] This dates the book to 85-90 CE.[131] Q is dated to the 40s, which is within two decades of Gospel events, thus Keener's assumption of a high degree of reliability.[132]

2.3.1.2.2. Authorship and Redaction

Early church tradition names the apostle Matthew as the author. However, this is disputed.[133] Because of the similarities of language between this Gospel and Jewish-Christian linguistic features,[134] as well as the author's understanding of the law and use of the Old Testament,[135] it is likely that, whoever the author was, the author was a Jewish-Christian. Matthew writes as a Jewish-Christian critiquing other Jews, but not with anti-Jewish sentiment.[136] Kenner's redaction criticism[137] notes, as well, that Matthew has emphasized the Jewishness of the Jesus presented in Mark's text.[138]

2.3.1.2.3. Reception

The author of Matthew wrote to a community that was likely urban and made up of Jews and Greeks,[139] though the community cannot be located with certainty.[140] Matthew's Gospel alone refers to the *ekklēsia*,[141] by which he indicates a group of like-minded people who were an intra-Jewish groups, distinct from Gentiles, and also from other groups. Hagner adds, that Matthew was written to help new followers understand their faith as being in continuity with the faith of their ancestors.[142] It is generally agreed that the audience was primarily Jewish-Christian. Matthew's *ekklesia*, regarded Jesus as central to their faith and actions.[143] Though the Gospel is primarily written to Jewish-

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[130] Keener, p. 48 fn. 145, see also, Rudolf Schnackenburg, *The Gospel of Matthew* (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002), pp. 5–6.

[131] See also, Luz, who agrees that dating should not be put "long after 80." Ulrich Luz, *Matthew: A Commentary* (Augsburg, 1989), p. 93.

[132] Keener, p. 9.

[133] Though the claim of authorship by the apostle Matthew was early and is undisputed in the early church tradition, there is a discrepancy as to whether Matthew was the tax-collecting apostle, or whether Levi was, since Mark and Luke name the tax collector as Levi. Thus, because it is possible that Matthew was not the tax collector-apostle, it is disputed that the Matthew who authored the Gospel is the apostle. Since Matthew was not the most likely author, e.g., Peter, Andrew or Thomas might have been more likely, many scholars accept that traditional authorship by Matthew, might equate to editing by Matthew's disciples. See, Keener, pp. 39–40.

[134] Luz, p. 80.

[135] Luz, p. 81.

[136] Luz, p. 81.

[137] Further comment on redaction is included in the literary analysis, *supra*.

[138] Keener, p. 13.

[139] Schnackenburg, p. 5.

[140] Keener, p. 5.

[141] See, Schnackenburg, p. 7-8, who notes that Matthew's *ekklesia* is "essential to Matthew's concept of salvation history: the new people of God is most intimately bound up with the Messiah."

[142] Hagner, p. 212.

[143] Wilhelmus Johannes Cornelis Weren, *Studies in Matthew's Gospel: Literary Design, Intertextuality, and Social Setting*, Biblical Interpretation Series (Leiden: Brill, 2014), CXXX, p. 223.

Christians, Luz and Keener agree that the Gentile Mission was central to Matthew's Gospel. Matthew portrays Jesus as the supreme teacher who directs his disciples to propagate widely.

Overall, the purpose of Matthew's Gospel is to communicate "the fulfillment of Israel's messianic expectations in Jesus Christ, the superiority of the Gospel to the religion of the Torah…and the constitution of a new community of salvation of both Jews and non-Jews, so as to establish all believers in Christ in the church of Jesus Christ."[144]

Finally, Luz notes that action is key to this Gospel. "[T]he community is exhorted to perseverance, to faithfulness, to practice, to courageous faith."[145] This message is aptly spoken to a community that had broken, and been excluded from the Jewish community, and was attempting to create a new blended community of Jews and Gentiles.[146]

2.3.1.3. Literary and Social Scientific Analysis

2.3.1.3.1. Retribution Teaching

In the expanded passage of the Sermon, Jesus warns against legal retribution. Keener, who is concerned with the rhetoric of the passage, establishes that "Jesus is speaking the language of rhetorical overstatement,"[147] not making literal recommendations. Notably, Matthew does not provide a rationale for the teachings of Jesus in the Sermon. "Any hint which could explain these demands as prudent and reasonable is missing."[148] This supports the view that the saying is hyperbole. Understanding the language as hyperbole, rather than as literal prudent and reasonable instruction, then explains Luz's conclusion about this passage. "There is conscious provocation here; shocking symbolic protest against the regular rule of force."[149]

Commanding a higher standard of justice than an eye for an eye, Keener notes that Jesus was not critiquing contemporary Jewish standards of retributive justice,[150] which would have reflected an equalizing of the punishment and the crime. The Jewish Gospel writer of Matthew would have been familiar with the ample rabbinic teachings of the time that concerned not seeking retribution.[151] It is clear that because there were Israelite laws that were meant to serve as deterrents to illicit behaviour (cf. Deut 19:20; 21:21), and meant to provide benefit for an injured person (e.g., Ex. 21:19, 26-27), the *lex talionis* (e.g., "an eye for an eye") regulations, which did neither, were meant primarily to

[144] Schnackenburg, p. 6.
[145] Luz, p. 90.
[146] Hagner, p. 209.
[147] Keener, p. 195.
[148] Luz, p. 327.
[149] Luz, p. 327.
[150] Keener, p. 197 fn. 109.
[151] For comprehensive listing of Rabbinic teachings, see, Keener, pp. 196–97.

avenge a person's honour, "vindicating the person by punishing the assailant."[152] In the Sermon, then, Jesus was not advocating that one should not seek justice, rather that one should not seek vindication of their honour. He taught that honour from the outside community did not need to be sought preserved. This teaching is reiterated in the instruction about turning the other check.

"A backhanded blow to the check…was an insult, the severest public affront to a person's dignity."[153] Matthew adds "right" cheek, which is absent from Luke's parallel of this teaching. Malina notes that signifying the "right" is an implicit reference to Hebrew tradition that connects the "right" appendage to honor. E.g., 1 Sam 11:2: "But Nahash the Ammonite said to them, "On this condition I will make a treaty with you, namely that I gouge out everyone's right eye, and thus put disgrace upon all Israel." The context is the besieging of the territory of Jabesh-Gilead by an Ammonite ruler whose terms of peace were complete humiliation via disfigurement.[154]

Jesus taught that the insult to dignity should not be retaliated against (gone to law against), but that dignity might be demonstrated by offering to further accommodate the offender.[155] Jesus was advocating a self-respect grounded in one's status before God so that the aggreived party "can dispense with human honour."[156] For the Gospel writer, the person is to seek that God be honoured and that God honour them, rather than the honour that comes from the larger community.[157]

2.3.1.3.2. Jesus's Conduct as Exemplary

Davies and Allison point out the Gospel writer's depiction of congruence between Jesus's words in the sermon and Jesus's deeds in life, which establish that Jesus was an exemplar of his teachings. The Sermon refers to slapping, nakedness, and being requisitioned by Romans, and later in Matthew's Gospel, Jesus was slapped (26:67), his clothes were taken (27:28,35), and his cross was carried by someone requisitioned by order of Roman soldiers (27:32).[158]

Further, in using instances of turning the other cheek, giving the outer coat, and walking the extra mile indicated, Matthew's Jesus is instructing the disciples that there should be radical action in response to the one who seeks to abuse. Luz declares that these ethics are not a statement of specific rules, but of the need for radical specificity of action in daily life that is required in obedience to God.[159]

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[152] Keener, p. 197.
[153] Keener, p. 197 (citations omitted).
[154] Malina and Rohrbaugh, p. 45.
[155] Keener, pp. 197–98.
[156] Keener, p. 198.
[157] Matthew notes that honour of God and from God is what matters in 5:16 and 6:1-18 as well.
[158] Dale C. Allison and W. D. Davies, *Matthew: A Shorter Commentary* (T & T Clark International, 2004), p. 83.
[159] Luz, p. 216.

"Matthew does not define what the definitive way is for the situation of each community and every Christian, and especially not how far one is to go on that way. He only says: as far as possible, in any case further than the scribes and Pharisees (5:20)."[160] Schnackenburg notes that Matthew "is thinking especially of life in the community…and its conduct in a situation of persecution.[161]

2.3.1.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism

Based upon the scholarship reviewed, and the contextual concern for honour/shame in the ancient Roman-Palestinian context, and also based upon a reading of the text that privileges the experiences of the those living under conditions of oppression and exclusion, who subordinated and dominated by those with social, political, and imperial power, it can be concluded that the "nonresistance" that is regularly connected to this passage does not accurately reflect the passage's meaning. This is not a passage that is meant to be taken literally and that instructs hearers to invite or to accept additional abuse of themselves. Rather, the Gospel writer uses the language of rhetoric, and Jesus's words are spoken in hyperbole to depict Jesus making a shocking, even scandalous, suggestion. The shock and scandal are not the result of the extreme acts named. The acts named, turning the other cheek, giving the outer cloak, walking the extra mail, are not named as literal recommendations of acts to be performed by Jesus's hearers. Rather the acts are a randomized naming of acts, that foreshadow acts that Matthew's audience will later b shown were experienced by Jesus. The choice of acts that the gospel writer tells us that Jesus advises, correlate to the acts that Matthew tells us of Jesus's own humiliation and death. Matthew reminds his hearers that Jesus, the Lord, was struck, stripped naked, and had someone requisitioned by Roman soldiers participate in his crucifixion. Matthew looks back at Jesus, to draw examples for his contemporary hearers, to (re)aquaint them with Jesus's passion ordeal. Matthew's hearers are shown that they can allow outward humiliations and entanglements such as being slapped, stripped, and requisitioned because these things happened to the Lord. Neither Jesus, nor the requisitioned cross-bearer, were diminished by their perpetrators. Ultimately, both were vindicated by God. Matthew is communicating that, in the same way, his hearers do not have to be diminished by their perpetrators. Their honour and vindication will come from God.

Additionally, Jesus is not simply raising the standard of social interaction above the *lex talionis* standard. What Jesus teaches is not a raising of the bar, since the Jewish bar was already raised. Jesus is shifting the paradigm. First, the emphasis of the text is htat the audience not seek dignity/honour from the community, but from God. Second, the naming of specific actions is meant to indicate that

[160] Luz, p. 216.
[161] Schnackenburg, p. 61.

the radical stance that Jesus advocates is a stance that requires specific action in everyday life, not mere intellectual affirmation. Jesus is advocating that his ethics requires that one *do* things, take action, perform deeds. Along with this teaching, Jesus advocates not that retribution be forsaken and suffering embraced, but that the honour that is besmirched or degraded or lost by public humiliations not be not-resisted. In other words, though honour comes from God, dishonour by the larger community should be resisted. Ultimately, one's dignity is not a matter of social consensus, nor is the level of honour which one is due. One's dignity is a matter of self-assertion, and self-actualization based upon the fact of being beloved members of th household of God. Jesus's teaching is essentially: "If someone engages in wrongdoing to humiliate you, let them, but refuse to be humiliated by anything that anyone does to you. Instead, respond by taking an action that demonstrates that your dignity and self-worth is not determined by them, but by you; your honour comes fromGod. Respond by taking an action that demonstrates that your dignity and self-worth are not deterined by the offenders, but by God's conferral of honour upon you."

This teaching is consistent with the early Christian community's strategy, discussed above, for managing the honor/shame culture. First, the illegitimacy of the out-group's opinion of honour is asserted by the gospel writer. Next, by pointing to Jesus and the experiences of the cross the audience is meant to equate their experiences of dishonour in the larger community to Jesus's, and likewise to view themselves, like Jesus, as those upon whom honour is actually conferred. Finally, by pointing to Jesus's passion as an example, the Gospel writer was lifting up Jesus's behavior as a behavioral model to follow. The stress on the opinion of God is the strategy that was emoloyed by the gospel writer in this passage.

2.3.1.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Sermon on the Mount Text

In light of the foregoing, to rely upon this passage in Jesus's Sermon on the Mount as a foundation for modern non-violence ideology, is to misread the text. Jesus is not making a radical claim about non-violence; Jesus is making a radical claim about (dis)honour, dignity and self-respect. The goal is for the Gospel's audience to de-legitimize the culture's power to determine their honour and dignity, or their dishoniour and shame. Matthew uses the examples of turning the other cheek, giving an outer cloak, and going the second mile, in order to draw a parallel between humiliations Jesus suffered, without a loss a dignity, and those that his hearers could also embrace without fearing a loss of honour or dignity.

2.3.2. Jesus's Life/Death: The Arrest

The second passage, which portrays Jesus's arrest in the Garden of Gethsemane, reveals similar emphases.

2.3.2.1. Text

Matt 26:47-54

47 While he was still speaking, Judas, one of the twelve, arrived; with him was a large crowd with swords and clubs, from the chief priests and the elders of the people. 48 Now the betrayer had given them a sign, saying, "The one I will kiss is the man; arrest him." 49 At once he came up to Jesus and said, "Greetings, Rabbi!" and kissed him. 50 Jesus said to him, "Friend, do what you are here to do." Then they came and laid hands on Jesus and arrested him. 51 Suddenly, one of those with Jesus put his hand on his sword, drew it, and struck the slave of the high priest, cutting off his ear. 52 Then Jesus said to him, "Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword. 53 Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels? 54 But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?"

2.3.2.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis

See discussion of this topic under the previous section (2.3.1.2), in the section related to Jesus's Life and the Sermon on the Mount. Included is discussion of the source, dating, authorship, redaction, reception, and purpose of the Gospel of Matthew.

As to Redaction of the subject passage (26:47-54), all three Synoptics, and John, contain a version of the sword incident in the Garden of Gethsemane.[162] However, in Matthew's version alone does Jesus use language about calling a legion of angels. Thus, this language has special significance to the gospel writer.

2.3.2.3. Narrative Criticism

The structure of the periscope is as follows:

- Arrival of troops, encounter and words with Judas, Jesus arrested (vv.47-50)
- Drawing of sword, Jesus's reaction (vv. 51-54)
- Jesus's words to the crowd and the flight of the disciples (vv. 55-56)[163]

[162] See, Mark 14:43-50, Luke 22:47-54, John 18:1-12.
[163] This movement of the pericope will not be discussed in this mini-exegesis due to space constraints.

This structure is roughly followed in all three synoptic gospels. It is slightly varied in John's Gospel.[164]

In the first movement of the structure, the troops arrive. Evans provides the background that the high priests routinely sent armed brigades to do their bidding.[165] The swords and clubs of the troops indicate that they "expected a fight from Jesus's followers."[166]

It is notable that, following the arrival of the troops, and the greeting of Judas, Jesus's reply precedes the arrest. His reply is rendered variously as "why have you come?" (HCSB), "do what you came for" (NIV), "do what you are here to do" (NRSV), etc.[167] Bruner concludes that this greeting triggers the arrest; that it reflects the authority of Jesus in the text, which is a central theme in Matthew's gospel.[168] Evans agrees that Matthew shows that Jesus is in control, "even ordering Judas to carry out his preordained betrayal."[169] Davies and Allison comment, "[o]ne has the impression…that Jesus is really the one in charge."[170] France also concludes that the arrest marks a point in the narrative where Jesus begins to be depicted as taking the initiative until his death.[171]

In the second movement of the Gospel, it is noted that the sword-bearer was "with" Jesus (v. 51).[172] It may be concluded from this "that Jesus did have armed followers."[173] After the sword is wielded, it is curious that this Gospel does not reflect that Jesus healed the wounded man. Instead, Jesus admonishes the sword-bearer to desist. Matthew's language is unique, here.[174] Only Matthew contains the three sentences that make up vv. 52-54:[175]

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[164] In John's Gospel, there are words spoken to the crowd before the arrest, no words spoken to Judas, the arrest happens after the sword event, and there are no words spoken to the crowd after the arrest. See, John 18:1-14

[165] The hired militias were a mark of the corruption of the first century priestly classes. See, Evans, pp. 437-38.

[166] Malina and Rohrbaugh, p. 132.

[167] The variation is due to the difficulty of the Greek, which is literally "for what are you come" (ἐφ' ὃ πάρει). It requires that a missing verb be supplied by the translator. See, Frederick Dale Bruner, *Matthew: The Churchbook, Matthew 13-28*, Revised and Expanded, 2 vols (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), II, p. 669.

[168] Bruner, II, p. 669.

[169] Craig A. Evans, *Matthew*, New Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 438.

[170] William David Davies, W. D. Davies, and Dale C. Allison Jr, *Matthew: Volume 3: 19-28* (A&C Black, 1988), p. 511.

[171] R. T. France, *The Gospel of Matthew* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2007).

[172] Luke notes that the sword-bearer was "around" Jesus (Luke 22:49), while John names the sword-bearer as the apostle Simon Peter (John 18:10). Davies and Allison find it unusual that the sword-bearer was not arrested. (Davies, Davies, and Jr, p. 511.) Davies notes that the occasion of a sword-bearer without arrest is ahistorical. "[The passage] appears to have obscured historical reality. Had any of Jesus' disciples been armed and resisted Jesus' arrest, it is impossible to explain how he escaped arrest with him [Jesus] or immediate execution." (See, Margaret Davies, *Matthew* (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2009), p. 214.)

[173] Malina and Rohrbaugh, p. 132.

[174] All three Synoptics include Jesus speaking to the sword-bearer, it is the language that is used that is unique to Matthew.

[175] Bruner, II, p. 672.

- Put away your sword; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword.
- Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?
- But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?"

As Bruner points out, Jesus's words are not "throw your sword away," or "have nothing to do with the sword." This seems to evidence that Jesus accepted that there was a place for the sword.[176] Davies and Allison point out that verse 52's "Put away your sword" (Ἀπόστρεψον τὴν μάχαιράν), use of Ἀπόστρεψον recalls the Sermon on the Mount. Matthew uses the word for "put away," or "return" only in the garden scene and in the Sermon (5:42) ("[give to everyone…and] you shall not turn away from/refuse (μὴ ἀποστραφῇς) [anyone who wants to borrow from you…]").[177] Thus, the Gospel writer uses this passage likely to refer back to the Sermon on the Mount.

Evans elucidates that Matthew's inclusion of the first sentence of Jesus's second statement in these verses, is an Aramaic paraphrase that implicitly references Jewish tradition.

> Isa 50:11: "Behold, all you who kindle a fire, who *grasp a sword*! Go, fall in the fire, which you kindled, and on the *sword, which you grasped*!" (italics indicate departures from or additions to the Hebrew)…On the phrase "put . . . sword back into its place," see *Joseph and Aseneth* 29:4, where Levi prevents Benjamin from slaying the wounded son of Pharaoh: "And now, put your sword back into its place, and come, help me, and we will heal him of his wound. . . ."[178]

The Jewish tradition is strikingly similar to the phrasing in Matthew and portrays use of the sword in a negative way.

Evans relays that Jewish tradition is the background of the second sentence of Jesus's statement, regarding calling upon angels, as well. "In Judaism and Christianity of late antiquity, angels were thought of as warriors, as well as messengers and worshipers of the Lord (cf. especially 1QM 7:6; 13:10)."[179] Others have concluded about Jesus's statement about his ability to call upon angels, that it is meant by Matthew to convey guidance and reinforcement to the persecuted community of hearers.[180] It also reminded the Matthean audience of God's plan and purpose, both for Jesus and for

[176] Bruner, II, p. 672.
[177] Davies, Davies, and Jr, p. 512.
[178] Evans, *Matthew*, 439, see also, Davies, Davies, and Jr, *Matthew*, 512.
[179] Evans, p. 439.
[180] Schnackenburg, p. 273.

themselves.[181] That Jesus could call upon twelve legions of angels, speaks to Jesus's power and authority,[182] and, thus, the honour that he possessed.

From the third sentence of Jesus's statement in verses 52-54, Davies and Allison read the fulfilment of mission and Jesus's agency as key. "Jesus's will is God's will. His fate is his choice, he can call angels but chooses not to…twelve disciples or twelve legions of angels make no difference, scripture must be fulfilled."[183]

2.3.2.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism

That Jesus was arrested and did not allow the use of the sword during his arrest is clear from this passage. His refusal of use of the sword in Matthew's narrative is consistent with how he is portrayed as responding in the other Gospels that record the sword incident. What becomes clear is that Jesus is not renouncing all manner of violence. First, his companions wear swords and he does not admonish them for bearing weapons. Second, though Jesus tells his companion not to use the sword, he acknowledges the use of weapons of the crowd that has come to arrest him. Though not a part of our pericope, the third movement of the entire passage shows Jesus asking, "Have you come out with swords and clubs to arrest me as though I were a bandit?" (v.55) This question implies that the use of weapons to approach an unarmed teacher is not required; however, it could be required to arrest an outlaw. Finally, Jesus's remarks about calling twelve legions of angels indicate his underlying acceptance of the idea of armies and battle. Though Jesus does not believe that angelic intervention should occur in this situation, his statement would be disingenuous and misleading if Jesus did not believe that in some situations, legions could be employed to engage in battle on behalf of those who call upon them.

Rather than an emphasis on condemnation of physical violence, what is more intently featured in this passage is that Jesus is in control of the maltreatment that is about to befall him, and that what is about to befall Jesus is a part of God's plan. Jesus exercises control in the garden by becoming the initiator, a posture that he will maintain until the end. He speaks to his betrayer, "Do what you came to do." He confronts the crowds that have seized him, "Why are you coming at me with weapons?" He even tells them that everything that is happening is not because of their control of this situation, but "so that the scriptures of the prophets may be fulfilled." (v.56) Later, he answers accusations before the Sanhedrin in a way that leads the high priest to tear his robes. (v. 65) When Jesus is before the

[181] Davies, p. 214.
[182] Allison and Davies, p. 487.
[183] Allison and Davies, p. 486-87.

governor, he refuses to answer at all or respond to his vehement accusers, "so that the governor was greatly amazed." (27:14) Throughout his crucifixion Jesus depicted as not yielding to the pressure to emotionally crumble. He maintains his composure, which is a disposition that brings honour. The garden arrest is where the beginning of Jesus's resistant demeanor occurs, at the moment when he is to be persecuted. His refusal of the use of the sword is a means of Jesus controlling the master-narrative of events, while surrendering control in the immediate situation.

Jesus is resolute in his acquiescence to the powers, because of his commitment to the plan of God. Twice, after the action of arrest is underway, when Jesus speaks, he references the fulfilment of scripture. "But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?" (v. 54), he asks the sword-wielder. "But all this has taken place, so that the scriptures of the prophets may be fulfilled," (v. 56) he informs the crowd. Jesus grounds the persecution that is to come in the plan and greater purpose of God.

Finally, though the inclusion of the sword incident in this passage is not about the use of physical violence, Matthew does include the incident and makes special effort to portray Jesus verbally responding to the incident. The conclusion that may be drawn from Matthw's depiction of the scene, which includes Jesus's verbal response, is that Matthew is implicitly connecting Jesus during the sword incident with the Jewish tradition. As has been noted, the words of the central verse that is typically used to support arguments in favour of non-violence, "all who take the sword will perish by the sword," has an intertextual reference to Isaiah 50:11. This verse represents reference to a larger passage that offers significant insight into Matthew's intention in including in the narrative the statements Jesus makes during the sword incident.

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to exegete Isaiah 50, however a cursory examination of the text reveals that it contains at its core, six verses that relate to the "humiliation," of the servant of God, and to the servant's resolute faith in God's vindication in the face of the humiliation. This familiar section of scripture reads as follows:

> 4 The Lord God has given me the tongue of a teacher, that I may know
> how to sustain the weary with a word. Morning by morning he
> wakens—wakens my ear to listen as those who are taught. 5 The Lord
> God has opened my ear, and I was not rebellious, I did not turn
> backward. 6 I gave my back to those who struck me, and my cheeks to
> those who pulled out the beard; I did not hide my face from insult and
> spitting. 7 The Lord God helps me; therefore I have not been
> disgraced; therefore I have set my face like flint, and I know that I
> shall not be put to shame; 8 he who vindicates me is near. Who will
> contend with me? Let us stand up together. Who are my adversaries?
> Let them confront me. 9 It is the Lord God who helps me; who will

> declare me guilty? All of them will wear out like a garment; the moth will eat them up. (Isa. 50: 4-9)

This passage from Isaiah has direct resonance with the tortures endured by Jesus. So much so that it has been connected to the suffering servant passage of Isaiah 53. In this passage the writer proclaims that he allowed his back to be struck, he offered his face/cheeks for defacement, and he presented himself to be insulted and spat upon. In other words, he allowed grievous actsof dishonour to be enacted against himself. Despite all this, the servant says, he "ha[s] not been disgraced." (v. 7) The servant's face was set "like flint" and the servant would "not be put to shame" (v. 7). The servant was convinced that "the Lord God who helps me" (v. 9) was their vindication (v. 8). The servant demands to be allowed to face his/her adversaries; demands to confront the accusers (v. 8). Further, because vindication, and honour, come from the Lord, the servant ca discount the opinion of the public that judges the servant to be dishonoured ("who will declare me guilty [dishonoured]" (v. 9)) The public that judges the servant are who will come to be destroyed, presumably by the servant's vindicator, God ("[they] will wear out like a garment; the moth will eat them up." (v. 9)).

In the Isaiah passage we see that the servant shows inner fortitude in the face of (especially physically violent) humiliation. The Matthean author wants the audience to connect Jesus's arrest in the Garden of Gethsemane with the willingness to allow seeign dishonour to be shown. Jesus (and the servant in Isaiah) though seemingly dishonoured by having his back struck, his beard plucked, and his body spat upon, was vindicated; not dishonoured but honoured by God. Jesus, then, is portrayed as prescribing the resistance of claimed dignity and self-respect, rooted in trust in God's vindication. This is the same message of the Sermon on the Mount, which the Gospel writer also alludes to in the same line of the statement of Jesus that alludes to the passage in Isaiah.

2.3.2.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Arrest Text

To rely upon the passage that describes Jesus's refusal of the use of the sword during his arrest as a foundation for modern "non-violence" ideology, is to misapply the message of the text. Jesus is not making a claim about non-violence, and the use of physical force. Rather, he is making a claim about his power to choose to yield to the powers that are against him, and a statement about his trust in and commitment to the plan of God. Matthew draws special attention to the sword event, using language cues, as a way of connecting the passage to Isaiah 50, with its message of seeming humiliation, fortitude, trust in God's vindication, and God;'s ultimate bestowal of honour. As in the analysis of the Sermon passage, the gospel writer is portraying Jesus as an advocate of an inner self-respect that acts to convert public humiliation into occassions to publicly assert God's honour of the person. The emphasis is, again, that the ostracized Christian community use a self-reference, and a God-reference, rather than the opinion of the larger culture, to secure their dignity and honour.

As in the Sermon on the Mount passage, this treatment is consistent with the early Christian community's strategy for managing the honour/shame culture of the first century Roman-Palestine. There is reframing of the out-group's opinion of honour as illegetimate. Then there is stress on the opinion of God as the arbiter of what brings honour, and depiction of the seemingly dishonoured as actually those who are honoured. Finally, by pointing to Jesus's actions that show him taking the intiative, exhibiting fortitude and dignified conduct in the persecution, Jesus is meant t be an example of honourable conduct as a model for the Christian community to emulate.

2.3.3. Jesus's Death: The Crucifixion

The passages exegeted in Luke's Gospel (23:34) depicts Jesus being crucified on the cross at Golgotha.

2.3.3.1. Text

LUKE 23:34

[3] *When they came to the place that is called The Skull, they crucified Jesus there with the criminals, one on his right and one on his left. [[*[34] *Then Jesus said, "Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing."]] And they cast lots to divide his clothing.*

2.3.3.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis of the Gospel of Luke

Luke is the third book of the New Testament, and the third recorded gospel account. The Gospel is written in the form of historical narrative.[184] Luke-Acts occupies fully one quarter of the NT canon and has been a pivotal source of Christian history and theology.[185] The two books can be read together as a single literary work (in a literary-critical approach to the text).

2.3.3.2.1. Source and Dating

The Lukan author makes clear that the reading offered is not the first attempt that has been made to construct an account of Jesus's life and impact. (Luke 1:1-4) Scholars generally agree that the author of the Lukan Gospel knew of the other documents that recorded Jesus's life and teachings and relied upon earlier compositions in constructing the Lukan Gospel; that that there was particular reliance upon Mark.[186] There is also a "double tradition" hypothesis, that holds that Luke relied upon Matthew as well as the Marcan document. However, this theory has been deemed problematic and

[184] Hegner considers that Luke is concerned to write a history. See, Hagner, The New Testament, 233–37.
[185] Luke Timothy Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke*, ed. Daniel J. Harrington, vol. 3, Sacra Pagina (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991), 1.
[186] See, Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, vol. 28, The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), 66–67.

unlikely.[187] The double tradition theory has not gained widespread support.[188] A minor stream of scholarship argues a "Proto-Luke" hypothesis.[189] This hypothesis asserts that Luke used "Q" and "L" sources to produce a "Proto-Luke" text, which comprised a full gospel narrative. This proto-Luke later incorporated Marcan material. This diverges from views that postulate that Mark's Gospel was first, and underwent Lucan additions and redactions.[190] What is not contested is that the Gospel of Luke derives from two principal sources. As Danker says, "evidence points to a [second] written source," and not just oral tradition.[191]

The book of Acts, which is a joint composition with Luke, ends in the early sixties, rather abruptly, leading to the suspicion that it ended before Paul's death in 64 CE.[192] Yet that would be an early dating that is unlikely.[193] The reference in Luke to the temple's "abandonment" (13:35) and to "Jerusalem surrounded by camps" (21:20) suggests a reference to the destruction of the temple (28:54).[194] However, Robinson,[195] argues that the absence of any explicit mention of the temple's destruction in any of the Gospels argues for their dating earlier than 70 CE. Yet, because it appears that the references to the temple's destruction are subtly included, and not omitted, Fitzmeyer concludes that the dating must be post-war. Danker agrees that the neither absence of mention of the destruction of the temple nor the absence of mention of Paul's death in the book of Acts are sufficient reasons for an early dating. Both are explainable. He argues that it was tact that led Luke to omit the temple's demise, and that Paul's death was irrelevant to the narrative purpose and unnecessary to discuss.[196] Hagner states that the apologetic tone of the Gospel makes it likely that it was written during a time of persecution, such as during the first Jewish Revolt of 66-74 CE. "It was above all such times

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[187] See, Fitzmeyer, 28:73–75.

[188] Frederick W. Danker, *Jesus and the New Age: A Commentary on St. Luke's Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 16.

[189] Taylor is the main proponent of this theory. He credits credits Feine with first articulating the theory, and lists numerous others who subscribe to the theory, including Burkitt, Bernhard and Weiss, Stanton, and Streeter. See, Vincent Taylor, *Behind the Third Gospel: A Study of the Proto-Luke Hypothesis* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1926). I note that Taylor's book is out of print. For listing of scholars advancing the Proto-Luke thesis, see, Stephen Hultgren, *Narrative Elements in the Double Tradition: A Study of Their Place within the Framework of the Gospel Narrative* (Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2014), 58–59, and see, Burnett Hillman Streeter, *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins, Treating of the Manuscript Tradition, Sources, Authorship, & Dates* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2008), 199–202.

[190] Hultgren, *Narrative Elements in the Double Tradition*, 58.

[191] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 16.

[192] Hagner, *The New Testament*, 247.

[193] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:54.

[194] Fitzmeyer, 28:54, 57–60.

[195] John A. T. Robinson, *Redating the New Testament* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2000), 86–117.

[196] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 17–18.

that made it important to stress that the Christian faith was no threat to the Roman Empire."[197] Dating, then is likely during the mid first century.

2.3.3.2.2. Authorship and Redaction

The author states that he is not an eyewitness to the events that are described but that he depends on those who are. (1:2) The author's writing reveals that he is educated and acquainted with Old Testament and Hellenistic literary traditions.[198] Church tradition[199] holds that the author was not an apostle, which, considering the significance of not associating the Gospel with an apostle for the earliest Christians, is a fact in favour or accepting that truth of that identity.[200] Though it is generally accepted by scholars that the author of Luke also authored the book of Acts,[201] which describe in detail the life and journeys of Paul, the evidence supporting the author's identity as Paul's reputed physician is weak.[202] Luke's ethnicity is not clear, however there is consensus that Luke was a Gentile.[203] The author is interested in relating the Jesus-tradition to the biblical history of Israel, showing that Jesus-followers have the same legitimacy as Judaism itself within the Roman empire.[204] In Acts the writer refers to the Jesus-followers as a party (24:5, 14) and sect (28:22). By doing so he is showing that there is connection and continuity between Judaism and Jewish and Gentile Christianity.

The text to be exegeted appears in Luke's gospel, and no other Gospel account. It appears to derive from oral tradition. Significantly, Luke 23:34 is a verse that is missing from important early manuscripts of Luke's Gospel.[205] This raises the question as to whether this verse was originally included and later omitted, or whether it was a later addition.[206] It is generally acknowledged not to be a part of the original text,[207] as the textual evidence is against its inclusion as original.[208] It might be patterned on Stephen's prayer in Acts (7:60), or Stephen's prayer might be patterned on this prayer.[209]

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[197] Hagner, *The New Testament*, 248.
[198] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:33.
[199] For a detailed description of this tradition, see, Fitzmeyer, 28:35–41.
[200] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 1.
[201] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:35.
[202] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 2.
[203] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:41–47.
[204] Fitzmeyer, 28:9.
[205] For details regarding the manuscripts that contain the verse and those that do not, see, Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke (X - XXIV): Introduction, Translation, and Notes*, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 1503.
[206] For a listing of proponents and opponents of the inclusion of the verse, see, Nathan Eubank, "A Disconcerting Prayer: On the Originality of Luke 23:34a," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 129, no. 3 (2010): 521, https://doi.org/10.2307/25765950.
[207] Eubank, 521.
[208] E. Earl Ellis, *The Gospel of Luke* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1983), 267.
[209] See, Ellis, 267; and see also, *The Expositor's Bible Commentary: With the New International Version: Matthew, Mark, Luke*, vol. 8 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), 1044.

Danker notes that the omission of this verse was considered by some as intentional, since the destruction of Jerusalem was deemed judgment for the crucifixion.[210] Such a judgment, Edwards notes, would mean that Jesus's prayer for forgiveness was not answered.[211] However, Ellis notes that Jesus's death provided the answer to his prayer as his death brings forgiveness of sin, according to Acts 2:38.[212] The prayer was also deemed as contrary to Jesus's predictions for judgment awaiting Jerusalem (13:34-35, 19:41-44, 20:16, 21:20-24, 23:27-33).[213]

However, as Edwards remarks, the fact that the prayer exists, argues for its authenticity as a saying of Jesus, since "who but Jesus would pray for the forgiveness of those mocking and crucifying him?" [214] Plummer notes that despite the uncertainty of its original inclusion, the prayer, "has exceptional claims to be permanently retained, with the necessary safeguards in its accustomed place."[215]

Amplifying this is Johnson who gives multiple reasons for why this verse should be retained in the Gospel. He argues that it confirms the image of Jesus as representing virtue even unto his death; it matches Luke's version of the Lord's prayer (11:4 "And forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive everyone indebted to us."); and it fits Luke's narrative preference, which is to feature the prophet being rejected out of ignorance (Acts 3:17, 7:25, 13:27).[216] Danker agrees, saying that the utterance on the cross anticipates the "ignorance motif" that will appear later in the book of Acts.[217]

Fitzmeyer also notes that the prayer fits Luke's pattern of showing Jesus at prayer regularly, particularly at pivotal moments of the narrative. (e.g., baptism (3:12), choosing the twelve (6:12), before Peter's confession and the first announcement of the passion (9:18), at his transfiguration (9:28), before he teaches the "Our Father" prayer (11:2), at the Last Supper (to strengthen Peter's faith) (22:32), during his agony on the Mount of Olives (22:41), and on the cross itself (23:46). Jesus, thus, modelling the life of prayer that the disciples should follow.[218]

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[210] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 373.

[211] Mark Edwards, "Christianity, A.D. 70-192," in *The Cambridge Ancient History: Volume 12, The Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337*, ed. Alan Bowman, Peter Garnsey, and Averil Cameron, Second, vol. 12 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 687.

[212] Ellis, *The Gospel of Luke*, 267–68.

[213] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 373.

[214] Edwards, "Christianity, A.D. 70-192," 687.

[215] Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to S. Luke*, Fifth (Edinburgh: T & T Clark International, 1901), 531 citing Westcott and Hort.

[216] Johnson, *Gospel of Luke*, 3:376.

[217] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 373.

[218] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:244–45.

2.3.3.2.3. Reception

Johnson states, "everything about Luke's narrative confirms that it was directed to Gentile Christians."[219] The "everything" mentioned by Johnson is spelled out by Fitzmeyer and includes, the fact that Luke communicates in the Greco-Roman literary style, his dedication is to a person with a Greek name, and his eagerness to connect the salvation promised to the Jews to Gentiles. Also, Luke eliminates as unnecessary much of the material in Mark or Q sources that is of Jewish concern.[220]

"If there is a main purpose of Luke-Acts, however, it has to be the obvious one of telling the story of Jesus and the birth of the church,"[221] as is noted in the prologue to the Gospel (1:3-4). Luke's favourable treatment of Romans and Gentiles, as well as the books deferential tone, suggests that Luke wrote "an apology" for the early church, and was attempting to portray the Christians as nonthreatening to the empire.[222] Further, there is a question of whether theodicy was at stake in the writing of the Gospel. Did God forsake God's promise to the Jews, since the Jews rejected the Gospel and it was taking root among Gentiles? Luke, thinks Johnson, seeks to defend the work and faithfulness of God in history. Luke makes God's faithfulness to Israel, before the Gospel penetration to the Gentiles, significant to his narrative.

2.3.3.3. Narrative Criticism

2.3.3.3.1. Structure

Luke divides the scene on the cross into two units. First, the unit with vv.33-38 "records the continued mocking of Jesus."[223] It parallels the accounts in Matthew and Mark. The second unit of the scene on the cross relates to the Jesus's exchange with the thief and is only found in Luke, it encompasses vv. 39-43.[224]

Luke highlights the rejection of Jesus in the first unit, by allowing his verses to implicitly reference passages related to rejection from the Old Testament.[225] Per Parsons the correspondence is as follows (*see, Table 2-1*):

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[219] Johnson, *Gospel of Luke*, 3:9.
[220] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:58.
[221] Hagner, *The New Testament*, 244.
[222] Johnson, *Gospel of Luke*, 3:8, and Hagner, *The New Testament*, 244.
[223] Mikeal C. Parsons, *Luke (Paideia: Commentaries on the New Testament)*, Commentaries on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), 336.
[224] This section will not be discussed in the exegesis as it exceeds the scope of the project.
[225] Parsons, *Luke (Paideia)*, 336–37.

Table 2-1 Comparison of Jesus's Arrest and OT Rejection Intertexts

Luke Verse:		Fulfils OT Verse:	
v.33	When they came to the place that is called The Skull, they crucified Jesus there with the criminals, one on his right and one on his left.	Isa. 53.12	Therefore, I will allot him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he poured out himself to death, and was numbered with the transgressors; yet he bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.
v.34	[Then Jesus said, "Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing."] And they cast lots to divide his clothing.	Ps. 22:18	They divide up my garments among them, and for my clothing they cast goral (lots)
v.35	And the people stood by, watching; but the leaders scoffed at him, saying, "He saved others; let him save himself if he is the Messiah of God, his chosen one!"	Ps. 22:7	All who see me mock at me; they make mouths at me, they shake their heads;
vv.36-37	The soldiers also mocked him, coming up and offering him sour wine, [37] and saying, "If you are the King of the Jews, save yourself!"	Ps. 69.21	They gave me poison for food, and for my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink.

Thus, in unit one, three different psalms are referenced that emphasize the theme of humiliation, mocking, and shame.

Between both units, three groups of mockers are noted. Those who reject Jesus are listed in descending order of social status. First, the religious leaders scoff at Jesus (23:35), next the soldiers mock him (23:36), finally at the apex of his humiliation, Jesus is ridiculed by the bandit who hangs

beside him (23:39). Fitzmeyer notes that Luke makes a distinction between the crowd, which stands silently, and the threefold mockery.[226] Johnson comments upon the division of groups that Luke includes as related to belief and unbelief. The leaders of the Jews mock Jesus, but the crowd remains silent and not mocking. The soldiers mock Jesus, and one soldier in the end realizes Jesus was righteous. One thief bandit Jesus, one bandit responds to Jesus in faith.[227]

Noting that all three groups of mockers mention the word "save," Fitzmeyer concludes that this indicates that there is salvific significance to Jesus's crucifixion in Luke. Jesus is crucified as saviour. (24:26, 46; Acts 3:18, 17:3, 26.23).[228] This coincides with Johnson's observation that the three groups ascribe a title to Jesus. In mockery, the leaders question if Jesus is "God's Messiah, the Chosen One," (v.35) the soldiers refer to him as "King of the Jews," (v.38) and the bandit referred to Jesus as "the Messiah." (v.39) The reiteration of the titles supports the argument that Luke is making Jesus's salvific identity significant to the scene.

2.3.3.3.2. Themes

2.3.3.3.2.1. Who and What is Forgiven

Luke seems to adopt the view of the tradition that holds the Jews responsible for the death of Jesus.[229] Plummer determines the forgiveness prayed for by Jesus to refer to the Jews, and not the Romans or Pilate, since the latter were bureaucrats simply doing what was expected. Plummer determines that the ignorance of the Jews mitigated their guilt.[230] Edwards concludes that there was no actual ignorance; those who killed Jesus knew what they were doing. Nonetheless, the prayer should be understood as applying to "Sanhedrin, Antipas, Pilate, Jewish leaders, and others of ill will…intercession for all without distinction."[231] Fitzmeyer's interpretation is similar - that application of Luke's "ignorance motif" would suggest that the prayer applies to the Jews.[232]

For Danker, the "what" referent is ambiguous by design. The persecutors know not that grouping Jesus with "malefactors" belies his identity as the "Great Benefactor."[233] Plummer's conclusion is more obvious, that Jesus was praying for forgiveness for the act of crucifixion orchestrated by the Jews, but not of for their sins generally.[234]

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[226] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:1501.
[227] Johnson, *Gospel of Luke*, 3:380.
[228] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28:1502.
[229] Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke*, trans. Geoffrey Buswell (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 91.
[230] Plummer, *Saint Luke*, 532.
[231] Edwards, "Christianity, A.D. 70-192," 688.
[232] Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel According to Luke*, 1503.
[233] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 374.
[234] Plummer, *Saint Luke*, 532.

2.3.3.3.2.2. Ignorance

An "ignorance motif" forms part of Luke's theological emphasis, according to Ellis and others[235] that though persecutors knew what they were doing, in practice they were unaware of the cosmic significance of their deeds.[236]

Conzelmann provides a detailed explanation of the meaning of ignorance as it pertains to this verse.[237] Because Jesus repeatedly told the Jewish elites of his identity, they did possess knowledge of who he was. However, because they did not believe him, they were not aware that they were killing the Messiah. They believed they were killing a false pretender. The resurrection, however, proved that Jesus was the Messiah, therefore denials can no longer be maintained. "[U]nbelief becomes inexcusable."[238] For Luke, ignorance is not an automatic excuse, but it is grounds for an excuse.[239]

Ellis agrees that, "[i]gnorance does not mean a deficient mentality or a lack of information but a sinful moral state…It exists in unbelief."[240] He finds that, for early Christians, prior to being exposed to the reality of who Jesus is, one's unbelief was excused. However, "persistent, or 'fixed' ignorance is a particularly damnable quality."[241] Here, as Fitzmeyer noted, because the Jewish and Gentile persecutors were ignorant that Jesus was indeed the Messiah, their ignorance is excused.

2.3.3.3.2.3. Humiliation

Jesus is portrayed by Luke as not threatening his executioners, nor cursing them as was typical of the condemned. He accepted his death "in the manner of a faithful witness."[242] Malina comments that this is the true victory of Jesus during the crucifixion.

> The true test of the victim, in the Mediterranean context, was not in the brutal pain itself, but rather in the endurance of pain and suffering, as a mark of *andrēai*, manly courage. Silence of the victim during torture proved his honour. And yet the loss of honour evidenced by the whole process and inability to defend one's honour were deemed far worse than the physical pain involved.[243]

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[235] Ellis, *The Gospel of Luke*, 267.
[236] James R. Edwards, *The Gospel According to Luke*, The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2015), 688.
[237] Conzelmann, *Theology*, 89–90.
[238] Conzelmann, 90.
[239] Conzelmann, 90.
[240] Ellis, *The Gospel of Luke*, 268.
[241] Ellis, 268, also see, pp. 16-18.
[242] Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, 374.
[243] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 347.

Parsons also comments that this passage is "portrayal of the extreme humiliation of Jesus."[244] Edwards notes that the crucifixion was a part of "Rome's terror apparatus, designed especially to punish criminals and quash slave rebellions in the most painful, protracted, and public manner possible as a warning against rebellion."[245]

That the Messiah could endure or be subjected to crucifixion was scandalous, "[a] stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles (1 Cor. 1:23)."[246] The physical violence was not the source of the scandal, however.

> The Gospels quickly pass over the physical pain and torture of Jesus ("Good Friday" is a medieval Christian invention.). Rather, they focus on the various attempts to dishonour Jesus by spitting on him (Mark 14:65/Matt 26:67…striking him in the face and head (Mark 14.65, Matt. 26:67, John 18:22, 19:3) ridiculing him (Mark 15:20, 31; Matt 27:29, 31, 41; John 19:3), heaping insults upon him (Mark 15:32, 34; Matt 27:44), and treating him as though he were nothing (Luke 23:11; see Acts 4:11).[247]

The multitude of ways that Jesus is shown to have been humiliated and degraded, not merely physically abused, makes it clear that Jesus's humiliation and loss of honour is a key feature of the crucifixion.

2.3.3.3.2.4. Love

Jesus's words from the cross are seen also as embodying Jesus's teaching on love of enemies described in 6:27-28 and 11:2-4. His words are echoed in Stephen's death prayer in Acts 7:59-60. Edwards regards the words of the passage as symbolic of Jesus's work of peace and reconciliation.[248] Also, according to Johnson, it shows Jesus legitimating the proclamation of "repentance for forgiveness of sins" within which the apostolic mission was conceived (24:47, Acts 2:38, 5:31, 10:43, 13:38, 26:18).[249]

2.3.3.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism of Specific Passage

Though Luke 23:34 is unlikely to have been part of the original text, its consistency with the Lukan narrative and value to the tradition indicate that it is not inappropriate to include it in the canon of scripture.

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[244] Parsons, *Luke (Paideia)*, 337, sidebar.
[245] Edwards, *Luke*, 275.
[246] Edwards, "Christianity, A.D. 70-192," 389.
[247] Parsons, *Luke (Paideia)*, 336.
[248] Edwards, "Christianity, A.D. 70-192," 687 n.84.
[249] Johnson, *Gospel of Luke*, 3:376.

If the verse is accepted, the customary contemporary meaning of what is accepted is that at the time that Jesus was crucified, he prayed for those who were his perpetrators, and asked that God show forgiveness to them for the deeds that they perpetrated against him. He does this because Jesus loves his enemies.

The most significant addendum needed to the traditional reading of this passage, is that the passage does not emphasize the physical nature of the passion experience. While contemporary accounts emphasize the suffering and brutal torture of the experience, this emphasis is lacking from the Gospel accounts. Luke, in particular, could easily be read as *deemphasizing* the physicality of the crucifixion. Rather, the aspects of humiliation are prominent.

After Jesus is arrested, the men holding Jesus are depicted as "mocking and beating" him (22:63). When Jesus is taken before the authorities, he is not physically assaulted. Pilate sends Jesus to Herod. Herod and his soldiers, "treated him with contempt and mocked him; then he put an elegant robe on him." (23:11) Pilate, reluctant to crucify Jesus, suggests that Jesus simply be whipped (23:16), but his suggestion is rebuffed. He reasons further with the accusers and suggests again that Jesus be whipped (23:22), and is again rebuffed. Pilate then gives in to the demands of the people to have Jesus crucified. Jesus is never whipped in Luke's account. As Jesus was led away to be crucified, Simon the Cyrenian is impressed "and they laid the cross on him and made him carry it behind Jesus." (23:26) Thus, Jesus did not endure the burden of actually bearing the cross to the site of crucifixion.[250] About the crucifixion Luke tells us only, "[w]hen they came to the place that is called The Skull, they crucified Jesus there with the criminals." (23:33) He adds no details of the physical or procedural elements of the act of crucifixion. What Luke does provide, however, are the details of the degradation that Jesus endured. Luke tells us that "the leaders scoffed at him," (23:35) and describes how; that the "soldiers also mocked him," (23.36) and describes how; that one of the criminals "kept deriding him," (23:39) and then describes how.

Throughout the crucifixion process, Luke presents a composed and in control Jesus. As he walks to the site of the hanging, unencumbered by the cross, Jesus makes a long statement advising those mourning him to instead mourn for themselves.[251] While he is on the cross, Luke's Jesus makes

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[250] This is quite remarkable considering that Luke's Jesus twice comments during his ministry that anyone unwilling to bear their own cross and follow him cannot be his disciple (Luke 9:23-24, 14:27).

[251] See, Luke 27:31:

> **27** A great number of the people followed him, and among them were women who were beating their breasts and wailing for him. **28** But Jesus turned to them and said, "Daughters of Jerusalem, do not weep for me, but weep for yourselves and for your children. **29** For the days are surely coming when they will say, 'Blessed are the barren, and the wombs that never

three statements.[252] First, there is his prayer of forgiveness for his accusers (23:34), second, Jesus gives assurance to the thief hanging beside him of entry to paradise (23:43), and third, Jesus commits his spirit to the Father (23:46). After yelling this last utterance, "he breathed his last." (23:46) Luke does not even tell us that Jesus "died."

What we glean from this description is that the physical suffering of Jesus was not of central significance to Luke. What was key was that Jesus was utterly humiliated and disgraced and, as a consequence, abandoned--from his arrest, to his trial, to the point before he took his final breaths. During this entire ordeal, and suffering *of degradation*, Jesus retained his dignity and composure. He was in control of himself, even when his body was in the control of others. He could retain control because of his confidence in God.

The redactions and language shifts in Luke support this reading. Mark uses the verb ἐβόησεν to describe Jesus's final statement from the cross, which means, "to cry, i.e. speak, with a high, strong voice; to cry to one for help, implore his aid; to cry out as a manifestation of feeling; to cry out harshly, often of an inarticulate and brutish sound…especially a cry for help."[253] Luke, on the other hand, uses the milder term φωνήσας to describe Jesus's final statement, which means, "to call, call to oneself…either by one's own voice, or through another; to send for, summon: with a genitive of the place, to call out of (i.e., bid one to quit a place and come to one).[254] Luke is emphasizing Jesus's lack of emotional turmoil.

The most telling cue that we have of Luke's intent to shift the focus from suffering to valour, however, is in the framing of the last words of Jesus as not within the experience of deep suffering. By silently deleting[255] from Mark's account Jesus's cry of dereliction ("My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"),[256] Luke portrays Jesus's last words as those of commitment of his spirit to God. This is, on its face, a less gloomy presentation of Jesus's state of mind. Yet it also speaks to Luke's shift away from the Old Testament reference alluded to by the utterance of forsakenness. The cry of

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> bore, and the breasts that never nursed.' **30** Then they will begin to say to the mountains, 'Fall on us'; and to the hills, 'Cover us.' **31** For if they do this when the wood is green, what will happen when it is dry?"

[252] Unlike Mark and Matthew's Jesus, Luke's Jesus does not offer the despairing cry of dereliction ("My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?").

[253] "Strong's Greek: 994. Βοάω (Boaó) -- to Call Out," in *Thayer's Greek Lexicon* (BibleHub.com, 2011), https://biblehub.com/greek/994.htm.

[254] "Strong's Greek: 5455. Φωνέω (Phóneó) -- to Call Out," in *Thayer's Greek Lexicon* (BibleHub.com, 2011), https://biblehub.com/greek/5455.htm.

[255] Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Gospels* (Baylor University Press, 2016), 235.

[256] See, Matthew 26:46 and Mark 15:34.

forsakenness alludes to Psalm 22:1.[257] This psalm details the psalmist's disgrace at great length, before turning to the psalmist's trust that Lord will deliver the psalmist. Instead of making an allusion to profound humiliation, Luke's Jesus commits his spirit, and in so doing alludes to Psalm 31:5 (30.6 LXX)[258] which is a psalm emphasizing deep trust in *God's redemption from shame and disgrace*, rather than the humiliation itself, as in Psalm 22. Luke's Jesus in the end, as he has been throughout his arrest, trial, and crucifixion, is confident and in command.

When Jesus prays that his persecutors will be forgiven, therefore, his statement is not framed here as being rooted in love for his enemies. The statement is not about Jesus's enemies. Rather, the prayer reveals Jesus to the reader. What is revealed is not merely that Jesus had a concern for others in his darkest hour of pain and torture. The text is not concerned with the pain and torture of the cross. What the prayer reveals of Jesus, instead, is Jesus's sense of self, his sense of personal empowerment. Jesus prays for his persecutors, as an indication that he remains in control and is not diminished at all by the persecutors attempts to diminish him.

2.3.3.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Crucifixion Text

The message of this passage, in which Jesus prays for forgiveness for his persecutors while he is on the cross, is not that Jesus loved and forgave his torturers. Rather, the point is that Jesus resisted the attempts of the powers to degrade him. He possessed such nobility of being that he *could* pray for those who sought to harm him. The gospel writer was conveying to a degraded group that, in like manner as Jesus, they are able to possess, display, and retain dignity. Despite the experiences they may endure of exclusion and persecution, they need not be diminished as persons.

2.3.4. Jesus Resurrected: The Heavenly Vision

The passage being exegeted (6:9-11) depicts a heavenly scene. Jesus is only indirectly depicted. The scene occurs following the revelation of "The Lion from the tribe of Judah, the Root of David" (5:5) who was "like a slaughtered lamb" (5:6) who had been victorious (5:5) and was now "worthy to take the scroll and to open its seals." (5:9) Because of this prior identification, when the exegeted text begins with "When He opened the fifth seal," the referent "He" is a clear reference to the "slaughtered lamb," who represents the crucified and resurrected Jesus.

2.3.4.1. Text

Revelation 6: 9-11

[257] See, Parsons, *Luke (Paideia)*, 335-336, see also, Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Gospels*, 235.
[258] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Gospels*, 235.

9 When he opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slaughtered for the word of God and for the testimony they had given; 10 they cried out with a loud voice, "Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long will it be before you judge and avenge our blood on the inhabitants of the earth?" 11 They were each given a white robe and told to rest a little longer, until the number would be complete both of their fellow servants and of their brothers and sisters, who were soon to be killed as they themselves had been killed.

2.3.4.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis of Revelation

Revelation is the 66th book of the bible, the final book of the New Testament. It is written in the form of a letter and employs apocalyptic (a unique genre) and prophetic genres of writing.

2.3.4.2.1. Source and Dating

Because this section of the text (6:9-11) parallels the Gospel accounts of the Olivet discourse, it seems clear that there was reliance upon the Gospels, particularly Luke, as the Seal judgments parallel closely the Woes provided by Luke. However, it is unclear as to whether there was use of Matthew and Mark as well, use of the source for Matthew and Mark, or if there was only reliance upon the oral tradition.[259] Charles concludes that the text is dependent upon the Gospel accounts, and that the Seal judgments are derived from a "pre-existing eschatological scheme,"[260] that existed outside of the Gospels. This scheme included the use of the number seven, and reliance upon Old Testament formulations of woes (such as Zech 1:8, 6:1-8).[261] Charles argues however, that the author's scheme takes on a new form, wherein the author connects the woes to actual historical events. Koester's view is consistent with this, in that he finds the variations in the text make it more likely "that the author knew a tradition like that of the Gospels but did not rely directly on the Gospel texts."[262] Also the vision in Revelation is expanded to include horses and the kinds of cosmic signs found in the prophets.[263] There is likely a shared oral tradition that is at the root of the eschatological tradition.

Revelation is traditionally understood to have been written around 95 CE during the persecution, towards the end of Domitian's reign.[264] Koester concludes that the time of composition was around 80-100 CE. This dating is consistent with the traditional view. The book was likely written after the death of Nero in 68 CE and before the mid-second century, since it is noted by Justin Martyr

[259] Robert H. Charles, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of St. John*, vol. 1, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: Clark, 1975), 159.
[260] Charles, 1:159.
[261] Charles, 1:160.
[262] Craig R. Koester, *Revelation: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, vol. 38a, The Anchor Yale Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 357 citing Boxall, Reddish and Witherington.
[263] Koester, 38a:357.
[264] Koester, 38a:65.

(c. 155-160), as well as Melito (c. 160-170), and probably also known by Papias (c. 130).[265] Because of the external references to the work, it had to have been completed by the late first or early second century. This corresponds to the reign of Domitian (81-96). Thus, the dating is understood to be within that timeframe.[266]

2.3.4.2.2. Authorship and Redaction

Tradition holds that the vision was written by the apostle John. However, this authorship is contested. Koester notes that historical studies suggest different streams of tradition are represented in the text, including Johannine, Pauline, and synoptic traditions.[267] According to Koester, it is likely that the author knew of the early Christian tradition but was not the apostle, but a Jewish prophet.[268] Hagner also concludes that the book was "almost certainly not" authored by the apostle John, but likely someone within the Johannine circle.[269]

Thomas argues, however, that the rationale for rejecting the traditional authorship is weak. He demonstrates that objections to the apostle's authorship can be traced to Dionysius's dogmatic objections, which he determines are specious. He finds that the "external evidence for authorship by John the apostle is earlier, clearer, more definite, and more positive for Revelation than for the traditional authorship of any other NT book."[270] Authorship, thus, is uncertain.

This text, and the entire book of Revelation has no counterpart. No redaction criticism is warranted.

2.3.4.2.3. Reception

The book of Revelation is addressed to a church that is undergoing persecution; that is confronted with seemingly indomitable forces of evil which is crushing them.[271] Revelation offers a message of comfort and hope for the church. As Hagner states, it "unveils reality in contrast to appearances; it provides a true understanding of the present and therefore also of the future. Things are not the way they seem to present perception."[272] The writer wants to convey that, though it appears to the persecuted Christians that they are the despised and only objects to be crushed, because they are

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[265] Koester, 38a:71.
[266] Koester, 38a:71.
[267] Koester, 38a:80–85.
[268] Koester, 38a:66–69.
[269] Hagner, *The New Testament*, 761.
[270] Robert L. Thomas, *Revelation 1-7: An Exegetical Commentary* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1992), 10.
[271] Hagner, 747.
[272] Hagner, 747.

followers of Jesus, the opposite of that is true. God is triumphant, and they, as God's people, are victorious over the powers of evil.

2.3.4.3. Narrative Criticism

2.3.4.3.1. Structure

This section has been linked to the Olivet Discourse of Jesus as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels.[273] Charles appears to be the originator of this hypothesis, which holds that there is a connection between the Revelation 6 "Seal judgments" and the Olivet Discourse in the Synoptics. This connection is viewed most clearly when the accounts are viewed together in summary.[274] (*See*, *Table 2-2*)

Table 2-2 Seal Judgements Compared to Olivet Discourses in Synoptics

	Matt. 24: 6-7, 9a, 29	Mark 13:7-9a, 24-25	Luke 21: 9-12a, 25-26	Rev 6:2-17, 7:1
1.	Wars	Wars	Wars	Wars
2.	Int'l Strife	Int'l Strife	Int'l Strife	Int'l Strife
3.	Famines	Earthquakes	Earthquake	Famine
4.	Earthquakes	Famines	Famines	Pestilence (Death and Hades).
5.	Persecutions	Persecutions	Pestilence	Persecutions
6.	Eclipses of the sun and moon; falling of the stars; shaking of the power of heaven.	Eclipses of the sun and moon; falling of the stars; shaking of the power of heaven.	Persecutions	Earthquakes, eclipse of the sun, ensanguining of the moon, falling of the stars, men calling on the rocks to fall on them, shaking of the powers of heaven, four destroying winds.

[273] See, C. Marvin Pate, *Interpreting Revelation and Other Apocalyptic Literature: An Exegetical Handbook*, Handbooks for New Testament Exegesis 4 (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic, 2016), 59–61 and; Charles, *Revelation*, 1:158–61.

[274] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:158.

7.			Signs in the sun, moon, and stars; men fainting for fear of the things coming on the world; shaking of the powers of heaven.	

Charles finds that Revelation follows the seven "Woes" of Luke, which themselves follow a pattern of seven plagues in Jewish literature,[275] but the Revelation combines the third and sixth woes into the sixth seal.[276] The full passage from which the selected verses under analysis are drawn (6:1 – 7:3), gives an account of the six seals, which were Messianic woes, "or signs of destruction of the immediate world."[277] According to Charles, this destruction, or consummation, will begin with breakdown of the political and social order (1-8), then the cosmic order will also be partially destroyed (12-17).[278]

Significantly, Koester concludes that the author of Revelation reinterprets the tradition to reflect that the eschatological expectation that proceeds smoothly and without interruption in the Gospels, is, in fact, interrupted. He argues that the progression is paused, and that the author places his readers within the pause. There is a redemption that must occur during the delay, which is what is shown distinctively in the seal visions.[279] Koester's view of the correspondence of the Gospel tradition to Revelation, thus, appears, as follows:[280] (*See, Table 2-3*)

[275] Charles, 1:158 n. 3.
[276] Charles, 1:158–59.
[277] Charles, 1:153.
[278] Charles, 1:153.
[279] Koester, *Revelation*, 38a:358.
[280] See, Koester, 38a:358.

Table 2-3 Seal Judgements Compared to Olivet Discourses in Synoptics With Interruption

	Matt. 24: 6-9, 29-31	Mark 13:7-9, 24-25	Luke 21: 9-12, 25-26	Rev 6:1-8:1-5
1.	Wars	Wars	Wars	Wars of conquest
2.	Violent conflict between nations	Violent conflict between nations	Violent conflict between nations	Violent conflict between people
3.	Famines	Earthquakes	Earthquake	Famine (grain shortage)
4.	Earthquakes	Famines	Famines	Violence, famine, disease, wild animals
5.	Persecutions	Persecutions	Disease	Persecutions
6.	Heavenly signs (sun and moon darkened, star fall, powers of heaven shaken)	Heavenly signs (sun and moon darkened, star fall, powers of heaven shaken)	Persecutions	Heavenly signs (sun darkened, moon to blood, stars fall, earth shaken)
7.	Son of man comes on clouds	Son of man comes on clouds	Heavenly signs (signs in sun moon stars; roaring sea; people afraid powers of heaven shaken)	Threats interrupted: vision of redemption
8.			Son of man comes on clouds	Heavenly silence and prayer

The work describes a period of intense suffering and tribulation for the inhabitants of the earth.[281]

[281] Mitchell Glenn Reddish, *Revelation*, Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary (Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys Pub., 2001), 122.

Pate concurs that the heavenly vision is a "reapplication of the Olivet Discourse/past fall of Jerusalem to the future Parousia of Christ/destruction of Rome."[282] The first four seals that precede the subject passage concern bloodshed, death and destruction on earth. The fifth seal of this passage shifts to a heavenly visage. The sixth seal concerns a period of Christian martyrdom, as seen from heaven, which was already partially accomplished.[283]

2.3.4.3.2. Themes of the Scene

2.3.4.3.2.1. Altar

The altar in the sixth chapter is viewed by Malina[284] as denoting the sky. He determines that such a view is consistent with the ancient understanding of the astronomical constellation of an Altar among the starscapes of the southern sky. Because the Altar was in the white Milky Way, Malina believes, the author clothes the witnesses who are "further below the horizon" or "below" or "under" the altar, as clothed in white.[285] For Malina, the ancient Mediterranean audience regularly sought signs from the sky as an means of understanding occurrences on earth.[286] Hence angels were considered "sky servants" and appeared regularly in the Gospels. A moving star, or comet, announced Jesus's birth, and a sky-caused earthquake occured at Jesus's death.[287]

Charles argues that the image involves a heavenly altar, a scene in heaven, which is like the altar of incense and the altar of burnt offerings.[288]

Reddish, however, sees the location under the altar as a place of honour. The witnesses are near God. Reddish relies for his interpretation upon Beasley-Murray, who cites a saying of Rabbi Akiba:

> He who is buried in other countries (other than Babylonia and Palestine) is as if he were buried in Babylon; and he who is buried in Babylon is as if he were buried in the land of Israel; and he who is buried in the land of Israel is as if he were buried beneath the altar, for the whole land of Israel is appropriated for the altar; he who is buried beneath the altar is as if he were buried beneath the throne of glory.[289]

Thus, for Reddish, when the witnesses are portrayed as being beneath the altar, it is the author's intent to portray them as near God's throne and God.

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[282] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 61.
[283] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:171.
[284] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 102.
[285] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 112.
[286] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 113.
[287] Malina and Rohrbaugh, 113.
[288] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:172.
[289] Reddish, *Revelation*, 130, see also; Koester, *Revelation*, 38a:399, where the saying is attributed to Rabbi Aqiba.

Thomas argues that the altar must be in heaven because that is the only place where communication with "the holy and true master" (v.10) can take place.[290] As to whether the heavenly altar corresponds to the earthly temple's altar for incense or for burnt offering, Thomas concludes that though the altar of burnt offering has merit, because that is where blood was poured, and the use of the word slain in the passage is associated with offering, it is not the better choice. The witnesses, he says, are not on, but under, the altar. More importantly, Thomas argues, sacrifices are no longer necessary since Jesus's sacrifice was conclusive. Koester, though, makes a distinction between the two sacrifices, holding that, "a martyr's blood marks a triumph for truth and faithfulness in the face of evil, whereas cleansing and redemption are accomplished by the blood of Christ."[291]

Thomas argues further for why the altar of incense and not that for burnt offerings is the more likely comparison to the heavenly altar. First, throughout Revelation the altar is connected with judgment and praying (5:8, 8:3,4). Second, the book speaks of heaven as a sanctuary, and the altar of incense in the earthly temple was near the sanctuary, the altar of burnt offerings was not.[292]

However, Koester makes the strong point, along with Boxall and Mounce, that the heavenly altar is a different altar that has multiple functions. It is comparable to neither the altar of incense nor the altar of burnt offering.[293]

2.3.4.3.2.2. Souls

The souls are those of the martyrs, as "the souls of the righteous" were regarded as sacrifices to God, in the Christian tradition as well as in pre-Christian Judaism.[294] Charles agrees that the righteous being viewed as martyrs follows the Jewish tradition.[295] "Though his body was slain on earth, the sacrifice was in reality made in heaven, where his soul was offered on the heavenly altar."[296]

The tradition is connected to the lives of the apostles.

> Sources say, Stephen was stoned, James was killed with the sword Peter was crucified, and Paul was beheaded…The most notorious persecution occurred under Nero, when Christians in Rome were "torn by dogs and perished, or were nailed to crosses, or were doomed to the flames and burnt"…Such traditions inform the vision of the fifth seal.[297]

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[290] Thomas, *Revelation 1-7*, 441.
[291] Koester, *Revelation*, 38a:398.
[292] Thomas, *Revelation 1-7*, 442–43.
[293] Koester, *Revelation*, 38a:398.
[294] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:173.
[295] Charles, 1:179.
[296] Charles, 1:174.
[297] Koester, *Revelation*, 38a:399.

Pate argues that the message of the sixth chapter is that, Jerusalem paid the price for spilling the blood of the martyrs, in the destruction of the temple in 70 CE, so Rome will also pay the price for the shedding of blood of the followers of Christ.[298]

In Charles's view, the author is looking back to Nero's persecution and ahead to that of Domitian. After that, the author expects the number of martyrs to be completed and then the end would come.[299] Reddish agrees that the point for the author is that the martyrdom is not over. The author writes to prepare the letter's hearers for further endurance of suffering. The author wants to give meaning to their suffering.[300] Reddish believes that Revelation's message is that the lamb's death accomplishes the victory, but the death of the martyrs contributes to the victory.[301]

2.3.4.3.2.3. Why slain

Charles's construal of the basis for the persecution and martyrdom of those under the altar, is that it was for "a word given by God and the witness borne by Jesus." It is not that the *martyrs* bore witness to something, but that Christ has given a testimony, and the martyrs have the testimony and preserve the testimony, which is the equivalent of the clause in 12:17,[302] and in 20:4.[303] Further, the martyrs were those who were persecuted under Nero.[304] Thomas agrees that the word of God here is the "testimony received from Jesus."[305] It is a testimony they held, not that they preached.[306] This was the cause of their persecution.

2.3.4.3.2.4. Prayer

The prayer is one that contains notes of vengeance for what the martyrs have lost.[307] This is similar to a prayer in Enoch 47:2, 4 [xlvii. 2,4].[308] Also, it alludes to 4 Ezra 4.35, wherein the souls of

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[298] Pate, *Interpreting Revelation and Other Apocalyptic Literature*, 66.
[299] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:179.
[300] Reddish, *Revelation*, 131–32.
[301] Reddish, 132.
[302] "Then the dragon…went off to make war on…those who keep the commandments of God and hold the testimony of Jesus."
[303] "…I also saw the souls of those who had been beheaded for their testimony to Jesus and for the word of God."
[304] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:174.
[305] Thomas, *Revelation 1-7*, 444 citing Mouncy.
[306] Thomas, 444.
[307] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:175.
[308] "The prayer of the righteous (that the shedding of their blood) may not be in vain before the Lord of Spirits, That judgment may be done unto them, and that they may not have to suffer forever…And the hearts of the holy were filled with joy, Because…the prayer of the righteous had been heard, And the blood of the righteous had been required before the Lord of Spirits."

the righteous in Shoel ask, "How long are we to remain here? When cometh the fruit upon the threshing-floor of our reward?"[309]

Thomas notes that the heavenly prayer, unlike Stephen's, is a call for vengeance rather than forgiveness. The prayer follows the pattern of imprecatory psalms,[310] which, he argues, are not only for vengeance, but also partly a protest against iniquity.[311] Reddish, however, states that the prayer is not for personal vindication, but for the vindication of God's justice.[312] The witnesses did not die in vain, God was not powerless to save them. The forces of evil had not conquered. "The prayer of the martyrs is that God will reverse the judgment of the world so that the purpose of their dying, as well as the sovereignty of God, might be revealed."[313] Reddish agrees that the point is that God has not forgotten the faithful witnesses. Their deaths would be vindicated. Even if the world is out of control, God is in control of the world and history; at the appropriate time God will act.[314]

For Thomas, the essential feature of the prayer is not that it is vengeful, but that it is an outcry; it comes in a loud voice, expressing a strong and urgent need.[315] This prayer outcry, he argues, is of significance because it constitutes the fifth judgment against those on earth.[316] Later in the book, all the saints, not only the martyrs, are praying (8:3, 7:10-17).[317] It is prayer that leads to trumpet judgments on earth, which increase in intensity from between chapters 8:3-5 and 9:13. In chapter 14:18 prayers are mentioned again. Then in chapter 19:11-21 notice is given of the seventh trumpet and the seven last plagues. By this point, the martyrdom is complete. When the altar was last heard from in chapter 16:7, before this last pronouncement of judgment, the cries of the martyrs vindicates God in God's just dealings with rebellious humanity. Their prayers have been fully answered, and their blood fully avenged. Just before the last judgment, in 19:1-2, there is joyful prayer. God's outpouring of wrath, then, is seen as an answer to these heavenly petitions.[318]

> Even though it may be a source of misery to those who become victims of such vengeance, vengeance of this kind has been an integral part of God's dealings with the enemies of righteousness since the earliest

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[309] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:175; Reddish, *Revelation*, 131.
[310] Thomas, *Revelation 1-7*, 445.
[311] Thomas, 445.
[312] Reddish, *Revelation*, 130, see also, Koester, *Revelation*, 38a:400.
[313] Reddish, *Revelation*, 130.
[314] Reddish, 130; Thomas, *Revelation 1-7*, 440.
[315] Thomas, *Revelation 1-7*, 445.
[316] Thomas, 521.
[317] Thomas, 521.
[318] Thomas, 522.

> history of man (Gen. 4:10) and will continue to be until the consummation of human history."[319]

Thus, Thomas sees prayer as a means for participating in the ultimate enactment of God's justice, which does include God's wrath upon evil. The passages' reference to the "holy and true," Thomas concludes, supports this view of God's vengeance. God is holy in apartness from evil, and true in his faithfulness to His Word. "God cannot tolerate iniquity. He [sic] must avenge."[320]

2.3.4.3.2.5. Robes

Charles argues that the giving of robes necessarily implies that the witnesses also have heavenly bodies.[321] Receipt of their heavenly bodies and having "attained their consummation…is a special privilege accorded to the martyrs, just as they exclusively are to reign for the 1000 years."[322] All of the righteous will ultimately receive such robes. Robes are symbolic of victory of the faithful over evil and death and symbolize the eternal life the recipients have been given.

Thomas says Jewish apocalyptic tradition consistently used white robes to represent the body of glory, the resurrection body. Here, a robe implies a body, because one cannot clothe what is immaterial.[323] However, he notes that the idea that the witnesses in chapter 6 are given bodies prior to the eschaton, contradicts the message of scripture that a new body is not given until Christ's return.[324] He concludes that the more important point is not whether or not the witnesses are embodied, but that they possess their animating spirits.[325]

2.3.4.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism of Specific Passage

It is not an easy task to undertake an investigation of the text of Revelation in search of support for the premise of non-violence. This passage is an example of why that is. The traditional reading presents us with a Jesus who attends to the cries of the martyred. Then (though the identity of the speaker is obliquely omitted) we are to understand that he tells them to rest while he awaits the further suffering and torture of others before justice is meted out. Under this reading, even though Jesus affirms the yielding to martyrdom, and the implied non-resistant posture of the martyrs to persecution, Jesus is at the same time necessarily affirming the violence of the ongoing persecution. He is also

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[319] Thomas, 524.
[320] Thomas, 445.
[321] Charles, *Revelation*, 1:176.
[322] Charles, 1:179.
[323] Thomas, *Revelation 1-7*, 443.
[324] Thomas, 447.
[325] Thomas, 443.

affirming that violent retribution will be, at a later time, visited upon those who perpetrated the martyrdom. This cannot be a text that supports notions of a non-violent ethos of Jesus.

Another problem with a reading that adheres to a strictly non-violent Jesus paradigm is that to understand texts such as the one examined, pain and suffering must be made central to the Christian identity. The Christian narrative must embrace the idea that God was pleased to wound and kill Jesus, and Jesus is pleased when those who follow him endure torture and killing out of loyalty to Jesus. The obvious facts of torture and death are too readily valorised as being a source of God's pleasure. The inquiry into the subtleties of what bring the Godhead pleasure are too easily abandoned. All the while, Christ-followers consciously affirm the opposite truth, that God does not take pleasure in the pain and suffering of God's people.

To understand the text, we must accept, as a first principle, that the text comes to us on its own terms. It does not come to us in a way that we necessarily understand or in a way that seeks our approval. We must surrender to the terms of the text and not expect that the text will surrender to our terms.

The terms of the text are these: those who have written and received the text are marginalized Others who have undergone, and who are at risk of undergoing further, great and brutal persecution in Palestinian Rome. They have lived through a civil war that resulted in the destruction of the Jewish temple in Jerusalem. This undoubtedly appeared to them as cataclysmic and world ending. This group of outcast, fugitive, prey for the Roman imperium are awaiting the glorious return of a Lord whose advent has been delayed far beyond anyone's expectation.

Our text, in particular, communicates several points to this audience: you are seen, your struggles are seen, and you are not forgotten. Jesus endured unto death, just like you, and overcame. You held on to the testimony of Jesus, and that makes you righteous. Great reward awaits you. Justice is coming, but not immediately. First, there will be more persecution.

The fact that Jesus is depicted as a slaughtered lamb, and that he is depicted as consoling and expecting martyrdom, is not an indication that God favours suffering. Jesus is depicted as both the Lion of Judah/Root of David (the conquering king), as well as the slaughtered lamb; both together. The lamb is as easily understood as a literary creation representing victory over defeat—a literary creation having seven horns and seven eyes—as it is understood as a normative expression of the expectation of suffering unto death for Christians.

In the context in which it is presented, the scene of the prayerful witnesses is not intended to communicate a message related to the use, or non-use, of physical force by Christians. It is not intended to convey a message of prescriptive ethical conduct for the Christian. It does not recommend to the

Christian the path of suffering and death. What the scene is meant to accomplish is the acknowledgement and encouragement of discouraged and disappointed followers of Jesus.

The scene references the slain lamb, yet the slain condition of the lamb is always accompanied by veneration. The slain lamb is victorious (5:5-6). The slain lamb is worthy (5:9). The lamb who was slain is worthy "to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might and honour and glory and blessing!" (5:12) What the book depicts is that the lamb is alive, which is to have obtained the supreme victory over not only the lamb's persecutors but over death itself. This, however, is not all that is conveyed about the lamb. The lamb is seen in the heavenly realm without shame, disgrace, or dishonour. In the heavenly vision the lamb that was slain is revered and shrouded in honour that is profusely described.

In the same way, when the Jesus-followers who were persecuted and martyred are depicted in our passage, it is as those slain, yet also as those who are venerated, being given a white robe and rest from the turmoil that engulfs the earth. The message is that the suffering obtain victory, and that victory includes life, it includes being present with God, and it includes the attainment of supreme honour.[326]

The honour that the slain lamb and the slain martyrs obtained, is not the result of their willingness to surrender to death without resistance. Their honour is the consequence not of their death, *but of their life*. To hold to the testimony of Jesus, which was contrary to and despised by the powers and the culture, was to live into a self-defined identity and to live according to their own standards of inner dignity, and honour. Regardless of the powers of the world despising and abusing them, to live trusting that they had an inviolable dignity that came from their trust in their truth about God. Their self-determination of their worth and their truth, resulted in death, but also privileged them to experience life, on earth and beyond the realm of earth.

Thus, the depiction of the righteous under the altar, or "beneath the throne of glory" as Rabbi Akiba supposes,[327] is not the depiction of those whose blood was accepted as a sacrifice to God, but as those who are covered by a heavenly altar upon which Jesus's cosmic sacrifice had already been made. Their committed living, which led to their suffering is at last over. Their suffering, we are meant to understand, was an unjust suffering that yet continues. Their suffering, we are assured, will be avenged by a holy and true God. This is the message that is meant to be conveyed to the audience of

[326] For more on honor and shame, generally, in Revelation, see, J A Du Rand and Y M Song, "The Ethos of the Book of Revelation," *Verbum et Ecclesia* 24, no. 2 (November 17, 2003): 381–84.

[327] See, footnote 212, *supra*.

persecuted Jesus followers. It is a message of confidence, endurance, victory, and above all, honour that awaits the faithful.

2.3.4.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Resurrected Jesus Text

Construal of the heavenly vision of martyred Jesus followers as a message of embrace of suffering and death, is a misconstrual of the text. The text conveys a message of encouragement and hope to those who suffered unjustly. The author assures them of Christ's victory and supreme honour, and of the honour that they themselves are due as a result of their commitment to the testimony of Jesus. The suffering and death of the Christian is not embraced in this passage so much as it is promised vengeance. What is implied is that a life lived in consciousness of a self-determined worth and value, such as following Jesus required, is a life that leads inexorably to death and degradation by the powers. Nonetheless, life and glory belong to those who so live.

2.4. Exegetical Conclusion

Focusing on "non-violence" tends to obscure the very evident cues in the text that point to the issue of honour/shame, which are of immense significance in the cultural context of the writers of the scripture. Jesus the teacher teaches through the Sermon on the Mount that his hearers cannot be defined by the social standards of honour. They must know their self-worth and know that their worth is based upon God's correct valuation and not the incorrect evaluation of broader society. When their dignity/honour is challenged and attempted to be diminished publicly, they must act publicly to demonstrate the impossibility of their worthiness being diminished. Jesus the criminal under arrest teaches through his initiative, and through his refusal of physical force that he will be obedient to the plan of God, and that the powers of the world may have power over his physical body, but they have no control over his being, identity, and worth. Jesus the crucified one demonstrates the same principle. The powers may abuse his body and kill him, but they are powerless over his will, his dignity. Jesus prays for his persecutors because he *can* pray for them. His intact and valorous personhood accords him the ability to look upon his persecutors with charity. Jesus the slaughtered lamb is shrouded in honour. The martyred witnesses in his heavenly presence are encouraged that, despite their humiliation and death, they, like Jesus are righteous and honoured. There is honour and dignity that come from holding onto the truth, though it cost one's life. This is the nature of the freedom that Jesus lived into and died to allow all people to experience.

What the exegesis finally demonstrates, is that once the veil of "non-violence" dogma is lifted, possibilities appear in the text for liberative, life-giving interpretations. These interpretations do not promote physical aggression as a means of liberation. They promote, instead, self-actualization and human dignity. The focus shifts from suffering and abasement, to *self*-respect, commitment/obedience

to truth, agency, and internal cultivation of the power one has to live with dignity in a hostile world. In light of the challenges that are facing the global communities in which Christians find themselves, the imperative of scripture to the violated, ecologically devastated, and economically excluded is not the communication of a message of "non-violence," nor is it the call to suffering. The good news of scripture today is that each of us has a dignity that comes from God that we cannot be stripped of regardless of what the world says about us, and regardless of how the world treats us. Our task is not to suffer the insults of the powers of the world, but to take action that responds to insults with a demonstration of our own awareness of our worth and value; to walk with a full apprehension of our divinely apportioned dignity; to make choices to live faithfully to what we know to be true; and to do these things and live our lives in this way even if it means persecution and death at the hands of the powers. To be Christian, scripture tells us, and especially tells the marginalized, is to live in a way that takes action to assert one's own dignity and inner freedom, in a world that seeks to steal and destroy it.

Part II

Historical Theological Analysis

3. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence to the Fourth Century

3.1. Review, Overview, and Vocabulary

This section will present a review of the previous chapter, followed by a brief overview of Part II, then a short comment on the lexicon. The historical theological discussion of non-violence then begins.

3.1.1. Review

The objective of this research project is the unmasking of language and ideas in the Christian tradition that are regarded as "non-violence" promoting, which function in cooperation with systems of oppression that harm the marginalized Other, particularly Black persons. The goal of this unmasking is the fostering of Christian imagination, and then construction, of a world that allows for the inbreaking of the Kingdom of God wherein all of creation flourishes.

The research began in the previous section with a look at the teachings of scripture, as they relate to principles of "non-violence." What was revealed was that the veil of "non-violence" leads to a reading of the text that often hides its meaning. Rather than emphasizing the use or non-use of coercive force, the scriptures reveal teaching that emphasize Jesus's interest in asserting his own dignity, and his defiance of the powers of the world that attempted to diminish his dignity. Scripture reveals a Jesus who moves, acts and speaks with freedom and inner power; who so lives into the freeness and power of his being, that threats against him by the powers do not elicit his fear nor cause his freedom and dignity to be diminished. The message of the exegesis was that, it is not a concern for "non-violence" that is central to Christian life and practice, but that the same level of inner worth and freedom that Jesus had, is intended as the privilege and responsibility of all Christians.

3.1.2. Overview

This section of the research continues the investigation of the Christian discourse of non-violence. The section begins with discussion of the vocabulary of "non-violence," "peace," "anti-violence," etc. A general description of how the terms are understood and used in the paper is provided. Following this, Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 consider the historical theological conceptualization of the concept of "non-violence" in the Christian tradition. Chapter three examines the first centuries of church history. Chapter four considers the medieval to the early middle ages church period. Chapter five considers the middle ages through modernity. Chapter

six covers modernity to the twentieth century. What the historical review shows is that "non-violence" has never been a static theological concept. What is also demonstrated is that *there has never been a period in the history of the Christian tradition when violence—the use of physically coercive force--was not accepted as legitimate, in one way or another.*

3.1.3. The Vocabulary

The language of peace and non-violence is typically broad and imprecise, being characterized, even as confused.[328] Related terms such as "pacifism," "non-violence," "nonresistance," "non-violent resistance," "Christian non-violence," etc., are often used in the public sphere haphazardly and interchangeably. Swartley questions whether the term *non-violence* has replaced *peace* in contemporary interpretations of the New Testament.[329] Hauerwas notes that while peace is clearly not violent, "a peace that is no more than "not violence" surely cannot be the peace that is ours in Christ."[330] While Yoder asserted that "there is no such thing as a single position called pacifism, to which one clear definition can be given and which is held by all."[331] Thus, Yoder, avowed advocate of peace, was also a self-described non-pacifist. Ultimately, as Yoder Neufeld notes, to speak of peace in the Christian tradition becomes an inexpressible task because of the "radical spiritual, social and cosmic dimensions"[332] of Christ's peace.

Yoder Neufeld's articulation of the problem of speaking of Christian peace encapsulates my thinking on this subject. Writing about the full dimension of peace would warrant several specialized dissertations that go beyond the scope of this one. For the purposes of this project, recognizing the limits and expansiveness of the ways in which peace may be spoken, "pacifism" is used to refer to the refrain from use of physical force and also the non-resistance to use to physical force against self or others. Non-violence[333] will refer to habitually

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[328] Gene Sharp, "The Meanings of Non-Violence: A Typology (Revised)," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3, no. 1 (1959): 41.

[329] Willard M. Swartley, *Covenant of Peace: The Missing Peace in New Testament Theology and Ethics* (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2006), 6.

[330] Stanley Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence* (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2015), 170.

[331] Hauerwas, 172 citing, John Howard Yoder, *Nevertheless: Varieties of Religious Pacifism* (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1992), p. 12.

[332] Swartley, *Covenant of Peace*, 8 citing John Yoder Neufeld, Ephesians, 229.

[333] A distinction has been made in the field of peace studies or peace and conflict studies between "non-violence" and "nonviolence." "[W]hile both refer to actions without violence, the latter [without a hyphen] also implies an explicit commitment to the strategy or philosophy of peaceful resistance." Madge Micheels-Cyrus, "Violence & Non-Violence," in *Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation: 20 Notions for Theory and Practice* (Berlin: Berghof Foundation Operations GmbH, 2012), 118, https://www.berghof-

refraining from the coercive use of physical force. It may or may not incorporate non-resistance. The implication of a definition that regards the disuse of physical force as definitive of non-violence, is that certain acts that are understood as "non-violent" by contemporary activists, e.g., nonviolent action, nonviolent direct action, direct action, nonviolent resistance, positive action, etc., may be deemed "violent" acts, to the extent that they rely upon the coercive use of physical force, whether or not human beings are injured or killed in the use of such acts.[334]

When speaking of direct, physical acts of violence, the paper will refer alternately to "acts of physical aggression," "physical violence" and the "coercive use of physical force." The emphasis will be on the physical expression of violence as opposed to other nonphysical, and/or non-visible expressions of violence. The physical expression of coercive force may or may not include harm to persons. Harm to property is also regarded as "violent." This is in line with the cultural perception of the destruction of property during protest by the marginalized, as acts of violence, or as "violent protest."[335]

Finally, the notion of justice is addressed in the research. Like "peace," "justice" could easily merit its own dissertation. In this research project, justice is contemplated as God's justice, rather than juridical determinations of the law. As the introduction to *God's Justice: The Holy Bible* describes, God's justice is related to righteousness. The two words come from the same root and are inseperable. Justice means "to make things right," and includes, "care for

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foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Books/Book_Glossary_Chapters_en/berghof_glossary_2012_20_violence_and_non-violence.pdf. In this paper, because no such commitment to ideology is intended, the hypen has been preserved in the usage of the term.

[334] Sharp would make a distinction between acts that result in damage to persons and those that result in damage to property. For him, harm to persons constitutes "violence," while damage to property constitutes "sabotage." See, Gene Sharp and Adam Roberts, *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts*, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). The distinction is not observed in this research as it is regarded as a subjective distinction. Part III's discussion of Nelson Mandela's politics of armed resistance reflect that his actions of sabotage were deemed by himself and society as acts of "violence."

[335] I note that the protest of White persons that intentionally or unintentionally damages property, may or may not be characterized by society as violent. The Cantonsville Nine, which included activists Daniel and Philip Berrigan, provide an example. During an anti-war, anti-draft protest in 1968, the group "entered the draft board office near Baltimore in broad daylight and ransacked the drawers, seizing hundreds of papers as a clerk tried to wrest them back. Outside…they dumped the files of would-be soldiers in the parking lot and incinerated them…" 250 similar acts of protest throughout the U.S. duplicated the Cantonsville Nine's acts. See, Maggie Astor, "Their Protest Helped End the Draft. 50 Years Later, It's Still Controversial.," *The New York Times*, July 18, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/us/catonsville-nine-anniversary.html. When compared, for example, to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s contemporaneious activism, for which he was regularly charged and vilified for lawbreaking that incited riots, the brazenness of the trespassing, vandalizing, theft of property from government offices, and of public burning, as well as the mimicry of the acts throughout the country, reflect that different standards have been applied for White protesters', when acts are being construed by society as "violent" or "not violent."

God's creation, generosity to the poor, good government, a world without wars, protection for the vulnerable, an end to lies and bribes…and much, much, more."[336] It includes, as well, making things right with regard to racialized oppression. "Making things right," in this project does not entail consideration of outcomes related to soteriology or the eschatological judgment of God. It entails the Spirit of God at work in the world through humanity. "Making it right" is God's way in the world now.

3.2. Introduction of the Early Church Period

Christian non-violence has enjoyed a preeminent theological ideological position throughout Christian history. Though the church has accepted legitimation of war under prescribed conditions ("just war"), engagement in physical violence has often been regarded as inappropriate to the practice of the Christian faith. From where is the conception of the church as a people of peace and non-violence derived? This question cannot be answered by simple reference to dogma and doctrine. Doctrine is rooted in history, and history is contingent upon the particularities of context.

This section will trace the origins of the church's conceptualization of Christian non-violence. By looking back to the ways that non-violence and peace were originally understood and practiced, the origins of the church's continuing privileging of the concepts will be made clear.

Further, historical review demonstrates that, nearly from the time of the birth of the church, the church's stance on matters pertaining to violence and refraining from violence has been ambivalent. Some forms of physical violence have been forbidden as inimical to faith in Christ, while at the same time, other forms of physical violence have received church approbation. Even where the church has been clear in its censure of physical violence, its doctrinal assertions about violence reflect a consistent tendency toward evolution and change over time.

What the text of scripture reveals about the apostolic church[337] is that there was physical violence that was not abhorred, but applied as justice warranted, e.g., the deaths of Ananias

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[336] Eds., "Introducing God's Justice: The Holy Bible," in *NIV, God's Justice: The Holy Bible: The Flourishing of Creation and the Destruction of Evil* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2016), iv.

[337] Reference to the apostolic church relies upon the biblical text as historic record, or historiography, of events that took place. I do not rely upon the biblical text as factual proof of the events transpiring as written, rather as a record that events like those described did occur, and that the events that occurred were perceived and remembered, and conveyed in writing in a particular way. The scriptural text as historical reference might be

and Sapphira.[338] The idea that physically violent acts under all circumstances were contrary to the nature of God and to the calling of the church, is not an accurate portrayal of the apostolic church.

In the early church of the second and third centuries, the expected apocalypse had not arrived. The church carried on, on the fringes of Roman society. The church's eschewal of physical violence, in favour of enduring persecution was the tradition that was passed down. Those in the church continued to endure persecution and martyrdom as they continued in faithfulness to the testimony of Jesus. Added to the notion of willing death held by the apostolic church, was the idea that killing, under any circumstances, was incompatible with the Christian witness. Questions about soldiering were met with the answers of church leaders that soldiering and killing could not be performed by the Christian, who was meant to live pursuant to the greater commandment of love. Nonetheless, there were ample examples of Christian soldiers. There is also evidence that Christians, though still subject to persecution, had grown to permeate all levels of Roman society. Greater involvement in the civil life of Rome meant that there were no universally applied prohibitions against soldiering and killing.

By the fourth century the church had transitioned from a fringe cult to the dominant religion of the Empire. Symbolism for Christ, Constantine's *chi-rho* cross, became the military standard of the imperial troops. Ambrose, the Bishop of Milan, was chief counsellor to the emperor in matters of ethics and faith, and influenced the emperor's control of the military; giving counsel about the proper and improper use of military violence. Threatened by marauding hordes from the north, Ambrose officially abandoned the traditional idea that Christians should refrain from killing, yet continued to make killing off-limits to clergy, and to morally compel the individual Christian to refrain from self-defence, preferring instead one's death than harm inflicted upon another. Ambrose's pupil, Augustine, whose home was also in the path of invading armies, further developed and systematized the idea of acceptable killing.

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considered then, a kind of creative non-fiction, in the vein of literary journalism, memoir, or personal essay. These literary forms are valuable in that they are meant to offer recollections of events that exist in the official historical record, from an author's specific, albeit subjective, point of view. "The [writing] may indeed be subjective, but it is still concerned with people who have really lived and events that have really happened, presenting history as a matter of personal significance as well as public record in a way that more objective reports--providing "just the facts"--could never hope to." William Bradley, "The Ethical Exhibitionist's Agenda: Honesty and Fairness in Creative Nonfiction," *College English* 70, no. 2 (2007): 204, https://doi.org/10.2307/25472261.

[338] See, Acts 5:1-11.

Augustine's theory of "just war" articulated specific conditions that would validate the resort to warfare and killing by the emperor's Christian armies, and by Christians.

Thus unfolds the narrative regarding pacifism and non-violence in the originating life of the church. What is seen is an apostolic church that embraced martyrdom, but not non-violence. Violence could be employed by the state, by those in authority, and by the Spirit, yet the individual Christian followed the pattern of non-resistance to persecution.

It could be argued, from the acceptance of the physically violent nature of the culture, generally, that the apostolic church was not pacifist as much as it was pragmatic. The church was an ostracized minority religious faction, within an already ostracized minority religious faction. It was persecuted by both its local cultural affiliates, the Jewish temple complex authorities, and later by the broader imperial community of Romans. First-century Palestine was rife with tumult and social unrest, with the Roman army securing peace through ruthless and crushing military power. Christians were isolated and without coalition with any other marginalized group. Under the circumstances, the possibility and appearance of political resistance could have meant annihilation, while withdrawal from public life, and subversive communitarianism, could safeguard group survival.

Added to this was the imminent apocalyptic expectation of Jesus-followers. Questions about whether a person should marry or even work were confronting the church, since the end of the age was seemingly near. These circumstances do not bespeak a spiritual call to resist all violence. What is indicated is that the specific circumstances of the first-century Christians mandated habits of church life like surreptitiousness and acquiescence. Already facing the wrath of the Jewish elite, they sought to avoid incurring the wrath of the Romans. Witnessing the crushing of insurgents in Palestine, during the first Jewish War, they sought to avoid insurgency and crushing. Expecting the imminent destruction of all that is, they sought to endure whatever suffering was required in this life, in committed hope of their truth found in Jesus, and of reward in the life to come. The church became inward looking, not seeking to impact the larger world and its injustices but seeking to remain unmolested by those in power.

The habits of the fugitive church, fugitivity, became enshrined as the doctrine of the church of the next generation. Though social instability had decreased for the church, and the imminent hope of Christ's return was absent, the instruction to endure persecution without resistance was carried forward. However, because the Jesus-followers were soon geographically dispersed and a generation removed from the rebellions, insurgencies, and crushings of war-stricken Palestine, alternate rationales for non-resistance were applied.

In the work of most of the patristic authors discussed in this section, the rationale that emerged for the Christian's counter-cultural living and non-resistance of persecution became that of modelling the love of Christ. Christ's love, rather than Christ's boldness or Christ's return, took precedence, and with it developed doctrine that privileged love. From this came admonitions against killing and soldiering. Despite this, in the lived experience of Christians, soldiering did occur, and unloving ostracism and church persecution of "heretics" was common. Also, Christians moved more and more into the cultural mainstream.

By the fourth century Christianity had become well-enough regarded that it was embraced by the emperor and made the official religion of the realm. The bishops, both in the East and in the West, now the guardians and tutors of the empire's faith, switched course on the issue of killing and physical violence and deemed it to be unequivocally forbidden only to the clergy. Otherwise, particularly for purposes of defending the empire, and thus the faith, killing and soldiering was a duty of the Christian, though perhaps a reluctant one.

3.3. The Apostolic Period

Non-violence ethics attributed to the pages of scripture derive from the presentation of Jesus in the gospels as physically non-violent. Though Jesus is confrontational in his words and actions, he refrains from the use of physical force. Jesus is presented as the much-anticipated messiah, yet his portrayal is of one who is "a humble, non-military messiah who does not conquer through physical force;"[339] nor does he preach a message of armed revolt. Jesus predicts and attempts to prepare his followers for his suffering, he submits willingly to his arrest by armed men, and he yields to an unjust state execution. Jesus's actions did not seek to preserve his own life, nor seek political power, nor did he use force to compel anyone to comply with his will. Rather, Jesus surrendered his will, and his life, to the mission of salvation of humanity.

Largely because of Jesus's model of non-aggression, the apostolic church adopted the ethical and political position of non-violence. The "non-violence" that was embraced by the early church, was the non-violence of absolute pacifism,[340] which principle espoused that

[339] Desjardins, *Peace, Violence and the New Testament*, 20.

[340] Douglas Bond uses this term, see, Douglas G. Bond, "The Nature and Meanings of Nonviolent Direct Action: An Exploratory Study," *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 1 (1988): 81–89. But see, Wink, who argues that the Greek *antistēnai* likely means "do not resist violently," thus, that Jesus exhorted his followers to non-violent resistance, rather than nonresistance. Collected Readings and Walter Wink, "Jesus' Third Way: Nonviolent Engagement," in *Walter Wink: Collected Readings* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013), 202–5.

followers of Jesus must endure suffering and sacrifice up to and including the point of their death. This is a non-violence that refuses to kill. The non-violence of the apostolic church is less clear on the issue of war. There was no sharing of the mood of insurrection and rebellion that was prevalent during the first century, however there seemed to be no objection to Christian soldiering. The non-violence of the apostolic church was a non-violence that primarily concerned with refraining from engagement in personal physical violence, and in acts of insurrection. The non-violence of the early church was entirely *negative* in its prescriptive orientation, stating what should *not* be physically done to others inside or outside of the church. It does not address what *should* be done to/for others, particularly those outside the church, in the name of promoting peace, beyond injunctions as to live harmoniously as a subsect of society.

3.3.1. Ambivalence About Violence

There is a clear teaching of non-violence, as well as spiritual and cosmic peace, in the pages of New Testament scripture, yet also undercurrents of violence in the stories that scripture tells.[341] Thus, it is fair to say that the early church's teaching on non-violence, violence, and peace was ambivalent.[342] The text of scripture makes it difficult to characterize the apostolic church as non-violent.

First, though the members of the church did not kill, ostensibly following Jesus's example of refraining from killing, relying upon the act of not killing as an indication of the church's non-violence requires basing the conceptualization of the non-violence of the church strictly upon the church's use or disuse of physical acts of force. This does not provide a full account of the milieu of violence that is represented in the corpus of scripture.

Also, the simple refraining from acts of physical force does not address the root issue of *why* the church refrains from such acts. For Jesus, who hailed from the margins of society,

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[341] For example, there is violence in the encounters between the cosmic forces of good and evil, there is violence in the parables with respect to acts of both protagonists and antagonists, (e.g., in the parable of the talents where the master (who has an ambiguous role as either the empowering protagonist, or as the unreasonable task-master, and thus an antagonist), throws his non-profitmaking servant into "the outer darkness."), there is violence in the accepted penalizing of women, there is violence in the cursing and death of the fig tree, there is violence in the language that Jesus uses towards his adversaries, and there is eschatological violence throughout.

[342] See, Desjardins, *Peace, Violence and the New Testament*; Warren Carter, "Sanctioned Violence in the New Testament," *Interpretation* 71, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 284–97, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020964317698764; de Villiers and Henten, *Coping with Violence in the New Testament*; Biggar, "Specify and Distinguish! Interpreting the New Testament on `Non-Violence'"; Biggar, "The New Testament and Violence."

who was a friend of sinners, whose closest friends carried swords, and whom he directed to do so, whose instructive stories regularly concluded with the antagonists facing divine judgement and wrath, and who commented that legions of angels were at his disposal if he but called, there was no apparent aversion to violence in itself. Jesus's self-articulation for refraining from acts of physical force, was so that "the scriptures [would] be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way." What this means is that Jesus practices non-violence, his surrender to arrest and crucifixion, to effect the plan of salvation. His refusal to resist was for the sake of "others," i.e., separated humanity.

If the church was following the example of Jesus, then its actions should have been based on an ethic of not resisting violence directed at it, and should also have been consistent with the rationale for Jesus's action of non-resistance unto death, which was for the sake of the lives of "others," or separated humanity. During the apostolic period, this was not the church's ethics. While it is true that those martyred did not resist their perpetrators, it is arguable as to whether or not those martyred went to their deaths as fully surrendered. The text of scripture recounts Stephen's many words upon being arrested prior to his stoning, whereas Jesus offered almost no words to his captors after his arrest. On the other hand, Paul, while unresisting of arrest, availed himself of every means of securing a trial, "justice," and prolonging his life. While his use of the apparatus of state to his own advantage, and extensions of his life are radically opposite of the example set by Jesus, his rationale was the same. Jesus surrendered for the sake of "others," or separated humanity. Paul stayed alive for the same reason. The rationale for the surrender of the martyrs of the apostolic period is not a uniform picture.

Second, there is contrary evidence that killing and war were forbidden during the apostolic period. The evidence of scripture does not indicate that being a soldier was to be an adversary to the kingdom. In Luke's gospel the text shows, presumably, sword-carrying soldiers among those who went to the Jordan to be baptized by John. When they asked, along with tax collectors, "And we, what should we do?" John did not turn the soldiers away, nor did he instruct them to abandon their position as soldiers. His instructions concerned integrity of service and money: "Do not extort money from anyone by threats or false accusation, and be satisfied with your wages."[343] Jesus also does not condemn soldiers. Matthew and Luke recount Jesus as being called to heal the slave of a centurion (a military commander of one hundred

[343] See, Luke 3:1-4.

men), and Jesus willingly going to the centurion's aid. When the centurion sends word that he is not worthy to receive Jesus, but that Jesus simply needs to speak a word for the slave to be healed, Jesus commends the centurion's incomparable faith. "[N]ot even in Israel have I found such faith," Jesus remarks.[344] No negative connotation attaches to the centurion's military profession. Likewise, when the centurion at the foot of the cross is identified in the text,[345] no negative connotation attaches to his service as a soldier—despite the fact that he participated in the execution of at least 3 men that very day. Finally, the text explicitly notes, of the post-resurrection apostolic church, the salvation and baptism of "Cornelius, a centurion of the Italian Cohort."[346] Later is recounted the salvation and baptism of the sword-wielding Roman guard of the jail where Paul and Silas were held in chains.[347] It is difficult to dismiss these examples that demonstrate that killing, which is implicit when serving in a police or military role is not a bar to entry into and participation in the kingdom of God.

A final note regarding the apostolic church is that, even if the church were entirely an absolute pacifist church, an argument that the above examples make difficult to sustain, the traditional depiction of the mode of the church as *negatively* absolute pacifist, is divergent from the gospel example of Jesus's life and teaching. Jesus's concern was not for his own longevity and security, rather for ministry to the masses of Palestinian Jews. Throughout its short span, Jesus's ministry was consistently depicted as intervening on behalf of those whose human dignity was being violated, be they adulterers, tax collectors, lepers, sex-workers, suffering from illness, or ritually unclean. *His intervention was not only that of personally restoring the dignity of individuals and bringing healing, but also that of confronting the power structure that was the source of their violation.* Jesus did not demur, and was not 'nonresistant' to the powers of exploitation and oppression. Jesus was in full resistance to the powers and authorities of his day. He challenged their authority with his greater authority, including the authority to forgive sin, and his authority to interpret the law for himself and others. Jesus was ever willing to publicly indict the Jewish elites' corruption, and did not hesitate to publicly humiliate them with his power and authority,[348] exercised on behalf of the marginalized and excluded. Jesus's

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[344] See, Luke 7:1-10; Matt. 8:5-13.
[345] See, Mark 15:39, Matt. 27:54, and Luke 23:47.
[346] See, Acts 10:1
[347] See, Acts 16:25-34
[348] See, for example, Jesus casts out a demon and teaches with astounding authority (Mark 1:27-28), Jesus heals a paralytic and confronts the Jewish elites for their thoughts about his deed (Mark 2:5-11, Matt. 9: 2-8); Jesus rebukes the Jewish elites for their judgment of the disciples who ate grain on the sabbath when they

confrontations of the powers of the Jewish community, can be viewed as the incarnation of Jesus's spiritual confrontation with the powers of evil, and as representational of the ultimate confrontation with the power of death. *Jesus confronts what has the power to kill him*. That power eventually dies, while Jesus, who was dead, lives on. In this sense, the remembrance of Jesus's death that is instituted prior to his arrest, may be understood as a remembrance, not simply of Jesus's non-resistance, but of his confrontation with the powers, which preceded his surrender.

While the apostolic church may be represented as a church that followed the non-violent example of Jesus, the apostolic church fell woefully short in following the non-violent resistance model of Jesus, which functioned to bring life and freedom to the oppressed.

3.3.2. Conclusion

The church tradition generally frames the Apostolic church as a church of absolute pacifism. This period of the church is viewed as demonstrating a pure adherence to Jesus's teaching of non-resistance, epitomized by the Sermon on The Mount and by Jesus's surrender to crucifixion. The church in its faithfulness, the tradition holds, refrained from killing as well as from participation in war. It modelled peaceableness both among adherents and with outsiders. The church tradition's framing does not withstand scrutiny. It requires the setting aside of the intrinsic violence of the text, and adopting a view of violence, and hence, non-violence, that is limited to enactments of physical force. It does not speak to the "why?" of Jesus's refrain from use of physical force, nor account for those occasions where Jesus did use physical force, such as during the temple incident, nor account for Jesus's aggressive speech, e.g., with religious elites, Peter, the Canaanite woman, etc. Further, framing the apostolic church as an absolute pacifist church, which refrained from killing, ignores the examples in the text of the kingdom's welcome of soldiers and guards, and the demise of Ananias and Sapphira. Finally, such a framing fails to follow the complete example of Jesus, who generally

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were hungry (Matt. 12:1-8); Jesus, despite the elites' plan to entrap him with the law, heals a man on the sabbath and re-interprets the law, after which the plots to kill him begin (Matt: 12:9-14). Jesus, as an invited guest of a Jewish elite Pharisee, nonetheless pronounces prophetic condemnation (Luke 11:37:37-54), "Now you Pharisees clean the outside of the cup and dish, but inside you are full of greed and evil. You fools!" (39-40) and then proceeded to lambast them with woe, after woe, for their injustices (42-52). His deeds provoked the fierce opposition of the leaders who thereafter, "were lying in wait for him, to catch him in something he might say" (54). Jesus healed a disabled woman, over the objection of the temple elite and then rebuked the man for his objection. The "opponents" of Jesus were humiliated and put to shame, yet the people rejoiced. (Luke 13:10-17).

demonstrates a lack of use of physical force, but at the same time also demonstrates full resistance to the ruling powers, not non-resistance.

Jesus can be viewed as exercising a "non-violence" that is personally non-resistant, for the purpose of fulfilling the scriptures and thereby effecting salvation for all. His practices were also publicly confrontational, in order to assert his own, and his followers', worth and dignity, to establish that their value was not determined by those who claim to be honourable (and in fact are not), and in order to incarnate the spiritual contest between good and evil. Ultimately, the peace of the apostolic church fails to mimic this standard of non-violence. It did not refrain from physical violence for the purpose of aiding or restoring third-parties to life, dignity and flourishing, either physically, spiritually or otherwise. While there was the assertion of dignity and self-determination of Jesus-followers through their choice to live counter-culturally, and to hold to the testimony of Jesus even if it cost their lives, unlike Jesus, the apostolic church did not act to confront the powers that exploited and oppressed.

For these reasons, it unpersuasive that the apostolic church was a pacifist church, which followed the ways of Jesus, in the way that "pacifism" is employed by Christians today.

3.4. The Patristic Period

The patristic church fathers' theology of non-violence was rooted in the church's marginalized identity. As those at risk of persecution, the church deemed it impossible for the church itself to participate in persecution. Further, because of the risk of persecution, and in the face of possibly oppressive state power, church theology promoted flourishing of the spirit, and the fight of spiritual war, rather than material comfort on earth or physical battles and warfare. Whereas the early church's non-violence emphasized the imminent hope of Jesus's return, and the judgment of evil, the patristic church's non-violence emphasized maintaining a particular Christian lifestyle.[349] The church merged its non-violence ethics, which was primarily concerned with peaceful interpersonal relations, no killing, and later no military service, with an ethics of personal piety and communal care.

While there is not an extensive treatment of non-violence, violence and war in the corpus of the church fathers' writings, historian Robert Clouse concludes that the early church was predominantly interested in the gospel's teachings on love, which informed their teaching

[349] Charles discusses the overall lifestyle that is expected of Christians. See, Charles, "Early-Christian Attitudes Toward Soldiering," 20.

on non-violence and war. "The early church saw an incompatibility between love and killing. Consequently, the early Christians would not serve in the Roman army. There is no evidence of a single Christian soldier after New Testament times, until about A.D.170." The intolerance towards Christian soldiering was a shift from the neutral position of the apostolic church, which seemed to follow the example of Jesus and John the Baptist and to make no requirement of refusal to serve in the military. The patristic church did not support social or political change through protest and uprising, and instead regularly signalled support for the Empire. Eventually, by the middle of the second century, the church showed an acceptance of military service. This signalled the changing relationship, and the inclusion, that Christians began to experience within the social order. Between the Apostolic period and the second century, however, the Christian church eschewed soldiering, war, and killing.

3.4.1. Pre-Constantine Church Fathers

It is quite common to find evidence at this pre-second century juncture, of the church's vehement opposition to service in the military and to killing. Ronald Sider[350] has compiled an exhaustive reference of the teachings of early church leaders with respect to the use of lethal violence. It includes the writing of The Didache, The Epistle of Barnabas, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Irenaus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Juius Africanus, Archelaus, and many others. A few examples will suffice to establish the nature of the teaching.

3.4.1.1. Justin Martyr

Justin Martyr was born a gentile Samaritan in approximately 100 CE. He received a Greek education and subsequently became a Christian disciple. He taught in Rome before being martyred for refusing to sacrifice to the Roman Gods.[351] Justin was one of the earliest martyrs of the church and set a precedent for non-resistance. From a letter to Trypho, who was Jewish, in arguing that Jesus was the messiah, Justin wrote the following:

> [We] Christians…having learned the true worship of God from the law, and the word which went forth from Jerusalem by means of the apostles of Jesus, have fled for safety to the God of Jacob and God of Israel; and we who were filled with war, and mutual slaughter, and every wickedness, have each through the whole earth changed our warlike weapons,—our swords into ploughshares, and our spears into implements of tillage,—

[350] Sider, Ronald J. Sider, *The Early Church on Killing: A Comprehensive Sourcebook on War, Abortion, and Capital Punishment*, Ebook (Baker Academic, 2012).

[351] Sider, 26

> and we cultivate piety, righteousness, philanthropy, faith, and hope, which we have from the Father Himself through Him who was crucified. Now it is evident that no one can terrify or subdue us who have believed in Jesus all over the world. For it is plain that, though beheaded, and crucified, and thrown to wild beasts, and chains, and fire, and all other kinds of torture, we do not give up our confession; but the more such things happen, the more do others in larger numbers become faithful, and worshipers of God through the name of Jesus."[352]

From this passage Justin Martyr's understanding of conversion to the Christian faith as a holistically transformative experience is clear. What believers in Christ once were, they are no longer. Justin is concerned with the true worship of God, and belief in Jesus as the promised Jewish messiah. He considers suffering, specifically State terror, as a means through which others will come to believe in Jesus and to worship God. Thus, there is no need to fear persecution. Martyr's reference to the long-ago-prophesied end of war, and weapons of war, ("swords into ploughshares, and our spears into implements of tillage") is echoed in the writing of later patristics.

Justin Martyr exemplifies a spiritually-inspired non-resistance to the persecution of the state. His might be a considered a non-resistance that copies the non-resistance of Jesus, in that it is performed with the intention that others will come to believe in Jesus, and in so doing find life and peace. His construal does not, however, fully conform to the paradigm established by Jesus. It does not embody Jesus's confrontational ethos. Justin lifts up inner transformation, rather than Christ's outworking of transformation of the social order.

3.4.1.2. Clement of Alexandria

Clement of Alexandria was likely born in Athens around 150 CE. He was educated in philosophy and poetry, travelled widely, and settled as a teacher of philosophy in Alexandria around 180 CE.[353] Origen was his most well-known student.[354] Clement's writings are extensive, yet they contain very little on violence, war, or military service. Highlighted are examples from his works.

In his *Exhortation to the Greeks*, Clement sets forth that the Christian is meant to engage in warfare that is spiritual, and in so doing the Christian imitates Christ.

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[352] Sider, *The Early Church on Killing*, 30–31 citing, Ante-Nicene Fathers: The Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds. 9 vols. (1885; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004).

[353] Sider, 42.

[354] Sider, 42.

> The loud trumpet, when sounded, collects the soldiers, and proclaims war. And shall not Christ, breathing a strain of peace to the ends of the earth, gather together His own soldiers, the soldiers of peace? Well, by His blood, and by the word, He has gathered the bloodless host of peace, and assigned to them the kingdom of heaven. The trumpet of Christ is His Gospel. He hath blown it, and we have heard. "Let us array ourselves in the armour of peace, putting on the breastplate of righteousness, and taking the shield of faith, and binding our brows with the helmet of salvation; and let us sharpen the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God" [cf. Eph. 6:14–17]. So the apostle in the spirit of peace commands. These are our invulnerable weapons: armed with these, let us face the evil one. Let us quench "the fiery darts of the evil one" with the sword-points dipped in water that have been baptized by the Word. . . . Better far, then, is it to become at once the imitator and the servant of the best of all beings; for only by holy service will anyone be able to imitate God, and to serve and worship Him only by imitating Him.[355]

This passage is also notable in that he uses the image of Christ's trumpet call not sounding the call of the final judgment, but the call to his peacemakers, who are to live arrayed in the armour of peace fighting their spiritual battles. The apostolic church's expectation of Christ's trumpet sounding the end of earthly life, the eschatological expectation, is completely absent.

Later, in his *Miscellanies*, Clement writes:

> [T]he humane law orders to be relieved from military service: [for] military reasons in the first place, lest, bent on their desires,[356] they turn out sluggish in war; for it is those who are untrammelled by passion that boldly encounter perils; and from motives of humanity, since in view of the uncertainties of war, the law reckoned it not right that one should not enjoy his own labours, and [that] another should…receive what belonged to those who had laboured. The law seems to also point out manliness of soul, by enacting that he who had planted should reap the fruit, and he that built should inhabit, and he that had betrothed should marry.… Does it not command us "to love strangers not only as friends and relatives, but as ourselves, both in body and soul?" …Accordingly, it is expressly said, "You shall not abhor an Egyptian, for you were a sojourner in

[355] Sider, Clement, *Exhortation to the Greeks*, para. 11 citing ANF 2:204; cf. the translation in Merton, Clement, 27. .

[356] He references the Deuteronomy provision for those with newly built homes, newly planted vineyards, and new wives to be excused from service in the military. See, Deut. 20:5–7.

> Egypt" [Deut. 23:7]; designating by the term Egyptian either one of that race, or any one in the world. And enemies, although drawn up before the walls attempting to take the city, are not to be regarded as enemies until they are by the voice of the herald summoned to peace [cf. Deut. 20:10].[357]

In this mid-second century writing, Clement does not encourage Christians to refrain from soldiering and war, but rather recognizes military service as an obligation, a reversal of his previous position in *Exhortation to the Greeks*. He states the just rationales for the law's release of men from military service, which include: their lack of focus on their military service, fairness, and the "manliness of soul" of enjoying the fruit of one's labour. Further, he states that enemies must first be given terms of peace. Yet he does not object to war or to the killing of enemies, generally.

Finally, in *Who Is the Rich Man That Shall Be Saved?*, Clement describes, again, the ideal of manly valour, saying it is the one who is ostensibly weaker that is in fact the man who is stronger in spirit:

> But be not deceived, thou who hast tasted of the truth, and been reckoned worthy of the great redemption. But contrary to what is the case with the rest of people, collect for thyself an unarmed, an unwarlike, a bloodless, a passionless, a stainless host, pious old men, orphans dear to God, widows armed with meekness, people adorned with love. Obtain with thy money such guards, for body and for soul, for whose sake a sinking ship is made buoyant, when steered by the prayers of saints alone; and disease at its height subdued, put to flight by the laying on of hands; and the attack of robbers is disarmed, spoiled by pious prayers; and the might of demons is crushed, put to shame in its operations by strenuous commands.[358]

Clement notes instances of physical attack or peril, and then that the prayers of the saints, of the pious, weak, and old man, are the means of overcoming. By the prayers of such lowly persons "demons are crushed." Thus, here Clement seems to again urge spiritual strength, rather than military or police defence.

It appears that for Clement military service is not an irregular feature of the life of Christians. Rather, that it is accepted, with Clement arguing for a privileging of the spiritual life over the life that relies upon physical strength or human victory. Clement does not address

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[357] Sider, *The Early Church on Killing*, chap. "Clement of Alexandria," sec. Miscellanies, para. 218 citing ANF 2:365–67.

[358] Sider, chap. "Clement of Alexandria," sec. *Who Is the Rich Man...*, para. 34 citing ANF 2:601.

non-resistance, nor does Clement speak to the issue of confrontation of the worldly powers for redress of wrongs against the marginalized.

3.4.1.3. Tertullian

Tertullian was born in Carthage, Roman North Africa in 160 CE. He was educated in Latin and Greek and became a Christian convert towards the middle of his life.[359] A prodigious corpus of writing rather suddenly was begun following his conversion.[360] Tertullian was the first Christian to write extensively in Latin. Writing around the same time as Clement, he is often presented as an unambiguous opponent of violence in the life of the Christian. Evidence for this is found in the regular treatment of military service and violence by Tertullian in both his earlier and later writings.[361]

In his *Apology*, Tertullian wrote that Christians are enjoined "to pray to God for our enemies, and to beseech blessings on our persecutors."[362] In *On the Spectacles*, he notes of God: "He puts His prohibition on every sort of man-killing by that one summary precept, "Thou shalt not kill." [64][363] In *On Patience*, he says, "If one attempts to provoke you by manual violence, the admonition of the Lord is at hand: "To him," He saith, "who smiteth thee on the face, turn the other cheek likewise" [Matt. 5:39]. Let outrageousness grow weary from your patience. Whatever that blow may be, conjoined with pain and contumely, it shall receive a heavier one from the Lord. [68]"[364] Here it is noteworthy that though Tertullian finds the Christian to be enjoined from reprisals or violent acts, he accepts without qualm that God acts harshly in vindication of the Christian.

With regard to Christian involvement in military service, Tertullian is particularly clear. About this he says in *On Idolatry*:

> But how will a Christian man war, nay, how will he serve even in peace, without a sword, which the Lord has taken away? For albeit soldiers had come unto John, and had received the formula of their rule; albeit, likewise, a centurion had believed;

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[359] "Catholic Encyclopedia: Tertullian," accessed April 20, 2018, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14520c.htm.

[360] Sider, *The Early Church on Killing*, chap. "Tertullian," intro.

[361] Tertullian began to follow Montanist teachings later in his life, and became critical of the orthodox church. His teachings on military service and killing, however, remained consistent.

[362] Sider, Apology, para 31.

[363] Sider, On the Spectacles, para. 2.

[364] Sider, On Patience, para. 8.

> still the Lord afterward, in disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier. [76][365]

He is even more adamant in *The Crown*:

> Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword [cf. Matt. 26:52]? And shall the son of peace take part in the battle when it does not become him even to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and the torture, and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs?...Shall he be disturbed in death by the trumpet of the trumpeter, who expects to be aroused by the angel's trump?...Then how many other offenses there are involved in the performances of camp offices, which we must hold to involve a transgression of God's law, you may see by a slight survey…Of course, if faith comes later, and finds any preoccupied with military service, their case is different…yet, at the same time, when a man has become a believer, and faith has been sealed, there must be either an immediate abandonment of it, which has been the course with many; or all sorts of quibbling will have to be resorted to in order to avoid offending God, and that is not allowed even outside of military service; or, last of all, for God the fate must be endured which a citizen-faith[92] has been no less ready to accept.[366]

Tertullian here offers an extended list of the ways that military service is incompatible with the Christian faith. Notably, one of the ways he lists involves either awaiting the trumpet sounding either of death or of that sounded by the angels, referencing an eschatological hope beyond the grave. Tertullian makes an exception for military service for those who became believers after they had begun serving already, however even this exception is limited.

Tertullian's objection to military service is rooted in following the example of Christ. He does not offer objections based upon love, but the argument is implicit. He does not ground his argument in the salvation of others, nor does he address issues of confrontation of oppressive power. His argument is that peace is required for the Christian for the sake of peace, and the sake of following Christ's example.

3.4.1.4. Origen

Origen was born to a Christian family in Alexandria in 185 CE. He was well educated in Greek culture and the Bible and was named by the bishop as master of the catechetical school

[365] Snider, On Idolatry, para. 19.
[366] Snider, The Crown, para. 11.

in Alexandria when he was eighteen.[367] His extant writings are extensive, and include several documents which address violence, including *Homilies on Joshua*; *On the Principles*; *Commentary on John*; *Commentary on Matthew*; and *Commentary on 1 Corinthians*. His most notable work addressing violence and war, however, is *Against Celsus*, which he wrote in response to the pagan Celsus, who many years before had written a detailed attack of Christians, which included the objection that they shirked civic responsibility by refusing to participate in the military when the empire was rightfully engaged in defending against unjust attack. Throughout Origen's writings, he emphasizes that killing is forbidden the Christian, and that Christian warfare is spiritual in nature.

Because Origen read the Hebrew scriptures in a spiritual, allegorical, manner, he determined them to be consistent with the New Testament directives of peaceableness. In the *Homilies on Joshua* he states:

> [T]hose physical wars [in Jewish history] bore the figure of spiritual wars…For what good was that description of wars to those to whom Jesus says, My peace I give to you; my peace I leave to you [John 14:27], and to whom it is commanded and said through the Apostle, Not avenging your own selves [Rom. 12:19], and, Rather, you receive injury, and, You suffer offense [cf. 1 Cor. 6:7]? *In short, knowing that now we do not have to wage physical wars, but that the struggles of the soul have to be exerted against spiritual adversaries*, the Apostle, just as a military leader, gives an order to the soldiers of Christ, saying, Put on the armour of God, so that you may be able to stand firm against the cunning devices of the Devil [Eph. 6:11].[368]

Origen makes it clear that those he is addressing are not only beyond the times of war described in the Hebrew bible, but the implication is that they are also beyond the precarity of the Christians of the first century. They do not face war or insurrection, or have need or fear of physical warfare. It is spiritual warfare that they are charged with.

Later in *Against Celsus* Origen again comments that Christians are to follow Jesus in the ways of peace:

> And to those who inquire of us whence we come or who is our founder, we reply that we are come agreeably to the counsels of Jesus, to cut down our hostile and insolent 'wordy' swords into ploughshares, and to convert into pruning hooks the spears

[367] Sider, Origen, Intro.

[368] Sider, *The Early Church on Killing*, chap. Origen, Sec. Homilies on Joshua citing Bruce, Homilies on Joshua, 138, emphasis added. .

> formerly employed in war. For we no longer take up sword against nation, nor do we learn war anymore, having become children of peace, for the sake of Jesus, who is our leader…[369]

Here Origen cites the passage regarding turning "swords into ploughshares," and notes that Christians no longer fight wars, but are children of peace "for the sake of Jesus, who is our leader." His basis for adopting the agenda of peace, then, is the imitation of Christ.

Origen also taught that Christians were forbidden to engage in military service, and that prayer was the Christian's duty and rightful service. In reply to Celsus' urging that Christians support the king in war, by fighting with him or leading an army, Origen states:

> [T]he more anyone excels in piety, the more effective help does he render to kings, even more than is given by soldiers, who go forth to fight and slay as many of the enemy as they can…Do not those who are priests at certain shrines…keep their hands free from blood, that they may…offer the appointed sacrifices to your gods...If that, then, is a laudable custom, how much more so, that while others are engaged in battle, these too should engage as the priests and ministers of God, keeping their hands pure, and wrestling in prayers to God on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous cause, and for the king…that whatever is opposed to those who act righteously may be destroyed! And as we by our prayers vanquish all demons who stir up war, and lead to the violation of oaths, and disturb the peace, we in this way are much more helpful to the kings than those who go into the field to fight for them…we fight on his behalf, forming a special army—an army of piety—by offering our prayers to God.[370]

Origen's *Against Celsus*, is significant in several ways. First, in his argument he makes the claim that Christians, as "priests and ministers" of God, should be afforded the same recusal from military service as priests of other gods. In comparing the two he makes Christians the superlative. If the shrine priests do not fight, "how much more so" should Christians not fight. This seems to indicate an accepted norm for Christians; that they occupied an elevated place in the culture with respect to piety and ethics. At the same time, Origen's arguments have the tone of those that might be made on behalf of a minority community seeking to avoid ostracism from the mainstream. It is a defence of the Christian community and lifestyle without any negative assessment of the mainstream. It is as though the Christians occupy an elevated status, but that their elevated status is precarious.

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[369] Sider, chap. Origen, sec. Against Celsus, para. 5.33 citing ANF 4-558.
[370] Sider, chap. Origen, sec. Against Celsus, para. 73 citing ANF 4:667–68.

Additionally, Origen's claims are internally inconsistent. He argues that they should not fight and kill, but also that they will labour spiritually, in prayer, for those who are fighting and killing. What is more, the spiritual "fighting" that the Christians do on behalf of those who are fighting and on behalf of the king, is of greater service than if they physically took up arms. Origen wants to maintain the Christian ideal, but also show support for the empire. The ideal seems to be fatally compromised by his attempt.

Finally, Origen argues that Christians should not kill or fight, but says that they will fight, and "vanquish all demons" whom he identifies as those "who stir up war, [violate] oaths, and disturb the peace." These grounds constitute a demonstration that Origen is loyal to the state and submissive to the state's authority, unlike the "demons" who are not. While Origen is claiming to be following Jesus by refraining from physical violence and war, here he offers no rationale that is consistent with a rationale offered by Jesus's life and teaching.

Jesus never contemplated that his example should be accepted or rejected because his actions conformed to the standards of how imperial religious life was practiced. Origen claims that Christian practices should be accepted just because they are the same as imperial practice. There is no record that Jesus ever prayed for the success of the imperial army or for combatants, who went to war as a matter of course to gain peace. Origen asserts that praying for the army, combatants and the king is exactly what Christians do with vigour. Finally, there is no indication that Jesus would have defended the state's purpose of defeating or punishing those who "stir up war" or those who "disturb the peace." Jesus was arrested and convicted of being exactly one such person, after all. Jesus's mission regularly involved disturbing the peace in the locations he visited.

What might be considered consistent with the position of the apostolic church is that Origen seemed to write from an awareness of his position as precarious in the culture. Unlike the apostolic church, however, his precarious position did not include extreme social exclusion. It did not include an expectation of an imminent end to the persecution that resulted from such exclusion. Rather, Origen's expectation was that the elevated position of the Christians, though precarious, must be sustained as far as possible.

Origen was staunchly opposed to Christian violence and Christian participation in war. However, it is clear from his writings that though he upheld this Christian prohibition, he did not observe it in the sense of being opposed to fighting, killing, and war generally. Nor did he uphold in eschatological hope. He allowed that war and military service are necessary activities of the state, and for the non-Christian citizen. And he allowed that Christian "fighting" in prayer was equivalent, and superior to, physical fighting. He did this with care to preserve his social

position, rather than forsaking his social position and denouncing war and violence, for the sake of following the example of Christ.

3.4.1.5. Conclusion

From Justin Martyr to Origen several things are apparent. First, there was a dispersal of the church, and of Christian authority, throughout the Roman Empire, from Palestine to the northern region of Africa, to Turkey, to Rome, and beyond.[371] The centres of gravity being Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, and Carthage in the second and third centuries.[372] Second, the suffering that the church underwent during this period was deemed to be suffering beneficial to spiritual elevation. Unlike Jesus's persecution, their suffering did not arise out of actions in the world seeking dignity and just care for the marginalized. Third, the warnings in James's letter notwithstanding,[373] the monied classes gained influence in the church and influenced the church's development.[374] After the second Jewish war (135 CE), non-Jewish Christians were

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[371] Iraneus noted that "Christianity had spread beyond those fortified boundaries [of the Roman Empire] to the far west of North Africa (the regions known in Latin as Gaetulia and Mauretania), throughout the Iberian peninsula and 'the diverse nations of the Gauls and the haunts of the Britons – inaccessible to the Romans, but subjugated to Christ'." Morwenna Ludlow, *The Early Church: The I.B.Tauris History of the Christian Church* (I.B.Tauris, 2008) citing Ireneus, Against the Jews I.7. For more on the spread of the early church see, e.g., Roderic L. Mullen, *The Expansion of Christianity: A Gazetteer of Its First Three Centuries* (Brill, 2004); and Mark Edwards, "Christianity, A.D. 70-192," in *The Cambridge Ancient History: Volume 12, The Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337*, ed. Alan Bowman, Peter Garnsey, and Averil Cameron, Second, vol. 12 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 573–88. For an insightful discussion of the ecclesial dynamics at play between the churches, as demonstrated through the ordination of Origen, see, Lisa Holliday, "From Alexandria to Caesarea: Reassessing Origen's Appointment to the Presbyterate," *Numen* 58, no. 5/6 (2011): 674–96.

[372] Ludlow, *The Early Church*.

[373] James 2: 1-13:

> My brothers and sisters, do you with your acts of favouritism really believe in our glorious Lord Jesus Christ? 2 For if a person with gold rings and in fine clothes comes into your assembly, and if a poor person in dirty clothes also comes in, 3 and if you take notice of the one wearing the fine clothes and say, "Have a seat here, please," while to the one who is poor you say, "Stand there," or, "Sit at my feet," 4 have you not made distinctions among yourselves, and become judges with evil thoughts? 5 Listen, my beloved brothers and sisters. Has not God chosen the poor in the world to be rich in faith and to be heirs of the kingdom that he has promised to those who love him? 6 But you have dishonoured the poor. Is it not the rich who oppress you? Is it not they who drag you into court? 7 Is it not they who blaspheme the excellent name that was invoked over you?
> 8 You do well if you really fulfil the royal law according to the scripture, "You shall love your neighbour as yourself." 9 But if you show partiality, you commit sin and are convicted by the law as transgressors. 10 For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it. 11 For the one who said, "You shall not commit adultery," also said, "You shall not murder." Now if you do not commit adultery but if you murder, you have become a transgressor of the law. 12 So speak and so act as those who are to be judged by the law of liberty. 13 For judgment will be without mercy to anyone who has shown no mercy; mercy triumphs over judgment.

[374] "The survival of Christianity in its early days depended on the aid of wealthy benefactors." Edward Moore, "Wealth and Poverty and the Value of the Person: Some Notes on the Hymn of the Pearl and Its Early

eager to emphasize the distinction between themselves and Judaism, and made more clear their distinct religious claims. Christianity became "Gentile."[375] Hierarchies in church structure, erudition of church leaders, and the building up of the church materially resulted.

By the time of Origen's letter to Celsus in the mid-third century, doctrine had become unmoored from Jesus's example, from the context of enmity with the ruling elites, and unmoored from the expectation of Jesus's imminent return. The concept of non-violence had shifted conceptually from non-resistance to being killed, to bearing arms and engaging in military killing. Upholding the letter of the faith, and the tradition of not serving in the military and directly killing, became the predominant basis and rationale for claims of not fighting, the chief new goal of non-violence.

The life of prayer was the way that the church approached a positive relationship with the culture. There was no confrontation of the powers, rather, by Origen's writing in the third century, the powers were able to rely upon the full support of the Christians. Further, there was no eschatological expectation of the imminent return of Jesus, and of the righteous (and violent) judgment of God. In following Christ, the church's following was not a following of self-determination unto death that others might have life. Rather it was centred in an ethic of love.

As Rhee notes, "Numerical growth, increasing penetration into the upper echelon of Roman society, and the emergence of a distinct material culture and collective property by Christians during this time period meant that Christians began to settle in as permanent citizens of the empire, not just to pass through the alien world as temporary sojourners."[376]

3.4.2. Post-Constantine Church Fathers

Following Constantine's ascendency to the throne in the early fourth century, the discourse of non-violence of the church continued to evolve and lessen in pacifist rigor. Acceptance of Christian engagement in war and killing, though often framed as a sudden shift following the rise of Constantine, was not sudden. Rather it was "the result of more than a century of prior political and military infiltration of the higher offices of state by Christians bearing arms."[377] As McGuckin points out, Diocletian's persecution of Christians in the fourth

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Christian Context," in *Wealth and Poverty in Early Church and Society*, ed. Susan Holman, Holy Cross Studies in Patristic Theology and History (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 56; Helen Rhee, *Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich: Wealth, Poverty, and Early Christian Formation* (Baker Books, 2012), 77–96.

[375] Rhee, *Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich*, 87.

[376] Rhee, 95.

[377] John McGuckin, "Nonviolence and Peace Traditions in Early & Eastern Christianity," Incommunion, December 29, 2004.

century began with those within his own court and army. Christians could be found serving important and influential roles in society.[378] McGuckin questions whether it was Constantine that was the patron of the church, or whether it was the church that was the patron of Constantine.[379] Further, the secular physical violence penetrated the ecclesial space and resulted in violence between the official "Catholic" church and those deemed schismatic, such as the Donatists.

In any case, it is clear that the theology of the church shifted to accommodate the stake the church had in participating in, thus preserving, its dominion in and through the Empire. Accordingly, where the grounds for warfare and the means of warfare were deemed morally just, Christian participation was not only allowed, but might be required. Ambrose, who was the first to articulate a Christian ethic of war, and Augustine who built upon Ambrose's teaching, were key inaugural proponents of this "Christian Just War" tradition. Nonetheless, Christian non-violence, which meant to refrain from killing, remained the ideal, despite "just war" conditions having been established.

3.4.2.1. Donatists

As Shaw has exhaustively documented,[380] the fourth century was rife with religious violence of the most brutal sort, including "specific acts of physical hostility – the threats, the beatings, the blindings, [and] the cuttings."[381] Not only were Christians adversaries of pagans and Jews, but Shaw shows the extensive Christian sectarian violence that transpired, related to the condemnation of "heretics." There is debate about whether the violence was an integral part of the culture, or whether the violence was the result of the breakdown of the imperial systems, however, that violence is ever-present is not debated.[382]

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[378] For example, "It is also telling that around the same time the canons of the regional council of Elvira, Spain, prescribed behaviors of landowners (can. 40, 49), slave owners (can. 5, 41), civic magistrates (duumvir; can. 56), and even provincial high priests of the imperial cult (flamen; can. 2, 4), which indicates that those most likely belonged to the local Christian communities." Rhee, *Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich*, 92.

[379] McGuckin, "Nonviolence and Peace Traditions in Early & Eastern Christianity."

[380] See, Brent D. Shaw, *Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[381] Shaw, 3.

[382] For arguments regarding the normality of violence that emanates from religious authorities, see, Ramsay MacMullen, "The Historical Role of the Masses in Late Antiquity," in Changes in the Roman Empire: Essays in the Ordinary (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1990), 250–76; and see, Neil McLynn, "Christian Controversy and Violence in the Fourth Century," Kodai 3 (1992): 15–44, for arguments in favor of the view that violence was the result of exceptional circumstances that arose in the face of the breakdown of normal structures of authority.

While some separated themselves from society and lived in secluded devotion to God when the church ascended to ruling authority, others publicly contested the church's alignment with the political system. Most notable of these were the Donatists.[383] The Donatists were one of a number of movements[384] that were seen as deviating from orthodox belief. Aside from those arising in earlier and later centuries, e.g., Gnosticism, Marcionism, Monophysitism, Nestorianism, etc., fourth century heresies included:

- Arianism, first advanced by Arius (256-336) a priest of Alexandria, which denied the divinity of Jesus;
- Apollinarianism, introduced by Apollinaris (310-390) a bishop of Laodicea in Asian Minor who held that human body, but not a human mind or free will, these were replaced by divine Logos.
- Macedonianism, after Macedonius (d. c. 362) Arian bishop of Constantinople, which denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit.
- Pelagianism, taught by Pelagius (355-425) a monk from the British Isles, which denied the idea of Original Sin, and denied that divine grace in the soul was required to do good, among other beliefs.

The Donatists, like the Novatianists of the third century, were a morally rigorous group with strict standards for inclusion in the church. They taught that the validity of the sacraments depended upon the moral character of the minister of the sacraments, and that sinners could not be members of the church if their sins are publicly known. The Donatists sought to create a pure church, separated from the corruption of the world. They were persecuted, as were earlier generations of Christians, and believed their persecution to be a mark of their identity as the

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[383] Instructive is Gaddis' note on the origination of the name:

> The name "Donatist" of course, was a label created by hostile polemicists. Orthodox heresiographers commonly stigmatized sects by naming them after their founders (e.g., for the other rigorist movements, "Novatians" after Novatus of Rome and "Melitians" after Melitius of Egypt) and thus denying them the name "Christian." The Donatists preferred to call themselves the Church of the Martyrs. … I have thought it easiest to continue using the terminology most familiar to modern readers, with due recognition of its polemical origins.

Michael Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire* (University of California Press, 2005), 104, n.6.

[384] For details on the various heretical and schismatic movements, see, Justo L. Gonzalez, *The Story of Christianity: Volume 1: The Early Church to the Dawn of the Reformation* (Harper Collins, 2014); Dr Mark Edwards, *Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013); K. D. Whitehead, *One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic: The Early Church Was the Catholic Church* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000).

true church. It has also been argued that the Donatist movement was not only religious in character but also related to Roman occupation and poor economic conditions; that it was a nationalist protest and rebellion against inequality.[385] For most of the fourth century, the majority of the Christian population in North Africa were Donatists.[386]

Though the exact date of the beginning of movement is unclear,[387] Donatists broke away from the "Catholic" church when members claimed that a bishop of Carthage, Caecilianus or Caecilian, was not a true bishop, since the bishop that ordained him was *traditore* (Latin: *tradere*, to hand over), or apostate.[388] Believing the church institution was corrupt, the Donatists ordained their own bishops, including Donatus, after whom the movement was named. They regarded the church leaders of the "Catholic" church as "deserters to a religion which was not Christianity, but resembled the paganism of the persecutors fifty years before, and was sponsored by the Emperor."[389]

After an altercation with a "Catholic" churchman, and his imperial travel guard, the Donatists were persecuted and repressed by the State.[390] Donatist leaders were sent into exile. The Catholic bishops declared an end to schism in 348 CE.[391] The property of the Donatists was seized by the church. Then in 362 Emperor Julian allowed the Donatist to return, which prompted a wave of violence as the Donatists sought to gain control of church buildings, which likely belonged to them before they were expelled.[392] The battles for the basilicas was bloody. Gaddis notes the oft cited example of the Damasus-Ursinus dispute of 366, which left one hundred and sixty dead in the Sicilian basilica in Rome.[393]

For all their piety, however, the Donatists were not a strictly non-violent group. There was a contingent who were wandering ascetics willing to perform violent, fanatical acts—

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[385] W. H. C. Frend, *The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa* (Clarendon Press, 1971). But see, Arnold Hugh Martin Jones, *Were Ancient Heresies Disguised Social Movements?* (Fortress Press, 1966), 6, and Maureen A. Tilley, *The Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist World* (Fortress Press, n.d.), 3.who disagree with the claim of nationalism and find the arguments of the Donatists to be primarily religious.

[386] Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, 106; see also, Frend, *The Donatist Church* generally.

[387] W. H. C. Frend and K. Clancy, "When Did the Donatist Schism Begin?," *The Journal of Theological Studies* 28, no. 1 (1977): 104–9.

[388] So called as one who, during the Diocletian persecution (303-305), escaped martyrdom by handing over his scriptures and writings to be burned as a sign of their renunciation of Christianity.

[389] W. H. C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus* (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2014), 557.

[390] Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, 106–8.

[391] Gaddis, 108.

[392] Gaddis, 119.

[393] Gaddis, 120, n.68.

including martyrdom by suicide and ritual martyrdom—in furtherance of their beliefs. The '*circumcelliones agonistici*', or Circumcillions "pursue[ed] the martyr's crown through the *agon* against the visible powers of evil."[394] The persistent acts of martyrdom of this group, and the moral influence they gained as a result of their acts, had the consequence of prompting the ecclesiastical authorities throughout the Roman world to take measures to retain for themselves "the power to decide who might and might not rightly be called a true martyr."[395] Augustine, who writes extensively against the Donatists, comments on the murders committed by the Circumcellions in resistance to missionary activity by the Roman church in a Donatist region. According to Augustine, they "laid ambushes for our bishops on their journeys, struck our fellow clerics with the cruellest blows, inflicted upon lay people most serious wounds, and set their buildings on fire."[396]

What the schismatic Donatists represent is resistance to the power of the empire, the claim of authority outside of ecclesial structure, and a desire for moral and spiritual distinctiveness among those who are called Christians. These are themes that will recur throughout subsequent centuries. They also represent the absence of a purely non-violent theology in the consciousness of the either party to the schism.

3.4.2.2. Ambrose

Aside from battling the Donatists, attacks against the western region of the Roman Empire by foreign invaders ("barbarians") informed the post-Constantinian views of Ambrose, Augustine and others. Because of these invasions they decreed that forceful acts might be faithfully employed by Christians to repel invaders. During the fifth century, the Emperor's subjection to the Bishop, or the state to the church, was unambiguously claimed by the Pope.[397] With the church having asserted ultimate authority over the governance of all, the bishops deemed it necessary to authorize the use of physical force to defend both the State and the church and its orthodoxy.

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[394] Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church*, 556.

[395] Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, 119.

[396] Augustine, Enchiridion, XVII, in Fathers of the Church, Vol. 2, translated by Bernard M. Peebles (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1947), 382.

[397] Pope Gelasius articulated this in his Edict XII, reproving Emperor Anastasius, "There are indeed, most august Emperor, two powers by which this world is chiefly ruled: the sacred authority of the popes and the royal power. Of these the priestly power is much more important, because it has to render account for the kings of men themselves at the Divine tribunal. For you know, our very clement son, that although you have the chief place in dignity over the human race, yet you must submit yourself faithfully to those who have charge of Divine things, and look to them for the means of your salvation." Stephen M. Feldman, *Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State* (NYU Press, 1998), 28.

Ambrose, born approximately 339 CE to a Roman Christian family, and was made Bishop of Milan in 374 CE.[398] During Ambrose's tenure as bishop, the, now Christian, Roman empire was under persistent threat from armies of "barbarians," as well as from those following a heretical Arian Christianity.[399] To defend the orthodox faith, and the Christian nation, Ambrose re-formulated Christian teaching to enable the Christian empire to faithfully engage in war.[400] Ambrose based his theological revisions upon classical philosophic ideas of justice and virtue. He also relied upon a literal reading of the Hebrew scriptures to legitimize engagement in warfare. Judas Maccabees, Joshua, even Moses were lauded for their military exploits. Of Moses, Ambrose wrote, "Thus holy Moses feared not to undertake terrible wars for his people's sake, nor was he afraid of the mightiest kinds, nor yet was he frightened at the savagery of barbarian nations. He put on one side the thought of his own safety so as to give freedom to the people."[401]

Ambrose concluded that war must be entered for just reasons,[402] it must be conducted via just means,[403]and that Christians must engage in violence to defend one another against aggression.[404] In addition to the concept of non-violence being construed to allow for imperial civic duty, it was also allocated to the private realm, and to the priestly office. Violent means were endorsed for the defence of others and for the defence of State, ("For anyone who does not prevent an injury to a companion, if he can do so, is as much at fault as he who inflicts it.").[405] However, unlike Origen's argument that all Christians, as priests and ministers, should

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[398] Philip Schaff, ed., "Ambrose: Selected Works and Letters," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Vol. 2, The City of God, Christian Doctrine*, American, Digital, vol. 10, Early Church Fathers 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics, 1994), 14, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf210.html.

[399] John William Charles Wand, *A History of the Early Church to AD 500*, ebook (Taylor & Francis E-Library, 2009), 203.

[400] Alease A. Brown, "Ambrose, Bishop of Milan," *War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict* (Denver, CO USA: ABC-CLIO, 2017), 29.

[401] Ambrose, "On the Duties of the Clergy," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 10, Ambrose: Select Works and Letters*, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. H. De Romestin, American, Digital, vol. 10, Second (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), bk. 1, chap. 28, para. 135, https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf210.iv.i.html.

[402] Ambrose, "On the Duties of the Clergy" Ch. 27, para. 129.

[403] Ambrose, Book 1, ch. 29, para. 13 (no unfair advantage of the enemy), Book 2, ch. 14, para 87, Book 3, chap. 15, para. 9 (no treachery or deceit to win), Book 3, chap. 15, paras. 91-93 (mercy must be shown to enemy in defeat).

[404] Ambrose, Bk. 1 chap. 36, para. 17.

[405] Ambrose, Bk. 1 chap. 36, para. 179.

be exempt from military service, Ambrose's claim was circumscribed. He advocated only that those with clerical office should be exempt.[406]

Self-defence continued to be disfavoured. Ambrose wrote:

> Some ask whether a wise man ought in case of a shipwreck to take away a plank from an ignorant sailor? Although it seems better for the common good that a wise man rather than a fool should escape from shipwreck, yet I do not think that a Christian, a just and a wise man, ought to save his own life by the death of another; just as when he meets with an armed robber he cannot return his blows, lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbour. The verdict on this is plain and clear in the books of the Gospel. "Put up thy sword, for every one that taketh the sword shall perish with the sword." What robber is more hateful than the persecutor who came to kill Christ? But Christ would not be defended from the wounds of the persecutor, for He willed to heal all by His wounds.[407]

Ambrose asserts that the rationale for prohibiting violence for the purpose of self-defence is that it risks a Christian "stain[ing] his love toward his neighbour." Thus, it was the risk of the spoliation of virtue—the virtue of love, and the virtue of obedience to God (which for Ambrose was the foundation of all virtue),[408] that made self-defence incongruous with a faithful Christian life. As Swift notes, for Ambrose "resisting an attacker amounts to preferring the human to the divine. By destroying the interior disposition of love, it vitiates the natural good of preserving one's own life."[409]

Ultimately, there are several key features of Ambrose's reframing of Christian duties of violence (killing) and non-violence. Though Ambrose embraced the classical philosophical concept of the common humanity of all, he implemented variations that better served the interests of Christians. First, for him, the enemies of orthodox Christianity were enemies of the state and could be treated with alternate standards of justice that displayed less or no reverence for life. Second, by proscribing self-defence, limiting state coercion, and sanctioning soldiering to fight pagan insurrection, Ambrose attempted to ensure that no unjust harm by enemy or by fellow-citizen, should come to Roman Christians. Finally, Ambrose ensured the state's

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[406] R.H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, Roland Bainton Reprint Series (Wipf & Stock, 2008), 90.

[407] Ambrose, "On the Duties of the Clergy," Book 3, 4:27.

[408] Louis J. Swift, "St. Ambrose on Violence and War," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 101 (1970): 537, https://doi.org/10.2307/2936070.

[409] Swift, 537.

application of just standards when it came to engagement in violence against the Roman populace; the state should not unjustly persecute.[410] By limiting the Emperor's penal authority, Ambrose effectively imputed Christian ideals of non-violence, the legal protection of life, to all Roman citizens, provided they were not Arians, pagans, or Jews.[411]

Ambrose's tactics of non-violence sought to preserve the orthodoxy of the church, and to maintain the security of the state.[412] His position is a complete about-face from the non-violence in the life and teachings of Jesus. Jesus would likely have faced persecution and death due to his failure to adhere to orthodox teaching, by Ambrose's standards. Further, the dual-standard of non-violence, one applied to Christians another to non-Christians, was an innovation. Also, unlike Jesus, Ambrose did not advocate the use of personal or institutional power to confront injustice perpetrated against those who were marginalized. Ambrose's basis for his teachings of non-violence were also innovative in that he relied more heavily upon the major philosophical ideas of his day in formulating his positions, and he introduced war ideology from the Old Testament to justify his teaching. There was no eschatological dimension to Ambrose's teaching.

3.4.2.3. Augustine

Augustine, born to a devout Christian mother near Carthage in 354 CE,[413] obtained the office of Bishop of Hippo in 391 CE.[414] Augustine's foundational theologies of non-violence and "just war" have been commented upon for centuries and continue to inform the ethics of States and of the Christian church with respect to violence and war.[415]

For Augustine, war was often compelled and necessary, but not a true good. Richberg calls him a "reluctant just war theorist," who often spoke about the regrettable necessity for

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[410] This position of his may have been influenced by the recent persecution of the Roman Christians under Diocletian.

[411] Brown, "Ambrose, Bishop of Milan."

[412] For a contrary view of Ambrose, see, Demacopoulos, who argues that Ambrose actually sought to limit, rather than valorize, violence by Christians. George E. Demacopoulos, "Constantine, Ambrose, and the Morality of War: How Ambrose of Milan Challenged the Imperial Discourse on War and Violence," in *Orthodox Christian Perspectives on War*, ed. Perry T. Hamalis and Valerie A. Karras (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017), 230–82.

[413] Philip Schaff, ed., "The Confessions and Letters of St. Augustine, With A Sketch of His Life and Work," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Vol. 1, The City of God, Christian Doctrine*, American, Digital, vol. 1, Early Church Fathers 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics, 1994), 13, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf210.html.

[414] Schaff, 15.

[415] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 99.

warfare at all.[416] "It is the iniquity on the part of the adversary that forces a just war upon the wise man,"[417] says Augustine. Yet he cautions against military imperialism:

> It is a wicked prayer to wish for someone to hate or to fear so that there might be someone to conquer. If, then, by waging just wars, not impious or iniquitous ones, the Romans were able to acquire such a large empire, should not "the iniquity of foreigners" be worshipped like some goddess? Indeed, we see how much assistance she has given to the extension of the empire, making others into wrongdoers so that there might be someone to wage just wars against in order that the empire might grow.[418]

Like Ambrose, Augustine deemed it possible for service in the military to be compatible with the faithful Christian life ("Do not think that it is impossible for anyone serving in the military to please God. Among those who did so was the holy David, to whom the Lord gave such great testimony"),[419] though the "greater place before God" rested with those who exercised the disciplines of Christian devotion (chastity, renouncing the world, etc.).[420] But both those who serve in the military and those who serve in devotion serve the cause of battling the enemy. To Boniface, the high military commander in Africa,[421] Augustine wrote, "Some, then, fight…against invisible enemies by praying; you toil for them against visible barbarians by fighting."[422]

Augustine understood the injunction to "turn the other cheek," to mean not enjoining warfare, but as necessitating a particular "inward disposition" since "[t]he sacred seat of virtue is the heart."[423] Jesus's passion, "sets the example of drinking this cup [of suffering], then hands it to his followers, manifesting thus, both in word and deed, the grace of patience."[424] Patience, then, not non-violence (refraining from killing), was the preeminent virtue, and through this virtue God's vindication would be secured. Non-violence for Augustine entailed

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[416] Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Wiley, 2006), 70–71.

[417] From *City of God*, book XIX, chap. 7. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 72.

[418] From *City of God*, book IV, chap.15. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 72.

[419] From *Letter 189, to Boniface*. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 74.

[420] Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 74.

[421] Geoffrey D. Dunn, "Discipline, Coercion, and Correction: Augustine against the Violence of the Donatists in Epistula 185," *Scrinium* 13, no. 1 (November 28, 2017): 115.

[422] From *Letter 189, to Boniface*. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, *The Ethics of War*, 74.

[423] From Reply to Faustus the Manichean, book XXII, chap. 76, "City of God," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Vol. 2, The City of God, Christian Doctrine*, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods, American, Digital, vol. II, 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.iv.html.

[424] Ibid.

taking no pleasure in violence, and having an internal peaceableness, rather than refraining from the use of force.

The rationale cultivation of an inward disposition towards virtue, of the love of God and of eternal things instead of temporal things, also underlies Augustine's rejection of the Christian defence of self. He emphasized that force should be used primarily in the defence of others. A passage from Augustine's *On Free Choice of the Will*[425] is particularly instructive on this point. In the passage, a discussion with interlocuter *Evdious,* Augustine questions whether

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[425] *Augustine On the Free Choice of Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, ed. and trans. Peter King, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9–13:

> *Augustine*: …[F]irst of all, I think there should be a discussion whether a charging enemy or a murderer attacking from ambush may be killed without lust, but for the sake of one's life, freedom, or chastity.
> *Evodius*: How can I think that people are free of lust if they fight ferociously for things that can be lost against their will? On the other hand, if such things cannot be lost, what need is there to resort to killing someone for their sake?
> *Augustine*: Therefore, the law is unjust which grants permission (a) to a traveller to kill a highway robber, so as not to be killed himself; (b) to any man or woman to slay a rapist in his onslaught, if possible, before enduring rape. Indeed, the law bids a soldier to kill the enemy, and if he holds back from this bloodshed he pays the penalties from his commander. Surely we will not dream of calling these laws unjust – or rather, not to call them "laws" at all, for a law that is not just does not seem to me to be a law.
> *Evodius:* …[T]he law is well protected against this kind of charge. [Offers defense of the justness of the law].
> Yet even if the law is blameless, I do not see how the people involved can be blameless. The law does not force them to kill, but merely leaves it in their power. Hence they are free not to kill anyone for things they can lose against their will, which they should therefore not love. With respect to life, someone could perhaps be in doubt whether it is somehow taken away from the soul when the body dies. Yet if life can be taken away, it should be held of little worth. On the other hand, if it cannot, there is nothing to fear. With respect to chastity, well, seeing that it is a virtue, who would doubt that it is located in the mind itself? Therefore, it cannot be taken away by a violent rapist. … In the end, I do not find fault with the law that permits such people [attackers] to be killed. Yet I have not found any way to defend those who do the killing. …. They have been stained with human blood for the sake of things that should be held of little worth. Therefore, it seems to me that a law drafted to govern society rightly permits these things, and also that divine providence rightly redresses them. The former [human law] has in its scope redressing deeds sufficiently to maintain peace among unenlightened people...The other faults, however, have different penalties appropriate to them, from which wisdom alone, it seems to me, can free them.
> *Augustine*: I approve and endorse this distinction of yours…that the law that is enacted to govern states tolerates and leaves unpunished many things, which are nevertheless redressed by divine providence (and rightly so)….Then let us call a law temporal if, although it is just, it can justly be changed in the course of time…
> *Evodius*: Fine.
> *Augustine*: Well, consider the law referred to as "supreme reason."[425] It should always be obeyed; through it good people deserve a happy life and evil people an unhappy one; and finally through it temporal law is both rightly enacted and rightly changed. Any intelligent person can see that it is unchangeable and eternal. Can it ever be unjust that evil people are unhappy while good people are happy? Can it ever be unjust that an orderly and responsible society sets up governing officials for itself while a dissolute and worthless society lacks this privilege?
> *Evodius*: I see that this law is eternal and unchangeable.

it is just to kill another for the sake of one's life, freedom, or chastity. He concludes that such killing is an attempt to cling to a thing that can be lost—a temporal thing. Killing to hold onto what is temporal is a sign of lust,[426] or corrupted passion. It is not virtuous. Augustine is concerned for the eternal good, above the temporal good, and makes a distinction between the human law, which is concerned with temporal good, and the divine law, which is concerned with the eternal.[427] Virtuous action, whether involving physical harm and violence or not, must be concerned with the eternal.

This reasoning has significant bearing on Augustine's position supporting the use of coercive force against the heretical Donatist faction. Though both "Catholics"[428] and Donatists engaged in "nearly identical" acts of physical violence, Augustine insisted "that the Donatists engaged in illegitimate violence while the [Catholics] engaged in legitimate violence, better described simply as correction."[429] The action of the dominant "Catholics" was legitimized by its characterization as corrective and not punitive, which distinction turned on the intention and motivation of the ones inflicting the forceful act.[430] "[S]imply to attack and cause terror or to punish was violence indeed, but to act so as to prevent further violence or to seek to rehabilitate was correction."[431] For Augustine, in matters of war and violence, "motive was everything."[432]

Because Augustine believed that there were military virtues, and that valorous military service was possible and necessary, Augustine delineated an ethics of "Just War." His writings establish three *jus ad bellum* criteria, or legitimate preconditions for engaging in warfare:

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[426] "The Latin word *libido*…[or] 'lust,' refers in Augustine's works not only to illicit sexual desire but to any disordered love which prefers lower or temporal goods to divine or eternal ones." Lower goods can be lost against one's will, higher good can only be voluntarily surrendered. See, Augustine, *Augustine: Political Writings*, ed. Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries, trans. Michael W. Tkacz (Indinapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 213.

[427] This passage is often also referenced in discussions of the distinction made by Augustine between divine law and natural law, which discussion is only tangential to the matter of Christian (non)violence that is under consideration in this section.

[428] Dunn, following Tilley, argues that the group opposing the Donatists should, in fact, be referred to as Caecalianists, not Catholics, since both sides at the time claimed the appellation of 'catholic.' "If we accept the term Donatists for one group, named after Donatus (315-355), even though it was Donatus' predecessor, Majorinus (311-315), who became the first of the rival bishops, we ought to call the other group Caecilianists, named after Caecilianus (311c. 336). Dunn, "Discipline, Coercion, and Correction," 117.

[429] Dunn, 117.

[430] I do not describe these particular acts as "violence" since use of the term imputes a negative moral color, which is exactly the opposite of what Augustine intended in his distinctions as to legitimacy of particular acts of force. See, Shaw, *Sacred Violence*. for a comprehensive treatment of the widespread sectarian violence in North Africa during Augustine's era; and see, Cam Grey, "Shock, Horror, or Same Old Same Old? Everyday Violence in Augustine's Africa," *Journal of Late Antiquity* 6, no. 2 (2013): 216–32, for discussion of the relationship between everyday violence and more reified (non)violence.

[431] Dunn, "Discipline, Coercion, and Correction," 124.

[432] Dunn, 124.

proper authority, just cause, and right intention. He also describes features that could constitute *jus in bello*, just conduct during warfare. He regards ambush, and combat ruses, as ethically unimportant,[433] and states in his letter to Boniface that agreements, even with enemies, must be kept, and that mercy should be shown.[434]

What is distinctive about Augustine's formulations of violence and non-violence, is that Augustine privileges internal dispositions, rather than outward conduct, as determinative of right actions. Further, Augustine had great concern for incorporating the ideals of peace, love, and justice into the waging of war. He concluded that war must only be waged to restore peace ("the desired end of war is peace, for everyone seeks peace, even by waging war, but no one seeks war by making peace,"[435]) it must have love of God as a motive (and not "love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like,"[436]) and it must secure justice, which Augustine viewed as represented by the cause fought for by only one side or party to a conflict.[437]

Ultimately, Augustine made allowances for warfare and violence in the life of the Christian, and distinguished the motivations for actions from the acts themselves. It was not killing, but killing with the wrong intent or attitude, that was objectionable. Self-defense constituted killing with the wrong attitude, as it entailed preferring the temporal, life or chastity, to the eternal, the virtue of love.

3.4.2.4. Conclusion

While during the apostolic church period there was the practice of non-resistance to persecution, the movement away from non-resistance, as ideology, began during the second century, and turned toward the refusal to kill. This movement away from non-resistance and killing, reached a theological apogee in the doctrinal formulations of Augustine. Though it is common to view the move away from the refusal to kill as occurring through the advent of Constantine as emperor, the transition was gradual and progressive.

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[433] From *Question on the Heptateuch*, book VI, chap. 10. In Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, *The Ethics of War*, 83.

[434] From *Letter 189, to Boniface*. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 79.

[435] From *City of God*, book XIX, chap. 12. In Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 79.

[436] From *Against Faustus the Manichean*, bk, XXII, chap. 74. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 73.

[437] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 98–99.

3.5. Conclusion of Early Church Period Non-violence Analysis

Restoration of peace, love of God, and securing dignity and justice were all aims of Jesus's mission on earth. Yet, for Jesus, the enemy was not the marginalized whose beliefs were unorthodox, whose ethnicity was Palestinian like his, nor those whose faith was not his own. Jesus lived, taught, and used his power in defence of such "Othered" persons when they were marginalized because of their difference. That the patristics and those following did not do the same, is the great divergence between their teaching and Christ's.

What this historic overview demonstrates is that during the first 400 years of the church, pacifism theologically rooted in Christian love of neighbour is a myth. In the apostolic church, the church was threatened with persecution from local Jewish authority and from the imperial state. The church refrained from physical violence, in expectation of Christ's imminent return and his destruction of both threats. Their non-violence was the act of expedience and fugitivity. Non-violence was not grounded in Christian love.

This church period's conduct comes closest to what many conceptualize when it comes to the non-violence of the gospel and the non-violence of the church. It is important to remember that the period of this church was brief. The church was highly precarious, life was unstable, and the expectation of Jesus's imminent return was high. Also, as much as peace was attempted to be fostered, a key component of the Jesus's work was entirely neglected by this church, and that was the confrontation of authority. By failing to confront authority the church failed to challenge the systems that created conditions of marginalization in the culture. *Creation of an alternate counter-culture, in lieu of confrontation of the dominant violent social order, was not the example of Jesus. The community life turned inward was an innovation meant to secure the lives and wellbeing of church members against their persecutors.*

In the patristic early church, the church was threatened with persecution from the imperial state. There was little expectation of Christ's imminent return or of destruction of the power of the state. To manage its place of marginalized precarity, the church embraced the doctrine of refraining from violence. The basis was no longer God's imminent impending vengeance but transformed instead to the idea of Christian love. The church was not opposed to war generally, but merely to the Christian involvement in war and killing. In the church of the empire, unlike in the fugitive church or the marginalized church, the church was not threatened with persecution, from either local or state authority. The threat to the church, and the state, was of foreign invasion. There was no longer a need to secure its survival by withdrawing or by accommodation. Such practices would ensure the opposite, the church's

demise. Accordingly, to secure its survival, the church legitimized violence and killing, as long as the grounds for doing so were those that could be understood as just.

4. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages

This section will review the period from late antiquity to the Middle Ages. The church split during this period. The research follows the development of the Western church. However, a short consideration of the Eastern church is also presented in this section.

4.1. Introduction

Constantinian peace was soon disrupted in the Western part of the empire by invaders from the north. A political and ecclesiastical challenge to authority resulted in unrelenting warfare in the West for several hundred years. During this period the church in the West placed few limits on warfare. Following Augustine, the church embraced the doctrine that war was the necessary duty of the Christian when the region or church is threatened by outsiders. Though Christian non-violence was not practiced, Christian peace remained idealized, particularly by those in monastic communities. Because of the unrelenting warfare and violence in the West, peace primarily came to mean law and order.

The Eastern part of the Empire was not threatened by the northern invaders in the way that the church of the West was during this period. Political and ecclesiastic stability resulted in the Eastern church's development of a more nuanced theology with respect to war. Augustine's theory of the just war was never a guiding principle for the Eastern church. Over time as the East faced foreign invasions, allowances were made for Christian engagement in warfare to defend the Empire against invading pagans. Soldiering and killing remained evils, however, though necessary and pardonable. Those who had killed while soldiering were required to penitentially refrain from the Eucharist for a three-year period following the end of their military duties. Also, there was no recognition of soldiers as martyrs. This differed from the West, where the church taught that soldiers would earn their salvation by acting in the service of God in war.

Ultimately, the church of the West and the church of the East both made theological concessions to allow for Christian engagement in killing. The West removed censure nearly entirely, composing a theology that could support killing in the name of Christ. As a result, the quest for peace became culturally important. The sovereign, clerics, and monasteries all sought to maintain control and authority over shaping the contours, and controlling the dispensation, of peace. The East made a concession to warfare out of necessity, yet theologically retained a prohibition on killing. Ecclesial repentance was prescribed for soldiers in acknowledgment of

the church's standard of peace. In the East and West heretical sects[438] arose that refused to engage in violence. Both churches deemed the sects' anti-violence positions to be proof of their heretical beliefs and practices.

4.2. Early Middle Ages and the Western Church

4.2.1. Monasticism

Ascetic life has been a feature of Christianity beginning with John the Baptist and Jesus, who both practiced solitude, prayer, and renunciation of wealth. With the changes to the character of Christianity in the fourth century, was added the rise of monasticism. Monasticism was for some "their expression of the rejection of the new order."[439] Preferable to the church ruled by imperial bishops was the simplicity and spiritual purity of life lived in separation from the empire's order and systems.

4.2.1.1. Monasticism and Peace

Monastery life became a common alternative for lay persons of the Christian faith. From the Greek, *monos*, the term refers to those who live apart from the world.[440] Monasteries took form in two different settings early in its development. Seclusion was generally sought either near or in a town (cenobitic) or deep in the countryside or desert (anchoritic).[441] There was great variety in the styles and locations of monastic practice, however.[442] Despite the variations in the practice, the intention of the monastic habit was the same for all: separation from the world and the focused seeking after God.[443]

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[438] For the purposes of this paper, sect will follow the definition first articulated by Weber and Troeltsch, and built upon by sociologists over time. Sects are those groups that split off from older established religious body for the purpose of purifying or re-establishing the old faith. See, Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, "Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 18, no. 2 (1979): 117–31, https://doi.org/10.2307/1385935; Charles Sarno and Helen Shoemaker, "Church, Sect, or Cult? The Curious Case of Harold Camping's Family Radio and the May 21 Movement," *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 19, no. 3 (February 1, 2016): 6–30, https://doi.org/10.1525/nr.2016.19.3.6.

[439] Darryl J Pigeon, "Cyprian, Augustine, and the Donatist Schism," *Ashland Theological Journal* 23 (1991): 37.

[440] Wand, A History of the Early Church to AD 500, 192; J. William Harmless, "Monasticism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies*, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 493.

[441] Harmless, "Monasticism," 493.

[442] Harmless notes that the tendency to form a linear narrative of the development of monasticism, beginning with Athanasius' account of Antony in the desert in Egypt leading straight to the Rule of Benedict in the Latin West, is "wrong." Harmless, 497. Rather, the development is "full of twists and turns and gaps in the historical record." Harmless, 498.

[443] Jean Leclercq, "The Monastic Crisis of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries.," in *Cluniac Monasticism in the Central Middle Ages*, ed. Noreen Hunt (Springer, 2016), 217.

The lifestyles of monastics were therefore ascetic. "Monastic life required from the outset, stark renunciations: of family, property, marriage, career."[444] Monastics usually renounced sex as well.[445] For those who lived in community, life was ordered around a common schedule. It included time devoted to worship, prayer, work, and study. St. Basil established a Rule of order in the fourth century that emphasized monks having a common roof, table, worship, and fixed hours for meals.[446] St. Benedict's famous Rule from the sixth century, builds upon Basil's and became the standard for monastery life in the West. Benedict's rule divided the day into separate periods allocated to communal and private prayer, sleep, spiritual reading, and his greatest innovation, manual labour. The Greco-Roman norm regarding labour was that it was the province of the slave and demeaning to any free person who performed it. Benedict's rule, which restored dignity to labour, was revolutionary. Labour was no longer an inescapable drudgery, but an integral part of the spiritual formation of the person.[447] As White notes, the monks were the artisans who made Europe.[448]

Monasteries became locations, in a landscape of total violence, where men and women found space to focus on devotional development, where they were independent of the authority of political sovereigns, were economically self-sustaining, and where culture and learning were fostered. The monasteries were essentially havens of peace and tranquillity in the midst of warring hostilities beyond their walls. Because of its potential for nurturing habits of spirit, soul, and body that lead to life, though transforming over the centuries, it remained a feature of the Christian tradition.

4.2.1.2. Violence and Boundary Enforcement

It is important to note, however, that even those who lived as monks and ascetics were participants in conduct that was at times physically violent directed towards the unorthodox, pagans, Jews, Muslims, and others. Such "ascetic militants," as Sizgorich describes,[449] served their communities in these violent roles. The cleric, as well as the monk and that ascetic, rather

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[444] Harmless, "Monasticism," 493.

[445] The influence of gnostic thought resulted in the perception of the physical body, and therefore sex, as impure as compared to the purity of the spirit. Also, the life of unmarried celibacy was seen as most desirable as it followed the pattern of Jesus and Paul. See, Wand, *A History of the Early Church to AD 500*, 192–93.

[446] Wand, 196.

[447] For description of the significance of the ideological and technological importance of the redemption of labor, , Lynn T. White, "The Significance of Medieval Christianity," in *The Vitality of the Christian Tradition*, ed. George F. Thomas (New York: Harper, 1941), 87–115.

[448] White, 198.

[449] Thomas Sizgorich, *Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 108.

than the lay person, was expected to maintain the proper doctrinal boundaries for the community. It was this group of religious devotees that was meant to discern which baptism, feast or fast was the true baptism, feast or fast, since all were not the same. Theirs was a duty to "command right and forbid wrong."[450] Part of this entailed exacting a physical penalty or reprisal from those who were found to have transgressed the true faith—whether outsiders or Christians. A story of a wayward monk is illustrative.

> In the eighth century, living under Muslim rule, the Syrian ascetic Timothy of Kākhushtā corrected a wandering ascetic who had fallen into heretical error by chaining him to his pillar and having two attendants beat the wanderer "with all their might and strength" until he saw the light.[451]

The ascetic awareness of the expectation of holding firm boundaries and punishing transgression, at times meant that that ascetic went against the will of the community in meting out punishment. In these cases, it was common for the community that objected to the violence performed to be labelled "weak Christians."[452]

4.2.1.3. Martyrdom and Mutilation

Additionally, the ascetic of fervent devotion, was commonly portrayed as his own physical brokenness of the most graphic sort. Szigorich postulates that the graphic depiction of the disfigurement or martyrdom of the aesthetic is a way to make visible that which is inherently invisible. For example, in describing the feet of Thomas the Armenian we learn:

> "His feet were like charred columns, being thick and black, until after ten years they used to discharge a large quantity of matter, and were as if they were not his, since he was smitten with severe ulcers, and would not concern himself even to wash off that discharge, and to apply a poultice."[453]

As torture unerringly reveals truth, so the graphic rendering of an aesthetic's, monk's, or martyr's suffering and physical ablation, distinguishes the true faithful ones from the false.[454]

4.2.1.4. Conclusion

Ultimately the monastics served a stabilizing role in the culture, while not being removed from the violence that permeated their world.

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[450] Sizgorich, 115.

[451] Sizgorich, 113–14 citing, *The Life of Timothy of Kākhushtā*, Saidnaya Version, 45, ed. and trans. John C. Lamoreaux and Cyril Cairala, PO 48.4 (Turnhout, 2000), 604–9. .

[452] Sizgorich, 110.

[453] Sizgorich, 126 citing John of Ephesus, *Lives of the Eastern Saints*, 21, PO 17, 291. .

[454] Sizgorich, 125.

4.2.2. Monastic, Ecclesial, Civil, and Heterodox Non-violence Evolution

During the fifth century, the idea of not participating in violence was not operative. There was the idea of an imperial peace, which the church accepted as the opportunity for a Christian peace, the inauguration of "a new societal order which was to last until the Parousia."[455] The imperial peace which the church hoped in was far from non-violent, however:

> normative imperial ideology justified and indeed demanded the use of violence against those thought to threaten peace and consensus. Emperors both pagan and Christian sought above all to achieve unity and concord, in religion as in secular politics, and were willing to use repressive and coercive means to this end.[456]

As Gaddis points out, the imperial peace valued "hierarchy, authority, stability, and unity"[457] above all else, and physical force was the means to secure it. When the responsibility for bringing and maintaining peace shifted from political to ecclesial spaces, the violence used to secure the peace remained consistent. The ecclesia remained the keepers of the idea of peace, and the chief arbiters of what violence was for the sake of peace and what violence was a disruption to the peace, until the first millennium. At that time, papal peace and monastic peace declined, and secular "public" peace replaced it.[458]

4.2.2.1. Peace in "Recession"

Despite the sanction of defensive warfare by Christian authorities, invading forces sacked Rome in 410 CE.[459] The invasions did not end with Rome's sacking, but continued unabated, until, finally, there was a dissolution of the western Roman Empire in 476 CE when the last Roman emperor in the West, Romulus Augustulus (c.460 CE) was deposed.[460] Throughout late antiquity persistent violence occurred through intra-Christian conflicts, Muslim conquests, and the raids of the Vikings.[461] Because of the military urgency,

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[455] Thomas Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," *Journal of Medieval History* 6, no. 2 (January 1, 1980): 143, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4181(80)90014-7.

[456] Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, 6–7.

[457] Gaddis, 7.

[458] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 143.

[459] Peter Van Nuffelen, "Not Much Happened: 410 and All That*," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 105 (November 2015): 322, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0075435815000428. See also, Peter J. Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (Macmillan, 2005); Bryan Ward-Perkins, *The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

[460] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 101; Ward-Perkins, *The Fall of Rome*, 2; Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, 424–50.

[461] Daniel Baraz, *Medieval Cruelty: Changing Perceptions, Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period* (Cornell University Press, 2003), 48.

legitimation of the use of physical force to repel the pagan and/or heretical invaders continued and expanded.[462]

From late antiquity to the early middle ages, pacifism, says Bainton, was "in recession"[463] and violence and warfare were ubiquitous.[464] After successfully making war against the empire, the invading Visigoth, Ostrogoth, Lombard, Suevi, Vandal, Frank, Saxon, Angle, and Jute hordes, whether adhering to orthodoxy, non-orthodox Christianity, or paganism, proceeded to war against one another.[465] Bainton notes that the weakness of the political structure enabled the church to assume a unifying role. As he sees it, the church became the "architect and moulder of our civilization. The church was heir to the unity of Rome...Through many centuries she sought to convert, tame, and unite the Northern peoples. Her success was Christendom."[466]

Thus, in the West, the church assumed the role of central governing authority, in lieu of the authority of an imperial state. The church's success at forging Christendom[467] was wrought by the hands of churchmen/tribesmen intent upon conquest and power. Bainton's descriptive pose is worthy of citation in this regard. In his description, the conquering men "were bellicose and utterly devoid of any feeling for the beatitude upon the meek…[the cross] they regarded…not as a yoke to be placed upon their pugnacity, but as an ensign to lead them to battle."[468] The Christian God retained pre-eminence through the adherence of warriors, those believing that the Christian God brought them to victory in battle against their non-Christian adversaries. The condition emerged that successful warriors were Christian warriors, and that successful Christian warriors became rulers and kings. For the Merovingian kings, who united

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[462] For more on the occurrence of everyday nature of violence in the 5th century, see, Grey, "Shock, Horror, or Same Old Same Old?" Subsequent centuries are discussed by Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 101–21; and comprehensively by Warren C. Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe* (Longman, 2011).

[463] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 102.

[464] Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe*, 1–25.

[465] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 101.

[466] Bainton, 102.

[467] Western Christendom is a broadly defined term, that has been used to define those following a particular doctrinal code, between the fall of the Roman Empire and the emergence of "Latin Christendom" in the middle of the eleventh century. However, Moore notes that in the early middle ages religious life revolved around temples and monasteries in Eurasia, and these local communities varied greatly in their practices, despite adherence to common tenets. Thus "Christendom" should be understood as entailing local community variation. See, I. E. Moore, "Medieval Christianity in a World Historical Perspective," in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Christianity*, ed. John H. Arnold (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[468] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*.

Gaul and ruled for three hundred years between the fifth and eighth centuries,[469] "war was considered the normal state of affairs. Peace was something a king could grant to a person or group."[470]

This view of peace as the respite from battle was offset by that of the institutional church and by those who sustained the monastic tradition, which viewed peace as including the repose of the soul. It was the church that cultivated and kept alive the notion of peace, as something other than order, during the early medieval war-entrenched centuries.

4.2.2.2. Monastic Attempts at Peace

The role of the monastics and the ecclesia in pursuing peace was undefined until the seventh century. During the seventh century Gregory I (c.540–604), or Gregory the Great, married monastic and ecclesial ideals[471] by outlining ascetic practices necessary for the cultivation of inward peace, and then instructing that the pastoral call should be preceded by seeking peace, as the beginning of other virtues.[472] For Gregory, "[t]he pastor who is not an ascetic may lose his soul while performing his normal duties of preaching, eradication of paganism and heresy, administering his church, defending the helpless, regulating monasteries, arbitrating conflicts, and admonishing lay rulers."[473] Under Gregory's leading, the monastic ideal of inward peace was the means employed by the ecclesia to accomplish the work of peace, and to make peace more than the secular sovereign's cessation of warfare and violence.

In the seventh century, there is evidence of monastic attempts at juridical creation of peace terms. In 697 CE, the abbot of Iona, Adomnán, established an ecclesial standard to temper the conduct of warfare and violence. The Abbott introduced in Ireland and Britain a 'Law of the Innocents' (the "Cáin Adomnáin" or "*Lex Innocentium*"), which was aimed at protecting women, as well as clergy and children, from the violence of war. The Cáin set forth prohibitions restricting what women could be subjected to in society, including soldiering, magical curses, rape and sexual assault, and also set out punishment for violations, even

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[469] See, Alexander Callander Murray, *From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) for original source documents on the Merovingian period; for Merovingian history generally, see, Ian Wood, *The Merovingian Kingdoms 450 - 751* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[470] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 145.

[471] Renna, 149.

[472] But see, Mews who outlines scholarship that contests that Benedict was the promotor of the important Rule. Constant J. Mews, "Gregory the Great, the Rule of Benedict and Roman Liturgy: The Evolution of a Legend," *Journal of Medieval History* 37, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 126–27.

[473] Renna, 149.

violations committed during war.[474] Adomnán did not object to the idea that war could be waged by legitimate authorities. His objective was to establish a protected status for non-combatants.[475]

Because of the instability and violence common in a society where most thought it laudable and virtuous to kill Vikings, Magyars, or Saracen infidels, the concern for peace was of interest to many. "Peace was idealized because it was hard to find."[476]

Peaceful monasticism flourished. Monastics decried the failure of the ecclesia to keep the peace of King Charlemagne who had died in 814. Many retreated in greater numbers to monastic community.

> By 900 the monks had long abandoned any attempt to apply their peace to society at large. Indeed, they are fond of contrasting their perfect way with the false peace of a hopelessly corrupt world…With their version of inner tranquillity and personal union with God they stressed the gap which existed between them and the external peaces of both prelatial Church and secular society…many monks professed an ideal of detachment in the midst of increased secularization and localization.[477]

The Cluniacs, founded in 910 CE, are an example of a monastic order symbolic of peace and unity during the chaotic 10th and 11th centuries.[478] The Cluniacs followed in the ascetic tradition, and aimed at detachment from the world.[479] Yet they also had a strong social impact, being led to make "demands for clerical liberation from lay control, and for higher standards of monastic and clerical conduct,"[480] particularly under abbot Peter the Venerable.[481] The reforms of the Cluniacs spread throughout the highest echelons of the church under Pope

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[474] Rory Cox, "The Ethics of War up to Thomas Aquinas" (Oxford University Press, 2015). Date Accessed 3 May, citing, Adomnán's "Law of the Innocents": Cáin Adomnáin: A Seventh-Century Law for the Protection of Noncombatants, trans. G. Márkus (Glasgow: Blackfriars Books, 1997), §§33-4, 41-2, 45-6, 50-2.

[475] Cox, 17, citing J.E. Fraser, 'Adomnán and the Morality of War', in Adomnán of Iona: Theologian, Law Maker, Peace Maker, ed. J. Wooding et al (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), 95-111.

[476] Renna, 155.

[477] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 153 (internal citation omitted).

[478] For discussion of Cluny, see, Dana C. Munro, *Medieval Civilization*, ebook (New York: The Century, 1907), 106–16. The Cluniac monastics were remarkable not only for their wealth and influence, but also for their independence. The Cluniacs were an "island of autonomy in the midst of an ocean of jurisdictions and feudal servitudes." Munro, 123.

[479] The Cluniacs, however, revised the Rule of St. Benedict, which was written in the sixth century and which had defined monasticism in the West. Benedict's rule balanced prayer, work, and leisure in the life of the monastic. The Cluniacs turned away from manual labor, however, and substituted writing and study. Simplicity gave way to splendour and grandeur.

[480] Renna, 153.

[481] James Aloysius Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam* (Princeton University Press, 2015), 7.

Gregory VII (the "Gregorian" reforms).[482] During the tenth and eleventh centuries Cluny amassed wealth and influence, and became the veritable capital of monasticism, with some ten thousand monks and six hundred monasteries throughout Western Europe.[483]

4.2.2.3. Ecclesial and Civil Attempts at Peace

The ecclesial and civil authorities also made attempts to pursue peace in the midst of the region's extreme violence. Asserting the need for an effective peace keeper, in 751, Pope Zachary crowned monastery educated Pepin the Short, king.[484] Pope Zachary's standard of peace was the ecclesial peace, rather than the peace of the Merovingian kings.[485] Pepin's son and successor, Charles, founded the Charlemagne dynasty and brought unity to much of the Latin speaking world. Pepin, and even more so Charles, understood the kingship not merely as a means to prevent local violence, but as enabling Christ's peace on earth, which the king's power could implement by means of coercive force if necessary.[486] In Charles' conceptualization, "Christian society and imperial political order were intertwined."[487] Charlemagne led campaigns into Muslim Spain and into Saxony to the east, where his conquest forced Christianization upon the Saxons upon pain of death.[488] (*see, Figure 4-1*)

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[482] John Derksen, "Peacemaking Principles Drawn from Opposition to the Crusades, 1095—1276," *Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (2004): 42.

[483] Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, 3.

[484] Renna, 150.

[485] Renna, 149.

[486] Renna, 150.

[487] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 151.

[488] "If any one of the race of the Saxons hereafter concealed among them shall have wished to hide himself unbaptized, and shall have scorned to come to baptism and shall have wished to remain a pagan, let him be punished by death." "Medieval Sourcebook: Charlemagne: Capitulary for Saxony 775-790," Fordham University Internet Sourcebooks, 1996, para. 8, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/carol-saxony.asp.

Figure 4-1 Charlemagne's Forced Baptism

de Neuville, Alphonse: "Charlemagne imposes baptism on the Saxons." in Guizot, François: L'histoire de France racontée à mes petits-enfants, vol. 1, Paris, 1877 (The story of France told to my grandchildren, vol. 1, Paris, 1877)[489]

Charlemagne unified most of western Europe for the first time since the demise of the Holy Roman Empire. He assumed the title of Holy Roman Emperor in 800.[490]

[489] Elisabeth Kristoffersen, "Pacifying the Saxons – An Interpretative Reading of the Hêliand," 2013, iii, https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/38506.

[490] For discussion of Charlemagne's coronation, see, Mayr-Harting argues that Charlemagne needed to conquer the Saxons to gain control of trade along the Rhine; that his title was bestowed to unite the Frankish peoples and the Roman papacy. The pope was happy to have an "emperor," rather than a *Patricius Romanorum*, since the authority of an emperor to deal with rebels was unquestioned. Charlemagne accepted the title since, it provided authority for his rulership of the Saxons who had no tradition of kingship.

"Charlemagne's clergy were…active participants in the enforcement of peace,"[491] though his peace policies were perceived as overreach by the church. To reassert authority, the church adopted, in 829 CE, the Council of Paris. The Council of Paris articulated a vision of how a bishop was to fulfil his office. It asserted the difference between the spheres of the sovereign and the bishop.[492] The Council of Paris made the episcopacy the rightful defender of the peace, with mere assistance from the sovereign. The sovereign, however, did not yield to this conceptualization of the church. The king maintained that his reign and authority came directly from God, not from the clergy, that his first duty was to enforce both the ecclesial and the civil the law; and that "the means peculiar to the secular ruler was armed force - a means forbidden the clergy."[493] Thus the line between church and clergy, in national identity as well as in promulgation of peace policy began to overlap in the infancy of Europe.

Between the 9th and 11th centuries, theories of peace abounded.

> For this was the time of episcopal treatises, church councils…the Peace and Truce of God, Cluniac peacemakers, a monastic theology of peace, the peace of Christendom, the reform papacy, the demise of the imperial peace, and the rise of the localized public peace.[494]

A group of bishops assembled at Charroux in 989 CE and instituted the Peace of God ("Pax Dei") accord, whereby all those who carried arms were obliged "to refrain from damaging churches, pillaging the poor, or causing bodily harm to clerics."[495] Failure to adhere to the new orders would result in anathema for the violators. In 1027, at a Council of Elne[496] another canon was issued, the Truce of God ("Treuga Dei"). The Truce of God "called for the cessation of warfare during certain days of the week, on specified religious festivals, and even for several weeks during Advent and other periods in the religious calendar." [497] The institutional church, in these ways, used the instruments of the church, including "conciliar

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[491] Renna, 151.

[492] Theo Riches, "Review, Steffen Patzold, Episcopus. Wissen Über Bischöfe Im Frankenreich Des Späten 8. Bis Frühen 10. Jahrhunderts (Episcopus. Knowledge of Bishops in the Frankish Kingdom of the Late 8th to Early 10th Centuries) (Review No. 961)," *Reviews in History*, no. 961 (2010), https://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/961#t1.

[493] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 151 citing; Karl F. Morrison, *Two Kingdoms: Ecclesiology in Carolingian Political Thought* (Princeton University Press, 1964), 118.

[494] Renna, 151.

[495] Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, *The Ethics of War*, 93.

[496] Charles Moeller, "Truce of God," in *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Robert Appleton Co., 1912), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15068a.htm.

[497] Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, *The Ethics of War*, 94.

decrees, malediction, anathema, excommunication, and interdict,"[498] to interpose peace on temporal society. Ecclesiastic means of peace during this period were often localized and were often implemented in regions where secular authority was weak.[499] It is not clear to what extent peace was actually effected through these means, however.[500]

It might also be argued that peace was pursued ecclesiastically in the West through the pursuit of holy war against infidel outsiders in the East. Pope Urban II called for the first Crusade in 1095. In his speech he called upon those undertaking local battles to leave their local disputes and to join together to aid their brothers in Eastern Christendom, in fighting against the Seljuk Turks. The "glorious reward of martyrdom" was offered to those who were willing to undertake war in the East.[501]

Also, during this time, possibly due to acceptance and promotion of killing and large-scale martyrdom, Christian culture began to dwell homiletically and artistically on Jesus's pain and suffering. Theology that formerly focused on Christ's nature and triumph over death, shifted to a focus on Jesus's suffering and pain. Visual images that formerly depicted Jesus healthy and alive on the cross, turned to depictions of Jesus wounded and dead or dying on the cross. Christians began to view themselves as vulnerable, and as threatened by the Muslim Turks, and also by Jews in their midst. Lipton documents that the *Goad of Love*, written between 1155 and 1180, and retelling the story of the crucifixion, was the first time the story had been portrayed as an anti-Jewish Passion.[502] "It describes Jews as consumed with sadism and blood lust."[503] According to Lipton, the characterization was meant to portray Jews as not only enemies of Jesus, but also of living Christians.[504] She notes that though there had been sporadic episodes of anti-Jewish episodes previously, now anti-Judaism became a cultural phenomenon. Vitriolic and extremist anti-Jewish rhetoric began to "permeate sermons, plays and polemical texts."

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[498] Renna, 154.
[499] Renna, 154.
[500] See, Keith Haines, "Attitudes and Impediments to Pacifism in Medieval Europe," *Journal of Medieval History* 7 (1981): 377. who argues that both the Peace of God and the Truce of God was ineffectual, inoperable, and blatantly disregarded.
[501] Angeliki Laiou, "The Just War of Eastern Christians and the Holy War of the Crusaders," in *The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions*, ed. David Rodin and Benson II Sorabji Richard D. (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013).
[502] Sara Lipton, "The Words That Killed Medieval Jews," *The New York Times*, December 21, 2017, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/opinion/the-words-that-killed-medieval-jews.html.
[503] Lipton.
[504] Lipton.

Peter the Venerable has left a record of some of the worst examples of the kind of rhetoric Lipton describes. In his tract *Against the Inveterate Hardness of the Jews*, he writes (as if to a Jewish person):

> It seems to me, O Jew, that…I have satisfied every human being...to the question proposed. But if I have satisfied every human, I have being, then I have satisfied you too, if, nonetheless, you are human. In fact, I do not dare avow that you are human, lest perhaps I lie, because I recognize that the rational faculty that separates a human from…wild beasts and gives precedence over them is extinct or, rather, buried in you…Now why should you not be called wild animal, why not a beast, why not a beast of burden?[505]

He goes on to "prove" at length that the Jew is in fact a beast. The horror of Peter's dehumanization of Jewish people is compounded by his advocacy of violence against them, that exceeds the violence due against the Muslims. In his Letter to Louis VII. of France he writes:

> What would it profit to fight against enemies of the cross in remote lands, while the wicked Jews, who blaspheme Christ, and who are much worse than the Saracens, go free and unpunished. Much more are the Jews to be execrated and hated than the Saracens; for the latter accept the birth from the Virgin, but the Jews deny it, and blaspheme that doctrine and all Christian mysteries. God does not want them to be wholly exterminated, but to be kept, like the fratricide Cain, for still more severe torment and disgrace. In this way God's most just severity has dealt with the Jews from the time of Christ's passion, and will continue to deal with them to the end of the world, for they are accursed, and deserve to be." He counselled that they be spoiled of their ill-gotten gains and the money derived from their spoliation be applied to wrest the holy places from the Saracens.[506]

Schaff notes that Peter advised that property of the Jews be seized and used and applied to the continuing fight against the Muslims.[507]

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[505] Peter the Venerable, *Against the Inveterate Obduracy of the Jews*, trans. Irven M. Resnick (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2013), 2011. Resnick, the translator of the first full publication of the treatise in English, notes that the treatise was written in stages. Chapter one to the first part of Chapter Four, dated to 1144, the remaining chapters four and five, dated to 1146, and the entire work reissued in 1147. Venerable, 7, 30–31.

[506] Philip Schaff, ed., *History of the Christian Church, Vol. 5: The Middle Ages*, American, Digital, vol. 5, History of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics, 1994), chap. 9, sec. 77, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf210.html citing ad majus tormentum et ad majorem ignominiam … sic de damnatis damnandisque Judaeis, lib. IV. ep. 36; Migne's ed., vol, 189, 365-367.

[507] Schaff, vol. 5, chap. 9, sec. 77.

Very shortly, the rhetoric turned to large-scale anti-Jewish violence throughout Western Europe. On the way to the first crusade, the crusaders, indeed, massacred hundreds, if not thousands of Jews in towns on route to the Holy Land.[508] It was violence that would continue for centuries.

The strategy of unity-against-a-common-enemy served to promote peace in the West. But also, by declaring such warfare holy, the church adopted as doctrine that salvation, forgiveness of sin and eternal peace with God, could be found through the act of killing and war itself.[509]

4.2.2.4. Heterodox Peace

Besides the secular, monastic, and ecclesial sources of peace making, the ineradicable dualist sects that persisted throughout the historic life of the church revived during this period. The largest, most threatening, and first dualist sect in the West, the Cathars,[510] explicitly rejected the use of violence. The 11th century Cathars, alternatively recognized as Albigenses, located within French -Catalan region of Languedoc, Northern Italy, and beyond, have been deemed to be a diffused revival of Manichaeism.[511] As Barber notes in his history of the sect,[512] their popularity was related to their total opposition to the Catholic church, which they viewed as a false and corrupted church. They believed that the sacraments were void of value, since God could not have had a material body, nor have been killed nor resurrected. Catholic opposition to the sect was, therefore, a matter of faith; their eradication a church imperative. The Cathars were subject to inquisition, and later to the first European Crusade. Nonetheless, they maintained an absolute prohibition against the taking of human life based upon Jesus's injunctions against killing. "This Church refrains from killing, nor does it consent that others may kill."[513]

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[508] Lipton, "The Words That Killed Medieval Jews."

[509] Laiou, "The Just War of Eastern Christians and the Holy War of the Crusaders."

[510] Pegg objects to broad use of the term Cathar as "deeply misleading and applied in such an indiscriminate way by modern historians as to make it, for all intents and purposes, a useless term." Mark Gregory Pegg, "On Cathars, Albigenses and Good Men," *Journal of Medieval History* 27 (2001): 192.

[511] By "Manichaeism" is meant the dualist sect first practiced then condemned by Augustine in the fourth century. Though the term did come to be used as an umbrella term for various unorthodox beliefs. For discussion of Manichaeism generally see, Geo Widengren, *Mani and Manichaeism* (London, Weidenfeld, 1965); Peter Brown, "The Diffusion of Manichaeism in the Roman Empire," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 59 (November 1969): 92–103, https://doi.org/10.2307/299850; and Michel Tardieu, *Manichaeism*, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Urbana, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008).

[512] Malcolm Barber, *The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages* (Routledge, 2017).

[513] Peter Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914.* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Pres, 2015), 26.

> Inquisition records after 1210 record Cathar opposition to the crusades. According to the Dominican Moneta of Cremona, they stressed the long suffering of Christ and the apostles before their enemies. They recalled that Christ had taught the disciples to bless their persecutors, and had commanded Peter to sheathe his sword. They condemned the church for preaching and issuing crusade indulgences. Finally, they quoted St. Paul, "Be without offence to the Jews and to the Gentiles (i.e., Muslims) and to the church of God" (I Cor. 10:31).[514]

In addition to the Cathars, other sects arose that embodied an opposition to violence and warfare. Among these were "the semi-monastic Beguine sisters and their male counterparts, the Beghards, in the Netherlands; [515] a lay poverty movement in northern Italy called the Humiliati;[516] and the Waldensians, founded by Valdes as the Poor Men of Lyons."[517] The pacifism of these groups was deemed a characteristic of their heretical beliefs.

Anti-violence sects, particularly the Cathars, had an influence on the monastic movement. As sects proliferated, monasteries often became refuges for proponents of an alternate Christian witness that included non-violence. "Monasteries became citadels of learning in a violent age, enclaves for Christians who refused to take up arms."[518] Members of monastic orders, including the famed Francis of Assisi, also took public stances against the Crusades of the church.

> Francis of Assisi believed Muslims might be won by persuasion, and unarmed he entered the Sultan's camp and engaged him in dialogue. In addition, he criticized the conduct of the crusader army and at times predicted its defeat…The Dominican Raymond Pennafort, who lived among Muslims for thirty-five years, declared that God disliked forced worship, so coercion had no place in mission work. William of Tripoli, a

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[514] Derksen, "Peacemaking Principles," 49 citing Siberry.

[515] Beguine communities formed in the early thirteenth century. They consisted of semireligious communities of women. The beguines led lives of contemplation and prayer and earned their livings as laborers or teachers. See, Walter Simons, *Cities of Ladies: Beguine Communities in the Medieval Low Countries, 1200-1565* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).

[516] See, Frances Andrews, *The Early Humiliati* (Cambridge University Press, 2000). This community was condemned by the Church for heresy in 1184. However, they were reconstituted seventeen years later and went on to establish a successful religious order in north Italy. See also, Sally Brasher, *Women of the Humiliati: A Moral Response to Medieval Civic Life* (Routledge, 2004). which examines the contributions of women to the Humiliati movement.

[517] Derksen, "Peacemaking Principles," 49.

[518] Mark Kurlansky, *Nonviolence: The History of a Dangerous Idea* (Random House, 2008), 47. However, Bainton points out that monastics at times engaged in battles, typically when monasteries were under attack. Men and women both are recorded as violently resisting on occasion. E.g., Chrodield, a nun of Poitiers, who led a 2-year long revolt. Bainton, Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation, 106.

> Dominican in Acre, emphasized the commonalities between Islam and Christianity. He rejected the thought of compulsion and urged that the church abandon crusades altogether.[519]

4.2.2.5. Monastic and Clerical Unity in Fostering Peace

Greater stability came to the West during the twelfth century, due to "urbanization, abundant food supply, material prosperity, scholastic and legal learning, and fewer internal wars and external threats."[520] With the increase in stability and prosperity, the ideals connected to monastic detachment were seen as less warranted and desirable.[521] Monastic influence lost ground to the more juridical notions of peace of the ecclesia. Twelfth century Cistercian monk,[522] Bernard of Clairvaux, addressed the tension between the two by making explicit the relationship of monastics and the ecclesia in fostering peace. Monks possess peace, while bishops make peace. By making peace among the laity, the clergy establish conditions in which monastic peace, repose of the soul, may exist.

> Without the undefiled peace of the cloister, the peace of the Church would lack a point of reference. Without the peace of the organizational Church, the peace of the cloister would be disturbed, and the souls of the laity would be lost through ignorance and dissipation.
> The monk is reconciled; the cleric reconciles. The monk rests in God; the cleric brings rest to others.[523]

The church's concern for sacramental practice was tied to its role as peacemaker. Bernard sought to maintain for the church, which vied with secular rulers for ultimate authority, the ownership of the value, source and dispensation of peace.

4.2.2.6. Ecclesial Regulation of War

Finally, the Church began to develop a detailed doctrinal position on, and ethical constructions of, just war, to temper the extremes of warfare. Churchmen of the day, most prominently Thomas Aquinas, (1225-1274) constructed a comprehensive update to Augustine's just war theories. Much has been written on Thomas' just war theorizations, that

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[519] Derksen, "Peacemaking Principles," 49.
[520] Renna, 160.
[521] Renna, 160.
[522] The Cistercians were founded in 1098 as many in the church objected to the monastic changes within the Cluniac monasteries. A return to greater simplicity and stricter observance of St. Benedicts rule, including serious work, was intended. Great contestation between the Cluniacs and the Cistercians continued for many years.
. [Need citation. Poss Bredero, "Controversy between Peter the Venerable and St. Bernard of Clairvaux," PV, 54-55 note 5…also note 16.].
[523] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 158.

cannot be adequately treated here,[524] however a brief expression of Aquinas's ideas regarding just war is offered. Aquinas believed that for a war to be just, three conditions were necessary. First, there must be just right or just authority to wage war. This principle was intended to restrict warfare to those with recognized authority, thereby limiting private occasions for resort to armed violence.[525] Second, there must be a just cause for war, or proper motive.[526] Third, there must be right intentions in fighting, not, for example, greed or cruelty.[527] "Right intent" for Aquinas represented a particular moral character "comprising habits, attitudes, sentiments, and prejudices…that disposed belligerents to limit both their recourse to war and their conduct of war."[528] Motive and intent were co-determinative so that, "the thing that compels us to do something also shapes what it is that one is trying to do."[529] Despite his detailed treatment of the topic, Aquinas's formulations amounted to an ideological moderation of warfare, more than a moderation that limited the practice of waging war.

4.2.3. Conclusion

In the West, a rivalry was present between the ecclesial authority of the church and the secular rulers. The cohesion of the church amidst the rampant violence and brutality of warring tribesmen of the North resulted in the ecclesial structure of Christendom gaining cultural and political authority between the fourth and eighth centuries.[530] The church remained in a position of great authority until the Carolingian kings established a unified Europe for the first time since the end of the Holy Roman Empire. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as smaller polities merged into more centralized principalities, the secular rulers began to co-opt ecclesial concepts of peace, like the Peace of God and Truce of God, and to construe them as practices of secular public peace.[531] During the 13th and 14th centuries, bishops, kings and nobles expanded these polices by engaging in practices of official mediation to avoid resort to armed

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[524] For a comprehensive discussion of Aquinas's thought, and of medieval constructions of just war theory see, John Langan, "The Elements of St. Augustine's Just War Theory," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 12, no. 1 (1984): 19–38; Gregory M. Reichberg, *Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace* (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[525] Nico Vorster, "Just War and Virtue: Revisiting Augustine and Thomas Aquinas," *South African Journal of Philosophy* 34, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 61–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2015.1010135.

[526] Vorster, 61–62.

[527] Vorster, 62.

[528] Anthony Coates, "Culture, the Enemy, and the Moral Restraint of War.," in *The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions*, ed. David Rodin and Richard Sorabji (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013), 215.

[529] David Whetham, *Just Wars and Moral Victories: Surprise, Deception and the Normative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages* (BRILL, 2009), 47.

[530] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 155.

[531] Renna, 161.

conflict.[532] When nation-states began to form in the fourteenth century, these mediating peace practices were conceived of as national peace practices, and stripped of eschatological or ontological concerns related to God.[533] "Thus, the Western notion of public peace…was the result of the gradual secularization of the *pax eccclesiae* by the new and larger political units."[534]

What may be said about the Western church's non-violence theory in the middle ages is that it was shaped by Christian understandings of peace with God, and inward dispositions of quietude, in the midst of a virulently violent social context. Monastic pursuit of peace influenced ecclesial efforts at peace-making, which ultimately resulted in nation-state co-optation of the role of peacemakers and peacekeepers. Arising as they did out of the context of social disruption and ongoing warfare, the conceptions of peace of the imperial, the ecclesiastical, and the monastic authorities, "[v]irtually all…from 500 to 1150 were connected to the idea of order. Peace was a conservative reaction to widespread discord and immorality; it was a return to right order."[535] Thus, there was a conception of peace, but no concept of "non-violence" *per se*. Violence was regulated but not viewed as an evil in itself.

4.3. Early Middle Ages and the Eastern Church

(This is a sketch of the theology of the Eastern Church, that will not continue to be developed in the research. I offer it as the time period covered preceded the split in the churches. The space constraints, and the fact that the Eastern church has not had the cultural influence that the Western church has had influenced by decision to limit consideration of this church's theological development of non-violence ethics.)

The rise of Constantinian Christianity, and the fall of Rome in 410 CE, created different kinds of pressures for the Eastern and Western regions of the church. The differences in the composition of the churches, as well as their differing challenges, resulted in their ideological distance, which led ultimately to a break between the two regions of the church in 1094.

In the fifth century, the Eastern Roman Empire was not confronted with ongoing foreign invasions in the way that the Western part of the Empire was.[536] Up through the seventh

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[532] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 116–17.
[533] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 161.
[534] Renna, 162.
[535] Renna, 148.
[536] Chris Wickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean, 400-800*, 1 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 24–34.

century, while the imperial structure was coming undone in the Western part of the Empire, the Eastern region continued to be politically and economically stable.[537] This stability would be challenged beginning in in the seventh century, by wars with Persia and the newly powerful Muslim tribal confederation, however, unlike the Western region, the Eastern region remained a highly centralised state.[538] The political conditions of the regions had implications for how the church approached issues of Christian warfare.

The Western regions devolved into militarized and martial local rulerships; a militarization which the church came to reflect. The East, however, retained the framework of empire, with the emperor as a central authority who controlled a central military.[539] The church remained separate from the state. The church functioned as a consultancy, with the church Patriarch assuming an advisory capacity to the emperor.[540] The Eastern empire engaged in warfare when under attack, but the pervasiveness and acceptance of violence that existed in the West was not present.[541]

4.3.1. Killing as Sin

Both Eastern and Western church traditions veered away from Augustine's just war formulations in the centuries after Augustine wrote. The Western church moved away from Augustine's principle that on some occasions war may be justified and veered toward a removal of limits on any and all violence and war, including engagement in warfare by the clergy. The Eastern church moved away from Augustine's principle, and could indeed be said to have never embraced it. In Eastern church theology, war and killing are never justifiable in the life of the Christian. Killing is always a sin, albeit a sin that could be repented of and forgiven.[542]

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[537] Mark Whittow, *The Making of Byzantium, 600-1025* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 68.

[538] Wickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages*, 128–29.

[539] Wickham, 128–29.

[540] See, Marian Gh Simion, "Just War Theory and Orthodox Christianity," *Papers from Department ARS New York*, 2008, 23–44.

[541] Simion, 26.

[542] The Eastern church's theology of war hinges on the centrality of the concept of theosis to their beliefs. Theosis, or deification, represents the Christian's ultimate goal, as it means participation in the eternal life of the Godhead. (See, Philip LeMasters, "Orthodox Perspectives on Peace, War and Violence," *The Ecumenical Review* 63, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-6623.2010.00093.x.) Warfare, which necessitates taking life, is a spiritually damaging act, and impedes the Christian's process of theosis. Accordingly, warfare is regarded as sin. The spiritually damaging act of killing during war requires cleansing. The soldier must repent, which entails the reorientation of the soldier's life towards God. LeMasters, 57–58.

Orthodox theologians Clement and Harakas conclude that the Eastern church's theology of war is that it is a "necessary evil," and though permissible, is not "justifiable."[543]

Though there was no acceptance of just war doctrine related to the just *cause* for war (*jus ad bellum*) in the Eastern church, a doctrine of just conduct *during* war (*jus in bellum*) was promulgated. The *Strategikon* of the late 6th or early 7th century serves as an example. The *Strategikon* was a military treatise which instructed that military campaigns should be conducted so as to minimize the loss of life for all combatants. It allowed an encircled enemy to escape rather than engaging that enemy in a battle that would be costly to both sides.[544]

The Eastern church never deviated from its reliance upon the teachings of the early Church Fathers for construction of doctrine regarding non-violence. This "'patristic' foundation…went on to provide the underpinning of Byzantine canon law, and (after the fall of Byzantium), the system of law that still operates throughout the churches of the East."[545] Basil of Caesarea (d. 379 CE), Gregory Nazianzus (d. 390 CE) and John Chrysostom (d. 407 CE) are considered the holy "Three Hierarchs" of the ancient Church.[546]

One of the most influential teachings regarding war and killing was that of St. Basil, who wrote in his 13th canon,[547] (his teachings as a bishop to his flock):

> Our fathers did not consider killings committed in the course of wars to be classifiable as murders at all, on the score, it seems to me, of allowing a pardon to men fighting in defence of sobriety and piety. Perhaps, though, it might be advisable to refuse them communion for three years, on the ground that their hands are not clean.[548]

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[543] Stanley S. Harakas, in *Wholeness of Faith and Life: Orthodox Christian Ethics: Orthodox Social Issues* (Brookline, Mass: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2004), Ch. 6; Olivier Clement, "The Orthodox Church and Peace – Some Reflections," in *For the Peace from Above: An Orthodox Resource Book on War, Peace and Nationalism*, ed. Hildo Bos and Jim Forest (Rollinsford, N.H.: Orthodox Research Institute, 2011), 172–79.

[544] David K Goodin, "Just-War Theory and Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Theological Perspective on the Doctrinal Legacy of Chrysostom and Constantine-Cyril," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 49, no. 3–4 (2004): 253 citing Harakas, The Morality of War (1981).

[545] McGuckin, "Nonviolence and Peace Traditions in Early & Eastern Christianity."

[546] John Anthony McGuckin, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography* (St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001), xxviii.

[547] For the Canonical Epistles of St Basil, otherwise known as the Ninety-Two Canons, see D. Cummings, *The Rudder (Pedalion) of the Metaphorical Ship of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of the Orthodox Christians, Or All the Sacred and Divine Canons of the Holy and Renowned Apostles, of the Holy Councils ...* (Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1957).

[548] John Anthony McGuckin, *The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to Its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual Culture* (John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 403 citing Basil, Epistle 188.13; Cummings 1957: 801. .

Basil's canon accepted soldiering while acknowledging the moral taint that it produces, thus, his recommendation of a three-year period of cleansing following participation in war. Basil's canon was relied upon throughout the first millennium.

A significant application of Basil's teaching occurred in the tenth century. The powerful and pious[549] Byzantine Emperor Nikephoras II Phokas (956-970 CE) and Patriarch Polyeukos (956-970 CE) disputed whether or not the emperor could "establish a law that those who fell during wars be honoured equally with the holy martyrs, and be celebrated with hymns and feast days."[550] The Church determined that it was not possible to "number with the martyrs" soldiers who had fallen during the war. How could it be, they asked, when "Basil the Great excluded [them] from the Sanctified Elements for three years since their hands were not clean?"[551] At which, several priests and bishops "confessed… that they [themselves had] fought with the enemy and killed many of them." Whereupon the synod ordered them "to cease from the ministry."[552] This is a vast difference from Pope Urban in the Western church framing Christian soldiers as martyrs following their voluntary participation in the church's eleventh century Crusade. In the East, martyrdom for Christian soldiers was denied.

McGuckin argues that there was a nuanced balance maintained by the Eastern church, following Basil. Basil recognized that theoretically, Christian morality turns away from war as an irredeemable evil. However, with respect to local insurgencies by pagan "barbarians," Basil had little patience for those who did not fight because of religious scruples. For Basil, "passive non-involvement betrays the Christian family (especially its weaker members who can not defend themselves but need others to help them) to the ravages of men without heart or conscience to restrain them."[553]

Basil's intention in barring soldiers from the Eucharist for a period was primarily symbolic to his society. Typically, in the fourth century, victorious soldiers were applauded by the Christian community. The majority in the community did not partake regularly in the Eucharist, and most Christians were not baptized yet and thus not bound by the canons of the

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[549] Laiou, "The Just War of Eastern Christians and the Holy War of the Crusaders," 35.

[550] Patrick Viscuso, "Christian Participation in Warfare: A Byzantine View," in *Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis, S.J.*, ed. Timothy S. Miller, John Nesbitt, and George T. Dennis (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 37.

[551] Viscuso, Christian Participation in Warfare, 38.

[552] Viscuso, Christian Participation in Warfare, 39.

[553] McGuckin, "Nonviolence and Peace Traditions in Early & Eastern Christianity."

Church. Yet, Basil sought to establish standards for the church: honourable warfare ends with an honourable repentance.[554]

> By moving in and out of Eucharistic reception Basil's faithful Christian (returning from his duty with blood on his hands) is now in the modality of expressing his dedication to the values of peace and innocence, by means of the lamentation and repentance for life that has been taken, albeit the blood of the violent.[555]

Though challenged during the later middle ages,[556] the thirteenth canon of Basil was ultimately followed into the fourteenth century.

4.3.2. Sects and Non-violence

In addition to church canon and tradition, there arose in the church of the East influential sects that embraced non-violence rather than war. The Bogomils in Slavic eastern Europe, were "the most important sectarian movement"[557] in the Byzantine Empire,[558] and influenced the ideological development of other sects in the West.[559] Bogomil origins in the tenth century seem to be a diffusion of the earlier Manichaeist heretical sect.[560] Bogomils adhered to the teaching that distinguished between life in the body and life in the spirit. The body belonged to the world, which was created by and remained the realm of Satan,[561] while the realm of the spirit was exalted.[562] The Bogomils lived ascetically. They were celibates, renounced all property, and devoutly followed a liturgical habit built around the Lord's prayer.[563] Because their lifestyle intentionally closely approximated the Orthodox church's ideal of holiness, they

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[554] McGuckin.

[555] McGuckin.

[556] See, Viscuso, "Christian Participation in Warfare," 38, who describes how 12th-century canonists, John Zonaras and Theodore Balsamon argued against the authority of Basil's 13th canon.

[557] Helmut Koester, *History and Literature of Early Christianity* (Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 9.

[558] The Bogomils are often regarded as arising within the Byzantine Empire, however scholars have commented that Bosnia, where the sect flourished, was only on the fringes of the Byzantine world, and not a part of it. "Ecclesiatically it was a diocese of the Western church, and politically the kings of Hungary claimed suzerainty over it." See, Janet Hamilton, Bernard Hamilton, and Yuri Stoyanov, *Christian Dualist Heresies in the Byzantine World, C. 650-c. 1450: Selected Sources* (Manchester University Press, 1998), x.

[559] But see, Mark Gregory Pegg, "On Cathars, Albigenses and Good Men," *Journal of Medieval History* 27 (2001): 185-186. Pegg argues against the linking of one ideological strand of Bogomilism across centuries and geographic regions, since to do so confuses and misnames disparate ideological sect groupings.

[560] Ewa Weiling Feldthusen, "In Search of a Missing Link: The Bogomils and Zoroastrianism," *Kontur*, no. 14 (2006): 4–5.

[561] Weiling Feldthusen, 6.

[562] Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914.*, 26.

[563] Hamilton, Hamilton, and Stoyanov, *Christian Dualist Heresies in the Byzantine World, C. 650-c. 1450*, 106.

were initially considered saintly. Eventually, charges of heresy were made against them in the eleventh century, due to their doctrinal deviations from orthodoxy.[564] Believing that killing prevented reincarnation, which aborted one's penitential possibility,[565] Bogomils "were admonished…to suffer wrong peacefully and to avoid the shedding of blood."[566] It is, however, unclear how entrenched the pacifist practice of the Bogomils was.[567]

4.3.3. Conclusion

Historically, faced with challenges arising throughout the era, including Islamic aggression, the Crusades and Slavic anarchy in the Balkans, the Eastern church arrived at a balance of teachings regarding war and killing. It upheld the doctrine that killing was always wrong, however allowed that under local circumstances of pagan insurgency, fighting and killing was required. It was insisted that service in war be followed by repentance. The church continued to prohibit killing outside of war conditions and continued to maintain that clergy who served at the altar of God may under no circumstances spill blood. For the Eastern church, there could be no "just violence," though the "violence of the just" must often be tolerated.[568] This nuanced tradition has been consistently pursued, to the present day.

4.4. Conclusion of Medieval Period Non-violence Analysis

For the church of this period, creating peace meant primarily restoring order, control, and power. The monastic movement that began as counter-cultural protest, soon became one of the wealthiest and most powerful arms of the church institution. There was little emphasis on using power to defend and protect those who were "Othered" or who were outsiders. There was almost no consciousness by the church of the value of an ethic of non-resistance. Sects that were subjected to persecution by the ecclesial and secular powers are the only ones who found merit in the dogma of self-sacrifice. Their embrace of doctrines of self-sacrifice was by

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[564] Hamilton, Hamilton, and Stoyanov, 35. See also, Linus Pierpont Brockett, *The Bogomils of Bulgaria and Bosnia; Or, The Early Protestants of the East: An Attempt to Restore Some Lost Leaves of Protestant History* (American Baptist Publishing Society, 1879), Sec. IX.

[565] Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914.*, 26.

[566] Brock, 26.

[567] Brock notes that it is unlikely that rejection of warfare was practiced generally, and that nobles did not in fact adhere to this teaching regarding warfare. Brock, 26. See, also, Marian Gh Simion, "Just War Theory and Orthodox Christianity," *Papers from Department ARS New York*, 2008, 116, who argues that the Bogomils, and like sects, engaged in a dualism that ultimately "favored not only an *us-versus-them* attitude, but it proceeded to the demonization of adversaries and justification of violence."

[568] McGuckin, "Nonviolence and Peace Traditions in Early & Eastern Christianity."

necessity. The church during this period diverged almost completely from the teachings of Jesus.

5. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from Late Middle Ages to Early Modernity

This section will review the period from the middle ages to modernity, roughly encompassing the 13th to the 17th centuries. The analysis will encompass the church in Europe and the movement into the New World.

5.1. Introduction

During the Late Middle Ages, the emergence of a different kind of non-violence doctrine is observed. The brutality of war resulted in the emergence of the idea that war, in itself, was contrary to Christian belief and practice. Generally, those promoting this belief were to be found on the margins of the culture. They were severely persecuted and repressed by the State and by the ecclesial authorities. This period sees the second spilt in the church. Loss of faith in the integrity of the Catholic church led to reformers splitting and establishing churches that operated outside of the authority of the Pope and the ecclesial structure. The new Protestant churches were often aligned with the civil authority of the nobles, princes, or kings. They were reforming of culture, but not counter-cultural. Smaller sects that were counter-cultural, anabaptists, were persecuted by those who supported the dominant church theological frames, both Protestant and Catholic. The reform movements and the counter-cultural movements varied in their promotion of the use of force for transformation. Generally, it was accepted and used to advance the cause of group empowerment.

5.2. Late Middle Ages and the Western Church

It becomes possible to trace the rise and consistent transmission of the idea of "pacifism" beginning in the 14th century, with the writing of John Wycliffe.

5.2.1. John Wycliffe

John Wycliffe (1330-1384) is most widely known as the person who first translated the Bible from Latin into English. He was much more than a biblical languages translator, however. Wycliffe "was acknowledged to be the greatest theological scholar and thinker in a centre of learning…there was only one Oxford, and at this time Wycliffe reigned there supreme. From there his opinions had emanated over

the country."[569] Despite his stature, between Wycliffe's unorthodox doctrinal positions and his stance against church excesses and abuses,[570] he came into to ill-repute with church authorities. Wycliffe was ultimately tried for heresy and forced to retreat to his Leicestershire parish of Lutterworth,[571] where he lived until his death. Wycliffe's ideas, however, which reached beyond church doctrine into the realm of the political, had far-reaching influence throughout Europe.

Writing in the midst of the 100 Years' War between England and France (1337-1453),[572] like other intellectuals of the age, Wycliffe criticized the war and killing in his writing. His criticism generally issued along two lines. Either it focused on the ethical bankruptcy of knights and princes whose avarice motivated their engagement in warfare, or it registered "the moral degeneracy of military leaders, clergy, and the population at large."[573] His, critique generally addressed the unjust way that war was conducted.

Wycliffe differed from others of his day in that his arguments against warfare were based on the illegitimacy of war itself, regardless of the manner in which war was waged. In his 1375 *De Mandatis Divinis* ("On the Divine Commandments") he based arguments against war on the fifth commandment, thou shalt not kill, and argued for the reverence of life. Just war criteria were the accepted standard of evaluating warfare, and required that there be just authority to declare war, among other things. Wycliffe argued in *De Officio Regis* in 1379 against just authority for the conflict between the English and the French. He claimed that a claimant to a throne, such as the English monarch's claim to France's throne, could never be sure that God had chosen him for that throne. Thus, he sinned by fighting and killing in pursuit of an uncertain claim.[574]

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[569] George Macaulay 1876-1962 Trevelyan, *England in the Age of Wycliffe;* (Wentworth Press, 2016), 42.

[570] For overview of Wycliffe's prolific writing, see Michael Wilks, *Wyclif: Political Ideas and Practice* (Oxbow Books, 2000).

[571] Rory Cox, "The Medieval Pacifist," *History Today* 60, no. 8 (August 2010): 27.

[572] This war between the ruling houses of England and France attempted to resolve who had the right to rule he Kingdom of France, the largest kingdom of western Europe at the time. See, for greater detail on the war C. W. Previté-Orton, *Cambridge Medieval History, Shorter: Volume 2, The Twelfth Century to the Renaissance* (Cambridge University Press, 1975); Christopher Allmand and Christopher Thomas Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War C.1300-c.1450* (Cambridge University Press, 1988); see also, Desmond Seward, *The Hundred Years War: The English in France 1337-1453* (Penguin Publishing Group, 1999).

[573] Cox, "The Medieval Pacifist," 26.

[574] Cox, 26.

For Wycliffe, war was not wrong merely because the motives articulated for fighting were corrupt, and the grounds for fighting were uncertain. Wycliffe's chief objection was that waging war was inherently incompatible with Christianity. In 1382 Wycliffe wrote *De Cruciata* ("On Crusade") condemning Pope Urban VI's planned Despenser Crusade (1383) (so called because it was led by the Bishop of Norwich, Henry Despenser), in which the Bishop and the Pope battled against papal claimant Clement VII.[575] The Crusade gradually became an opportunity to attack French and Flemish enemies of England.[576] Wycliffe's objection to the crusade, according to Cox, was that it disregarded the way of Christ, i.e., humility, poverty and love, and instead sought wealth and worldly glory.[577] Wycliffe regarded the Crusade as anti-Christian.

The view of Christianity that was adhered to by Wycliffe was informed by a theology that centred caritas ("charity") and predestination as core tenets of the faith. Wycliffe argued, based on his reading of the New Testament, that charity or love were primary attributes of true Christians. Accordingly, following Christ's example, Christian love of neighbour entailed the willingness to suffer harm rather than harm another. Love of neighbour and violence were completely incompatible.[578] Further, membership in the true church, though preordained, was impossible to ascertain during one's earthly life. There was no way to know who was saved or damned, nor who was truly innocent or guilty. Thus, to kill an enemy without knowing if he were innocent or guilty, and possibly kill the innocent, was sin.[579]

Cox demonstrates that Wycliffe's writings over time countered the accepted doctrine of just war. His opposition included the just war arguments of just cause, approval of a legitimate authority, and just intentions, as legitimate grounds for conduct of war. More than this, Cox shows Wycliffe's rejection of the accepted view of political life and institutions as good and as advancing human and social development. Wycliffe instead asserted that the role of government (dominium) in human society was the

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[575] The crusade occurred during the great Western papal schism (1378-1417). England supported Pope Urban VI in Rome, France supported Pope Clement VII in Avingon. For more, see Christopher Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095-1588* (University of Chicago Press, 1996); Richard Allington-Smith, *Henry Despenser: The Fighting Bishop* (Larks Press, 2003).

[576] Cox, "The Medieval Pacifist," 27; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095-1588*, 333.

[577] Cox, "The Medieval Pacifist," 27.

[578] Cox, 27.

[579] Cox, 27.

product of the Fall and sin. Political structures led to a desire to dominate and, almost inevitably, to war. For Wycliffe, force and violence should play no part in a society ruled by the law of Christ, which is centred on love. As Jesus did not resist crucifixion, nonresistance is the proper Christian response to violence.

This can be viewed as the first European ecclesiatic articulation of the ideals of "pacifism" as that term is conceptualized today. Wycliffe's disavowal of war, his anti-violence and nonresistance connected to and based upon Jesus's teachings on love, as well as his emphasis on the sanctity of life, were innovations. Typically, these ideas contributed to his lack of acceptance and to his being charged for heresy.[580]

5.2.2. Lollardry

In the 1380s, Wycliffe was linked to a prior populist insurrection, the Peasant's Revolt of 1381.[581] The uprising was not the result of the religious objections (heresies) espoused by Wycliffe,[582] and Wycliffe repudiated the insurrection.[583] Nonetheless, the perception held that the rebellion's leader, John Ball, was a disciple of Wycliffe,[584] teaching his "perverse doctrines…and the insane opinions that he held,"[585] as Walsingham, a lucid detractor[586] and chronicler of the revolt concluded. Wycliffe's heretofore support by the political order, was soon undermined by the church's claims that Wycliffe's heresy promoted sedition, which led to the erosion of peace and order

[580] Vasilev argues that Wycliffe and others were influenced by the Cathars of previous generations. His arguments as to Wycliffe adhering to a dualist faith are not well supported, however there is overlap in the ideology of Wycliffe and the Cathars/Bogomils with respect to ideas about non-violence. See, Georgi Vasilev, *Heresy and the English Reformation: Bogomil-Cathar Influence on Wycliffe, Langland, Tyndale and Milton* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007).

[581] The Peasants Revolt was the first popular rebellion in English History. It was caused by "anger and frustration at years of heavy taxation with nothing to show for it, oppressive tolls and customs exacted by landlords such as the abbeys…punitive labor legislation, and corruption and extortion by officialdom." Juliet Barker, *1381: The Year of the Peasants' Revolt* (Harvard University Press, 2014), xv.

[582] Surviving sources do not indicate that any of the rebelling peasants' grievances were related to dissatisfaction with the church, or with Wycliffe's critiques, including those of the real presence, the cult of the saints, or of pilgrimage. Richard Rex, *The Lollards* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2002), 52.

[583] R. B. Dobson, *The Peasants' Revolt of 1381* (Springer, 1983), 1983. However, see Barker, who describes Wycliffe's response to the insurrection as "ambivalent," since he both objected to the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury but also pleaded for mercy for the rebels because their grievances should have been redressed but were ignored. Barker, *1381*, 397.

[584] Barker, *1381*, 396.

[585] Barker, 396.

[586] Barker, x.

in the land.[587] All the movements involving attempts to create social change, which inevitably involved social unrest, were encompassed within the idea of lollardry, which in the records of the period was synonymous with "heresy" or "dissent" generally.[588] As Aston notes, "[s]omehow, through deliberate falsification, fixed prejudice, or plausible hypothesis, the conviction seems to have become established that Lollardry was associated with revolt."[589] It also continued to be associated with Wycliff and his beliefs. Rex observes that this is due to the demographics of the lollards. There was a larger group of lollards whose views were similar to those of Wycliffe and his disciples, who tended to be geographically clustered together, than of those individual dissidents who had no known links to Wycliffe.[590]

The beliefs of the Lollards, or Wycliffites, which were repeatedly self-articulated by those accused of lolladry, centre on two issues: the theology of the Eucharist and adoration of the cross.[591] However, the Lollards also followed Wycliffe in denouncing violence and war. As Brock notes, in a 1395 pioneering move, the Lollards presented the first petition to the House of Commons with pacifist aims. They declared that "manslaughter by battle or…law…without special revelation[592] is express contrarious to the New Testament, the which is a law of grace and full of mercy," since Christ taught "to love and have mercy on his enemies, and not for to slay them."[593]

Lollardry was decried as unlawful and schismatic. Adherents were branded heretics and subjected to persecution.

> …the burden of disrepute carried in the name [of Lollardry] was cumulative. While in 1411 Lollards and

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[587] Dobson, *The Peasants' Revolt of 1381*, 353; Rex, *The Lollards*, 52.

[588] Rex, *The Lollards*, 53.

[589] M. E. Aston, "Lollardy and Sedition 1381-1431," *Past & Present*, no. 17 (1960): 5.

[590] Rex, *The Lollards*, 53.

[591] Fiona Somerset, Jill C. Havens, and Derrick G. Pitard, eds., *Lollards and Their Influence in Late Medieval England* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell & Brewer, 2003), 12. In this volume, Aston argues that the lollards challenge to cross worship was a prefiguration of reformation iconoclasty. see Margaret Aston, "Lollards and the Cross," in *Lollards and Their Influence in Late Medieval England*, ed. Fiona Somerset, Jill C. Havens, and Derrick G. Pitard (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell & Brewer, 2003), 100. Rex discusses the arguments against transubstantiation of the Eucharist espoused by Wyclift and adopted by the lollards. See, Rex, *The Lollards*, 43–45.

[592] By "special revelation" the Lollards meant revelation that was issued in specific and particular circumstances and which was limited to those circumstances only, e.g., Joshua's instructions from God in the Book of Joshua chapter 1. Jenny Teichman, *The Philosophy of War and Peace* (Andrews UK Limited, 2017), 25.

[593] Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914.*, 30.

> heretics are mentioned alongside homicides and other malefactors….By 1425 there was no doubt that Lollardy was on a par with treason, felony, "or any such other high poynt", and six years later Lollards were described as "traitors and enemies of the king". To be called a Lollard - as to be called a Quaker or a Ranter - was to be abused at the outset in the very derivation of the name, but the name had grown in content. Opinion and legislation must here have reacted upon each other...[594]

Aston notes in this quote that the Lollards' reputation progressively declined over a relatively short period of less than twenty years. Ultimately, they were regarded as enemies of the king worthy of death.

5.2.3. Jan Hus, the Hussites and Peter Chelčický

Though the influence and teaching of Wycliffe's beliefs began to decline in England during the early 15th century, in Continental Europe Wycliffe's ideas became increasingly influential.[595] They had significant resonance in Bohemia, where Jan Hus embraced Wycliffe's criticism of the abuse of church power.[596]

The Kingdom of Bohemia was a region that existed between the Eastern Orthodox Christian world to the east and the Latin (Catholic) Christian world to the west, making it geographically and linguistically far removed from both.[597] Hus was a preacher and rector of the University of Prague, and greatly influential among the non-Germans in Prague and the Bohemians at the University. His attacks against church power were condemned as heterodox in 1403. This led to a decade of contention between Bohemians (Hussites) and Germans (Catholics). Ultimately, in 1415, Hus was burned alive at the stake, after being tried and found guilty of heresy.[598] Hus' death was

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[594] Aston, "Lollardy and Sedition 1381-1431," 6, quotes citing 3 *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, ed. J. Strachey (London, 1767-1777), iv, 292 and 5 P.R.O. E.403/700, m. II. (not identified further), respectively.

[595] Katherine Eleutheria Basanti, "Heresy and Hussites in Late Medieval Europe," *Reformation & Renaissance Review: Journal of the Society for Reformation Studies* 17, no. 3 (November 2015): 269, https://doi.org/10.1080/14622459.2015.1119443.

[596] Fudge notes, however, that Hus stands in the tradition of previous Slavic moral reformers, including Jan Milíč of Kroměříž, Moravia, Matěj of Janov, Bohemia, and others. (Fudge 2004:22)

[597] Thomas A. Fudge, *Jan Hus: Religious Reform and Social Revolution in Bohemia* (I.B.Tauris, 2017), 1.

[598] Fudge, 9.

viewed as a martyrdom by his followers. National uprising followed between 1416 and 1420 by various factions of Hus's supporters.[599]

Hus and his supporters' arguments were primarily doctrinal and theological in nature, encompassing four tenets. These were codified in the 1420 'Four Articles of Prague'. The Articles concerned: 1) free preaching of the Word of God; 2) communion in both bread and wine for all believers; 3) elimination of ecclesiastical secular power; and 4) the punishment of serious sins.[600] Notably, pacifism was not a core tenet of Hussite belief.

Hus was not a pacifist. The core contingent of his followers were also non-pacifist. Hus believed that fighting in good causes was a duty of the secular authority, though warfare was forbidden to the clergy.[601] Clergy, even if attacked by an enemy, did not have a right to self-defence, but should rather suffer death, praying for the enemy.[602]

Nonetheless, a Bohemian Hussite adherent,[603] Peter Chelčický (c.1390-c.1460), soon became convinced of the centrality of the issue of non-violence to Christian belief and practice. He argued that the early church was its "golden age" and that that age was pacifist; that Christ's law was a law of love and forbade killing. Further, that Christ came to redeem souls and not to destroy bodies.[604] When, in 1420, the Prague university masters deemed it permissible for Christians to take up arms in defence of God's truth, against Prince Sigismund, who had declared war on the

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[599] Otakar Odložilík, "Bohemian Protestants and the Calvinist Churches," *Church History* 8, no. 4 (1939): 342–55, https://doi.org/10.2307/3160169; John Howard Yoder, Theodore J. Koontz, and Andy Alexis-Baker, *Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution* (Brazos Press, 2009), 147.

[600] Fudge, *Jan Hus*, 22.

[601] Matthew Spinka, "Peter Chelčický: The Spiritual Father of the Unitas Fratrum," *Church History* 12, no. 4 (1943): 209, https://doi.org/10.2307/3160037.

[602] Spinka, 209.

[603] Chelčický was also influenced by the Waldensians whose teachings were transmitted to Bohemia from nearby Austria. (Spinka 1943:274) It was Waldenses who believed in the restoration of the "apostolic," i.e., pre-Constantinian church, repudiating the post-Constantinian church as utterly corrupted; they repudiated the priestly consecration of sacraments as possessing no validity; they held that all Catholics including the pope, were heretics who would be damned; they rejected the hierarchical system; their sole source of truth the Bible, or rather the New Testament; in accordance with their strict biblicism, they rejected the purgatory, the auricular confession, indulgences, the veneration of images and of saints, holy orders, fasts, oaths, and all homicide, including capital punishment even of the worst criminals, and repudiated Crusades against the Turks. (Spinka 1943:274)

[604] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 120.

Czechs,[605] Chelčický asserted his pacifist position that all killing was wrong.[606] Further, since war was a sin, and since the state rested upon the use of force, echoing Wycliffe, Chelčický denounced all political power and its exercise of authority as "against the divine commandment."[607] The law of force and the law of love were mutually exclusive according to Chelčický.[608]

> These two divisions, the temporal order of force and Christ's way of love, are far removed from each other. . . . An action done because of the compulsion of Authority is quite different from one done through love and from the good will arising out of the words of truth. Thus civil authority is as far removed from Christ's truth inscribed in His gospel as is Christian faith from the necessity of using such authority. Those in power are not led by faith nor does faith need them. . . . For the fullness of authority lies in the accumulation of wealth and vast gatherings of armed men, castles, and walled towns, while the fullness and completion of faith lies in God's wisdom and the strength of the Holy Spirit. Faith supported solely by spiritual power stands firm without the power of authority, which only brings fear and can only attain what it wishes under the threat of compulsion.[609]

Here Chelčický argues for a faith that resembles the ascetic model; a faith that compels action based on love of, and truth from, God, and that is "supported solely by spiritual power," without the power of outside authority. Chelčický's expectation seems to be of monastic-like social conditions which lack civil or ecclesial domination, not in seclusion but for all of the society. Chelčický was, "keeping with the rigorous other-

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[605] This was a chapter in the Hussite Wars wherein the papacy, Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor, and the Catholic nobility battled the Hussite rebels. The university masters switched sides to join the rebels after a delicate truce had been agreed upon and then broken by Sigismund; instead of amnesty for those whose beliefs diverged, and adoption by the church of "both kinds" of communion (bread and wine), Sigismund returned to a hardline orthodoxy and persecution of the rebels. See, Howard Kaminsky, *A History of the Hussite Revolution* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2004), 361–65.

[606] Spinka, "Peter Chelčický," 275–76.

[607] Spinka, 282 citing K. Krofta, ed., *Petra Chelčkiékho O boji duchovním a O trojím lidu* (Praha, *Světová Knihovna*, 916-918).

[608] Spinka, 283.

[609] Peter Brock, *The Political and Social Doctrines of the Unity of Czech Brethren in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries* (Mouton, 1957), 45.

worldly, ascetic view prevalent in the Middle Ages, demand[ing] of all Christians an utter renunciation and repudiation of the world and all its work."[610]

In the 1420s, radical Hussites "held sway militarily and threatened to eradicate the office of kingship and any other country-wide institution,"[611] in favour of popular self-governmence.[612] With their military success, the threat of government without a sovereign was realized in the region. Yet, the ideal of self-rule by the common people could not be sustained. The rebellion faltered. By 1434, nobles had seized authority from the revolutionaries. The nobles "set up temporary governmental offices, defeated the radicals on the battlefield, and sponsored negotiations for the return of the monarch."[613]

With defeated political ideals, many who had rebelled then turned to Chelčický's earlier teachings as an alternate reform possibility. The structured community of the Unity of Brethren (*Unitas Fratrum*) took shape in the 1450s at Kunwald, and officially organized as a church in 1467. Starting out as a small group of Bohemians and Moravians, by the sixteenth century, they had become "the very heart and conscience of the Czech masses."[614] Though the Unity of Brethren retained important traditions and doctrines of the Catholic church, such as the seven sacraments and upholding transubstantiation of the Eucharist, the Unity of Brethren sect made the unheralded move of instituting its own priesthood and dispensing with the channels of apostolic succession. Its move was revolutionary "even in fifteenth-century Bohemia."[615] The church faced periods of severe persecution from the authorities. Nevertheless, the Unity of Brethren endured into the next century.

Initially, the Unity of Brethren was comprised of "a group of simple people distrustful of secular learning and of participation in worldly affairs."[616] However, as the church grew, learned people and Bohemian nobility became members of the

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[610] John Klassen, "Hus, the Hussites and Bohemia," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History: Volume 7, C.1415-c.1500*, ed. Rosamond McKitterick et al., vol. 7 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 384; Spinka, "Peter Chelčický," 282.

[611] Klassen, "Hus, the Hussites and Bohemia," 391.

[612] This was an early iteration of the call for democracy in Europe.

[613] Klassen, "Hus, the Hussites and Bohemia," 391.

[614] William R. Cook, "John Wyclif and Hussite Theology 1415-1436," *Church History* 42, no. 3 (1973): 343, https://doi.org/10.2307/3164390.

[615] Brock, *The Political and Social Doctrines of the Unity of Czech Brethren in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries*, 70.

[616] Odložilík, "Bohemian Protestants and the Calvinist Churches," 344.

church.[617] By 1520 the church was marked by two distinct groups: a "minor" group, which observed literal nonresistance and forbade participation in civic government, since it necessitated taking an oath and wielding a sword; and a "major" group which refused all killing and participation in war, but allowed civic leadership. This spilt in the composition of the Unity of Brethren continued until the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).[618] As a result of the Thirty Year's War, in which the burgeoning nation-states of central Europe battled for political and religious pre-eminence, the Czech world was forcibly re-Catholicized. Dissenters were either killed or forced to become refugees, e.g. the Moravian Protestants.[619]

What took place in Bohemia and Moravia among the Czech Brethren in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries has been referred to as the first reformation, in that it contained the elements that would come to denote the church reformations that followed, including break with papal rule, insistence on the ultimate authority of Scripture, seizure of church lands and wealth, and vibrant nationalism and clamour for vernacular text and ritual.[620] Notably, what did not appear in reformation ecclesiology was the theology of non-violence. Though the Unity of Brethren was crushed in the seventeenth century, by the time it was erased important echoes of the beliefs of Chelčický and those following him had begun to be heard throughout Europe.

The sixteenth century's religious upheaval throughout Europe resulted in the formation of not only the Protestant Churches of Luther and Calvin, the Anglican church of the English, and the newly nominated and reformed "Catholic" church, but

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[617] Odložilík, 344.

[618] Wilson's study of the Thirty Years' War identifies it as was one of the most destructive conflicts in human history, having claimed 8 million lives. It transformed the religious and political map of Europe. It was a religious war to the extent that faith influenced every facet of culture during the period, yet the war involved geopolitical ambitions as well. See, Peter Hamish Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

[619] Yoder, Koontz, and Alexis-Baker, *Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution*, 149.

[620] Barry P Whittaker, "Towards a Theology of Revolution: An Investigation of Historical and Ecumenical Resources." (University of Windsor, 1970), 35, https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6880.

also the formation of churches by "radical reformers,"[621] most particularly the anabaptists.[622]

5.2.4. Anabaptism

Anabaptism origins are diverse. They lead to the founding of what became the Anabaptist, Brethren, Mennonite, Society of Friends and other traditions. Despite the geographic diffusion throughout diverse nation-states, and despite the differences that existed among the various adherents to anabaptism,[623] there were consistent political-theological rationales behind the multiple foundings, and there was a consistent degree of doctrinal unity among the different communities.[624] Anabaptism itself might be understood simply as those Christians who adhered to the practice of adult baptism, as opposed to infant baptism, or "spiritual baptism" (whereby water baptism was deemed superfluous).[625] The first adult baptism in Europe took place in Zurich in 1525.

Interestingly, though Swiss anabaptism was the progenitor of the historic peace churches, the anabaptism that first appeared in Zurich was not entirely rooted in an anti-violence ethos. Synder demonstrates that Swiss anabaptism was ambivalent on questions of violence, as well as on questions of church separation from society and involvement with the world.[626] However, the non-violence claims that would be the

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[621] George H. Williams' *Radical Reformation* introduces the distinction between "magisterial" and "radical" reformers. "Magisterial" refers to those reformers who received support from or worked with those in authority. "Radical" refers to those who, whether or not by choice, did not receive some kind of institutional support. (Williams 1995)

[622] Following Hauerwas, who was following James McClendon, the lowercase "anabaptists" is used to indicate that "what anabaptists stand for is not to be found only in those officially identified as Anabaptist." See, Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith*, 170 n.2.

[623] See, Williams' *Radical Reformation* for a detailed description of the variety of adherents to the adult baptism doctrine. George

[624] Stubrind argues that the notion of a minority, separatist, nonresistant church can be traced consistently from the anabaptist beginnings in Zurich to the adoption of the Schleitheim Confession. Andrea Strübind, *Eifriger als Zwingli: die frühe Täuferbewegung in der Schweiz* (Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 313.

[625] C. Arnold Synder, "The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-1530)," *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 80, no. 4 (October 2006): 502.

[626] Synder, "The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-1530)," October 2006. There was particular ambivalence on questions of separation from and involvement with the world. Synder shows, however, that despite its claims, the movement only became resolutely sectarian and separatist after the failure of the Peasants' War in 1525.

In the Waldshut-Schaffhausen-St. Gallen area, particularly in the rural villages, [the Peasants' War] provided a temporary breakdown of magisterial authority for most of 1525, thus enabling Swiss Anabaptism to spread behind its smoke screen." [citing Stayer, 319] The Anabaptists of the Grebel circle were quick to enter and promote their vision of congregational reform, free from state interference, based on the freely-chosen baptism of adults, wherever political openings allowed, and they showed themselves to be politically astute in capitalizing on local grievances for the advancement of their

hallmark of the peace churches were early in evidence during the sixteenth century.[627] As Synder shows, sentiments regarding non-violence were contained in a letter of 1524 from the Zurich radical reformers to Thomas Muntzer of Germany, a reformer who took issue with Luther's reforms. The letter is significant in that it is an early articulation of the anabaptism of Conrad Grebel, the letter's author, and of the Swiss, that theirs is an anti-violence faith. The letter makes two points on the issue of non-violence: first, that there should be no coercion within the church for any reason, i.e., the church should not use the state to put unbelievers to death on grounds of heresy; and second, that believers who are true to the Christian faith do not participate in war or use of the sword, and do not kill for any reason.[628] The letter argued for a church that would be defenseless in the world.[629]

Following the Peasants' Rebellion,[630] in 1525, the civil rulers passed anti-anabaptist legislation that was progressively more stringent. The measures were meant to quash not only religious (doctrinal) dissidence, but also the civic insubordination and unrest that tended to accompany anabaptist adherence. When the Peasants' Rebellion was crushed, the magistrates followed it with assertion of firm control over their territories. By 1526 the anabaptist church had largely been driven underground.[631] The reality of persecution informed the developing Swiss anabaptist theology of the church as people separated, persecuted, and opposed to the world.[632] This was distinct from anabaptist theology in other regions, where magistrates, soldiers, and lords were counted among the baptized. At the same time anabaptist missionaries were spreading

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religious cause. [citing Stayer, 320] Only with the failure of the Peasants' War, and the closing of political space in the face of intense political repression, did Swiss Anabaptism establish an ecclesial understanding of the baptized church as a persecuted, separated minority.

For further discussion of the "two-phase" thesis of Anabaptist origins see, James M. Stayer, *Anabaptists and the Sword* (Coronado Press, 1976), and see, also, Hans Jürgen Goertz, "History and Theology: A Major Problem of Anabaptist Research Today," *The Mennonite Quarterly Review* 53, no. 3 (July 1979): 177–88; and Michael Baylor et al., "Responses to Snyder," *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 80, no. 4 (October 2006): 647+.

[627] Synder, "The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-1530)," October 2006, 524.

[628] These views were not original to the Zurich Reformers, but were adoptions of positions articulated earlier by Thomas Muntzer. Synder, 527–28.

[629] Synder, 528.

[630] The Peasant's War of 1525, or the German Peasants' War, was Europe's largest uprising until the French Revolution of 1789. See, James M. Stayer, *The German Peasants' War and Anabaptist Community of Goods* (McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, 1994), for links between the war and the anabaptist community.

[631] Synder, "The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-1530)," October 2006, 583.

[632] Synder, 586–87.

beyond Zurich and entering regions, including that of distant Moravia, where there was greater religious tolerance.

In 1527, Michael Sattler, a Swiss anabaptist leader, crated draft articles of the faith tenets of the burgeoning church, at the momentous occasion of the gathering in Schleitheim of Swiss anabaptists from Zurich to the Black Forest. The tenets of the "Schleitheim Confession," as the document came to be known, included commitment to adult baptism, separation from evil and, therefore, the world,[633] and the nonuse of violence in all circumstances.[634] As Yoder notes, the basis of the nonresistance ethic adopted by those at Schleitheim was not scriptural texts found in the writings of Peter or Paul, which addressed the powers held by and duties owed to the State. Rather, the rationale was obedience to the example of Jesus's acts and character. The anabaptists were not interested in delineating the civic duties of Christians, as the true church was expected to be separated from the world. The anabaptists were concerned with making the life and example of Jesus the standard of Christian ethics.[635]

The ethic of nonresistance was not universally supported following the Schlietheim meeting. Balthasar Hubmaier (c.1480–1528) was a proponent of personal nonresistance, but never advocated that the state should be nonresistant. Thomas Muntzer (c.1489-1525) diverged entirely from the teaching of nonresistance, as his leadership of the Peasant's Rebellion in 1524-25 demonstrates. Hans Hut (c.1490-1527), an acolyte of Muntzer, argued for nonresistance now, but warned of an eschatological time of violent reckoning. Nonetheless, within a decade, those anabaptists who remained, who were not martyred, expelled from the region, or compelled to recant, came to settle on the ideals set forth at Schleitheim as the most practicable for the adherents' continued survival.[636]

The Schleitheim Confession would influence the development of sister movements in neighbouring Swiss regions,[637] and the movement's development in

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[633] This separation was not that of the Desert Fathers or of the medieval monastics. Rather it was, a "tense missionary dualism, representing in the midst of the world a position the world could not tolerate." (Yoder, Koontz, and Alexis-Baker 2009:187)

[634] For full text of the Schleitheim Articles, see, William R. Estep, *Anabaptist Beginnings (1523-1533): 1523-1533 ; a Source Book* (De Graaf, 1976), 100–105.

[635] Yoder, Koontz, and Alexis-Baker, *Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution*, 179–80.

[636] Yoder, Koontz, and Alexis-Baker, 183.

[637] Differences remained, however. There was a divergence between spiritual anabaptists of South Germany, who embraced pneumatic expressions of the Spirit, and ecclesial anabaptists of

other parts of the continent. Dutch anabaptist leader Menno Simmons, the progenitor of the Mennonites, relied on the experiences of the utter defeat of violent anabaptist radicals to advance the previously micro idea of an anti-revolutionary, anti-violence, anti-apocalyptic suffering church. The Hutterites in Moravia, lived in peaceful and separated areas, where they were unmolested, provided they did not attempt to proselytize those outside of their regions. A century and a half after Schleitheim, in the late seventeenth century, Jacob Amman, founder of the breakaway Amish community, renewed the anabaptist mission. When intercourse with the world and its ways threatened Swiss Anabaptist identity, Amman called again for separation and for nonresistance. He criticized the Swiss followers for their laxity, accommodation and compromise.[638]

The Puritans of England were also influenced by the separatist and adult baptism theology during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In a reminiscent movement of resistance, a group of sundry "radicals"--Puritans, Independents, Familists, Levellers, Brownists, Quakers , Diggers, Quakers, and Fifth Monarchy men--united[639] and resisted in God's name,[640] the encroachment of the royal power represented by King Charles I in the mid-1600s.[641] That the resistance resulted in the use of revolutionary force serves to underscore the variation of beliefs that existed under the banner of adult baptizers' counter culture. The major and minor sects that formed insisted upon new manners of pursuing human relationship with God and new kinds of political and social relationships.

Switzerland, who did not. The Hutterites committed to the idea of the true church being those who held goods in common, however other anabaptists did not adopt this viewpoint. Further, Melchoir Hoffman's branch of Swiss Anabaptism was repudiated by other "Swiss Brethren" as error, due to his 'celestial flesh' Christology. C. Arnold Synder, "The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-1530)," *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 80, no. 4 (October 2006): 644.

[638] Synder, "The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-1530)," October 2006, 645.

[639] See, G. E. Aylmer, "Presidential Address: Collective Mentalities in Mid Seventeenth-Century England: III. Varieties of Radicalism," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 38 (1988): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.2307/3678964, for an interesting account of the common core of the various independent ideologies.

[640] Bradstock argues that the reading scripture, the text itself, provided a lens through which the radicals reinterpreted the world around them. See, Andrew Bradstock, *Radical Religion in Cromwell's England: A Concise History from the English Civil War to the End of the Commonwealth* (I.B.Tauris, 2010).

[641] This refers to the English Civil War or English Revolution that resulted in a rejection of the monarchy and the execution of Charles I. For more details on this period, see Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642* (New York: Routledge, 2017); and Michael J. Braddick, *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).

5.2.5. Conclusion

From Wyckoff in England in the fourteenth century to the anabaptists in Zurich and beyond in the sixteenth century, a startling idea was birthed in Europe--that war and killing were evils in and of themselves. At the same time, the steady establishment of political kingdoms, which were tied to the power and corruption of the church, led dissident voices to assert the need for political and church reform. Part of that reform was the translation of the bible into the local vernacular languages of the people. The demands for reform that the towering theological figure of Wyckoff triggered in the fourteenth century lit the fuse for the Hussite Revolution of the fifteenth century, and exploded in the Reformations of the sixteenth century. Yet, the demands for reform demanded by Wyckoff that pertained to his anti-violence ethics did not proceed in tandem with his complaints about the authorities. Indeed, a regular feature of the Reformation's protestations involved the reformers' acts of armed resistance against the authorities. Even among the early anabaptizers, there was no consensus about adoption of an anti-violence ethics. What is significant is that the idea itself was being publicly transmitted with consistency, whether or not adopted. Of even greater significance is that the nature of the anti-violence ethics that was promoted found its grounding in the teachings of Jesus and the doctrine of love, and not in theories of state sovereignty. In other words, the admonition of those against violence was not that individuals should be subject to the state's biblically-legitimate authority, but that Jesus taught that individuals ought to show love to the enemy.

5.3. Humanism

As Johnson points out,[642] just war theory, beginning in the fifteenth century, adapted to the new realities of medieval warfare. Medieval warfare depended upon soldiers, and the knights who led them into battle. The siege warfare that was the most common in early medieval times, ceased in effectiveness as fortifications became more impregnable. Technology addressed this problem with the creation of cannons and guns for warfare. The new technologies of fighting required more individual soldiers, resulting in greater armies, greater casualties and greater destruction than previous

[642] James Turner Johnson, *Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions In Western Cultural History*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 135–38.

kinds of warfare. Warfare made a steady progression: freom the siege to chess-like "manoeuvres" that drew opposing sides just to the brink of battle, before the outmanoeuvred side surrendered. Then from "manoeuvres" to tactics that drew the opponent into armed battle. The objective of warfare was no longer to lay siege and force surrender, nor to outmanoeuvre and force surrender, but to defeat through killing and wounding. These technologies and tactics dramatically increased the number of casualties among soldiers. Further, as the costs of war increased, so did the occurrence of war between the more powerful nation-states. All of these fatal conditions pre-existed the escalation of the internal religious warfare occasioned by the rise of religious reformation. Reformation only worsened matters.

At the time that anabaptism was taking root, humanist ideals were also being advocated. The anabaptists sought to inculcate a more authentic practice of the Christian faith, and sought reforms, including Christian rejection of all violence, that often made them political and religious pariahs. Humanist thought during the sixteenth and seventeenth century Reformation period, made similar arguments in favor of peace as the anabaptists. However, the humanist rationale was secularized. Though adhering to Christian faith, the humanists sought to emphasize the nonreligious benefits of non-violence. Violence was deemed inimical to cultivating the highest human character, and war was deemed to encompass such evil that it lost any redeeming value. Humanists thought to reform the civil authorities by appealing to the efficacy of peace for human well-being, rather than appealing to a mandate for peaceableness rooted primarily in Jesus's life and teaching.

5.3.1. Erasmus

During the early 1600s, at the time when the destructiveness of war was at a height, leading thinkers sought ways to limit the recourse to these total wars.[643] This was akin to the strategies of the Truce of God and the Peace of God of earlier centuries. Those attempts sought to put rules around the timing and conduct of war. The seventeenth century attempts sought to discourage kings and princes from engagement

[643] The idea of imposing restraints on the conduct of warfare was not advanced until subsequent centuries. Turner suggests that the lack of expectation of limitations on the conduct of warfare during the sixteenth century explains the surge in anti-war thinking during this period. Johnson, 152–53.

in war altogether. Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), of Rotterdam, a towering scholar in the period between the Renaissance and the Reformation, was a chief proponent of non-violence. Erasmus was convinced of the evils of war. He believed that the costs in death far outweighed any good that might be obtained.[644] He made arguments from the humanist perspective that appealed to man's better nature. His arguments rested, though, on both biblical principles as well as classical sources, such as Plato and Cicero.[645] Erasmus espoused the view that princes living according to Christian principles, which, in his view, were opposed to war, could bring about radical change in the society. Princes may resort to war, but only as a last resort. In *The Education of a Christian Prince*, Erasmus states that the "good prince will never start a war at all, unless, after everything else has been tried, it cannot by any means be avoided…In the end, if so pernicious a thing cannot be avoided, the prince's first concern should be to fight with the least possible harm to his subjects, at the lowest cost in Christian blood, and to end it as quickly as possible."[646] Erasmus was the most significant of succeeding humanist Christian intellectuals, as it was he who, influenced by Christian faith and doctrine, developed a vision of enlightened and humane personhood that necessitated a move away from the brutality and "stupidity" of war.[647]

5.3.2. Grotius

During the 17th century twenty-eight editions of Erasmus' writings were published, eagerly consumed by intellectuals weary of political and religious war.[648] In a humanist vein, just war theory was reimagined, conceived less from a theological rationale and more from natural law. Dutch Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who wrote *De Iure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace)*[649] was a chief architect of just war theory's revisioning. He contemplated just war as a means of accomplishing a plan

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[644] Johnson, 159.

[645] Desiderius Erasmus, "A Complaint of Peace," in *The Erasmus Reader* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 288–315.

[646] Desiderius Erasmus, "The Education of a Christian Prince," in *The Erasmus Reader* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 281.

[647] Yoder, Koontz, and Alexis-Baker, *Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution*, 198–99.

[648] Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, 177.

[649] See, for English abridged and annotated translation, Hugo Grotius and Stephen C. Neff, *Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace: Student Edition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); for full translation with commentary, see, Hugo Grotius and Jean Barbeyrac, *The Rights of War and Peace, in Three Books: Wherein Are Explained, the Law of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points Relating to Government* (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2004).

for world peace. Grotius shifted the locus of "just cause" from the prince to the "the political community, the laws and customs passed down in their traditions, and the territory they inhabited."[650] Rulers' authority rested upon the sovereignty of these defined communities. Violating a political community's borders became the central feature of just cause for war, according to Grotius. In this way, violation of justice was no longer subjective, such as dissent from a ruler's religion. Rather, violation of a territorial border became an objective fact as grounds for war.[651] The ruler was no longer the judge of violations, but merely one who declared that the violation had occurred and how it had occurred. Further, Grotius reasoned that both sides to a conflict could have just cause, thus both sides should conduct warfare with restraint. They should do more than simply engage in war according to reasonable scruples, but should engage in conduct that observed particular standards rooted in regional custom and in the Christian ideal of charity.[652] This reasoning was the beginning of conceptualization of a law of armed conflicts normed by European cultural standards. Those who followed Grotius,[653] developed a plan of international law wherein they envisioned manageable criteria for warfare and peace, tribunals for enforcement, and ways of compelling kings to adopt treaties. Johnson describes these as attempts to create a plan for "perpetual peace" among the nations of the world.[654] The perpetual peace that these humanists envisioned depended upon new political structures for international relations. They were structures that presupposed and necessitated not merely defining nation-state boundaries, but also that required decreasing the power of nation-state sovereignty.[655] Architects of the newly imagined structures attempted by their rules to "repristinate the just war theory—to make war again the servant of the law, the instrument of justice,

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[650] Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, 457.
[651] Johnson, 458.
[652] Johnson, 458.
[653] See, Johnson, "A Practically Informed Morality of War," for comment on those who, with Grotius, influenced the development of the law of nations, or positive International Law, including Pufendorf, Wolff, and Vattel. Johnson, 458+.
[654] See, Johnson for details regarding leading influential figures in the development of theories of "perpetual peace" that appear in the canon from the early 17th to the late 18th centuries. These include works by Emeric Crucé, Maximilien de Béthune de Sully, William Penn, Abbé de Saint Pierre, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Emmanuel Kant. Johnson, 177–98.
[655] James Turner Johnson, "A Practically Informed Morality of War: Just War, International Law, and a Changing World Order," Ethics & International Affairs 31, no. 4 (ed 2017): 458, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679417000442.

and the tool of peace."[656] The rules that sought "perpetual peace" became the normative political order following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War. They proliferate into the present.In the 18th century, the notion of state sovereignty as the basis of just war, was expanded to include an emphasis on human rights, and the popular assent to being governed.[657] Implementation of these conceptions of individual rights and democratic rule would only come through the force of insurrection and war, however. Just war formulations generally have been useful as theoretical constructs, but they have continually been unsuccessful at deterring war and maintaining sustained peace between, and within, nations.[658]

5.3.3. Conclusion

The desire and attempts at reform and revolution in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries turned to the opposite desire in the seventeenth century. The idea of the nation-state had solidified and, ideologically, the idea that the state had the exclusive right of use of force, against threats from without and within the state, gained sway. The ideology moved away from emphasis upon Jesus's teaching and scripture, and towards nonreligious theories seeking maximization of human potential. Erasmus set the stage in this regard in the sixteenth century by influencing princes to refrain from war, yet acknowledging their right to the conduct of war where necessary. Grotius was the leading figure of the seventeenth century to revisit issues of war and to posit in the civil authority the right to go to war. However, Grotius sought to establish constraints around a king's authority to declare war that were based on objective factors, such as territorial infringement, rather than subjective claims of violation and offense, such as disagreement on religious doctrine. Grotius was of the school of those who envisioned that a set of rules could govern inter-state, or inter-nation, relationships and lead to a period of "perpetual peace."

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[656] Bainton, Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation, 178.

[657] Johnson, "A Practically Informed Morality of War," 458.

[658] Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder, War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Routledge, 2016), 247–50.

5.4. Conclusion of Late Medieval to Early Modern Period Non-violence Analysis

The church of the late Medieval period to the modern period was not a church that was concerned with creating peace, as much as it was concerned with reform. There were regular calls for cessation of Christians using physical force, but these calls were largely unheeded. Both those resisting authority and those in authority made use of physical force and aggression to accomplish their will. Those resisting authority did so, however, with the intention of securing the betterment of those who were marginalized by the social order and desiring change.

From Wycliffe to Grotius the themes of peace and pacifism have repeatedly arisen in the context of social reform and governance. Wycliffe introduced to the modern era the idea that war and killing were incompatible with Christianity, which holds love as its central characteristic. Wycliffe's beliefs included the idea that force and violence should play no part in a society ruled by the law of Christ, which is centred on love, and that governmental authority that derived from the use of force was contrary to Christian faith and was sin. His views resulted in him being tried as a heretic, but they resonated with the masses and were adopted by many throughout Europe. Wycliffe influenced Jon Hus of Bohemia, who shared his views on the need for ecclesiastical reform, though not his views on pacifism. An acolyte of Hus, however, Peter Chelčický, did deem the issue of pacifism central to Christian belief and practice. Decades after Chelčický's arguments were made, the failure of resistance through violent means caused some of those seeking reform to turn to Chelčický's (and Wycliffe's) vision. The Swiss Unity of Brethren, who followed the pacifist ideal of Chelčický became a movement of adult baptizers and baptized in diverse locations with diverse beliefs; some pacifist and some not. Yet an early document sets forth pacifist beliefs as early as 1525, and the influential Schleitheim Confession of 1527 adopted officially the tenets of adult baptism and the non-use of violence under all circumstances, based on the life and teachings of Jesus. The resistance of the anabaptists to church and governing authority resulted in their persecution. They were driven to become an underground church. From this experience, they adopted the theology of being separated, persecuted, and opposed to the world.

With the rise of humanism, the arguments for peace added a secular dimension. Erasmus asserted that war was evil but allowed that the sovereign might resort to war

if all other means of resolving a dispute failed. Erasmus appealed to the inefficiency and intellectual insipidness of war, rather than, primarily, to Christian doctrine. The adoption of secularized rationales for the moderation, and hopefully cessation, of war continued apace with Grotius' re-conception of just war theory. The ambition of his attempt to establish objective criteria for the instigation of violence, was the creation of a perpetual peace among nations. Grotius and those following him failed in this endeavour. The anabaptist vision of pacifism, and the political vision of just violence/war both continue to have intellectual and cultural support and have not been fundamentally changed since their original articulations.

What is clear from the history is that, since Wycliffe, the preachers of peace have preached against the axis of ecclesial/political power generally. The claims of peace have been raised by reformers, and those in the counter-culture. The Peasants' Rebellion in England (1381), the Hussite Wars (1419-1434), the German Peasants' Revolt (1525), and the English Revolution of the 1600s, attest to the fact that the overarching counter-cultural message of the peace proponents, was regularly adapted for use by those who employed physical violence to bring about the social, political and economic change. Even among the anabaptist churches, there was great variation in the teachings on pacifism.

It can be said, then, that there has not been a time when Peace teaching has prevailed in the church in modernity, though the teaching has been raised repeatedly. Typically, those raising the prospect of pacifism, were persecuted killed or martyred, as the institutional church marked claims of pacifism as incident to other claims that were deemed heretical. It can also be said that whenever claims of peace were raised, they were never raised separate from calls for general reform and change in society. Claims to stop the warring of governments were akin to claims to stop the unjust killings, moral depravity, and corruption that was rampant in society. Also, it is clear that distinctions have been made between the war and violence of the state and the participation in war and violence of individuals.

Finally, whether motivated by the teaching and example of Christ's love, or by humanist rationality, there has not been, in Christian history, a movement for peace that resulted in long-term peace.

6. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence in Modernity

6.1. Introduction

The desire for peace in the Late Medieval Period resulted in the proscription of the power of the state, as the period underwent the transformation of nation-state building, and revolutions that insisted upon government by the consent of the governed. The desire for reform led to the Ecclesial power being diminished, as many left the Catholic church and began new church movements. The desire for autonomy and self-determination of religious affairs, led to the formation of sects that rejected the official ecclesial power, the reformed ecclesial powers, and often the civil authority. It was a time of change, and of ideas of peace without peace being obtained.

The New World was reached by Europeans during the Late Medieval Period. The ideas of peace, reform, and self-determination that were transforming Europe, did not find expression in New World for the people of that world. Colonial subjugation and Christian triumph over the natives were the tenor of the engagement between the peoples.

Christian philosophers began to theorize in concrete terms that Christians should practice "non-violence," and to contemplate the character of non-violence. For most, following the ideas of Kant and Thoreau, non-violence involved a citizen-resistance that upheld the power of the State, and that had the goal of influencing the State to cease from perpetrating violence of some kind. Tolstoy, writing as a Russian elite, advocated withdrawal of all forms of support from the State, in order to precipitate the State's collapse, since, for Tolstoy, there could not be a State that did not embody violence. Non-violence had moved from being an ecclesial doctrinal concept to being advocated as a political means of orderly transformation.

Two world wars within decades changed the conception that a stable political order would ensure a stable culture. The church regained the opportunity to offer a conception of peace connected to spiritual ideals rather than the political. Niebuhr, Yoder, and King offered different visions of what and how peace for the Christian should be pursued. Niebuhr, writing between the world wars, found war to be a just necessity for the Christian. Yoder promoted non-resistance, and King non-violent resistance. All upheld the State's inherent legitimacy and promoted conduct that was within lawful bounds. Wink, writing in the U.S. during the period of U.S. clandestine proxy wars around the globe, also advocated non-violent resistance, but accorded deference to those movements against the powers that chose to employ armed resistance. Thus, the church's historic alignment with the interests of the State continues to be

reflected in the positions advanced by leading Christian thinkers of the twentieth century. Wink's position, however, suggests the possibility of a potential move away from church/state cooperation.

6.2. The New World

While the European nation-states were attempting to create rules of peace, in the New World that had been stumbled upon by Columbus at the end of the fifteenth century, just war principles were not advanced to ensure peace, but to facilitate conquest. Bainton writes about the initial European encounter with indigenous peoples of South America, that

> The just war required the announcement of the conditions on the fulfilment of which war could be avoided. These were set forth in a document called the Requirement in 1513. The natives must acknowledge the church as the ruler of the world and the king of Spain as its representative, and they must permit the preaching of the faith.[659]

By the middle of the sixteenth century in the New World, which was controlled by the church and Spain, Christian just war theory was under renewed debate among key Spanish philosopher-theologians Vitoria, Las Casas, and Sepúlveda. In 1544 Sepúlveda wrote *Democrates Alter* (or, *on the Just Causes for War Against the Indians*), which became the most important text at the time supporting the genocidal methods of Spanish conquest of the Americas.[660] In this text Sepúlveda adapted just war theory to argue, following Aristotle, essentially that, "just war is one waged to enslave those who by nature are destined to be slaves and who resist their destiny."[661] His argument was ideologically persuasive, and well remembered by history, however it did not gain official sanction. Following a debate with Las Cases, who argued that the Spanish monarch should mandate humane treatment of the indigenous, Las Casas' view gained official support. Las Casas' arguments in favor of the humanity of the indigenous peoples resulted in Emperor Charles V halting further expansion of the New World after the conquest of Mexico.[662] Nevertheless, in the territories of the

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[659] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 166.

[660] See, Anthony Pagden, "Dispossessing the Barbarism: The Language of Spanish Thomism and the Debate Over the Property Rights of the Americas," in *Theories of Empire, 1450-1800*, ed. David Armitage, vol. 20, An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450-1800 (Brookfield,VT: Ashgate, 1998), 159–78; Brian Tierney, *The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150 1625*, 1st edition (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997); Margaret Kohn and Kavita Reddy, "Colonialism," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017).

[661] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 166.

[662] Bainton, 167.

Americas, the impact of the outcome of the debate in Spain was negligible. Bainton notes, "the conquistadores thumbed their noses alike at the friars and the government."[663]

As other nation-states followed Spain into colonization of the New World, the abdication of peace principles and just war theory continued. In the 17th century the Puritans in North America resurrected the biblical idea of the war of aggression that was commanded by God. The Christians framed themselves as righteous Israel seizing the land of Canaan from Israel's and God's enemies.[664] In this way, they sanctioned war with the indigenous.[665] Wars against the indigenous, and seizure of land, continued into at least the 19th century.

Quakers, of pacifist anabaptist Christian lineage, did emigrate to the New World and attempt to live peaceable with indigenous peoples. They began auspiciously in Pennsylvania, granted to William Penn by the King of England with the intention of being a non-violent commonwealth. However, the émigrés were subject to colonial monarchs who were not pacifist. There was also pressure from other arrivals to the new world who had the impulse for dominion. In 1756, the Quaker-controlled Pennsylvania legislature voted to go to war against their neighbors, the indigenous Delawares, with whom they were hitherto at peace. The vote was their compromise, since the bill contained an exemption from fighting for Quakers.[666] With this vote, the improbability of the idea of pacifism as a governing system and the application of just war theory was made clear. From these beginnings, the ideals of peace and just war did not gain a strong footing in the colonial expeditions and territories of Christians in the New World.

6.3. 18th and 19th Centuries

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, scientific discoveries, and humanism, rationalism, and individualism shifted the discussion of non-violence and peace from the theological to the 'philosophical' realm. It was no longer axiomatic that the bible was the

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[663] Bainton, 167.

[664] Sacvan Bercovitch, *The Puritan Origins of the American Self* (Yale University Press, 1975) for discussion of Puritan theology of substitution of Israel as God's chosen people, and of how America's identity developed around this idea. Bercovitch's thesis has been contested; some argue that Puritan's though believing themselves chose, also believed that there remained a restored place for the Jews. See, Russell J. Reising, *Unusable Past* (Routledge, 2013), 74–92; Andrew Delbanco, *The Puritan Ordeal* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 41–148.

[665] Bainton argues that the view of war being declared by God to wipe out a people group, went against the contemporary norm of Christianity, which held that "God…no longer to issue[d] such commands." Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 167.

[666] Bainton, 170–71.

absolute authority for knowledge and belief. "Enlightenment thinkers 'thought they had possession of a new knowledge and a new way of knowing which gave them a privileged position to judge the errors of the past and fashion the achievements of the future.'"[667] In this cultural climate, the discussion of non-violence and peace was reshaped. Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, and Henry David Thoreau are representative of theorists who expressed the evolution of the ethics of the period.

6.3.1. Kant

Towards the end of the 18th century, decades after the revolutions for liberation waged by the people of America and France, German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) formulated what would later be considered the first liberal democratic peace theory ("LDPT")[668] in his 1795 work, *Toward Perpetual Peace*. According to Turner, Kant provided the conceptual bridge between the principles of perpetual peace expounded upon by those followers of Erasmus's idealism, and the 19th and 20th century traditions of internationalism and international law.[669] Historian H. Hinsley, who was the first to frame Kant as a peace theorist,[670] claimed that Kant's most important insight was his showing that peace would come not mechanically through organizational efforts, as philosophers before Kant maintained. Rather, that the mechanical structures must interact with the human rational morality. The freedom of states allows for the vainglorious qualities of men, e.g., love of power and possession, to create the conditions in which men's better qualities and use of reason flourish.[671] It was as recently as 1983 that Doyle advanced the theory tying Kant's peace principles to a new liberal democratic peace theory ("LDPT"), based upon three pillars of sustained peace in society: "respect for individual rights" (liberal democratic norms), "constitutional restraint" (liberal democratic institutions), and "shared commercial interests" between liberal democracies.[672] Following Doyle, LDPT developed as a school of thought in

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[667] Roger E. Olson, *The Journey of Modern Theology: From Reconstruction to Deconstruction* (InterVarsity Press, 2013), 17 citing James M. Byrne, *Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), ix.

[668] Also referred to as liberal peace theory, or democratic peace theory. All are concerned with the idea that democracies are more peaceful and cooperative in international relations than other forms of government.

[669] Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, 198.

[670] Seán Molloy, *Kant's International Relations: The Political Theology of Perpetual Peace* (University of Michigan Press, 2017), 6.

[671] F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 74.

[672] Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1162, https://doi.org/10.2307/1960861.

the discipline of international relations[673] resting upon the idea that liberal democracies do not fight each other, but may fight with non-democracies.[674] Thus Kant's influence as a peace theorist brings notions of peace, within the ambit of just war between nations, into the twentieth and 21st centuries.

In *Towards Perpetual Peace*, Kant's arguments for creating a sustained peace are part of his broader discussion of the human being and humanity's moral and social potential.[675] In much of Kant's corpus, and in this work, Kant expresses ambivalence towards human potential and toward peace, and warrants close reading. Molloy notes that "the language and concepts employed by Kant are particularly ambiguous and it can be difficult, if not impossible, to discern what his position is on any given subject".[676] Waite observes that because of Kant's ambiguities that it is impossible to know Kant's full stance on peace ("I insist, the serious philosophical and hermeneutic problem throughout *Toward Perpetual Peace,* and indeed in all Kant's major texts, remains. We simply *cannot* know what his full stand was.").[677] Molloy attributes Kant's inscrutability to a "deep-rooted ambiguity and ambivalence within Kant's work."[678] In light of this, the close attention that Alpert pays to Kant's position on peace is valuable.

Alpert shows that Kant's position was deeply nuanced. Though he unconditionally forbade, on moral grounds, the rebellion of subjects against states,[679] Kant nevertheless leaves

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[673] LDPT's evolution has moved away from Kant's original theses, and become more specialized, concerned with the key maxims of the field concerning the empirical "laws" of evading war between states. (Molloy 2017:8)

[674] Fuat Gursozlu, "The Triumph of the Liberal Democratic Peace and the Dangers of Its Success," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence*, ed. Andrew Fiala, Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy (Routledge, 2018). See also, Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no. 2 (June 1, 1992): 309–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002792036002005; Zeev Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (July 1, 1997): 162–98, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.1.162. However, Gibler and Owsiak show that peace must precede democracy, rather than democracy preceding peace. See, Douglas M. Gibler and Andrew P. Owsiak, "Democracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919 to 2001," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 9 (October 1, 2018): 1847–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717708599.

[675] Molloy, *Kant's International Relations*, 17–18.

[676] Molloy, 5.

[677] Geoffrey Waite, "Kant, Schmitt or Fues on Political Theology, Radical Evil and the Foe," *Philosophical Forum* 41, no. 1/2 (Spring/Summer ///Spring/Summer2010 2010): 226, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2009.00359, emphasis in original.

[678] Molloy, *Kant's International Relations*, 179, n.14.

[679] Kant writes: "this prohibition is unconditional, so that even if that power or its agent, the head of state, has gone so far as to violate the original [social] contract...a subject is still not permitted any resistance by way of counteracting force." Immanuel Kant, "On the Common Saying, That May Be Correct in Theory But It Is

room for resistance to authority.[680] What Alpert highlights is the rationale underlying Kant's thought. Kant began with a modified Hobbsian premise, that prior to the social contract, the state of nature was lawless. Everyone was not necessarily always fighting, but everyone always could be fighting.[681] In this state, no authority could mediate the dispute. Before the law became sovereign, destructive violence was inevitable. Essential to Kant's theorization, then, is that the social contract exists as a means to end violence.[682] "The genetic distribution of physical might, or violence, is reorganized through the establishment of the state for the purposed distribution of right, or justice."[683] The purpose of the sovereign is that "it provides norms by which people can appeal against each other's unjust actions."[684] The state is given coercive power, in order to end the coercion of those who would inhibit freedom. Thus, for Kant, for individuals to resist the will legislated by the state is inherently unlawful; it constitutes "abolishing the entire legal constitution."[685]

Where the state, which is intended to end violence, itself becomes the purveyor of violence, Kant nevertheless requires the obedience of the subject to the sovereign. Yet at the same time, his concern for the moral development of humanity leads him to assert a duty of individuals to disobey immoral demands.[686] As Alpert notes, Kant endows individuals in society with a duty to be active, and not passive, citizens.[687] They also have a duty to be non-

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of No Use In Practice (1793)," in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J. Gregor, trans. Gregor, Mary J., Paperback (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pt. 8:300.

[680] Kant writes: "The proposition, 'We ought to obey God rather than men,' means only that when human beings command something that is evil in itself (directly opposed to the ethical law), we may not, and ought not, obey them." Immanuel Kant, *Kant: Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: And Other Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pts. 6:99n, 110n.

[681] Kant, pt. 6:97n.

[682] Because the purpose of the state is to end violence, Kant finds it "unintelligible" that a state might declare war against other states, or engage of acts of violence against its own people. He writes:

The concept of the right of nations as that of the right to go to war is, strictly speaking, unintelligible (since it is supposed to be a right to determine what is right not by universally valid external laws limiting the freedom of each but by unilateral maxims of force). Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace (1795)," in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J. Gregor, trans. Gregor, Mary J., Paperback (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pts. 8:356-357.

[683] Immanuel Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals (1797)," in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J. Gregor, trans. Gregor, Mary J., Paperback (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pt. 6:307.

[684] Avram Alpert, "Philosophy against and in Praise of Violence: Kant, Thoreau and the Revolutionary Spectator," *Theory, Culture & Society* 33, no. 6 (November 1, 2016): 56, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276416651976.

[685] Kant, "On the Common Saying," 1999, pt. 6:320.

[686] Alpert, "Philosophy against and in Praise of Violence," 56.

[687] Kant writes about passive vs. active human reason, for e.g., in *The Critique of the Power of Judgement*: "reason should never be passive, since this passivity means we need to be led by others, are subject to prejudices, and hence not autonomous (5:294–295/174–175)." In his Metaphysics of Morals he describes the

violent. They have, additionally, the fundamental duty to preserve a form of government that dispels violence. In light of these overlapping duties, individuals must positively act in a non-violent way to ensure non-violent governance. Accordingly, in the face of the State's unjust use of violence, the people are condoned in using "negative resistance, that is, a refusal of the people to accede to every demand the government puts forth as necessary for administering the state."[688]

6.3.2. Tolstoy

Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), the celebrated Russian novelist, was also one of the most influential advocates of non-violence in recent history. His work influenced the movements led by Mohandas Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr.[689] Though often diminished in significance, Tolstoy's writing on non-violence, religion and government constitute the majority of his corpus in the second half of his life.[690] Tolstoy was born into an aristocratic Orthodox Christian family.[691] His family's holdings surpassed even those of the czar of Russia.[692] He became a soldier who fought in the Crimean War (1853-1856),[693] where he personally witnessed the atrocity of battle.[694] His novels, *War and Peace* (1869) and *Anna Karenina* (1878), brought him renown, and reflect his developing convictions regarding non-violence. In 1879 Tolstoy wrote *A Confession,* in which he described his ideological move away from the Orthodox church, towards his own formulated belief system.[695] His belief system made central the

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inalienable freedom that no law should trespass as the freedom "that anyone can work his way up from [the] passive condition to an active one." (Kant, 1996b: 6:315/ 459).

[688] Kant, "On the Common Saying," 1999, pt. 6:322.

[689] John Randolph Fuller, "Leo Tolstoy and Social Justice," *Contemporary Justice Review* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 321, https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580903105871.

[690] J. H. Abraham, "The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy," *The International Journal of Ethics* 40, no. 1 (October 1929): 105, https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.40.1.2378292.

[691] Leo Tolstoy, "A Confession," in *Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 Classic Works with Analysis and Historical Background (Annotated Classics)*, ed. Rose Polak, trans. Aylmer Maude and Louise Maude, Kindle ed., n.d., chap. 1, para. 1.

[692] Fuller, "Leo Tolstoy and Social Justice," 322.

[693] The Crimean War was a contest of might between Russia on one side and the Ottoman Empire, France, and Britain allies on the other side. Though Russia's support had long aided the Ottoman Empire, the nationalism and portent of internal conflict between Greek Christians, Latin Christians, and Muslim Turks in the Ottoman Empire seem to have resulted in the great powers' engagement in a war to determine whose influence would control in the event that the Ottoman Empire did not hold. See, Goldfrank's excellent treatment David M. Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War* (Routledge, 2014); ; and for an historic overview of the analysis of the causes of the war see, Brison D. Gooch, "A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War," *The American Historical Review* 62, no. 1 (1956): 33–58, https://doi.org/10.2307/1848511.

[694] Sobia Tahir, "Tolstoy™s Ideology of Non-Violence: A Critical Appraisal," no. 4 (n.d.): 347–48.

[695] Tolstoy's views have been described as "Christian anarchism" due to the radical nature of his claims regarding the Lordship, but not deity of Christ (Townsend 98) which is combined with his denunciation of the state and its ecclesial collaborators. See, more on this topic see, Terry Hopton, "Tolstoy, God, Anarchism,"

teachings of Jesus, particularly as they related to non-violence and wealth. His beliefs also entailed condemnation of the state.[696]

In his personal life, Tolstoy attempted to bring egalitarianism to his landholdings by divesting himself of wealth, and by attempting work at a trade making sandals and shirts. However, his gesture towards egalitarianism with his serfs was rebuffed due to suspicion that his divestment was, in reality, more a transfer of control to his wife, and though he made sandals, his lifestyle was not that of a cobbler, but continued to reflect the opulence of the wealthy.[697]

Still, Tolstoy's outlook was revolutionary for its time. In an age when Russian aristocrats were battling the czar for control of their own affairs and for control of their economic livelihood, Tolstoy battled instead for the welfare of the peasants. At this time, it was estimated that 80% of Russians were in the peasant class and that the vast majority of the wealth went to those in the government and the church. In many ways, what Tolstoy did would be equivalent to Americans advocating giving the land back to the American Indians.[698]

As Fuller notes, what is remarkable and significant is that Tolstoy embraced a belief system that led him to attempt the radical re-distribution of wealth. Because of his beliefs, Tolstoy was shunned, he risked arrest and execution, and he was ultimately excommunicated by the Orthodox church due to his divergence from orthodox Christian doctrine.[699]

Tolstoy's beliefs on non-violence stemmed from his understanding of Christianity as following the teachings of Jesus, who was "the highest representative of humanity's wisdom."[700] For Tolstoy the essence of Jesus's teachings was distilled in the Sermon on the Mount. Of five key teachings,[701] two were paramount: to not resist evil force or violence, and

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Anarchist Studies 8 (2000); Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, *Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel (Abridged Edition)* (Andrews UK Limited, 2013); Alexandre J.M.E. Christoyannopolis, "Leo Tolstoy on the State: A Detailed Picuture of Tolstoy's Denunciation of State Violence and Deception," *Anarchist Studies*, no. January (2008): 20–47.

[696] Tahir, "Tolstoy™s Ideology of Non-Violence: A Critical Appraisal," 348–49.

[697] Fuller, "Leo Tolstoy and Social Justice."

[698] Fuller, 323.

[699] Fuller, 323.

[700] Christoyannopolis, "Leo Tolstoy on the State: A Detailed Picture of Tolstoy's Denunciation of State Violence and Deception"; citing "Patriotism and Government," in Leo Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God and Peace Essays*, trans. Maude Aylmer (New Delhi: Rupa & Company, 2005).

[701] The five Commandments taken by Tolstoy from the gospels were these: "1. To refrain from anger under any circumstances. 2. Marriage contracted between man and woman is irrevocable and sexual intercourse not in a marriage state is for bidden. 3. The taking of an oath is not permissible. 4. Not to resist anything in the nature of evil, force, or violence. 5. To love one's enemies, and thus not to inculcate a spirit of sham patriotism;

to love one's enemies. For Tolstoy, love of enemies included not resorting to use of arms, and not erecting false barriers between nations and classes.[702]

Tolstoy became convinced that the use of force, in defense of oneself and one's property, was a source of great evil in the world. At issue was both the ownership of property as well as the use of force. He became convinced that what mattered in life was "hard work, poverty, humility, the renunciation of property, and the renunciation of one's rights."[703] As having no property was the ideal, the defense of property became indefensible.

> If I now feel tempted to defend others or myself, the property of others or my own, by violence, I can no longer give way to temptation. I dare not amass riches for myself. I dare not use violence of any kind against my fellow-creatures, except, perhaps, against a child in order to save it from present harm; nor can I now take part in any act of authority, the purpose of which is to protect men's property by violence. I can neither be a judge, nor take part in judging and condemning.[704]

There were no grounds for defense of self or property, and no grounds to aid the state in the defense of property. Further, the principle of not resisting violation (of self or property) was not merely personal, but also extended to the government. He argued in *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, that the wicked are always those in power, as good people do not seek to obtain, and thus do not rise to, power over others. "The wicked will always dominate the good and will always oppress them."[705] Those in favor of maintaining the status quo argue that power of the State is necessary to restrain evil people. Tolstoy counters that attempts to restrain violence by use of force "only punishes certain forms of covetousness, such as robbery and swindling, certain forms of profligacy and cruelty, such as conjugal infidelity, murder, and wounding…[I]t seems to countenance all the manifestations of covetousness, profligacy, and cruelty which do not come under its narrow definition."[706] For this reason the coercion of force corrupts public opinion, which is the only true means of dissuading bad acts. As, "[f]orce can

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not to resort to arms, and not to institute false barriers between nations and classes." Abraham, "The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy," 113.

[702] Abraham, 113.

[703] Leo Tolstoy and Constantine Popoff, "What I Believe (or My Religion)," in *Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 Classic Works with Analysis and Historical Background (Annotated Classics)*, ed. Rose Polak, Kindle ed., n.d., chap. 12, para. 19.

[704] Tolstoy and Popoff, chap. 12, para. 19.

[705] Leo Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God Is Within You," in *Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 Classic Works with Analysis and Historical Background (Annotated Classics)*, ed. Rose Polak, trans. Constance Garnett, Kindle ed., n.d., chap. 10, para. 23.

[706] Tolstoy, chap. 10, para. 70.

never suppress what is sanctioned by public opinion."[707] He argues for a stateless social order wherein other nations or states are left "in peace." If interaction is needed or desired with them

> we ought only to influence them by Christian manners and Christian teaching, setting them the example of the Christian virtues of patience, meekness, endurance, purity, brotherhood, and love. Instead of that we begin by establishing among them new markets for our commerce, with the sole aim of our own profit; then we appropriate their lands, i. e., rob them; then we sell them spirits, tobacco, and opium, i. e., corrupt them; then we establish our morals among them, teach them the use of violence and new methods of destruction, i, e., we teach them nothing but the animal law of strife, below which man cannot sink, and we do all we can to conceal from them all that is Christian in us. After this we send some dozens of missionaries prating to them of the hypocritical absurdities of the Church, and then quote the failure of our efforts to turn the heathen to Christianity as an incontrovertible proof of the impossibility of applying the truths of Christianity in practical life.[708]

In this passage Tolstoy posits that instead of demonstrating a Christian example in our engagement with other cultures and countries, the actions of Christian nations rob, corrupt, and debase by their example.

Tolstoy argues for individuals and nations to live as exemplars of Christ's teaching, as a means of shaping public opinion, as a means of instigating change in society. He notes that only by actually living into the practice of non-violence and virtue will humanity collectively learn *how to* live into this way of life. One cannot expect a map of territory that has never been seen.

Tolstoy identifies as evil a Christian government's refusal of the truth of nonresistance. He uses the example of slavery to make his point. For Tolstoy, slavery characterized not only the condition of Africans in the West, but also the class of serfs in Russia. Indeed, to Tolstoy, slavery has a deceptive way of being perpetuated and is regularly accomplished through a diversity of methods.[709] This becomes possible because of the instrument of money, which "in

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[707] Tolstoy, chap. 10, para. 77.

[708] Tolstoy, chap. 10, para. 84.

[709] These he names as slavery by violence, threats of punishment and death; slavery by deprivation of land, depriving persons of sustenance and a livelihood; and slavery by tribute or taxation. In all of its guises, slavery constituted the elevation of a small class of people over another, overwhelmingly large, class of people. Abraham, "The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy," 114 referencing; graf Leo Tolstoy, *The Slavery of Our Times* (Dodd, Mead, 1900), chap. 11. Tolstoy also articulated a kind of slavery that arises out of the use of money. "I understood that money is the impersonal and concealed enslavement of the poor…The root of every slavery is the use of the labor of others; and hence, the compelling others to it is founded indifferently on my

all societies known to us...has served as an instrument of violence."[710] Tolstoy concluded that the condition of slavery is inescapable as long as there is legislative government.[711] "The essence of slavery lies...in the fact that slavery exists, that there are people that have the power to decree laws profitable for themselves, and that as long as people have that power, there will be slavery."[712]

Tolstoy understood legislative government to be a deception. He viewed the masses of people as passive machines without any option but to carry out the interests of the governing class.[713] He described the law as "rules, made by people who govern by means of organized violence, for non-compliance with which the noncomplier is subjected to blows, to loss of liberty, or even to being murdered."[714] He concludes that the law is nothing more than organized violence. Ending the evil of slavery, for Tolstoy, required first ending the evil of government.

This end should not come about by violent overthrow, however. The end of government should be realized by a moral revolution. By exposing the fraud that the government perpetuates, and as Abraham states, abject refusal to participate in any government enterprise that is maintained and supported by governmental violence.[715]

> It would seem so simple and natural for working people, particularly the agricultural workers, who in Russia, as in the rest of the world, form a majority to finally understand that they have for centuries been suffering from something they have brought upon themselves to no advantage... and finally say to those they regard their leaders: 'leave us in peace! If you emperors, presidents, generals, judges, bishops, professors and

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right to the slave, or on my possession of money which is indispensable to him. [To avoid this evil] I shall not compel others to toil for me, but I shall endeavor to free them from the labor which they have performed for me, as far as possible, either by doing without this labor or by performing it for myself." Leo Tolstoy, "What To Do?: Thoughts Evoked by the Censor of Moscow," in *Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 Classic Works with Analysis and Historical Background (Annotated Classics)*, ed. Rose Polak, trans. Isabel F. Hapgood, Kindle ed., n.d., chaps. 18, paras. 7, 9.

[710] Abraham, "The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy," 114 citing "What Then Must We Do?" (A more specific location could not be determined. It is possible that the text was rendered differently in other translations consulted.).

[711] Abraham, 114.

[712] Tolstoy, *The Slavery of Our Times*, chap. 11, para. 7.

[713] Abraham, "The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy," 114.

[714] Tolstoy, *The Slavery of Our Times*, chap. 12, para. 11. He gives the example of what happens when one fails to give the fruits of his labor that are demanded, such as in taxes. "[a]rmed men will come and take from him what is demanded, and if he resists he will be beaten, deprived of freedom, and sometimes even killed…the same will happen to anyone who does not show respect to those whom it is decreed that we are to respect…for every nonfulfillment of the established laws there is punishment." Tolstoy, chap. 12, paras. 6–7.

[715] Abraham, "The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy," 115.

> other learned men need armies, navies, universities, ballots, synods, conservatories, prisons, gallows and guillotines, do it all yourselves: collect your own taxes, judge, execute and imprison among yourselves, murder people in war, but do it all yourselves and leave us in peace because we need none of it, we no longer wish to participate in all these useless, and above all evil deeds!'[716]

In Tolstoy's vision, such resistance would result in government being overthrown, laws being abolished and private property disappearing. Human justice and equality would be possible, and would result.

6.3.3. Thoreau

Writing during roughly the same period as Tolstoy in Orthodox Russia, was Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), who wrote in the abolitionist-north of the U.S. Thoreau was a philosopher, essayist and a Transcendentalist. He espoused engagement in non-violent resistance as a way of bringing about radical change, and performing an act of citizenship that was of utmost integrity.

Most, in his estimation, "serve the state…not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies...Others serve the State chiefly with their heads. A very few, [serve] as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men serve the State with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part."[717]

Thoreau advocated active conscientious engagement with the State, by resistance to the State. He argued that one must demonstrate a commitment to upholding the entity of government, while at the same time demonstrating a commitment to radical change. Such engagement entails resistance to the function of the state when it functions violently. In his specific case, though aknowledging that the specifics of other cases would require different strategies, advocacy of the refusal to pay taxes was a strongly viable act of conscientious resistance.

> If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer . . . asks

[716] Leo Tolstoy, "The Law of Love and the Law of Violence," in *A Confession and Other Religious Writings*, trans. Jane Kentish (London: Penguin UK, 1987), chap. 8, paras. 13 (p.178-179).

[717] Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience," in *Civil Disobedience and Other Essays*, Dover Thrift Ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012), 3 (emphasis in original).

> me, as one has done, 'But what shall I do?' my answer is, 'If you really wish to do anything, resign your office'. When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished.[718]

Here we see Thoreau encouraging the engagement of government through the positive act of not paying taxes, and not working for the government, as protest to the violence of the State.

Though Thoreau urged conscience-led action against government malfeasance, and though he was stridently opposed to slavery, there is some disagreement as to whether or not he participated in the abolitionist cause.[719] Though he may not have taken action regularly as part of the abolitionist struggle, Thoreau did believe that not paying his taxes was his duty as a man and as a citizen. Following the U.S. declaration of war against Mexico (1845),[720] which Thoreau believed was waged under pretense, while its true intent was extending slavery into the southwestern region of the U.S., Thoreau condemned the war. His condemnation of the war resulted in his arrest for his ongoing nonpayment of taxes. Though he did not remain long in jail (one night), his intention of acting in resistance to the expansion of legislated slavery in the U.S., which he deemed unjust, was accomplished.[721]

Thoreau believed that the only legitimate government was that which "establishes justice in the land."[722] For Thoreau, the goal of civil resistance was to use peaceful revolution to turn the ship of government in the direction of accomplishing its true purpose, which was the ending of violence. For him it was the citizen's duty to speak up and to perform an act of resistance when the government acted contrary to its purpose.

Thoreau's support of John Brown evidences that his resistance ideals went even further than advocacy of personal conscience-led non-violent decisions. John Brown was a radical abolitionist who believed in, and attempted, armed insurrection as a means to coerce slavery's

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[718] Thoreau, 9–10.

[719] See, Gilman M. Ostrander, "Emerson, Thoreau, and John Brown," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 39, no. 4 (1953): 716, https://doi.org/10.2307/1895396, who notes the thorough study of Thoreau's attitude toward the abolitionist movement that is provided in Henry S. Canby, *Thoreau* (Boston, 1939), as well as an attempt to prove Thoreau was an abolitionist made by Nick A. Ford, "Henry David Thoreau, Abolitionist," *New England Quarterly* (Baltimore, Portland), XIX (September, 1946), 359-71.

[720] The Mexican-American war (1846 to 1848) was ostensibly declared after the U.S. annexed the Republic of Texas. Mexico, having never accepted the secession of Texas, regarded the territory as still a part of Mexico.

[721] It's not clear whether or when Thoreau resumed paying taxes.

[722] Henry David Thoreau, "A Plea for Captain John Brown," in *Civil Disobedience and Other Essays*, Dover Thrift Ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012), 43.

abolition. He attacked the U.S. arsenal at Harper's Ferry, Virginia in 1859, hoping the arms could be passed on to the enslaved and a full-scale revolt ignited. Brown's plan was unsuccessful. After the rebellion was crushed, Brown was arrested, jailed, and tried. Within two months of the raid, he had been convicted of treason, murder and inciting a slave insurrection. He was thereafter hanged.[723] The rebellion caused a media sensation. Slave holders were outraged and terrified. Abolitionists decried the methods used by Brown in his abolitionist zeal, but claimed his motives to be righteous. Some regarded him as a martyr.

Thoreau, who previously spoke merely of taking a non-violent stand in accordance with conscience, was one of Brown's vocal and committed supporters. When public opinion and news reports began to turn against John Brown in Thoreau's community, it prompted him to make a public speech (his *Plea*) to balance the public discourse. Turner notes, "More than any other action in his lifetime, Thoreau's public defense of John Brown was a premeditated projection of himself into political affairs."[724]

Turner makes the argument that Thoreau, in delivering his speech, was exemplifying his belief in the *performance* of conscience as a means of political transformation. "The aim of the performance is to provoke one's neighbors into a process of individual self-reform that will make them capable of properly vigilant democratic citizenship and conscientious political agitation."[725]

Alpert suggests that part of the significance of Thoreau's public performance to balance the public discourse, is that by making his public speech, he engaged those in the community who felt they were alone in rooting for the success of Brown, though they themselves would not participate in physical violence. "Moreover, through his witnessing, he is enabling these spectators to see the existence of this community themselves. They no longer have to hide their opinions from others in the fear of rebuke or censure. They can attach themselves to Thoreau's city of words. In fact, Thoreau, along with other dissenters who wrote about Brown, was largely successful in transforming the mainstream interpretation of the event."[726]

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[723] For more on the Harper's Ferry Rebellion and John Brown, see David S. Reynolds, *John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights* (Vintage, 2009).

[724] Jack Turner, "Performing Conscience: Thoreau, Political Action, and the Plea for John Brown," *Political Theory* 33, no. 4 (August 1, 2005): 452–53, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591705276269.

[725] Turner, 453.

[726] Alpert, "Philosophy against and in Praise of Violence," 63 citing Beck JK (2009) Creating the John Brown Legend: Emerson, Thoreau, Douglass, Child and Higginson in Defense of the Raid on Harpers Ferry. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland.

Thoreau died less than three years after Brown's execution. Speaking at his funeral, friend and neighbor Ralph Waldo Emerson named John Brown as one of the three men who had influenced Thoreau most in the last few years of his life.[727] The encounter with a man of violence,[728] though he himself was not such a man, had a profound impact on Thoreau. It shaped and influenced the way that history was remembered.

We receive from Thoreau, then, the conception of non-violent positive activity, which could constitute a performance in line with one's conscience, that is intended to shape the community discourse of the event and to create a counter-community. What he adds to the evolution of non-violence is that he endorses, not merely living as a Christian and refraining from unvirtuous behavior, but taking affirmative steps towards creating justice and causing the government to function as it is intended.

6.3.4. Conclusion

Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau represent the diversity of settings, circumstances and conclusions that were being reached regarding non-violence and peace in the generation following the upheaval of national revolutions.

Writing in eighteenth century Europe, in the years following the disruptions of reformations and revolutions as he did, Kant adhered to a notion of the state as securing peace and order. Ultimately, peace for Kant acknowledged violence as a fact of social existence and, through the social contract, conferred upon the state the exclusive right to inflict violence, in order to coerce justice. He, like Erasmus believed that violence was the rightful province of the state to wield. Kant adds, however, that the state is "unintelligible" when it wields violence, since the state's purpose is fostering the cessation of violence. He adds, as well, that the people, meaning the ruling or legislative class and not private individuals, do have a right to disagree and to resist the unjust acts of those governing, when warranted. Kant's peace theory introduced the notion of non-violent resistance as a moral duty in cases where the sovereign fails to act in furtherance of its purpose of ending violence. He was ambiguous as to when and how such a duty might be enacted, however.

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[727] Franklin Benjamin Sanborn, *The Life of Henry David Thoreau: Including Many Essays Hitherto Unpublished, and Some Account of His Family and Friends* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 383.

[728] Researchers of Brown have uncovered that he was "an embezzler, a murderer, a cattle thief, and an inveterate liar." Ostrander, "Emerson, Thoreau, and John Brown," 713 citing, James Claude Malin, *John Brown and the Legend of Fifty-Six* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1942); Oswald Garrison Villard, *John Brown: 1800-1859: A Biography after Fifty Years* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1910); Robert Penn Warren, *John Brown: The Making of a Martyr* (New York: J.S. Sanders, 1993).

A different peace theory was articulated by Tolstoy, who wrote in Czarist Russia during the 19th and early twentieth centuries. Tolstoy was raised an Orthodox Christian, but left the church and developed a radical vision for a new society. He rejected the notion of the state, finding it to be a deceptive means of violence and enslavement, just as he found the teachings of the eastern orthodox church of Russia itself to be corrupt. Tolstoy's formulations of the Christian life involved major political commitments. Tolstoy advocated abolition of the state and private property, and the governance of society through the law of Christian neighbourliness and love. He espoused the overthrow of government by the common people without the use of physical force, but through not-acting in furtherance of government's violent ends, e.g., not doing soldiering work, prison work, tax collecting, working as clergy, etc. Tolstoy proposed a radical vision of what was possible for Christian peaceableness.

Thoreau, who wrote at roughly the same time as Tolstoy, but in the U.S., was less radical. Thoreau was not a Christian, but a Transcendentalist, and he upheld the authority of the state, but believed that the state should be non-violent. Thoreau adds to the conceptualization of an ethics of anti-violence that one must take affirmative action in resistance to state authority to compel the state to act justly.

Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau demonstrate that consideration of peace was ongoing, and that the dimensions of peace contemplated were contrary to the peace-through-war methods of nation-state builders. They contemplated peace being achieved without the use of physical force, and through the actions of individuals. Tolstoy also contemplated individuals acting in concert against, or collectively refusing to act in furtherance of, the goals of the state, which for him equated to violence.

6.4. 20th Century

As Olson notes, "WWI sounded the death knell of the nineteenth century European intellectual ethos including classical liberal theology."[729] The promise of the Enlightenment, that reason would result in unending human progress, was proved false as people faced the horrors of war, waged between Christian nations. In reaction, a neo-orthodoxy arose. There was a sense that Christian theology should turn from philosophies such as Kant's and Hegel's and stick closer to, as Barth referred to it, "the strange new world of the Bible," which recognized a Christocentric norm for life and doctrine. Into this climate many Christians desired to formulate an ethics for avoiding another world war, and later to grapple with the realities of further war in the world. Niebuhr, Yoder, and Wink, articulate three different approaches of Christian theology to the modern condition.[730]

6.4.1. Niebuhr

Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) initially, because of the barbarous level of death and killing that occurred during WWI, advocated pacifism and non-violence. He was a leader of the Fellowship for Reconciliation, a group founded in the early months of WWI. However, while pastoring a church in Detroit, his views changed. Witnessing the plight of his congregants who were pre-union industrial workers, as well as the rise of Hitler's fascism in Germany,

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[729] Olson, *The Journey of Modern Theology*, 295.

[730] See, David Cramer, "A Field Guide to Christian Nonviolence," *Sojourners*, December 7, 2015, https://sojo.net/magazine/january-2016/field-guide-christian-nonviolence, for discussion of other, lesser known, twentieth century theorists with diverse perspectives on Christian nonviolence, including, Walter Rauschenbusch (1861- 1918), a proponent of the Social Gospel ("Capitalism has often sacrificed the higher values of humanity to make big profits."), Howard Thurman (1899-1981) ("the religion of Jesus says to the disinherited: 'Love your enemy. Take the initiative in seeking ways by which you can have the experience of a common sharing of mutual worth and value. It may be hazardous, but you must do it."), André and Magda Trocmé (1901- 1971, 1901-1996) ("Jesus actually engaged in a kind of civil disobedience, whereby he and his disciples systematically violated those traditions that only helped to oppress the people."), Hélder Câmara (1909- 1999) ("the only true answer to violence is to have the courage to face the injustices which constitute violence No. 1."), William Stringfellow (1928-1985) (He described U.S. society as "inextricably committed to ideologies of death, a society like Babylon that does not merely commit acts of violence but is violence."), Dorothee Sölle (1929- 2003) ("To exist free of violence means to think and act with other living beings in a common life. ... It is the mysticism of being at one with all that lives."), Lisa Sowle Cahill (1948-) ("the nonviolence of the kingdom of Jesus is not presented in the Bible as an absolute ethical system, but as a calling, as conversion, and even as beatitude."), Traci C. West (1959-) (Calling for an ethic that resists violence against women she writes, "We must measure Christian ethics by the extent to which its rhetoric on violence is applicable to the circumstances of women's lives. This is the proper test of the viability and adequacy of its moral prescriptions."); also, see Girard, who argues that only those human societies that were able to contain the violence of escalating retaliation by employing a "scapegoat" mechanism to manage violence, were able to survive. René Girard, *The Scapegoat* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).

persuaded him that coercive force might be the most principled position for Christians committed to peace. Following his reconsideration of non-violence and pacifism, Niebuhr wrote the highly influential *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932), which has been described by Chernus as "the most influential, and probably the most trenchant, critique of non-violence ever written in the United States."[731]

In this book, and in the subsequent essay, "Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist," (1940) which I quote from here, Niebuhr articulated an ethics of Christian non-violence. He asserted the "absolute and uncompromising ethic" [732] of "love universalism and love perfectionism,"[733] which entailed Jesus's embrace of complete non-resistance to evil. This law of love, for Niebuhr, "transcends all other laws."[734] Jesus's standard of complete non-resistance is normative, but not applicable to the concrete circumstances of human experience and political reality. Human experience, and the political realities that are the communal expression of individual human experience, reflect the reality of humanity's sin; the desire to refute one's insignificance and finitude by acquiring some sense of significance at the expense of others.[735] Humanity is not good, but sinful at heart. History reflects the persistence of human sinfulness, and scripture records it, even up to the final scenes of the eschaton in scripture.[736] The sinful condition of humanity challenges the institution of justice, and justice requires a balance of power that can only be achieved by some means of coercion.

Here Niebuhr, more than any other theorist before him, makes a connection between violent force, non-violent force, and coercion, finding that whether violent or non-violent the use of force is coercive.

> Once we admit the factor of coercion as ethically justified, though we concede that it is always morally dangerous, we cannot draw any absolute line of demarcation between violent and nonviolent coercion…It is impossible to coerce a group without damaging both life and property and without imperilling [sic] the interests of the innocent with those of the guilty. Those are factors which are involved in the intricacies of group relations, and they make it impossible to transfer an ethic

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[731] Ira Chernus, *American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea* (Orbis Books, 2004), chap. 8, p.2.
[732] Reinhold Niebuhr, "Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist," in *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses*, ed. Robert McAfee Brown, Digital (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 106.
[733] Niebuhr, 106.
[734] Niebuhr, 106.
[735] Niebuhr, 108.
[736] Niebuhr, 112–13.

> of personal relations uncritically to the field of inter-group relations.[737]

Niebuhr blurs the line between violence and non-violence, finding even the non-violence of Ghandi to be evidence of the coercive use of collective force, which has the potential to cause physical violence, e.g., the consequences to the British merchants and their families who are deprived of a livelihood because of Ghandi's non-violent protest. If children starve, that is not unrelated to the protest and constitutes violence, with which Ghandi is complicit. "Non-co-operation, in other words, results in social consequences not totally dissimilar from those of violence."[738]

Arguing against the use of force, then, is an argument in favour, not of non-violence, but of non-resistance. Nonresistance, despite being the method of Jesus, is idealist and utopian. This is not a bad thing. However, it is *unrealistic*. Christian realism requires acceptance of the principled use of force against tyranny and aggression, force which cannot be conceived of as inherently wrong. "[A] political policy cannot be intrinsically evil if it can be proved to be an efficacious instrument for the achievement of a morally approved end."[739] Christian love and proper Christian motivation could be measured by its social goal. If it has the general welfare of others as its objective, then its aims are just. There are no absolutes. Thus, for him, the argument of non-violence proponents, that the means must match the ends, is fallacy. More realistic to the human condition and experience was whether a policy's ends justify the means.

Niebuhr's thinking did much to influence the theorization of Christian non-violence in the United States. U.S. foreign policy, in particular, was greatly influenced by his realist ideology, and could arguably be said to still be guided by his thinking. As Chernus states, "[leading foreign policy creators after WWII] took his writings as a religious seal of approval on their realist uncompromising stance against the Soviet Union. By the late 1940s, they were creating a permanent national security state dedicated to an all-out war against communism."[740] Decades later this resulted in the U.S. pursuing a nuclear arms agenda whereby, towards the close of the twentieth century, men in power brazenly flirted with planetary annihilation.

Ultimately, Neibuhr objected to pacifism in that it requires one to make no judgements at all regarding justice, or "to give an undue preference to tyranny in comparison with the

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[737] Reinhold Niebuhr, "Moral Man and Immoral Society," in *Reinhold Niebuhr: Major Works on Religion and Politics*, ed. Elisabeth Sifton, Digital (New York: Library of America, 2015), chap. 7, para. 5.
[738] Niebuhr, chap. 9, para. 10.
[739] Niebuhr, chap. 7, para. 4.
[740] Chernus, *American Nonviolence*, chap. 8, p. 16.

momentary anarchy which is necessary to overcome tyranny."[741] His is an objection to a "heretical" kind of pacifism that "absorbed the Renaissance faith in the goodness of man, hav[ing] rejected the Christian doctrine of original sin as an outmoded bit of pessimism."[742] He stringently objected to the notion that humans could become reasonable and work together for the good of all.

6.4.2. J.H. Yoder

When John Howard Yoder's (1927-1997) ideas entered the Christian non-violence discourse the map of the historical terrain had been redrawn to a degree. Two world wars had occurred, with unheralded atrocities due to advances in military technology. Fascism and anti-Semitism at unprecedented levels was accomplished. Instead of a number of globally powerful sovereign states, two dominant super-powers ruled the world. A cold war between those two powers was underway, shaping the emergence of hostilities around the globe. Most importantly for proponents of Christian non-violence, the early part of the twentieth century had provided a *method* for the theory of the earlier proponents of non-violence via Ghandi's non-violent resistance. Niebuhr saw this mass action as coercive, and thus violent, despite its non-violent tactics. However, others saw it as a mode of protest that epitomized the ideal means of resistance. Yoder disagreed with Niebuhr and offers one of the most penetrating accounts of Christian non-violence of the twentieth century. His most influential work, *The Politics of Jesus* (1972) is considered a classic.[743]

Yoder wrote from the Mennonite Anabaptist tradition and adhered to a theology of pacifism,[744] which he understood as the obligation of all Christians. Yoder decries the turn to a theology of the natural, that attempts to discern what is, e.g., fitting, relevant, or effective, for a mainstream audience, instead of taking Jesus on his own particularized terms.[745] He especially wrote against a theological framing of Jesus that portrayed Jesus as apolitical and concerned merely with the personal piety of the believer.

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[741] Niebuhr, "Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist," 117.
[742] Niebuhr, 104.
[743] Rachel Waltner Goosen, "The Failure to Bind and Loose: Responses to Yoder's Sexual Abuse," *The Mennonite: A Publication of Mennonite Church USA Providing Anabaptist Content*, January 2, 2015.
[744] John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1994), x.
[745] Yoder, 8.

Yoder, like Niebuhr, places Jesus at the center of his theology, and identifies Jesus's ethics as centered around the cross.[746] The ethics that disciples are called to "imitate" include: forgiving as Christ has forgiven,[747] loving indiscriminately as God does, [748] serving others,[749] and suffering that includes the descriptions of: definitive of apostolic existence,[750] giving one's life,[751] servanthood in place of dominion,[752] suffering though innocent without complaint,[753] suffering as bearers of the kingdom cause.[754]

Based upon these values, Jesus set up an alternative community that would live in a counter-cultural way according to this ethics. This new community would eschew violence, which was an alternative option for seizing power in Jesus's context, which the Zealot[755] faction favored. Instead, the community of Jesus followers would be committed to love without violence. The key to the community's relationship with the world would be to live in loving "revolutionary subordination" to those with whom one is in social relationship, in particular with the state. The Christian is to hope that "the loving willingness of...subordination will itself have a missionary impact; the unbelieving husband is consecrated through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is consecrated through her husband…The voluntary subjection of the church is understood as a witness to the world."[756] Christian hope is to be found in the fact of the resurrection. That God has power to bring life from death, hope from despair, and victory from seeming defeat. In this way Yoder argues for humanity to realize its limited role in ordering history. Yoder discredits two assumptions about the future:

> 1. …that the relationship of cause and effect is visible, understandable, and manageable, so that if we make our choices on the basis of how we hope society will be moved, it will be moved in that direction.

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[746] Yoder, 52–53.
[747] Yoder, 115.
[748] Yoder, 116.
[749] Yoder, 119.
[750] Yoder, 120.
[751] Yoder, 123.
[752] Yoder, 123.
[753] Yoder, 124.
[754] Yoder, 124.
[755] Yoder identifies the Zealots as those who chose the way of revolutionary violence against Rome, as the only way to change the social, political, and economic conditions of the time. See, Yoder, 56-58.
[756] Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 185.

> 2. …that we are adequately informed to be able to set for ourselves and for all society the goal toward which we seek to move it.[757]

Ultimately, for Yoder, it is God and not humanity who drives human history. Thus, there is no issue for the Christian in submitting to power. Indeed, Christians must accept their powerlessness. "The key to the ultimate relevance and to the triumph of the good is not any calculation at all, paradoxical or otherwise, of efficacy, but rather simple obedience."[758] Ultimate good is determined by faithfulness and not by results.

Yoder calls Christians to adhere to an ethic of loving subordination out of obedience to Jesus, in imitation of Jesus. It is a radical pacifism that endorses Christian suffering, and, unlike Neibuhr, has no expectation of Christian effectiveness in the world.

6.4.3. King

Beginning with 1955-1956 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929-1968) emerged as a leading figure in the civil rights protest movement in the U.S.[759] King's activism for desegregation applied the method of non-violent direct action. His methods included use of marches, sit-ins, and boycotts to harness the collective power of disenfranchised African-Americans, to compel legislative change. Pivotal to King's ethics was his role as a Baptist minister who was a product of the U.S. south, where he was exposed to the inequalities and violences faced by African-Americans through Jim Crow governance and martial law.

During his formal education, King investigated different theories seeking ways to address U.S. social inequality. He was influenced by Rauschenbusch, Muste, and Neibuhr, but his greatest source of influence was Ghandi of India.[760] King became convinced that Ghandi's

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[757] Yoder, 229–30.

[758] Yoder, 237–38.

[759] Cobb makes a distinction between the "civil rights movement" and the "Freedom Movement," though both are related. The civil rights movement was concerned with the passage of equalizing legislation, such as the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The Freedom Movement was concerned with "the achievement of civil rights, civil liberties, and the liberated consciousness of self and community. It recognizes that law alone cannot uproot white supremacy, ever creative and insidious in its forms and practices, and that civil rights law alone cannot create a new liberated sense of self and human capacity." Charles E. Cobb, *This Nonviolent Stuff'll Get You Killed: How Guns Made the Civil Rights Movement Possible* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 2.

[760] King considered Ghandi (1869-1948) to be a great Christian, though he was a Hindu Indian. "For here was a man who was not a Christian in terms of being a member of the Christian church but who was a Christian. And it is one of the strange ironies of the modern world that the greatest Christian of the twentieth century was not a member of the Christian church." Martin Luther King and Cornel West, "Palm Sunday Sermon on Mohandas K. Ghandi," in *The Radical King* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2016), 26.

accomplishment in using *Satyagraha* ("*Satya* is truth which equals love, and *agraha* is force; '*Satyagraha'* therefore, means truth-force or love-force.")[761] in his campaigns of non-violent resistance were ideal. King writes, "I came to feel that this was the only morally and practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom."[762] Based upon the work of Ghandi, King came to understand pacifism not as nonresistance, but as non-violent resistance to evil. He states that non-violence became more than merely a method. "It became a commitment to a way of life."[763]

King outlines his understanding of non-violent resistance in his 1958 essay, "Pilgrimage to Non-violence."[764] It is a philosophy that, for him, has six components.[765] First, non-violent resistance is not passive; it is not cowardice. Fighting would be preferable to cowardice and would not be necessary because "there is always another alternative."[766] This alternative for King is active non-violent resistance. Second, non-violent resistance "does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding."[767] The objective of protest is to prompt moral shame in the opponent, with the goal of reconciliation and creation of beloved community. Third, the contest is against the invisible, not the visible. It is not the White person but injustice that must be overcome. Fourth, non-violent resistance involves a "willingness to accept suffering without retaliation, to accept blows from the opponent without striking back."[768] Violence is accepted if necessary, but only as one who receives violence, never as one who administers violence. King adopts Ghandi's view that "unearned suffering is redemptive"[769] for the resister. Added to that, suffering has the possibility of gaining the attention of, and winning over, an intractable opponent.[770] Fifth, non-

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[761] Martin Luther King King, *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010), 84.

[762] King, 85.

[763] King, 89.

[764] Chapter Six in King's first book, *Stride Toward Freedom*.

[765] King, 90–95.

[766] King, 90.

[767] King, 90.

[768] King, 91.

[769] King, 91.

[770] King takes a remarkable position on the extent to which he believes in the virtue of suffering, a position that is often quoted by advocates of nonviolence:

To our most bitter opponents we say: "We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. We shall meet your physical force with soul force. Do to us what you will, and we shall continue to love you. We cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws, because noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good. Throw us in jail, and we shall still love you. Send your hooded perpetrators of violence into our community at the midnight hour and beat us and leave us half dead, and we shall still love you. But be ye assured that we will wear you down by our capacity to suffer. One day we

violent resistance avoids internal, as well as external, violence of spirit. Love, not hate, for the enemy must be cultivated. Just as God loved sinners, while they were yet sinners, and greatly in need of God's love, Blacks must love Whites, whose souls are greatly scarred "because the white man needs [Black people's] love to remove his tensions, insecurities, and fears."[771] Sixth, is based on the belief that "the universe is on the side of justice,"[772] thus the resister can have hope.

Cobb, a veteran of the Freedom Movement and former civil rights worker in the deep South, where racism and segregation were most entrenched, has commented on the value of the method of non-violent resistance.

> Acts of nonviolent resistance contributed mightily to ending the mental paralysis that had long kept many black people trapped in fear and subservient to white supremacy, reluctant to even try to take control over their own lives despite the fact that slavery had ended roughly a century earlier. The principled, militant dignity of nonviolent resistance also won nationwide sympathy for the idea of extending civil rights to black people.[773]

He emphasizes here not the change in legislation that was made possible by the method, but the more important psychic transformation that was made possible. Black people were liberated from fear and subservience, and Whites gained new sympathy for the claims for equality made by Black people.

King's activism was not limited to correction of racial inequality in the U.S. He was concerned with the evils of racism in its global manifestations. He witnessed the process of decolonization occurring throughout the world and assessed the racial dimensions of the global clamor for political independence. King concluded that, just as all other great civilizations have fallen as a result of internal decay, "[r]acism can well be that corrosive evil that will bring down the curtain on Western civilization."[774] In addition, King was concerned with the intersecting

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shall win freedom, but not only for ourselves. We shall so appeal to your heart and conscience that we shall win you in the process, and our victory will be a double victory.

See, Martin Luther King and Cornel West, "Loving Your Enemies," in *The Radical King* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2016), 62–63.

[771] King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 94.

[772] King, 95.

[773] Cobb, *This Nonviolent Stuff'll Get You Killed*, 2.

[774] Martin Luther King, *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos Or Community?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010), 186.

issues of poverty ("The time has come for an all-out world war against poverty.")[775] and war ("Wisdom born of experience should tell us that war is obsolete. There may have been a time when war served as a negative good by preventing the spread and growth of an evil force, but the destructive power of modern weapons eliminates even the possibility that war may serve any good at all.")[776] With respect to poverty and war, King's concerns extended beyond the borders of the U.S. and engaged global conditions.

Based upon Jesus's teaching ("Love your enemies . . . that ye may be children of your Father which is in heaven"),[777] and modeled on Jesus's example, King's principles had a radical love of enemies at its core. What his work contributed was the implementation of ideas of non-violent action with mass mobilization. King used the principles rooted in the Christian tradition of love, to promote anti-violence methods, and prove that such methods were sufficient to create change in society.

6.4.4. Wink

Where Niebuhr provided Christian theology with a twentieth century theological ethics for engagement in war and violence, Yoder provided the ethics for non-resistance to violence, Wink, like King, found a middle ground and advocated an influential ethics of a "third-way." Wink's "third way" envisions an active resistance to evil using means that are not physically violent.

Walter Wink (1935-2012) was a biblical scholar who was exiled from the academy in his earlier years due to his critique of the scholarly objectivism that silo-ed "theory from practice, mind from body, reason from emotion, knowledge from experience."[778] Wink's work shows a marked interplay between reason and religious experience. His work is also distinctive in its reflection of the consideration of the dynamic struggles underway in post-colonial settings. After a period of immersion in Chile's context in the 1980s, experiencing life in a military dictatorship, Wink became physically and psychically unwell. He wrote:

> The evils we encountered were so monolithic, so massively supported by our own [U.S.] government, in some cases so

[775] King, 188.
[776] King, 194.
[777] King and West, "Loving Your Enemies," 61.
[778] Walter Wink, *Walter Wink: Collected Readings*, ed. Henry French, Digital (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013) editor's introduction citing Walter Wink, *The Bible in Human Transformation* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010).

> anchored in a long history of tyranny, that it scarcely seemed that anything could make a difference.[779]

Out of his illness and his reckoning with the issues he confronted most visibly in the Chilean context, Wink produced a trilogy on "the powers," as understood from his systematic biblical exegesis on the topic. In his first book, Wink examines the use of the terms for power in the relevant literature of the period and in the New Testament. In the second book, he examines the "disputed passages" in scripture related to the principalities and powers. In the third book, Wink applies an interpretation of his theories to scriptural texts and contemporary contexts. It is the third book that outlines his "third way" of non-violent resistance to the powers.

Wink works with the conception of the powers as identified in scripture. As he describes, the powers

> are both visible and invisible, earthly and heavenly, spiritual and institutional. The Powers possess an outer, physical manifestation (buildings, portfolios, personnel, trucks, fax machines) and an inner spirituality, or corporate culture, or collective personality. The Powers are the simultaneity of an outer, visible structure and an inner, spiritual reality. The Powers, properly speaking, are not just the spirituality of institutions, but their outer manifestations as well.[780]

The Powers are spiritual as well as the material manifestation of the spiritual, then. Also, the Powers are not to be understood simply as evil, nor simply as good. Rather, "[t]he Powers are good. The Powers are fallen. The Powers must be redeemed."[781] The engagement with corrupted power is therefore a proper Christian endeavour because the Powers "have been created in, through, and for the humanizing purposes of God in Christ," thus they may be "honoured, criticised, resisted, and redeemed."[782]

The Powers operating together in "an entire network integrated around idolatrous values," result in what Wink calls the Domination System. The Domination System is a system "characterized by unjust economic relations, oppressive political relations, biased race

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[779] Walter Wink, *Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), ix.

[780] Walter Wink, *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 3.

[781] Wink, 10.

[782] Wink, 10.

relations, patriarchal gender relations, hierarchical power relations, and the use of violence to maintain them all."[783]

It is within the context of the Domination System of the Powers that the gospel is revealed. "The gospel is a context-specific remedy for the evils of the Domination System. This means that the overthrow of any particular manifestation of oppression can never satisfy the demands of the gospel if what replaces one form of domination is simply another."[784] The gospel recognizes that the system of domination requires redemption, and that the redemptive process cannot involve substitution of one form of domination for another.

This understanding of the Powers and of the Domination System underlies Wink's appreciation for Jesus's engagements with the world, and our own. Wink envisions Jesus's engagement with the world as exemplary of a "third way" out of the violence of the Domination System. Instead of responding using violence, or with passively doing nothing, Jesus demonstrates the use of the third way of non-violent direct action.

Relying upon an exegesis of the "turn the other cheek" passage of Matthew 5,[785] Wink argues that Jesus provided a revolutionary paradigm for resistance. By encouraging his hearers to turn the other cheek, Jesus was restoring their human dignity, "because this action robs the oppressor of the power to humiliate. The person who turns the other cheek is saying, in effect, 'Try again. Your first blow failed to achieve its intended effect. I deny you the power to humiliate me. I am a human being just like you. Your status does not alter that fact. You cannot demean me.'"[786] By a debtor surrendering not only the coat, but the other garments that he [sic] is wearing, the poor again exercises agency and refuses humiliation. He also issues "a stunning protest against the system that created his debt. He has said in effect, 'You want my robe? Here, take everything! Now you've got all I have except my body. Is that what you'll take next?'" In doing so the debtor not only sheds his own shame, but cloaks his creditor in shame instead, since "[n]akedness was taboo in Judaism, and shame fell less on the naked party than on the person viewing or causing the nakedness (Gen. 9:20-27)."[787] By offering to carry the heavy

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[783] Walter Wink, *The Powers That Be* (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 39.

[784] Wink, *Engaging the Powers*, 48.

[785] Matt. 5:38-42: 3 "You have heard that it was said, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; 40and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; 41and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile. '2Give to everyone who begs from you, and do not refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you.' (See also Luke 6:29-30.)" Wink, 175.

[786] Wink, 186.

[787] Wink, 189.

pack of a Roman soldier an extra mile, the impressed load-bearer "can recover the initiative and assert their human dignity." It was forbidden for soldiers to impress civilians to labor for them beyond certain limits. Thus, by going beyond what was asked, the load-bearer puts the soldier in the position of risk of punishment for overworking the civilian.

> From a situation of servile impressment, the oppressed have suddenly seized the initiative. They have taken back the power of choice. The soldier is thrown off balance by being deprived of the predictability of his victim's response. He has never dealt with such a problem before. Now he has been forced into making a decision for which nothing in his previous experience has prepared him. If he has enjoyed feeling superior to the vanquished, he will not enjoy it today.[788]

For Wink, having the oppressed take steps on their own behalf, even to their detriment, is empowering for them and accomplishes effective resistance to the system.

Jesus's advice, therefore, represents the espousal of revolutionary non-violent direct action tactics. "No one, not only in the first century but in all of human history, ever advocated defiance of oppressors by turning the cheek, stripping oneself naked in court, or jeopardizing a soldier by carrying his pack a second mile…These sayings are, in fact, so radical, so unprecedented, and so threatening, that it has taken all these centuries just to begin to grasp their implications."[789] Jesus's third way, according to Wink, avoids passivity and violence; it allows "evil [to be] be opposed without being mirrored, the oppressor resisted without being emulated, and the enemy neutralized without being destroyed."

Despite his comprehensive theorizations, Wink makes a concession in the end that those who engage in revolutionary protest violence, should not be judged as unfaithful. He writes:

> The counterviolence of the oppressed may even in the mystery of God's wrath be something that God is able to employ. Just as God used Assyrian military conquest as the rod to punish Israel for its apostasy (Isa. 10:5), so the violence of the poor has awakened some people to the severity of their poverty. So, while I do not believe that Christians have a vocation for violence, and should actively oppose its use, we are also not permitted to sit in judgment over those who resort to violence. God can take care of that.[790]

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[788] Wink, 192.
[789] Wink, 194.
[790] Walter Wink, *Jesus and Nonviolence: A Third Way* (Fortress Press, 2003), 86.

Further, he also concluded that it is preferable to act, even violently, against evil than to passively accept it, writing "…in a situation of extreme oppression, it is far better that we act violently than let our fear of sin and guilt paralyze us into no act at all."[791]

Wink's method of exegesis and reframing the discussion makes a significant contribution to Christian non-violence theorization by incorporating the spiritual dimension of struggles that underlie contests resulting in physically violent protest.

6.4.5. Conclusion

Niebuhr, Yoder, King, and Wink represent a trend in the twentieth century of Christian leaders beginning to interrogate the concepts of "non-violence" and "pacifism" using traditional theological language. They represent the return of the discussion of peace to the church. What is represented are four different approaches that shaped contemporary Christian theology, namely, sanction of the use of physical force for the Christian, the non-resistance of physical force used against the Christian, committed action without use of physical force of the Christian, and committed action without the use of physical force of the Christian, with acceptance of the use of force by those Christians who deem it necessary.

6.5. Conclusion of Modern Period Non-violence Analysis

The church of the modern period moved from Christ of liberal humanism to a more orthodox Christianity that placed the Jesus of the Godhead at the centre of doctrine and teaching. The meaning of Jesus at the centre, however, was not consistent when it came to the use of physical force in the life of the Christian. War was accepted and endorsed, but there were consistent instances of Christian advocacy against war, and against the use of any kind of physical force. Non-violent resistance gained a model for effective use through the Christian protests of King.

In the 18th century, humanist Immanuel Kant, presented ideas meant to foster peace among nations. Kant's peace was not grounded in an ethic of love, nor Jesus' teachings, nor in the elevation of human distinctiveness, nor even in the desire for international cooperation. Kant's theory of peace was grounded in the belief that governments' purpose for existence was the creation of peace among hostile individuals who would otherwise exist in a primitive violent state of nature.

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[791] Wink, 83.

Thoreau's ideology of non-violence, like Kant's, was not rooted in Christian ideals. Instead, he affirmed the social contract and the government's central authority. His interest in non-violence was based upon his ideals of self-actualization. True "manhood," or selfhood, required that one opposed the State when the state acted against freedom. He went further than Kant, in that he not only endorsed the citizen's refusal of participation in what the government compelled that was wrong. Thoreau also introduced the idea of using affirmative acts, such as nonpayment of taxes, to deny the needed support for the government to maintain its wrongful conduct. This was much in line with Tolstoy's views.

Tolstoy wrote with experience of war in his own Russian context. Having witnessed war firsthand, and also having experienced life as a member of Russia's plutocracy, Tolstoy was mistrustful of the state. He advocated against the State, and, instead, for a radical transformation of the social order.

Tolstoy continues in the vein of Wycliffe, in connecting his theories of peace with the reform of government, though in Tolstoy's case reform measures were more extreme to the point of advocating abolishment of the State. Also, like Wycliffe, Tolstoy grounded his conception of peace in the conception of Christian love as taught and modeled by Christ. What Tolstoy introduced that shifts the peace conversation, is imagination of radical non-violent resistance to, and nonparticipation in, *all* violent acts of the government, and also the radical redistribution of wealth. This is similar to the intention of the anabaptist adherents, particularly the Hutterites, who included an economic mission as part of their separation from the world. Tolstoy is significantly different, however, in that he, alá Peter Chelčický, did not envision Christian withdrawal from the world. He did not envision a world/church dichotomy. Tolstoy would have Christians remain in society, yet express objection to the social order, and create revolution, by withdrawal of support. He argued for not only refraining from oathtaking and holding civic office, as the anabaptists espoused, but also refraining from paying taxes, serving in the military, farming, or doing anything that maintained the violent acts of the state. Finally, Tolstoy greatly differed from Kant in his estimation of what would occur without the state. For Kant, chaos and violence were certainties without the State, as humanity would be reduced to life in the state of nature. For Tolstoy peace and equality would result from un-statehood, as humanity would be freed from the violence of government.

What the three together reflect is a strain of non-violence, from Russia to the U.S., that would lead to acting directly to withdraw support from the state. Their thought informs the work of those in the twentieth century who also argue for resistance. What changes in the twentieth century, is the concern for showing support for the state itself. Much of the discussion

of non-violence and peace in the twentieth century is written with full acceptance of the nation-state, and of the legitimacy of States using force to expand or defend their borders. The writers of the twentieth century are either looking back or forward to such uses of force, which resulted in the occurrence of large-scale, devastating wars, including WWI, WWII, and the war in Vietnam.

Niebuhr's work is important not only because of its articulation of the prototypical rebuttal to Christian non-violence, but also because the arc of his writing demonstrates modes of thinking about non-violence. With the atrocities of WWI in mind, he positioned himself, initially, against the violence of war. Later, witnessing the inequalities of industrial workers, he shifted to consideration of the coercive use of force, then with the rise of totalitarianism, shifted further to consideration of war as the necessary and most realistic course for morally informed Christians to take. A non-resistance that allowed tyranny was "peace, but it is a peace which has nothing to do with the peace of the kingdom of God." Later, when the threat of war and tyranny was past, his position might be seen as shifting again to embrace a gradualist non-violent coercion. Thus, he could praise the delayed implementation of the judicial decision mandating school desegregation in the landmark U.S. case, *Brown v. Board of Education*, as "statesmanship" and "concern for political realities."

Niebuhr believed that the Court, by declaring a principle but "wisely postpon[ing] application of the principle" until the segregationist states had time to "adjust themselves," was allowing for the general acceptance that would eventually follow.[792] His praise of the Court was based on the idea that a more rapid implementation might lead to revolt. "Revolt that is so widespread that police power cannot suppress it represents defeat of the law and the ideal."[793] By this, Neibuhr articulates a sentiment that reveals a change from his previous position--that "peace with tyranny" is not the peace of the Kingdom of God--to acceptance of "peace with delayed human dignity". Thus, it would seem to be a particular kind of tyranny, or a particular degree of tyranny, that is objectionable to Niebuhr, rather than tyranny itself. And for Niebuhr it could be argued that the objectionableness of the degree turns on race.

Yoder, a product of the anti-Vietnam War popular sentiment, presented to the public a theological rationale for why war must be avoided, and peace sought. He opposed the idea of

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[792] Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Supreme Court on Segregation in the Schools," in *Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr*, ed. D. B. Robertson (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992), 149.

[793] Niebuhr, 150.

Niebuhr that Christ's message was one of complete (and unrealistic) apolitical non-resistance, and instead showed that Christ was deeply political in his actions and teachings. Yoder concluded that Christ's message was one of resistance by radical submission and acceptance of suffering. Yoder combined the notion of obedience to the Christian calling of non-violence, with the notion of full disregard for the outcome, and with hope for the possibility of the intervention of the Spirit to ultimately provide a good outcome; to bring life out of even death.

As almost a reaction to the "active non-resistance" of Yoder, King moved Christian conceptualization forward by implementing the idea of active non-violence. King, unlike Niebuhr, honoured a distinction between resistance and violence, and grounded in the idea of radical Christian love, King advocated resistance without use of violence. King's ethics were implemented during the civil rights movement and represented the first non-violent mass mobilization of people, through use of Christian principles of love. King's ethics, which were informed by Ghandi (who himself was informed by Tolstoy and Thoreau), have had a lasting effect on global movements for equality and liberation.

Wink, writing in the era of American proxy-wars in post-colonial newly-democratic nations, was influenced by the violence he witnessed in such contexts; both the injustices perpetrated against those seeking change and the internal guerrilla warfare that between those seeking different models of changed government. Wink stressed the need for non-passive Christian non-violence, and applied the Kingian method of mass mobilized non-violent resistance to international post-colonial contexts. Wink ultimately deemed it preferable to sanction violence than to sanction passivity in the face of injustice.

What becomes clear in the modern era is that the political and moral arguments for peace that were advanced, were in fact arguments for peace among the nation-states of Europe and the U.S. The effect of the violence of colonization in the New World, and of slavery, is not addressed or central to any who address concepts of non-violence or peace, with the exception of King and Wink, who wrote late in the twentieth century, following global movements for equality and liberation. Tolstoy alone was concerned with the condition of slavery and its inherent connection to violence and injustice. He shows no particular concern, however, for the dimensions of violence present in trans-Atlantic slavery and its sequalae. There were no demands for peace married to demands for just treatment that were raised on behalf of the indigenous. For most of the theorists, no practice of just war or pacifism grounded in Christ's love would apply to the distant peoples of newly discovered lands. The indigenous in possession of land desired by Europeans, obdurate African laborers required to work the land,

and truculent Negros and South and Central American “peasants” were consistently regarded as obstacles to the “peace” that Europeans sought to secure for themselves.

Prior to this period, advocates of non-violence and peace were regarded with suspicion and subjected to examination, or penal correction. Such claims presented challenges to the structures of power. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Christian discussions of peace represented much less of a threat to the structures of power. Though Tolstoy wrote about the demise of the State, he did so as one securely esconsced in the aristocratic class made possible by the State’s hierarchical ordering. None of the men who wrote about peace during this period, except arguably King and Wink, did so in a way that risked their collective Western power and security.

7. Part II SUMMARY: Historical Theological Conclusions

7.1. Introduction

This section is a **compilation** of the different "Conclusion" sections from Part II. No new research is presented. It is included for ease of reference, for tracking the history and the argument that is presented in detail in the four historical theological analysis chapters.

7.1. Summary of Findings by Historic Period

7.1.1. Apostolic Period

The church tradition generally frames the Apostolic church as a church of absolute pacifism. This period of the church is viewed as demonstrating a pure adherence to Jesus's teaching of non-resistance, epitomized by the Sermon on The Mount and by Jesus's surrender to crucifixion. The church in its faithfulness, the tradition holds, refrained from killing as well as from participation in war. It modelled peaceableness both among adherents and with outsiders. The church tradition's framing does not withstand scrutiny. It requires the setting aside of the intrinsic violence of the text, and adopting a view of violence, and hence, non-violence, that is limited to enactments of physical force. It does not speak to the "why?" of Jesus's refrain from use of physical force, nor account for those occasions where Jesus did use physical force, such as during the temple incident, nor account for Jesus's aggressive speech, e.g., with religious elites, Peter, the Canaanite woman, etc. Further, framing the apostolic church as an absolute pacifist church, which refrained from killing, ignores the examples in the text of the kingdom's welcome of soldiers and guards, and the demise of Ananias and Sapphira. Finally, such a framing fails to follow the complete example of Jesus, who generally demonstrates a lack of use of physical force, but at the same time also demonstrates full resistance to the ruling powers, not non-resistance.

Jesus can be viewed as exercising a "non-violence" that is personally non-resistant, for the purpose of fulfilling the scriptures and thereby effecting salvation for all. His practices were also publicly confrontational, in order to assert his own, and his followers', worth and dignity, to establish that their value was not determined by those who claim to be honourable (and in fact are not), and in order to incarnate the spiritual contest between good and evil. Ultimately, the peace of the apostolic church fails to mimic this standard of non-violence. It did not refrain from physical violence for the purpose of aiding or restoring third-parties to life, dignity and flourishing, either physically, spiritually or otherwise. While there was the assertion of dignity

and self-determination of Jesus-followers through their choice to live counter-culturally, and to hold to the testimony of Jesus even if it cost their lives, unlike Jesus, the apostolic church did not act to confront the powers that exploited and oppressed.

For these reasons, it unpersuasive that the apostolic church was a pacifist church, which followed the ways of Jesus, in the way that "pacifism" is employed by Christians today.

7.1.2. Patristic Period

From Justin Martyr to Origen, several things are apparent. First, there was a dispersal of the church, and of Christian authority, throughout the Roman Empire, from Palestine to the northern region of Africa, to Turkey, to Rome, and beyond.[794] The centres of gravity being Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, and Carthage in the second and third centuries.[795] Second, the suffering that the church underwent during this period was deemed to be suffering beneficial to spiritual elevation. Unlike Jesus's persecution, their suffering did not arise out of actions in the world seeking dignity and just care for the marginalized. Third, the warnings in James's letter notwithstanding,[796] the monied classes gained influence in the church and influenced the

[794] Iraneus noted that "Christianity had spread beyond those fortified boundaries [of the Roman Empire] to the far west of North Africa (the regions known in Latin as Gaetulia and Mauretania), throughout the Iberian peninsula and 'the diverse nations of the Gauls and the haunts of the Britons – inaccessible to the Romans, but subjugated to Christ'." Ludlow, *The Early Church* citing Ireneus, Against the Jews I.7. For more on the spread of the early church see, e.g., Roderic L. Mullen, *The Expansion of Christianity: A Gazetteer of Its First Three Centuries* (Brill, 2004); and Mark Edwards, "Christianity, A.D. 70-192," in *The Cambridge Ancient History: Volume 12, The Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337*, ed. Alan Bowman, Peter Garnsey, and Averil Cameron, Second, vol. 12 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 573–88. For an insightful discussion of the ecclesial dynamics at play between the churches, as demonstrated through the ordination of Origen, see, Holliday, "From Alexandria to Caesarea."

[795] Ludlow, *The Early Church*.

[796] James 2: 1-13 "2 My brothers and sisters, do you with your acts of favoritism really believe in our glorious Lord Jesus Christ? 2 For if a person with gold rings and in fine clothes comes into your assembly, and if a poor person in dirty clothes also comes in, 3 and if you take notice of the one wearing the fine clothes and say, "Have a seat here, please," while to the one who is poor you say, "Stand there," or, "Sit at my feet," 4 have you not made distinctions among yourselves, and become judges with evil thoughts? 5 Listen, my beloved brothers and sisters. Has not God chosen the poor in the world to be rich in faith and to be heirs of the kingdom that he has promised to those who love him? 6 But you have dishonored the poor. Is it not the rich who oppress you? Is it not they who drag you into court? 7 Is it not they who blaspheme the excellent name that was invoked over you?

8 You do well if you really fulfill the royal law according to the scripture, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." 9 But if you show partiality, you commit sin and are convicted by the law as transgressors. 10 For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it. 11 For the one who said, "You shall not commit adultery," also said, "You shall not murder." Now if you do not commit adultery but if you murder, you have become a transgressor of the law. 12 So speak and so act as those who are to be judged by the law of liberty. 13 For judgment will be without mercy to anyone who has shown no mercy; mercy triumphs over judgment." NRSV

church's development.[797] After the second Jewish war (135 CE), non-Jewish Christians were eager to emphasize the distinction between themselves and Judaism, and made more clear their distinct religious claims. Christianity became "Gentile."[798] Hierarchies in church structure, erudition of church leaders, and the building up of the church materially resulted.

By the time of Origen's letter to Celsus in the mid-third century, doctrine had become unmoored from Jesus's example, from the context of enmity with the ruling elites, and unmoored from the expectation of Jesus's imminent return. The concept of non-violence had shifted conceptually from non-resistance to being killed, to bearing arms and engaging in military killing. Upholding the letter of the faith, and the tradition of not serving in the military and directly killing, became the predominant basis and rationale for claims of not fighting, the chief new goal of non-violence.

The life of prayer was the way that the church approached a positive relationship with the culture. There was no confrontation of the powers, rather, by Origen's writing in the third century, the powers were able to rely upon the full support of the Christians. Further, there was no eschatological expectation of the imminent return of Jesus, and of the righteous (and violent) judgment of God. In following Christ, the church's following was not a following of self-determination unto death that others might have life. Rather it was centred in an ethic of love.

As Rhee notes, "Numerical growth, increasing penetration into the upper echelon of Roman society, and the emergence of a distinct material culture and collective property by Christians during this time period meant that Christians began to settle in as permanent citizens of the empire, not just to pass through the alien world as temporary sojourners."[799]

While during the apostolic church period there was the practice of non-resistance to persecution, the movement away from non-resistance, as ideology, began during the second century, and turned toward the refusal to kill. This movement away from non-resistance and killing, reached a theological apogee in the doctrinal formulations of Augustine. Though it is common to view the move away from the refusal to kill as occurring through the advent of Constantine as emperor, the transition was gradual and progressive.

Final Conclusion of the Period

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[797] "The survival of Christianity in its early days depended on the aid of wealthy benefactors." Moore, "Wealth and Poverty," 56; Rhee, *Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich*, 77–96.

[798] Rhee, *Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich*, 87.

[799] Rhee, 95.

Restoration of peace, love of God, and securing dignity and justice were all aims of Jesus's mission on earth. Yet, for Jesus, the enemy was not the marginalized whose beliefs were unorthodox, whose ethnicity was Palestinian like his, nor those whose faith was not his own. Jesus lived, taught, and used his power in defence of such "Othered" persons when they were marginalized because of their difference. That the patristics and those following did not do the same, is the great divergence between their teaching and Christ's.

What this historic overview demonstrates is that during the first 400 years of the church, pacifism theologically rooted in Christian love of neighbour is a myth. In the apostolic church, the church was threatened with persecution from local Jewish authority and from the imperial state. The church refrained from physical violence, in expectation of Christ's imminent return and his destruction of both threats. Their non-violence was the act of expedience and fugitivity. Non-violence was not grounded in Christian love.

This church period's conduct comes closest to what many conceptualize when it comes to the non-violence of the gospel and the non-violence of the church. It is important to remember that the period of this church was brief. The church was highly precarious, life was unstable, and the expectation of Jesus's soon return was high. Also, as much as peace was attempted to be fostered, a key component of the Jesus's work was entirely neglected by this church, and that was the confrontation of authority. By failing to confront authority the church failed to challenge the systems that created conditions of marginalization in the culture. *Creation of an alternate counter-culture, in lieu of confrontation of the dominant violent social order, was not the example of Jesus. The community life turned inward was an innovation meant to secure the lives and wellbeing of church members against their persecutors.*

In the patristic early church, the church was threatened with persecution from the imperial state. There was little expectation of Christ's imminent return or of destruction of the power of the state. To manage its place of marginalized precarity, the church embraced the doctrine of refraining from violence. The basis was no longer God's imminent impending vengeance, but transformed instead to the idea of Christian love. The church was not opposed to war generally, but merely to the Christian involvement in war and killing. In the church of the empire, unlike in the fugitive church or the marginalized church, the church was not threatened with persecution, from either local or state authority. The threat to the church, and the state, was of foreign invasion. There was no longer a need to secure its survival by withdrawing or by accommodation. Such practices would ensure the opposite, the church's demise. Accordingly, to secure its survival, the church legitimized violence and killing, as long as the grounds for doing so were those that could be understood as just.

7.1.3. Early Middle Ages

Ultimately the monastics served a stabilizing role in the culture, while not being removed from the violence that permeated their world.

In the West, a rivalry was present between the ecclesial authority of the church and the secular rulers. The cohesion of the church amidst the rampant violence and brutality of warring tribesmen of the North resulted in the ecclesial structure of Christendom gaining cultural and political authority between the fourth and eighth centuries.[800] The church remained in a position of great authority until the Carolingian kings established a unified Europe for the first time since the end of the Holy Roman Empire. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as smaller polities merged into more centralized principalities, the secular rulers began to co-opt ecclesial concepts of peace, like the Peace of God and Truce of God, and to construe them as practices of secular public peace.[801] During the 13th and 14th centuries, bishops, kings, and nobles expanded these polices by engaging in practices of official mediation to avoid resort to armed conflict.[802] When nation-states began to form in the fourteenth century, these mediating peace practices were conceived of as national peace practices, and stripped of eschatological or ontological concerns related to God.[803] "Thus, the Western notion of public peace…was the result of the gradual secularization of the *pax eccclesiae* by the new and larger political units."[804]

What may be said about the Western church's non-violence theory in the middle ages is that it was shaped by Christian understandings of peace with God, and inward dispositions of quietude, in the midst of a virulently violent social context. Monastic pursuit of peace influenced ecclesial efforts at peace-making, which ultimately resulted in nation-state co-optation of the role of peacemakers and peacekeepers. Arising as they did out of the context of social disruption and ongoing warfare, the conceptions of peace of the imperial, the ecclesiastical, and the monastic authorities, "[v]irtually all…from 500 to 1150 were connected to the idea of order. Peace was a conservative reaction to widespread discord and immorality; it was a return to right order."[805] Thus, there was a conception of peace, but no concept of "non-violence" per se. Violence was regulated but not viewed as an evil in itself.

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[800] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 155.
[801] Renna, 161.
[802] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation*, 116–17.
[803] Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150," 161.
[804] Renna, 162.
[805] Renna, 148

Final Conclusion of the Period

For the church of this period, creating peace meant primarily restoring order, control, and power. The monastic movement that began as counter-cultural protest, soon became one of the wealthiest and most powerful arms of the church institution. There was little emphasis on using power to defend and protect those who were "Othered" or who were outsiders. There was almost no consciousness by the church of the value of an ethic of non-resistance. Sects that were subjected to persecution by the ecclesial and secular powers are the only ones who found merit in the dogma of self-sacrifice. Their embrace of doctrines of self-sacrifice was by necessity. The church during this period diverged almost completely from the teachings of Jesus.

7.1.4. Late Middle Ages to Modernity

From Wyckoff in the fourteenth century to the anabaptists in Zurich and beyond of the sixteenth century, a startling idea was birthed in Europe; that war and killing were evils in and of themselves. At the same time, the steady establishment of political kingdoms, which were tied to the power and corruption of the church, led dissident voices to assert the need for political and church reform. Part of that reform was the translation of the bible into the local vernacular languages of the people. The demands for reform that the towering theological figure of Wyckoff triggered in the fourteenth century, lit the fuse for the Hussite Revolution of the fifteenth century, and exploded in the Reformations of the sixteenth century. Yet, the demands for reform demanded by Wyckoff that pertained to his anti-violence ethics did not proceed in tandem with his complaints about the authorities. Indeed, a regular feature of the Reformation's protestations involved the reformers' acts of armed resistance against the authorities. Even among the early anabaptizers there was no consensus about adoption of an anti-violence ethics. What is significant is that the idea itself was being publicly transmitted with consistency, whether or not adopted. Of even greater significance is that the nature of the anti-violence ethics that was promoted found its grounding in the teachings of Jesus and the doctrine of love, and not in theories of state sovereignty. In other words, the admonition of those against violence was not that individuals should be subject to the state's biblically-legitimate authority, but that Jesus taught that individuals ought to show love to the enemy.

The desire and attempts at reform and revolution in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries turned to the opposite desire in the seventeenth century. The idea of the nation-state had solidified, and ideologically the idea that the state had the exclusive right of use of force, against threats from without and within the state, gained sway. The ideology moved away from

emphasis upon Jesus's teaching and scripture, and towards nonreligious theories seeking maximization of human potential. Erasmus set the stage in this regard in the sixteenth century by influencing princes to refrain from war, yet acknowledging their right to the conduct of war where necessary. Grotius was the leading figure of the seventeenth century to revisit issues of war and to posit in the civil authority the right to go to war. However, Grotius sought to establish constraints around a king's authority to declare war that were based on objective factors, such as territorial infringement, rather than subjective claims of violation and offense, such as disagreement on religious doctrine. Grotius was of the school of those who envisioned that a set of rules could govern inter-state, or inter-nation, relationships and lead to a period of "perpetual peace."

Final Conclusion of the Period

The church, from the late Medieval period to the modern period, was not a church that was concerned with creating peace, as much as it was concerned with reform. There were regular calls for cessation of Christians using physical force, but these calls were largely unheeded. Both those resisting authority and those in authority made use of physical force and aggression to accomplish their will. Those resisting authority did so, however, with the intention of securing the betterment of those who were marginalized by the social order and desiring change.

From Wycliffe to Grotius the themes of peace and pacifism have repeatedly arisen in the context of social reform and governance. Wycliffe introduced to the modern era the idea that war and killing were incompatible with Christianity, which holds love as its central characteristic. Wycliffe's beliefs included the idea that force and violence should play no part in a society ruled by the law of Christ, which is centred on love, and that governmental authority that derived from the use of force was contrary to Christian faith and was sin. His views resulted in him being tried as a heretic, but they resonated with the masses and were adopted by many throughout Europe. Wycliffe influenced Jon Hus of Bohemia, who shared his views on the need for ecclesiastical reform, though not his views on pacifism. An acolyte of Hus, however, Peter Chelčický, did deem the issue of pacifism central to Christian belief and practice. Decades after Chelčický's arguments were made, the failure of resistance through violent means caused some of those seeking reform to turn to Chelčický's (and Wycliffe's) vision. The Swiss Unity of Brethren, who followed the pacifist ideal of Chelčický became a movement of adult baptizers and baptized in diverse locations with diverse beliefs; some pacifist and some not. Yet an early document sets forth pacifist beliefs as early as 1525, and the influential Schleitheim Confession of 1527 adopted officially the tenets of adult baptism and the non-use

of violence under all circumstances, based on the life and teachings of Jesus. The resistance of the anabaptists to church and governing authority resulted in their persecution. They were driven to become an underground church. From this experience, they adopted the theology of being separated, persecuted, and opposed to the world.

With the rise of humanism, the arguments for peace added a secular dimension. Erasmus asserted that war was evil but allowed that the sovereign might resort to war if all other means of resolving a dispute failed. Erasmus appealed to the inefficiency and intellectual insipidness of war, rather than, primarily, to Christian doctrine. The adoption of secularized rationales for the moderation, and hopefully cessation, of war continued apace with Grotius' re-conception of just war theory. The ambition of his attempt to establish objective criteria for the instigation of violence, was the creation of a perpetual peace among nations. Grotius and those following him failed in this endeavour. The anabaptist vision of pacifism, and the political vision of just violence/war both continue to have intellectual and cultural support, and have not been fundamentally changed since their original articulations.

What is clear from the history is that, since Wycliffe, the preachers of peace have preached against the axis of ecclesial/political power generally. The claims of peace have been raised by reformers, and those in the counter-culture. The Peasants' Rebellion in England (1381), the Hussite Wars (1419-1434), the German Peasants' Revolt (1525), and the English Revolution of the 1600s, attest to the fact that the overarching counter-cultural message of the peace proponents, was regularly adapted for use by those who employed physical violence to bring about the social, political and economic change. Even among the anabaptist churches, there was great variation in the teachings on pacifism.

It can be said, then, that there has not been a time when Peace teaching has prevailed in the church in modernity, though the teaching has been raised repeatedly. Typically, those raising the prospect of pacifism, were persecuted killed or martyred, as the institutional church marked claims of pacifism as incident to other claims that were deemed heretical. It can also be said that whenever claims of peace were raised, they were never raised separate from calls for general reform and change in society. Claims to stop the warring of governments were akin to claims to stop the unjust killings, moral depravity, and corruption that was rampant in society. Also, it is clear to identify that distinctions have been made between the war and violence of the state and the participation in war and violence of individuals.

Finally, whether motivated by the teaching and example of Christ's love, or by humanist rationality, there has not been in Christian history a movement for peace that resulted in long-term peace.

7.1.5. Modernity

Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau represent the diversity of settings, circumstances and conclusions that were being reached regarding non-violence and peace in the generation following the upheaval of national revolutions.

Writing in eighteenth century Europe, in the years following the disruptions of reformations and revolutions as he did, Kant adhered to a notion of the state as securing peace and order. Ultimately, peace for Kant acknowledged violence as a fact of social existence and, through the social contract, conferred upon the state the exclusive right to inflict violence, in order to coerce justice. He, like Erasmus believed that violence was the rightful province of the state to wield. Kant adds, however, that the state is "unintelligible" when it wields violence, since the state's purpose is fostering the cessation of violence. He adds, as well, that the people, meaning the ruling or legislative class and not private individuals, do have a right to disagree and to resist the unjust acts of those governing, when warranted. Kant's peace theory introduced the notion of non-violent resistance as a moral duty in cases where the sovereign fails to act in furtherance of its purpose of ending violence. He was ambiguous as to when and how such a duty might be enacted, however.

A different peace theory was articulated by Tolstoy, who wrote in Czarist Russia during the 19th and early twentieth centuries. Tolstoy was raised an Orthodox Christian, but left the church and developed a radical vision for a new society. He rejected the notion of the state, finding it to be a deceptive means of violence and enslavement, just as he found the teachings of the eastern orthodox church of Russia itself to be corrupt. Tolstoy's formulations of the Christian life involved major political commitments. Tolstoy advocated abolition of the state and private property, and the governance of society through the law of Christian neighbourliness and love. He espoused the overthrow of government by the common people without the use of physical force, but through not-acting in furtherance of government's violent ends, e.g., not doing soldiering work, prison work, tax collecting, working as clergy, etc. Tolstoy proposed a radical vision of what was possible for Christian peaceableness.

Thoreau, who wrote at roughly the same time as Tolstoy in the U.S., was less radical. Thoreau was not a Christian, but a Transcendentalist, and he upheld the authority of the state, but believed that the state should be non-violent. Thoreau adds to the conceptualization of an ethics of anti-violence that one must take affirmative action in resistance to state authority to compel the state to act justly.

Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau demonstrate that consideration of peace was ongoing, and that the dimensions of peace contemplated were contrary to the peace-through-war methods of

nation-state builders. They contemplated peace being achieved without the use of physical force, and through the actions of individuals. Tolstoy also contemplated individuals acting in concert against, or collectively refusing to act in furtherance of, the goals of the state, which for him equated to violence.

Niebuhr, Yoder, King, and Wink represent a trend in the twentieth century of Christian leaders beginning to interrogate the concepts of "non-violence" and "pacifism" using traditional theological language. They represent the return of the discussion of peace to the church. What is represented are four different approaches that shaped contemporary Christian theology: namely, sanction of the use of physical force for the Christian, the non-resistance of physical force used against the Christian, committed action without use of physical force of the Christian, and committed action without the use of physical force of the Christian, with acceptance of the use of force by those Christians who deem it necessary.

Final Conclusion of the Period

The church of the modern period moved from Christ of liberal humanism to a more orthodox Christianity that placed the Jesus of the Godhead at the centre of doctrine and teaching. The meaning of Jesus at the centre, however, was not consistent when it came to the use of physical force in the life of the Christian. War was accepted and endorsed, but there were consistent instances of Christian advocacy against war, and against the use of any kind of physical force. Non-violent resistance gained a model for effective use through the Christian protests of King.

In the 18th century, humanist Immanuel Kant, presented ideas meant to foster peace among nations. Kant's peace was not grounded in an ethic of love, nor Jesus' teachings, nor in the elevation of human distinctiveness, nor even in the desire for international cooperation. Kant's theory of peace was grounded in the belief that governments' purpose for existence was the creation of peace among hostile individuals who would otherwise exist in a primitive violent state of nature.

Thoreau's ideology of non-violence, like Kant's, was not rooted in Christian ideals. Instead, he affirmed the social contract and the government's central authority. His interest in non-violence was based upon his ideals of self-actualization. True "manhood," or selfhood, required that one opposed the State when the state acted against freedom. He went further than Kant, in that he not only endorsed the citizen's refusal of participation in what the government compelled that was wrong. Thoreau also introduced the idea of using affirmative acts, such as nonpayment of taxes, to deny the needed support for the government to maintain its wrongful conduct. This was much in line with Tolstoy's views.

Tolstoy wrote with experience of war in his own Russian context. Having witnessed war firsthand, and also having experienced life as a member of Russia's plutocracy, Tolstoy was mistrustful of the state. He advocated against the State, and, instead, for a radical transformation of the social order.

Tolstoy continues in the vein of Wycliffe, in connecting his theories of peace with the reform of government, though in Tolstoy's case reform measures were more extreme to the point of advocating abolishment of the State. Also, like Wycliffe, Tolstoy grounded his conception of peace in the conception of Christian love as taught and modeled by Christ. What Tolstoy introduced that shifts the peace conversation, is imagination of radical non-violent resistance to, and nonparticipation in, *all* violent acts of the government, and also the radical redistribution of wealth. This is similar to the intention of the anabaptist adherents, particularly the Hutterites, who included an economic mission as part of their separation from the world. Tolstoy is significantly different, however, in that he, alá Peter Chelčický, did not envision Christian withdrawal from the world. He did not envision a world/church dichotomy. Tolstoy would have Christians remain in society, yet express objection to the social order, and create revolution, by withdrawal of support. He argued for not only refraining from oathtaking and holding civic office, as the anabaptists espoused, but also refraining from paying taxes, serving in the military, farming, or doing anything that maintained the violent acts of the state. Finally, Tolstoy greatly differed from Kant in his estimation of what would occur without the state. For Kant, chaos and violence were certainties without the State, as humanity would be reduced to life in the state of nature. For Tolstoy peace and equality would result from un-statehood, as humanity would be freed from the violence of government.

What the three together reflect is a strain of non-violence, from Russia to the U.S., that would lead to acting directly to withdraw support from the state. Their thought informs the work of those in the twentieth century who also argue for resistance. What changes in the twentieth century, is the concern for showing support for the state itself. Much of the discussion of non-violence and peace in the twentieth century is written with full acceptance of the nation-state, and of the legitimacy of States using force to expand or defend their borders. The writers of the twentieth century are either looking back or forward to such uses of force, which resulted in the occurrence of large-scale, devastating wars, including WWI, WWII, and the war in Vietnam.

Niebuhr's work is important not only because of its articulation of the prototypical rebuttal to Christian non-violence, but also because the arc of his writing demonstrates modes of thinking about non-violence. With the atrocities of WWI in mind, he positioned himself,

initially, against the violence of war. Later, witnessing the inequalities of industrial workers, he shifted to consideration of the coercive use of force, then with the rise of totalitarianism, shifted further to consideration of war as the necessary and most realistic course for morally informed Christians to take. A non-resistance that allowed tyranny was "peace, but it is a peace which has nothing to do with the peace of the kingdom of God." Later, when the threat of war and tyranny was past, his position might be seen as shifting again to embrace a gradualist non-violent coercion. Thus, he could praise the delayed implementation of the judicial decision mandating school desegregation in the landmark U.S. case, *Brown v. Board of Education*, as "statesmanship" and "concern for political realities."

Niebuhr believed that the Court, by declaring a principle but "wisely postpon[ing] application of the principle" until the segregationist states had time to "adjust themselves," was allowing for the general acceptance that would eventually follow.[806] His praise of the Court was based on the idea that a more rapid implementation might lead to revolt. "Revolt that is so widespread that police power cannot suppress it represents defeat of the law and the ideal."[807] By this, Neibuhr articulates a sentiment that reveals a change from his previous position--that "peace with tyranny" is not the peace of the Kingdom of God--to acceptance of "peace with delayed human dignity". Thus, it would seem to be a particular kind of tyranny, or a particular degree of tyranny, that is objectionable to Niebuhr, rather than tyranny itself. And, for Niebuhr it could be argued that the objectionableness of the degree turns on race.

Yoder, a product of the anti-Vietnam War popular sentiment, presented to the public a theological rationale for why war must be avoided, and peace sought. He opposed the idea of Niebuhr that Christ's message was one of complete (and unrealistic) apolitical non-resistance, and instead showed that Christ was deeply political in his actions and teachings. Yoder concluded that Christ's message was one of resistance by radical submission and acceptance of suffering. Yoder combined the notion of obedience to the Christian calling of non-violence, with the notion of full disregard for the outcome, and with hope for the possibility of the intervention of the Spirit to ultimately provide a good outcome; to bring life out of even death.

As almost a reaction to the "active non-resistance" of Yoder, King moved Christian conceptualization forward by implementing the idea of active non-violence. King, unlike Niebuhr, honoured a distinction between resistance and violence, and grounded in the idea of

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[806] Niebuhr, "The Supreme Court on Segregation in the Schools," 149.
[807] Niebuhr, 150.

radical Christian love, King advocated resistance without use of violence. King's ethics were implemented during the civil rights movement and represented the first non-violent mass mobilization of people, through use of Christian principles of love. King's ethics, which were informed by Ghandi (who himself was informed by Tolstoy and Thoreau), have had a lasting effect on global movements for equality and liberation.

Wink, writing in the era of American proxy-wars in post-colonial newly-democratic nations, was influenced by the violence he witnessed in such contexts; both the injustices perpetrated against those seeking change and the internal guerrilla warfare that between those seeking different models of changed government. Wink stressed the need for non-passive Christian non-violence, and applied the Kingian method of mass mobilized non-violent resistance to international post-colonial contexts. Wink ultimately deemed it preferable to sanction violence than to sanction passivity in the face of injustice.

What becomes clear in the modern era is that the political and moral arguments for peace that were advanced, were in fact arguments for peace among the nation-states of Europe and the U.S. The effect of the violence of colonization in the New World, and of slavery, is not addressed or central to any who address concepts of non-violence or peace, with the exception of King and Wink, who wrote late in the twentieth century, following global movements for equality and liberation. Tolstoy alone was concerned with the condition of slavery and its inherent connection to violence and injustice. He shows no particular concern, however, for the dimensions of violence present in trans-Atlantic slavery and its sequalae. There were no demands for peace married to demands for just treatment that were raised on behalf of the indigenous. For most of the theorists, no practice of just war, or pacifism grounded in Christ's love, would apply to the distant peoples of newly discovered lands. The indigenous in possession of land desired by Europeans, obdurate African laborers required to work the land, and truculent Negros and South and Central American "peasants" were consistently regarded as obstacles to the "peace" that Europeans sought to secure for themselves.

Part III

Theological Analysis from the Margins: Violence, Black Being, and the Human Will

8. Theological Analysis from the Margins: Violence and Black Being

8.1. Introduction

Up to this point this project has examined the ways in which scripture has been interpreted related to Jesus's engagements with use of coercive force, and also the ways in which non-violence has been incorporated into Christian discourse throughout the history of the church. Jesus demonstrated restraint in his sanction of physically coercive acts, though his restraint was not an end in itself. Jesus emphasized living out the reality of a self-determined dignity that did not require the use of coercive force, and that did not fear in the face of the use of coercive force against him by others. Because of this it is possible to read scripture as not focused on the use of force, but rather as focused on the use of *personal power*. Jesus compels followers to live out expressions of valour, loyalty to one's truth, and to the support and defence of marginalized Others.

Our review of history has shown that the church has not been consistent in following Jesus's example. First, even if we consider that a key feature of Jesus's mission was turning people away from the coercive use of physical force, the historic record shows that the church has not consistently imitated this. Nor has it used coercive force in support and defence of the marginalized Other, thereby honouring Jesus's command to love. The church, from its inception in the Apostolic era, has sanctioned the violence present in the culture. From the violence enacted by the State via the Roman armies that pursued peace through war, to crusading militias, literal witch hunts, to the overt violence enacted by States during the world wars of the twentieth century. This is not even to consider the violence inherent in the culture and structure of society, such as the implicit and often explicit acceptance of the marginalization of women, the acceptance of the slave economy, native genocide, racial supremacy, and the persistent drive towards conformity with a Christian ideal that is intolerant of cultural difference. The sanction of coercive physical force in culture, and even more so of cultural and structural violence in culture, went unchallenged and unquestioned until the modern contemporary era, almost the entirety of church history.

The fact that the Christian tradition has so regularly embraced violence in its diverse guises without question and without, in many cases, considering the violence to be violence, is cause for interrogation. Though it is not appropriate to read twentieth century ethics into the first or fifth or tenth century context, the response to the first century's acceptance of the slave

economy, and patriarchal and hierarchical authority, or to the third century's diminution of the personhood of women, of the fifth century's elevation of the official Christian worldview above and in militant opposition to all others, cannot be glossed over as minor points of doctrinal concern, or as cultural and conceptual aberrations. First, to continue to gloss over the violence that is woven into the fabric of the church perpetuates the notion that there was a period in church history in which there was no violence that was accepted or practiced by the church--a time of "church purity"; which notion is an unhelpful fiction. Second, denying church violence prevents the church from reckoning with historic and deeply entrenched issues of bias and inequality in the church's founding, which prevents a serious grappling with the ways that these issues persist into the present.

Yet, to do the work of naming the violence that grows like a weed together with the wheat of the Christian faith, requires that "violence" be adequately conceptualized. What does it mean to say that the church has been steeped in "violence" from its inception? The goal of this chapter is to undertake a conceptualization of "violence."

This chapter will first provide an overview of social scientific perspectives on violence. Because of the vastness of the fields of social science, two fields have been selected for consideration of the meaning of violence in human life, namely anthropology and psychology. Following this analysis, the chapter theorizes violence broadly. Within this theorization it shows how violence is uniquely apparent in the victimization of Black persons. It does this by presenting a typology of violence that includes as a type "existential" violence, which works physical, psychological, and ontological harm against those raced as Black. The chapter then argues that the existential violation to Black being is addressed by Jesus. Jesus's response is not primarily concerned with the use or non-use of physical force by the marginalized, but is a response that offers healing and restoration to the violated by restoration of human dignity and power. It accepts the possibility, and perhaps likelihood, of suffering, without suggesting that there is inherent value in and need for suffering.

8.2. Social Scientific Scholarship on Violence and Human Being

Understanding the ways that "violent" phenomena have been observed by social scientists provides a helpful way of beginning to understand how the concept of violence functions. Towards this end, a limited overview of the social scientific treatment of "violence" will be undertaken in this section.

8.2.1. Social Scientific Fields of Investigation: Anthropology and Psychology

This section will present an overview of the study of violence from specialized fields of anthropology and psychology. There are numerous social scientific specialized fields of study that might inform this project. An investigation into all of them exceeds the scope of the paper. Thus, I have chosen two fields representing those that might contribute significantly to the goal of understanding violence. Anthropology was chosen because it relates to understanding human being outside of fixed social structures; unlike, for example, political science or economics. Further, the subfields of anthropology encompass cognate disciplines, such as biology and sociology, that allow for a nuanced picture of how violence functions in human life in community at a fundamental level.

Psychology was chosen because a significant premise of this project is that violence is related to the psychological life of the human. The project, in the second chapter, discussed these psychological aspects with respect to scripture and human dignity. I argued that the ways much of scripture has been understood as relating to non-violence, in fact relates to one's *psychology of being*. I argued that Jesus was interested in individuals living into their own sense of themselves as worthy and dignified. Later in this chapter and the next chapter, the connection between psychology, violence, and Blackness will be drawn. Accordingly, the concept of violence from the perspective of psychology is relevant to the overall project.

8.2.1.1. Anthropology

The discipline of Anthropology has as its goal the study of humans, as well as human behaviour and societies, in the past and present.[808] As such, it has much to contribute to the theoretical understanding of what violence has meant to humans individually and in society. The discipline is divided into four main branches, biological (or physical), socio-cultural, linguistic and archaeological.[809]

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[808] See, generally, John Monaghan and Peter Just, Social and Cultural Anthropology: A Very Short Introduction, Ninth Edition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[809] Sarah Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence: Historical and Current Theories, Concepts, and Debates in Physical and Socio-Cultural Anthropology," *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment* 22, no. 5 (June 26, 2012): 537, https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2011.598727 citing J. D. Moore, *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists* (AltaMira Press, 2008), 33.

8.2.1.1.1. Method and Overview of Anthropology Analysis

The literature on the topic of violence in the field of anthropology is extensive. As a result, what is presented here is an overview of the most prominent theoretical concepts, rather than a comprehensive engagement with the entirety of the corpus of the literature in the field.

Theoretically, there have historically been two methodological streams of investigation in the field of anthropology. Objective lines of theory are influenced by the biological sciences and attempd to find explanations, causes, and laws for human social behaviour. Objective theories view ‘‘social life as transactions in goods and services.’’[810] Subjective lines of theory, on the other hand, are connected to the humanities, and are more concerned with interpretation and finding meaning.

Currently, despite the increasing complexity of theoretical perspectives that have arisen, which reflect the increasing complexity of global culture, anthropologists agree on two points. First, that theories must reflect the more complex and nuanced current understandings of culture. [811] Second, that “theories are culturally and politically constructed, so anthropologists must examine their own cultural and political contexts when developing theory about culture.”[812]

Anthropological acknowledgment of the cultural and political constructs that underlie theorists’ work, is an exemplar of the ideological underpinning of conceptualizations that will be discussed in the next section of the chapter.

8.2.1.1.2. Biological (or Physical) Violence Theories

The study of “violence” within the discipline of anthropology is relatively recent, having begun in earnest during the 1960s. [813] Prior to that time, research was typically concerned with “violent” societies’ contrast with “peaceful” societies.[814] Research conducted using the categorizations of “violent” and “peaceful” was often grounded in the evolutionary theories first espoused by Charles Darwin. Aggressiveness and competition were viewed as

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[810] Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 538 citing Robert Layton, *An Introduction to Theory in Anthropology* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[811] Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 538 citing Moore, *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists*.

[812] Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 538 citing Adam Kuper, *Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School*, Third (London: Routledge, 2014); Layton, *Theory in Anthropology* and; Moore, *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists*.

[813] Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 537 citing Layton, *Theory in Anthropology*.

[814] Deborah A. Thomas, “Violence - Anthropology,” in *Oxford Bibliographies Online* (Oxford University Press, January 2012), Intro., https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780199766567-0027.

inherent human traits that allowed for the strongest of the human species to survive. Applied to cultural investigations of anthropologists,[815] the evolutionary theory "suggested that a continuum of cultural progress exists and that all cultures fall somewhere on this continuum, with 'most primitive,' including savagery and barbarism, at one end, and 'most civilized' at the other."[816] Violent expressions of a culture were understood as indicating that the culture was further behind on the evolutionary continuum.

Other theorists, however, detoured from the conceptualization of violence in culture as evolutionary delay. The idea of functionalism[817] was introduced, which emphasized that culture is not the result of evolutionary stages but that "culture provides a medium to meet the basic biological, physiological, and social needs of humans."[818] The functional idea of culture was eventually incorporated into the evolutionary idea of culture. The fusion of functional and evolutionary culture produced theories which espoused that violence served a function in societies; it was used by advancing societies to gain status and resources.[819]

Beginning in the 1950s, an increase in scientific inquiry resulted in anthropology turning to theories based upon empirical data. Empirical studies of aggression and conflict in animals and humans were performed. These studies revived the rationale of an evolutionary benefit resulting from aggression in humans, due to aggression allowing some humans greater access to resources. Biological anthropologists used studies of animal behaviour, such as baboons and chimpanzees, to draw conclusions about the biological nature of human violence and aggression.[820] Some scholars have argued that the propensity to aggression is not a negative trait, but has positive aspects not only for resource allocation, but for relationships. De Waal, for example, states, "[w]e need to think of aggression as one way in which conflicts of interest are expressed and resolved, and be open to the possibility that its impact on future relationships ranges all the way from harmful to beneficial."[821]

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[815] See, e.g., Lewis Henry Morgan's classic work *Ancient Society*, published in 1877.

[816] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 539 citing Moore, *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists*, 23.

[817] See the work of Bronislau Malinowski (1926).

[818] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 540 citing.

[819] Accomazzo, 540 citing; Moore, *Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists*.

[820] See, e.g., studies of Periera (1992), De Waal (1992), Patton (2000).

[821] Frans B. M. De Waal, "A Critique of the Seville Statement on Violence," in *Aggression and Peacefulness in Humans and Other Primates*, ed. James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 37.

Most post-modern physical anthropologists, however, do acknowledge that violence cannot be explained solely by theories based on evolutionary and biological grounds; that for humans, culture and the environment always play a role.[822]

Theories of violence grounded in biological and evolutionary anthropology that emphasize violence and war as inherent to the human species, are both helpful and unhelpful in conceptualizing violence. They are helpful in that they allow the conceptualization to move beyond a good/bad subjective binary, and become an objective aspect of human nature. Once conceived as such, the potential for violence, becomes easier to accept as a manageable human trait, as opposed to a behaviour that must be eliminated from the Christian life. Nonetheless, theorization of this kind can be less helpful in that it restricts the conceptualization of violence to physical aggression. This chapter develops the argument in the next section, that violence should not be conceptualized in such a limited way, as doing so prohibits the appreciation of the myriad ways that human non-aggressive behaviour functions violently against other humans, particularly against Black persons.

8.2.1.1.3. Socio-cultural Violence Theories

Promoting views that were both anti-theoretical and anti-evolutionary,[823] Franz Boas is regarded as having created the sub-field of socio-cultural anthropology. In the early 20th century, he contended that cultures were not recognized by fixed evolutionary stages. Instead, he argued for a cultural relativist view that regarded each culture as complex, formed by many different processes within specific and diverse contexts.[824] He proposed a humanistic, not empirical, method of study that emphasized cultural immersion. Ethnography and fieldwork arose out of Boas' methodological innovations.

Socio-cultural methods of anthropology, because they emphasize cultural relativism, initially reflected an unwillingness to assign the label of "violence" to observed cultural phenomena.[825] Later, research did name phenomena as "violence" and study of such

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[822] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 542. See also, Lee Cronk and William Irons, "Two Decades of a New Paradigm," in *Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective*, ed. Napoleon Chagnon, Lee Cronk, and William Irons (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter, 2000), 3–26; De Waal, "Critique of Seville Statement"; Bruce M. Knauft et al., "Violence and Sociality in Human Evolution [and Comments and Replies]," *Current Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (1991): 391–428; and James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray, "Violence and Peacefulness as Behavioral Potentialities of Primates," in *Aggression and Peacefulness in Humans and Other Primates*, ed. James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 37–56.

[823] See, Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 538, 540.

[824] Accomazzo, 543, citing; Layton, *Theory in Anthropology*.

[825] One result of a reluctance to name occurrences as violent has been the failure to acknowledge particular acts of violence, such as genocide, that were occurring in the midst of anthropological study. See,

phenomena increased. Though maintaining a focus on physical violence, theories "moved away from attributing violence to "traditional" or "tribal" societies and began to acknowledge that violence occurs in all societies."[826] Also, theories began to be articulated of "violence" as culturally relative, and as involving questions of legitimate and illegitimate use of force. Anthropologists began to consider the forces of economics and politics as committing their own kinds of violence, and slowly began to acknowledge the impact of colonialism and globalization.[827]

Another important development was the 1986 publication of *Anthropology of Violence*[828] by David Riches. In this volume Riches offers a definition of violence that has been highly influential,[829] as well as highly contested. He defines violence as: "an act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses."[830] A significant theory of Riches is that violence is both expressive, communicating a message to those involved, and instrumental, serving a specific purpose; that violence is utilized rationally and strategically and with the intention of sending a message. Politically, he found, violence is easily manipulated, and enables the perpetrator to gain attention quickly.[831]

Also developing theoretically, as a result of globalization, was the realization that the studies previously undertaken of small stable societies did not accurately reflect larger, more complex societies. The larger societies had more violence and colonial disruption.[832] Theories of colonialism's impact on culture, and theories of symbolic and structural violence gained

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Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois account of anthropologist Richard Geertz who omitted noting signs of impending genocide in Bali in 1965, due to not wanting to engage in "politics of advocacy." Scheper-Hughes, 2004, 6.

[826] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 544.

[827] Accomazzo, 544, 545.

[828] David Riches, *The Anthropology of Violence* (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1986).

[829] Neil L. Whitehead, "On the Poetics of Violence," in *Violence*, ed. Neil L Whitehead, School of School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series (Sante Fe, N.M.; Oxford: School of American Research Press ; James Currey, 2005), 57.

[830] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 545, citing; Riches, *The Anthropology of Violence*, 8. Whitehead notes the limits of this definition, writing that it is "reductive and misleading." Further, that such definitions of violence "fail to address a wide variety of violence that has no immediate material correlates, such as sorcery or verbal aggression, because they use only physical injury as the linking element between examples of violence." Whitehead, "On the Poetics of Violence," 57.

[831] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 545.

[832] Accomazzo, 545-546, citing; Alexander Laban Hinton, "The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an Anthropology of Genocide.," in *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide*, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 1–40; Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, "Introduction: Making Sense of Violence.," in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 1–32; Pamela Stewart and Andrew Strathern, *Violence: Theory and Ethnography* (London: A&C Black, 2002).

traction.[833] Ultimately, violence was theorized as more than the occurrence of merely physical phenomena, and understood as encompassing underlying and interrelated social and cultural constructs.

The theories of colonial violence, symbolic violence, and structural violence have all contributed to a post-modern anthropological conception that violence occurs in conditions of both war and peace and that the invisible, everyday violences, as exemplified in the concept of structural violence, are often the results of the larger, overarching political, economic, and institutional forces that shape the visible violence that occurs between individuals and families, such as domestic violence, rape, or one gang member's shooting another.[834]

Finally, socio-cultural anthropology has identified the concept of extraordinary state violence. Violence of this type "is authorized, public, visible, and rewarded."[835] Extraordinary state violence is characterized by both invisible/structural violence and visible/physical violence. An example might be that of a government killing and torturing civilians in pursuit of a rebel faction.[836] Recent theorists have proposed a "continuum of violence" to account for the interconnectedness of all forms of violence, from the visible to the invisible to the extraordinary.[837]

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[833] Bourdieu in particular gave much attention to the topic of symbolic violence. He suggests that symbolic power rests with the powerful who assign meanings to observed symbols, regardless of whether they understand the meaning of the symbols to those inside the culture. Further, Bourdieu provides an account of "symbolic violence" which argues that there is a shared dynamic between a perpetrator, a victim, and a witness whose shared worldview in which patterns and customs are taken for granted, make them unaware that violence is occurring. Ultimately, symbolic violence elicits the complicity of the victim, by making the violence part of the established social system; it becomes a cultural norm, e.g., male domination of women. See, Pierre Bourdieu, "Outline of a Theory of Practice," in *On Violence: A Reader*, ed. Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha Karim (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 189–98; and see, Pierre Bourdieu, "Symbolic Violence," in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 272–74; see also, Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[834] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 547, citing; Paul Farmer, "On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below," in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 281–89; Philippe Bourgois, "The Continuum of Violence in War and Peace: Post-Cold War Lessons from El Salvador," in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 425–35; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, "Making Sense of Violence."

[835] Michel Foucault, "Right of Death and Power Over Life," in *Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology*, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 81, see also, Michel Foucault, "Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison," in *On Violence: A Reader*, ed. Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha Karim (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 445–71.

[836] See account of Bourgois of the Salvador Civil War in 1981, Bourgois, "Continuum of Violence."

[837] Accomazzo, "Anthropology of Violence," 547.

Cultural anthropology's analysis of violence is helpful and supports the argument that identifies the phenomena of complexities that underlie the conceptualization of violence that will be articulated in the next section of this chapter. Of particular relevance is the theory of Riches, that violence expresses and is intended to send a message. This lends support to the theory advanced previously in the paper, that Jesus's teaching on self-worth and dignity interrupts the causal chain that prompts individual physical violence. By authorizing the alternate means of self-claimed dignity and worth, the marginalized express power. The power of those with the potential to exercise great physical force is taken away. In the absence of the method of self-claimed dignity and worth, Riches identifies physical violence as a viable means of expression sending a message.

8.2.1.1.4. Linguistic Violence Theories

Linguistic Anthropology is a close relative of the subfields of Anthropological Linguistics and Sociolinguistics.[838] Linguistic anthropology, "is dedicated to the study of the role of languages in the…activities that make up the social life of individuals and communities."[839] As Piers Kelly describes, "linguistic anthropologists are concerned with the way in which we systematically connect language to other aspects of our lives: the way we organise ourselves as social creatures, how we signal belonging and exclusion, or how we express our values."[840]

Language can be used in ways that assume the inferiority of others, and by its use and prevalence, language can brand inferiority upon the being of others, such as the language of slurs or derogatory speech. This may be understood as a kind of violence in speech.[841] In other ways language diminishes, as well. Such as where, a woman is regarded as a "woman playwright" or as a "lesbian writer," or the even more marginalizing "black woman playwright."[842]

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[838] Both anthropological linguistics and sociolinguistics are subfields of Linguistics. These fields are primarily concerned with scientifically studying the structure of language itself. The difference has been described as primarily one of method. Anthropological linguistics methodologically tends towards ethnography, while sociolinguistics methodologically tends towards data collection to discern patterns and correlates. https://yammeringon.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/anthropological-linguistics-vs-sociolinguistics-vs-linguistic-anthropology-argh/

[839] Alessandro Duranti, *Linguistic Anthropology*, 2nd ed. (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 1.

[840] Piers Kelly, "What Is Linguistic Anthropology?," *Brave New Words* (blog), January 18, 2018, https://bravenewwords.info/2018/01/18/what-is-linguistic-anthropology/.

[841] See, e.g., Jane H. Hill, *The Everyday Language of White Racism* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).

[842] Elaine Aston, *Feminist Views on the English Stage: Women Playwrights, 1990-2000* (Cambridge, England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 125.

There is also a psychological way that language inherently operates violently. In discussing the acquisition of language in children, renowned linguist Julia Kristeva has argued that violence is unavoidable, when "we create a discontinuity…[when] we break up a *sign* for an *object* that can only be constituted by becoming an object of desire…we…disturb the patient's continuous and analogical sensoriality…[and we] impose on [the patient] our desire for a name, for an object".[843] She sees the act of demanding that desire be found in the object and communicated by a name as an act of violence.

This is similar to the function of naming identified by anthropologist Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss located violence in the presence and gaze of the foreigner within the native culture, which led to disclosure of that-which-is-taboo-to-speak. He finds the written word to be an equivalent violence against the uttered word. This violence is accidental.[844] Derrida, much like Kristeva, however, determined that the violence of disclosing the name, is not the significant violence. The first violence is that of naming in itself, of "arche-writing," which reduces the unique and essential difference inherent to the individual to a symbolic system.[845] "Anterior to the possibility of violence in the current and derivative sense, the sense used in [Lévi-Strauss's study] 'A Writing Lesson,' there is…the violence of arche-writing, the violence of difference, of classification, and of the system of appellations."[846] This system disallows the "purity" of the person to stand.[847]

Scholarship in this regard, however, is lacking. There appears to be limited research in linguistic anthropology with respect to violence *qua* violence. The research named, in addition to other research, has taken place in the related fields of linguistics[848] and philosophy;[849] both have engaged issues involved with language and violence extensively. The scholarly vacuum

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[843] Julia Kristeva, "Is Sensation a Form of Language," in *The Portable Kristeva*, ed. Kelly Oliver (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 127.

[844] James K. A. Smith, *The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic* (InterVarsity Press, 2000), 122.

[845] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Spivak Chakravorty, Corrected (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 115–28.

[846] Derrida, 119.

[847] Smith, *The Fall of Interpretation*, 122.

[848] The linguistics subfield of sociolinguistics birthed its own subfield of Critical Discourse Analysis, which engages issues that relate to violence in language. Critical discourse analysis investigates "opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language." R. E. Wodak, "Power, Discourse, and Styles of Female Leadership in School Committee Meetings," in *Discourse and Power in Educational Organizations*, ed. David Corson (Cresskill, N.J: Hampton Pr, 1995), 204. It studies real, and often protracted, instances of social interaction which take on at least partially linguistic form. Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen, "Critical Discourse Analysis," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 29 (October 2000): 448.

[849] Notably, Paul Ricoeur, Jaques Derrida, and Slavoj Žižek.

in linguistic anthropology seems to speak to the problem of the narrow ways in which violence has been historically understood.

8.2.1.1.5. Archaeological Anthropological Violence Theories

Archaeology has served to establish, contrary to certain political philosophical claims, that there was violence in ancient societies.

There is ample scholarship of archaeological anthropological studies of violence. This scholarship has been defined "either by their subject specialism, or by a specific temporal or geographical focus," and is often centered around the study of warfare.[850] When warfare in past societies is studied, the studies have investigated the societies' material culture, such as weaponry, or the motivations for and consequences of the societies' engagement in warfare.[851] Frequently, there has been an "equation of violence with war, and its conflation into the latter."[852] Such a conflation is evidence of the lack of *theorization* of violence in the field of archaeology,[853] though the *study* of "violence" abounds.

Studies related to non-warfare violence are not completely absent, however, as Martin and Frayer's investigation of hunter-gatherer through state societies in the New and Old Worlds demonstrates. This study places a particular emphasis on osteological data, which is the study of bones.[854] There have also been studies showing political violence in the archaeological record, such as the violent imagery that was created relating to Rome's "bad" emperors,[855] and Rome's bloody spectacles of martyrdom.[856] Archaeology has also accounted for ritual, or

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[850] Sarah Ralph, ed., *Archaeology of Violence, The: Interdisciplinary Approaches* (State University of New York Press, 2012), 2, https://muse-jhu-edu.ez.sun.ac.za/book/21784.

[851] Ralph, 2. In this regard, Ralph references the work of Elizabeth N. Arkush and Mark W. Allen, eds., *The Archaeology of Warfare: Prehistories of Raiding and Conquest* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2008); John Carmen and Anthony Harding, eds., *Ancient Warfare* (Stroud: The History Press, 2010); Sheila Dillon and Katherine E. Welch, eds., *Representations of War in Ancient Rome*, 1 edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Axel E. Nielsen and William H. Walker, eds., *Warfare in Cultural Context: Practice, Agency, and the Archaeology of Violence*, 1 edition (University of Arizona Press, 2014) and; Ton Otto, H. Thrane, and Helle VANDKILDE, eds., *Warfare and Society: Archaeological and Social Anthropological Perspectives* (Aarhus ; Oakville, CT: Aarhus University Press, 2006).

[852] Simon James, "Facing the Sword: Confronting the Realities of Martial Violence and Other Mayhem, Present and Past," in *The Archaeology of Violence: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Sarah Ralph, Reprint edition (Place of publication not identified: SUNY Press, 2014), 98.

[853] James, 98.

[854] Ralph, *Archaeology of Violence, The*, 3.

[855] See, Eric R. Varner, "Violent Discourses: Visual Cannibalism and the Portraits of Rome's 'Bad' Emperors," in *The Archaeology of Violence: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Sarah Ralph, Reprint edition (Place of publication not identified: SUNY Press, 2014), 121–42.

[856] See, John Carman, "'Persuade the People': Violence and Roman Spectacle Entertainment in the Greek World," in *The Archaeology of Violence: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Sarah Ralph, Reprint edition (Place of publication not identified: SUNY Press, 2014), 158–68.

religious violence. More recently, Costa has studied acts of domestic racialized terrorism, such as in Rosewood or Tulsa in the U.S. He notes that the archaeological record has been approached materially, "only in collections of objects, burned ceramics and glass, or twisted metals about forgetfully subaltern groups.[857]

Recently, Hall has argued for the necessity of an "archaeology of violence" to address the "'traumatic gap' that emerges as the unrepresentable space between words and images."[858] Archaeological practice must find ways to theorize the ordinary modern materials, such as chairs or photographs, that, as a result of extreme violence inflicted by the materials, take on haptic properties that are greater than the objects themselves.[859]

It appears that most archaeological explorations of violence, excluding the new theorization of Hall, relate to physical violence, if not war specifically. In this regard, Bernbeck provides an important critique of archaeology's failure to account for structural violence.[860]

8.2.1.1.6. Conclusion of Anthropology Scholarship Overview

It appears from a review of the anthropological study of violence, that violence is understood primarily as aggression and as the use of coercive physical force. Cultural anthropology alone provides a scholarly account of the violence of systems and structures. Cultural anthropology makes the important contribution of acknowledging the significance of colonialism to the phenomena of violence. What may be said, then, is that the typology of violence that will be identified in a subsequent section of this chapter, finds support in the scholarship of cultural anthropologists.

8.2.1.2. Psychology

Psychology, as a discipline, largely attributes the causes of violence to individual and familial dysfunction or pathology,[861] according to Bryn King in her overview of psychological theories of violence. The pathways to violence are considered at an individual level. Questions are asked about the internal characteristics of perpetrators, their immediate circumstances, and

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[857] Diogo M. Costa, *Water and War at Pyreneus Mountains: Historical Eco-Archaeology of Lavras Do Abade* (Saarbrucken, Germany: LAP, 2011), 41.

[858] Martin Hall, "Objects, Images and Texts: Archaeology and Violence," *Journal of Social Archaeology*, January 27, 2016, 82, https://doi.org/10.1177/1469605315612891.

[859] Hall, "Objects, Images and Texts."

[860] Reinhard Bernbeck, "Structural Violence in Archaeology," *Archaeologies* 4, no. 3 (December 1, 2008): 390, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11759-008-9076-6.

[861] Bryn King, "Psychological Theories of Violence," *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment* 22, no. 5 (June 26, 2012): 553, https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2011.598742.

the type of violence committed.[862] The theoretical corpus regarding the psychological causes of violence is extensive and diverse.

Huesmann, who describes violence as "simply an extreme form of aggressive behaviour in which the target is physically harmed,"[863] concludes that violence is "like a contagious disease,"[864] since an individual's experience or mere observation of violence influences the individual to behave violently themselves, unless one has internalized a script that socializes one away from violent behaviour. Huesmann lists multiple social and biological factors that researchers have shown result in extreme aggression, including genetic predispositions, environment, central nervous system trauma and neurophysiological abnormalities, early temperament or attention difficulties, family violence, poor parenting, inappropriate punishment, environmental poverty and stress, and peer group identification.[865] He determines that "no one factor by itself" can explain the different levels of aggressiveness that appear in different persons.[866]

Huesmann's work supports the conclusion of King, in that the variables that Huesmann identifies as influencing violent behaviour are recognizable as either those one is born with, or as those that are cultivated as a result of one's environment. Huesmann's work is also relevant to this study in that he acknowledges that learing/internalizing an alternate script can result in less violent behaviour. This supports the main argument that Jesus was attempting to provide a new script and to create the possibility for the positive consequences that result from this, including decreased violence.

8.2.1.2.1. Violence as General Aggression

The widely accepted General Aggression Model ("GAM") of aggression and violence, defines aggression as "any behaviour intended to harm another person who does not want to be harmed,"[867] and violence as "any aggressive act that has as its goal extreme physical harm,

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[862] King, 554.

[863] L. Rowell Huesmann, "An Integrative Theoretical Understanding of Aggression," in *Aggression and Violence: A Social Psychological Perspective*, ed. Brad J. Bushman, Frontiers of Social Psychology (New York: Routledge, 2017), 3.

[864] Huesmann, 14.

[865] Huesmann, 4.

[866] Huesmann, 4.

[867] C. Nathan DeWall, Craig A. Anderson, and Brad J. Bushman, "The General Aggression Model: Theoretical Extensions to Violence," *Psychology of Violence* 1, no. 3 (2011): 246, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023842 citing; Craig A. Anderson and Brad J. Bushman, "Human Aggression," *Annual Review of Psychology; Palo Alto* 53 (2002): 27–51 and; Brad J. Bushman and L. Rowell Huesmann, "Aggression," in *Handbook of Social Psychology* (American Cancer Society, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002023.

such as injury or death."[868] GAM incorporates several psycho-social processes and concepts into an overarching theoretical framework, allowing complex psychological hypotheses to be formulated and tested. GAM recognizes that a personality which engages in violence is influenced from two sources: human nature, and experiences that an individual undergoes (environmental influences).[869] Aggressive episodes are then understood in 3-stage cycles:

> (1) person and situation inputs, (2) present internal states (i.e., cognition, arousal, affect, including brain activity), and (3) outcomes of appraisal and decision-making processes.[870]

In other words, input, interpretation, and output. DeWall, et al., suggest that GAM has application in interpersonal violence contexts, as well as other contexts as disparate as intergroup violence, climate change, and suicide prevention.[871]

DeWall, et al, seem to suggest that application of the GAM framework has the potential to eradicate violence in many if not most circumstances. However, the study itself indicates that the hypothesis for resolution of intergroup conflict is highly variable, and not likely to be effective in highly charged group conflict situations, for example in international politics, or the Israeli Palestine conflict.

Within GAM theory, Jesus's teaching might be understood as addressing the second step, "interpretation," since his emphasis on dignity and self-worth re-interprets the "input" of cultural dishonor. However, Christian theology has traditionally regarded Jesus's teaching as merely addressing the "output" of physical violence. Application of GAM to Jesus's "non-violent" teaching appears to be an area for future research.

8.2.1.2.2. Violence as a "Wicked" Problem

Kazdin has contributed that the psychological aspects of interpersonal violence should be understood as a "wicked" problem. The concept of "wicked" "is a way to characterize complex problems and their unique features."[872] Wicked problems include the following characteristics:

- There is no single, definitive, or simple formulation of the problem;

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[868] DeWall, Anderson, and Bushman, "The General Aggression Model," 246.
[869] DeWall, Anderson, and Bushman, 246.
[870] DeWall, Anderson, and Bushman, 246.
[871] DeWall, Anderson, and Bushman, 251–54.
[872] Alan E. Kazdin, "Conceptualizing the Challenge of Reducing Interpersonal Violence.," *Psychology of Violence* 1, no. 3 (2011): 171, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022990.

- Multiple stakeholders and participants are likely to be involved, and this leads to multiple formulations of what "really" is the problem and therefore what are legitimate or appropriate solutions;
- The problem is not likely to be the result of an event (e.g., violence in the media) or a small subset of events but rather a set of intersecting trends that co-occur and co-influence each other;
- The problem is embedded in other problems, including other wicked problems (e.g., poverty, substance abuse);
- Values, culture, politics, and economics are likely to be involved in the problem and possible strategies to address the problem;
- There is no one solution, no single, one shot effort that will eliminate the problem;
- The problem is never likely to be solved;
- Information as a basis for action will be incomplete because of the uniqueness of the problem and the complexities of its interrelations with other problems; and
- The uniqueness of the problem means it does not lend itself easily to previously tried strategies.

Essentially, the concept of the "wicked" problem creates a categorization for problems that are complex, with multiple stakeholders, have intersecting causes, are impacted by social values, have multiple solutions, are never likely to be solved, have incomplete information available, and that have been unsolved by previously tried strategies. The value in this conceptualization being applied to violence, is that it "sensitizes us to some of the challenges of violence that are tacit, and in that way helps prepare for strategies to deal with them."[873]

8.2.1.2.3. Conclusion as to Psychology and Violence

Kazdin's approach to violence, as a "wicked" problem seems much more accepting of the various factors that contribute to violence, and of the difficulties present in confronting those factors, than the application of GAM suggested by DeWall, et al. Yet, DeWall etal.'s approach more closely aligns with Jesus's teaching, as it acknowledges the person as the middle step between input and outcome. In any case, nearly all of the psychological approaches to

[873] Kazdin, 172.

violence (to a lesser extent the "wicked" conception of the phenomenon) rely upon a definition of violence that is rooted in notions of physical harm. Accordingly, they are of limited use in the broader analysis of this research. However, the work is helpful to the extent that it acknowledges the complexities of eradicating violence, due to human susceptibility to violence as a contagion and due to the complexity and "wickedness" of violence in society.

8.2.2. Conclusion of Social Scientific Analysis

The review of the literature of anthropological and psychological fields of study reveals that, in the social sciences, violence is primarily understood as physical aggression or the coercive use of physical force. Cultural anthropologists alone have identified the social and political elements, including colonialism, that constitute phenomena of violence. This void in the canon of scholarship in itself suggests the reifying role that academic knowledge plays in the invisibilisation of violence in society. Within anthropology, cultural anthropologists have identified the ways that social structures constitute violence. However, within the same field this knowledge is not absorbed. The academy of the social sciences fails to fully interrogate culture, and fails to appreciate, as cultural anthropologists have pointed out, the role that they themselves play in creating and maintaining systems that are violent and that do violence. Instead the violence goes unseen, unreported, unlearned, and untaught. It remains a consistent invisible force in the social ecology. The ongoing non-acknowledgement of the violence embedded in the social structure, means that often only the results are studied, while the root of the phenomena goes unaddressed.

The social science scholarship has great implications for the subject matter of this project. First, it provides evidence that the view of structural and cultural violence, invisible violence, that is argued for in this paper, is confirmed by those who study human social interaction. The research itself confirms the nature of the violence that is named. Second, the study of the social scientific purview of violence makes clear the utter radicality of Jesus's teaching in the first century, as argued in Chapter Two. Jesus made a connection between psychology and violence that seems to be unnamed some two thousand years later. Those in the academic study of psychology and violence primarily identify violence as being related to human proclivity towards aggression, as a result of natural/biological and environmental factors. Jesus's teaching, in contrast, makes a connection between one's inner life, and inward sense of self-worth, and how an intact and uplifted psychological perspective can lead to a diminution in one's engagement in acts of physical violence. For the post-modern scientist there is genetic grounds for violence. For Jesus, there is a psychology that is able overcome the

power of social forces, and also to overcome the internal natural/biological impulses triggered by those social forces. Ultimately, the psychological reorientation results in overcoming the inclination to use aggressive or coercive physical force. Further, because it insulates the individual from socially determined notions of worthiness and unworthiness, it disarms the powers that create violent structures and that instrumentalize violent systems to diminish and destroy the human beings that it deems to have disposable lives. Jesus's psychology was far ahead of its time.

8.3. Conceptualizing "Violence" Broadly

The preceding review of the state of social scientific scholarship makes plain the need for a more robust conceptualization of "violence" in the academy. Work has been performed in this regard in an interdisciplinary fashion within the humanities. Here I will pull together various strands of theory to weave a theorization of violence that is adequate to the task of addressing the vast array of violences with which the marginalized, particularly the Black marginalized, contend.

As should be clear from the analysis of the social scientific scholarship, violence is a contested concept.[874] This is largely due to the pervasive existence of ideological structures in any given society,[875] which define the very concept of violence.[876] Ideology is the "linking mechanism between actions and meanings."[877] It implies that the meanings assigned to actions are legitimate in the society, and structure society's morality.[878] Societal ideological structures influence the development of the social system, and community, in general, but it is also results for the individual in "the internalization of that social system…([meaning] the developmental growth [of] a person within a meaning system, and the subsequent determination of normative stages of development.)"[879] It influences the individual's ethics. For example, religion, and in the West, Christianity, has been an ideological structure with immense influence, as has the economic structure of capitalism. Structures such as these inform a culture's conception of *acts* that are within or outside of the boundaries of socially and politically acceptable behaviour.

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[874] O'Neill, 128.

[875] See, Tite, *Conceiving Peace and Violence*, for a detailed discussion of the ideological underpinnings of the conception of violence. Tite, *Conceiving Peace and Violence : A New Testament Legacy*, 19–32.

[876] Tite, 34.

[877] Tite, 19.

[878] Tite, 19.

[879] Tite, 19.

"Violence," as well as its usual obverse, "peace,"[880] do not merely describe behaviour, but function as evaluations of the behaviour, or acts, described. These words "are labels that make 'good' and 'bad' moral statements regarding particular acts, thoughts, and institutional structures."[881]

Staudigl[882] has described violence as "a social phenomenon, within the horizon of its ordering, within which we negotiate, define and debate what counts and is recognized as violence and what does not."[883] Tite's and Staudigl's observations are buttressed by the assertion of Lawrence and Karim that "violence is always and everywhere historically contingent; it can never be morally or politically neutral."[884] Thus, there is no "violence" *per se*.[885] A culture's ideological influences, relative to its historical, political, and social constructs, are what allow certain phenomena to be understood as morally reprehensible and as "violence."

While certain phenomena are encoded as "violence" by society's ideological structure, the phenomena that are determined to reflect "violence" are identified by specific acts. Lawrence and Karim articulate that "[t]here is no general theory of violence apart from its practices."[886] Endreß and Rampp have likewise determined that examining the phenomenon of

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[880] Peace is often construed as the absence of violence, or violence as the absence of peace. Likewise, peace is often conceived of as a passive state, while violence is an active state. However, the conception of the ancient Romans, which remains operative today via its influence on early Christianity, Tite, 41. is of a peace which was achieved through violence. Peace and violence are conceptually linked. See, also Galtung, who discusses the abuse of the word "peace" due to it being appended to a multitude of policy matters to obtain verbal consensus, since "it is hard to be all-out against peace." John Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167.

[881] Tite, *Conceiving Peace and Violence : A New Testament Legacy*, 34.

[882] Staudigl has made a phenomenological analysis of violence from several vantage points. See, e.g., Staudigl, Michael. "Introduction: Topics, Problems, and Potentials of a Phenomenological Analysis of Violence." *Phenomenologies of Violence*, Jan. 2014, pp. 1–32. *brill.com*, doi:10.1163/9789004259782_002; "Racism: On the Phenomenology of Embodied Desocialization." *Continental Philosophy Review*, vol. 45, no. 1, Mar. 2012, pp. 23–39. *link-springer-com.ez.sun.ac.za*, doi:10.1007/s11007-011-9206-5; "Towards a Relational Phenomenology of Violence." *Human Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1, Mar. 2013, pp. 43–66. *link-springer-com.ez.sun.ac.za*, doi:10.1007/s10746-013-9269-x.

[883] Michael Staudigl, "Introduction: Topics, Problems, and Potentials of a Phenomenological Analysis of Violence," *Phenomenologies of Violence*, January 1, 2014, 1, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004259782_002.

[884] Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha Karim, eds., *On Violence: A Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 6.

[885] Staudigl, "Introduction," 1.

[886] Lawrence and Karim, *On Violence*, 7.

violence requires addressing the question of "*how* violence presents itself, *how* it is perceived, and *how* it happens."[887] The details of violence are "essential" to attend to.[888]

8.3.1. Violence Is Identified as "Product" or "Process"

In elucidating the fundamental nature of violence, scholars have also determined that the phenomenon of violence, the specific acts, must be understood as either *product* or as *process*. Viewing violence as product entails regarding an act or occurrence as episodic, sporadic and as an exception to the norm. The understanding of violence as process, accommodates an open view of violence. It reflects the nature of violence's porous boundaries. Violence as process recognizes violence as "cumulative and boundless," and as "spill[ing] over."[889] Concurring with Lawrence and Karim, Endreß and Rampp conclude that violence as process is a fitting conception; "violence ought to be thought of not as a static but rather a highly dynamic and processual phenomenon."[890]

Coady has been an ardent proponent of the definition of violence as "product,"[891] which he refers to as the "restricted definition" of violence. For Coady, several factors make this view the ideal one. First is that the linking of violence and physical force is consistent with the language adopted by the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines violence as, "The deliberate exercise of physical force against a person, property, etc.; physically violent behaviour or treatment."[892] Second, the connection of violence with physical force is typically the base line that other views expand upon. More importantly, the view of violence as force provides a straightforward and unambiguous definition of the term, which allows instances of violence to

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[887] Martin Endreß and Benjamin Rampp, "Introduction," *Human Studies* 36, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-013-9272-2 empahsis in orig.

[888] Endreß and Rampp, 4.

[889] Lawrence and Karim, *On Violence*, 12.

[890] Endreß and Rampp, "Introduction," 4.

[891] This view of violence has also been described as the "narrow" view, the "restricted" view, the minimalist view, etc. See, e.g., Vittorio Bufacchi, "Two Concepts of Violence," *Political Studies Review* 3, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 193–204, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2005.00023.x; C. A. J. Coady, "The Idea of Violence," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 3, no. 1 (1986): 3–19; Norman Geras, *Discourses of Extremity: Radical Ethics and Post-Marxist Extravagances* (London: Verso, 1990), 22.

[892] Oxford English Dictionary, "'violence, n.'.," in *OED Online* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, July 2018), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/223638?rskey=tOdHaT&result=1. This definition has changed. Previously, the OED Second Edition defined violence as "the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, person or property; action or conduct characterized by this." Oxford English Dictionary, "'violence, n.'.," in *OED Online* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989), http://www.oed.com.ez.sun.ac.za/oed2/00277885. The updated definition frames violence as "deliberate," and removes the negative outcome of the act, *i.e.*, the resulting "injury…or damage." Currently, violence merely entails the deliberate use of physical force in the OED.

be easily identified. Further, Coady claims, this definition is neutral, and does not involve moral considerations.

There are disadvantages to the "product" or "restricted" view of violence, however. The "product" view of violence, while conceptually clear, does not sufficiently account for the multitude of harms that persons regularly experience that violate their human integrity. These include psychological harms, social harms, and economic harms, to name a few. Other meanings that recognize the harms that might be accounted for by the term "violence" broaden the concept, making it more appropriately complex. While it may be argued that this complexity creates ambiguity that empties the term "violence" of concrete meaning,[893] the greater complexity is favoured in this paper, as it is warranted by the true complexity of the phenomenon of violence.

The "product" view of violence holds that violence is an episodic exception to the norm. The idea that violence is an episodic exception, and that there is a normal state of society that is not violent, is challenged by a reading of politics and history through raced, gendered, and postcolonial hermeneutics. Because the dissertation considers the concept of violence through the lenses of the marginalized, and these groups often comprise those whose lives are on the margins, the concept of violence necessarily incorporates the views that have been expressed by marginalized women, Black persons, and those in regions that have been formal colonies of the West. Once the views of the marginalized are incorporated, the rationale for adoption of the "process" description of violence is clear; violence is not limited to overt instances of physical force, and must reference the invisible "forces" that comprise the norm, and that constitute initial invisible and provoking inflictions of violence to individuals.

8.3.2. Violence as Process, Process as Cultural Hegemony

Understanding the "process" of violence, is aided by reference to Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony. Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) extended theories of Marxist materialism to the realm of ideology. Gramsci introduced the concept of cultural hegemony, whereby intellectual and moral leadership of civil society, which consists of schools, families, labour unions, etc., is gained by a predominating social class through means of influence, rather than means of coercion or force. "Owners and managers of media…can produce and reproduce the content, inflections, and tones of ideas favourable to them far more

[893] See, Coady, "The Idea of Violence," 7–12.

easily than other social groups because they manage key socializing institutions, thereby guaranteeing that their points of view are constantly and attractively cast into the public arena."[894]

Cultural hegemony is the means by which the normative, default understanding of the social realm becomes an understanding that the norm is neutral or non-violent. The hegemonic ideal of the normal, non-violent status quo, reflects the ideals of those members of the social class that dominate culture and that have institutional power. This class of persons in the West is generally male, White, possessed of some economic wealth, Christian (Protestant), and heterosexual. Cultural conceptions of normativity with regard to violence, which are inculcated by such persons, render transparent the violence that is mediated through, and inherent to, gendered, racialized and colonial understandings of the ordering of the culture.

8.3.3. Violence as "Instrumental" or "Non-Instrumental"

The description of violence as process, is augmented by the idea that the specific acts that are constitutive of violence are either *instrumental* or *non-instrumental*. Instrumental violence, or violence as pure means, "refers to a concept in which the implementation of…violence occurs as a means to an end…a party enacts violent measures solely to achieve a particular result."[895] Dodd regards such phenomena as "stupid" violence; there is a "stupidity of violence" where "it involves nothing more significant than what can be captured and organized in a technical fashion."[896]

Non-instrumental violence, on the other hand, refers to violence that is intrinsically meaningful. It occurs when the specific act of violence "itself contains inherent value…Intrinsic violence places positive value on a violent act irrespective of the outcome at a specific moment of implementation."[897] Dodd-describes this type of violence as itself a source

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[894] James Lull, *Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach*, Second (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 49–50. Even today in the seemingly democratized space of social media, owners of media control media outlets and algorithms, and determine who has access to what stories and to the technology itself. They continue to hold inordinate power over ideas. Even the idea to use social media at all, and the minimizing of the risks and hazards it entails, is an idea and information that is curated and/or restricted by owners and managers of media.

[895] Neil Roberts, "Fanon, Sartre, Violence, and Freedom *," *Sartre Studies International: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Existentialism and Contemporary Culture.* 10, no. 2 (2004): 145, https://doi.org/10.3167/135715504780955366.

[896] James Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*, ebook, Studies in Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2009), 12.

[897] Roberts, "Fanon, Sartre, Violence, and Freedom *," 146.

and origin of meaning.[898] One example of intrinsic violence provided by Roberts is that of sexual rape, wherein the rapist does not rape instrumentally, in order to derive sexual pleasure, but rapes because he finds intrinsic value in the forced intrusion of another.[899]

A more instructive example might be located in the practice of religion. In *Violence: Thinking Without Banisters,* philosopher Richard Bernstein discusses the work of Jan Assmann,[900] and points out the possibility of an intrinsic violence within monotheistic religion. This example is significant in that it highlights the institution of religion, which contributes to the shaping of culture in particularly invisible ways. Since religion is often regarded as compartmentalized away from the secularized operations of daily life and politics. Without question religion has been essential to the formation of the modern/colonial world, and complicit in the violence of that world. The theory of non-instrumentality helps to reveal the fundamental violence of religion, that seems to spill over into political, philosophical, and social knowledge systems that have shaped the development of Western culture.

Assmann's work investigates the historic distinctions between Jewish and Egyptian culture. He names as a Mosaic "first distinction,"[901] "the distinction between true and false in religion that underlies more specific distinctions such as Jews and Gentiles, Christians and pagans, Muslims and unbelievers."[902] Analysing Assmann's contribution, Bernstein concludes that if the Jewish "Mosaic distinction" is "as rigorous and as absolute as Assmann indicates, and if it introduces a new kind of religious truth--'absolute, revealed, metaphysical, or fideistic truth'--that is radically opposed to all false religions, then it would seem that the Mosaic distinction is *intrinsically* violent."[903]

Berstein appraises Assmanns' Mosaic distinction as intrinsically violent because of the way that it distinguishes the Mosiac religion from other religions, which entails opposing other

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[898] Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*, 12.

[899] See, Roberts, "Fanon, Sartre, Violence, and Freedom *," 147. This example is weak, however. It posits that the rape is not instrumental because it is not performed for the purpose of sexual gratification. However, it well known that rape is an act of domination and control, and not an act of sexual gratification. One might say, then, that the act of violation of another, rape, *is* the instrument used to accomplish the end result of domination. The violence of the rape can be considered meaningful not in itself, but in its conferral of power to the rapist. Rape is used instrumentally to gain power.

[900] Jan Assmann is a noted Egyptologist and cultural philosopher who in 1977 published the controversial, Jan Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism*, New ed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[901] Richard Bernstein, *Violence: Thinking Without Bannisters*, paperback (Polity, 2013), 128.

[902] Bernstein, 128.

[903] Bernstein, 143.

religions. Further, the Mosaic distinction's violence is in its constitution of religion as meaning-making; it is the source of meaning for Abrahamic faith traditions. Thus, the religious Mosaic distinction is an example of the ways in which violence may be conceived as intrinsic to structure. Intrinsic (non-instrumental) violence, more subtle than instrumental violence, can be as detrimental as it is transparent.

8.3.4. Conclusion

Violence is known according to specific acts, is best understood as process and not product, and may be either instrumental or non-instrumental, with both having damaging outcomes. This theorization is helpful in establishing a broad framework for thinking conceptually about violence. The framework does not account for every instance of violence, nor for every violent practice, neither is it desirable for a theory to do so. As Enderß and Ramp have observed, prematurely narrowing down the phenomenal domain "can lead to the danger of overlooking central aspects. Instead…it is sensible to begin by conceiving violence as openly as possible in order to do justice to its historical manifoldness."[904] The next section of this chapter will examine the work of Johan Galtung to construct a framework upon the theoretical ground that has been discussed.

8.4. Galtung Typology of Violence

The open view of violence, which follows the practices of violence and does not dictate its parameters, aligns well with the theorization advanced by Johan Galtung, who founded the discipline of Peace Studies. Galtung established a path-breaking typology of violence that systematized the ways in which violence is conceived. Galtung's typology allocates violent phenomena to broad categories as well as to specific types within those broad categories of violent occurrences. Unlike the theories of "violence" identified in the previous section, Galtung's theorization was intended to be prescriptive. He reasoned that "the concept of violence must be broad enough to include the most significant varieties, yet specific enough to serve as a basis for concrete action."[905] His goal was to understand violence as a means of effectively working towards peace. The previous discussion of the limitations of a "product" view of violence, and of cultural hegemony's masking of violence towards women, Black persons, and the colonized, will be revisited here. Because Galtung acknowledges the function

[904] Endreß and Rampp, "Introduction," 3.
[905] Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 168.

of "culture" in his typology, it is possible to map many of the violent features previously mentioned within his typology.

This section will first discuss Galtung's typology of violence, and will introduce two new types of violence to the typological structure. Following this, Galtung's typology will be subjected to an ideological critical review to determine its meaningfulness to women, Black, and colonized persons.

8.4.1. Galtung's Definition of Violence

Galtung offers a delimitation of the general theory of violence as that which is an ideologically influenced negative evaluation of particular existing phenomena. He posits that the negative phenomena that constitutes violence must entail more than instances of application of physical force, or what he calls "narrow violence"[906] (the "product" view). Such a limited definition, and narrowed concept, of violence is prone to allowing "highly unacceptable" conditions and situations to be regarded as conditions of peace.[907]

Galtung proffers the alternate definition, that: "violence is present when human beings are being influenced [against their will][908] so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations...Violence is…the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual."[909] In other words, when one's experience in the body or mind is caused to be diminished from what it had the potential to be, the phenomena that caused the diminishment is a violent phenomena; it is violence.[910] Later Galtung offers a clearer

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[906] Galtung defines the concept of narrow violence as "somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence." Galtung, 168.

[907] Galtung, 168.

[908] Addition of the language "against their will" is offered by Coady and rectifies a shortcoming of Galtung's definition. E.g., if a young child expresses needs or desires that make demands upon its parents that cause their actual realization to be diminished from their potential, the child might be said, under the original Galtung definition to have engaged in violence. Coady, "The Idea of Violence," 7.

[909] Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 168.

[910] See, also, Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, where he theorizes violence in naming; that to be named is a first, "originary violence of language." It is to think "the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of the arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper…of a self-presence which has never been given but only dreamed of and always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance." Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 112. Derrida's "first violence" does not contradict Galtung's. Galtung's definition does not require that the violence inflicted be known to the violated person; merely that there be a difference between the potential and the actual experience of such a person, a diminished experience. Derrida's "first violence" would constitute a diminution in the somatic and mental realizations of the person who was named, in that they lost their unique self-ness, and were inscribed within the system by being named. Further, Galtung recognizes a violence that exists whether or not there is a subject who acts to cause the harm. He understands such anonymized acts as indirect violence.

redefinition, "I see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Threats of violence are also violence."[911] This is an improved conceptualization. First, it is more readily accessible linguistically. Second, it emphasizes unmet human needs, which are universal categories that lend themselves to concrete identification and remedy. Unlike "somatic and mental realizations," which are amorphous, mutable, and unmeasurable.

8.4.2. Galtung's Framework of Violence

After offering a widely-encompassing definition of violence, Galtung distinguishes six dimensions that order consideration of various phenomena that are constitutive of violence.[912] Galtung's six dimensions inform the categorizing of violence in his typology. The six dimensions, or questions, that bound the consideration of violence are:

1. Whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts. As Galtung notes, this is a matter of primary importance. It leads to the assessment that whether or not there is an identifiable subject who commits a specific action, individuals are often exposed to potential risk of harm and to actual harm. This identification of violence as deriving from a subject who acts and as also deriving from acts that do not derive from a specific subject's actions, underlies the distinction between Galtung's categories of personal (direct) and structural violence.
2. Whether acts use negatives or positives to influence. Galtung points out that a person can be influenced to comply or conform, not only by means of punishment, following a perceived transgression, but also by means of rewarding the person who does what is perceived as right. An example that Galtung uses of positive influence is that of consumer society rewarding those who consume, while not positively punishing those who do not. The reward-orientation of the system is arguably better in that it gives pleasure rather than pain, and arguably worse in that it is more manipulative and less overt.[913]

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[911] Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (August 1990): 292.
[912] Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 168–72.
[913] Galtung, 170. I note that this particular example does not immediately relate to an instance of violence, however it does reflect the ways that cultural manipulation towards what is perceived as an economic good, often fails to raise the question of whether and what kinds of harm might be incident to such manipulations. E.g., the expansion of the Walmart empire, and availability of cheap goods to consumers, fails at the outset to even question the harmful trade and labour practices upon which the growth and stability of the

3. Whether or not there is an object that is harmed. Can there be violence, Galtung questions, if no physical or biological object is hurt? By raising this question Galtung points to the violence of *threatened* physical harm. Such as when a person, group, or nation is displaying the means of physical violence, with the intention of coercing another to comply.[914] The legal concept of assault recognizes this conception of a violation. Another example might also be the arrangement of state security forces, with militarized combat equipment, physically aligned in opposition to protesters. Also, there is the example of domestic violence. Though direct physical or psychological harm may not be occurring continuously in the home, the potential for direct physical or psychological violence permeates the home environment. The threatening environment itself constitutes violence. Thus, threats of harm, and the coercion accomplished by such threats, are meaningful to conceptualizations of violence.
4. Whether harm is physical or psychological. Galtung is interested in establishing that psychological violence is as significant a phenomenon as physical violence, which "narrow" definitions of violence often elide. He uses as examples of psychological violence "lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats, etc."[915] Galtung seems to mention these examples of psychological violence within the context of war and politics. These examples of psychological violence (lies, brainwashing, indoctrination, etc.) gain added meaning, however, when applied to hegemonic ideas of gender, race, and coloniality. For this reason, a reframing of the distinction between physical and psychological harm seems warranted. Instead of physical/psychological language, the terms "tangible" and "intangible" capture the broader scope of what is intended. Tangible/intangible draws attention to the diversity of bodies, human, nonhuman, and inanimate, that are potential objects of violence. Also, it widens the notion of "psychological" violence, which seems to imply a consciousness of an inward harm that is inflicted, whether by the actor or the subject of the harm. Further, it seems to imply

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Walmart empire is predicated, and continues to fail to curb the harms that Walmart's empire perpetuates. This speaks to one of the subtleties of structural violence.

[914] Galtung, 170.

[915] Galtung, 169.

an introspection to that which is not visible to the eye, which limits the notion's applicability to animal (human or nonhuman) life. To speak of intangible harm, however, is to recognize harms that may not be readily cognizable, but are nonetheless real, whether they be, for example, harms to the conscious existence of Black persons, or harms to the ozone layer.

5. Whether harm is intended or unintended. Galtung highlights the connection that exists between notions of intentional causation and guilt. This connection, he argues, underlies Christian ethics and jurisprudence. Galtung concludes that ethical systems based upon intentionality are inadequate to capture, or prevent, harms other than personal, direct occasions of violence.[916] There is culpability for unintended harm, which he captures in the idea of structural violence.
6. Whether harm is manifest or latent. Manifest harm is observable. It includes harm such as direct violence, but also includes harm that can be characterized as potential, or threatened, though not instantly occurring. Latent violence makes visible that violence which is "not there," or even explicitly threatened, but which might easily come about. Galtung offers the example of a racially charged conversation that results in a punch. The difference between latent violence and threatened violence, would seem to be that threatened violence is anticipatory, whereas latent violence is not. Threatened violence is meant to, and does, anticipate the consequence of direct violence in the event of noncompliance or non-cooperation with the threat. Latent violence, on the other hand, is not anticipated, and results from an unstable situation in the instant. Galtung states, latent violence is indicated, "where the level of actual realization [of harm] is not sufficiently protected against deterioration by upholding mechanisms."[917]

It is the function of these dimensions[918] in a multiplicity of combinations, within which phenomena of violence operate.

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[916] Galtung, 171–72.
[917] Galtung, 172.
[918] Galtung allows that there are many more dimensions that could be included in addition to these, but provides no examples. Galtung, 172.

8.4.3. Galtung's Categories of Violence

Galtung's outline of the framework of issues that orient our evaluation of phenomena that constitute violence now enables a description of Galtung's categories of violence. Galtung categorizes violence as direct,[919] structural,[920] and cultural.[921] Galtung sees the categories of violence as interrelated, but also as temporally differentiated. "Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, a 'permanence', remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformations of basic culture."[922]



The Arrows represent the STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE that creates the conditions and connects the incidents of DIRECT VIOLENCE. The Structure of Arrows may be in motion, may stop, may reverse motion. It is a process. CULTURAL VIOLENCE makes the shape of the violence structure a Circle and determines the shape and colour of the boxes that

[919] Galtung, 169.

[920] Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Galtung acknowledges institutional violence as an alternate way of discussing structural violence, however he distinguishes the terms. His preference is for structural violence in that it is more open-ended, and not tied to any social institution. See, Johan Galtung, Essays in Peace Research (Copenhagen: Humanities Pr, 1975), 24.

[921] See, Galtung, "Cultural Violence."

[922] Galtung, 294, (citation omitted).

Figure 8-1 Galtung's Violence Types

8.4.3.1. Direct Violence

Direct violence is determined by whether or not there is an identifiable subject who acts. If there is an identifiable subject who acts, then the violence that occurs is regarded as personal or direct violence. This violence often receives more focus because of its newsworthiness, or episodic newness.[923] Also, direct violence registers more readily because the object of personal violence "perceives the violence, usually, and may complain—[whereas] the object of structural violence may be persuaded not to perceive this at all."[924]

8.4.3.2. Structural Violence

Where there is caused to be a difference between actual human realization and potential human realization, and that cause is not attributable to an identifiable subject who acts, the violence represented by the difference between potential and actual, is structural violence. Structural violence "is built into the [societal] structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances."[925] When structural violence functions, resources are unevenly distributed, and, more significantly, "the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed."[926] "If people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation."[927] Galtung alternately refers to structural or indirect violence as social injustice.[928] A violent structure, he claims, "leaves marks not only on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit."[929]

Galtung situates exploitation at the centre of structural violence. "This simply means that some, the topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure, than…the underdogs." [930] The exploitation of structural violence is accomplished by and because of penetration, segmentation, marginalization, and fragmentation. Penetration, "implant[s] the topdog inside the underdog." Segmentation "

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[923] Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 173 see also fn 22.
[924] Galtung, 171.
[925] Galtung, 171.
[926] Galtung, 171.
[927] Galtung, 171.
[928] Galtung, 171.
[929] Galtung, "Cultural Violence," 294.
[930] Galtung, 293.

giv[es] the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on." Marginalization, "keeps[s] the underdogs on the outside. Fragmentation, "keep[s] the underdogs away from each other. The four accomplish structural violence, but constitute structural violence in themselves; they are a variation of "structurally built-in repression."[931]

Imperialism is a specific example of structural violence. Imperialism establishes "a dominance relation between…nations" wherein a power nexus exists between "the [elite] center in the Center nation" and "the [elite] center of the Periphery nation," primarily for the mutual benefit of those in the center of both nations, but also benefitting those in the periphery of the Center nation.[932] In such a structure, "[a]lliance-formation between the two peripheries is avoided, while the Center nation becomes more and the Periphery nation less cohesive - and hence less able to develop long-term strategies."[933]

Galtung's typology has an underlying aim of communicating that assumptions that structural violence amount to less suffering than personal violence are ill-founded.[934]

8.4.3.3. Cultural Violence

Cultural violence draws attention to the ways that acts of direct violence and of structural violence are legitimized and made acceptable in society.[935] Cultural violence has as its source meaning-making aspects of a society's culture, which include "the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)."[936] Cultural violence makes direct violence and structural violence look and feel normal and right.[937]

Cultural violence is accomplished by means of internalization. Through external mechanisms of positive and negative reinforcement, the internal conscience of the person is shaped to uphold the existing social system.[938] Using the symbolic grammar of language, art, religion, etc., cultural violence changes the "moral color" of an act "from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable."[939] It also functions by mystification; by "making reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least [we see it] not as

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[931] Galtung, 294.
[932] Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2 (1971): 81, 84.
[933] Galtung, 84.
[934] Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 173.
[935] Galtung, "Cultural Violence," 292.
[936] Galtung, 291.
[937] Galtung, 291.
[938] Galtung, 303 fn. 3.
[939] Galtung, 292.

violent."[940] Cultural violence, in its conscience-forming enlistment of ideas, might also be understood as ideological violence.

An example of cultural violence may be found in the conceptualization of racial superiority. Such a theory is constructed through pervasive language, media, scientific and religious representations that promote the theory of a superior race. Because the idea of a superior race becomes accepted and normalized, the concurrent dehumanization of the inferiorized race is also accepted and normalized. The acceptance and support of the theory of a superior race constitutes cultural violence against those not of the race presented as superior. This cultural violence then undergirds the justification and legitimation of acts of structural and/or direct violence against the dehumanized "Other."

When Galtung places his categories of violence in communication with basic human needs, which he identifies as survival, well-being, identity, and freedom,[941] the outcome is the production of a matrix of how cultural violence appears in symbolic languages of religion, ideology, science, etc. (*See, Table 7-1 below*)

Table 8-1 *Violence Matrix*

	Survival	Well-Being	Identity	Freedom
Direct	Killing	Maiming, Siege, Sanctions, Misery	Desocialization, Resocialization, Secondary citizen	Repression, Detention, Expulsion
Structural	Exploitation A	Exploitation B	Penetration, Segmentation	Marginalization, Fragmentation

8.4.3.4. Additions to Galtung's Typological Categories

The usefulness of Galtung's typology is that it is not an exhaustive mapping. It provides a framework for conceptualizing how violence operates in society. To his categorization of direct, structural, and cultural violence, evident in society, racialized and colonial lenses produce the additional categories of foundational violence and existential violence.

[940] Galtung, 292.

[941] Prior research of Galtung identified these as primary human needs. See, Johan Galtung, "The Basic Needs Approach," in *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate*, ed. Katrin Lederer, Johan Galtung, and David Antal, vol. 12, Publication of the Science Center Berlin, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980), 55–125.



Existential Violence

8.4.3.4.1. Foundational Violence

Joan Cocks recently augmented Galtung's taxonomy of violence by elucidating the concept of foundational violence, which she determined was not encompassed by Galtung's robust typology. Foundational violence is the term Cocks employs to describe the "secret and transparent violence that occurs when a new [political] order of things comes into being."[942] Following Derrida, Cocks argues that there is a double violence to the founding of political sovereignties, such as settler colonial states. First, newly founded sovereignties effectively deem themselves Authorities by fiat. "Authority that establishes itself as legitimate has no right to do so, since right does not create authority but is created by [the Authority]."[943] The installation of Authority, then, as it "inaugurates a new law…always does so in violence.

[942] Joan Cocks, "The Violence of Structures and the Violence of Foundings," *New Political Science* 34, no. 2 (2012): 222, https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2012.676400.

[943] Cocks, 223 quoting; Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law," in *Acts of Religion*, ed. Gil Anidjar, First ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), 269 (emphasis in original).

Always, which is to say even when there have not been those spectacular genocides, expulsions or deportations that so often accompany the foundation of states."[944]

This violence descriptor moves beyond Galtung's typology in several ways. First, where Galtung's categories hinge on a definition of violence that assumes the difference between potential and actual realization of commonly held values of human life, foundational violence recognizes that the founding of nations involves "the decimation of one sense of what is valuable in life by another, clashing sense."[945] Second, with respect to cultural violence, Galtung speaks of the cultural or ideological mystification that the symbolic language of words or images employs to veil or sanitize a violent social order. Foundational violence, though, acknowledges the cultural violence in the "eradication of one set of meanings animating a way of life to clear the ground for another set." There is a "first-order decimation of meaning-laden practices as well as the second-order mystification of the decimation."[946] Third, foundational violence requires the replacement of one world by another, which goes beyond the idea of structural violence, which entails sustained asymmetrical relationship.[947] Finally, Foundational violence must be distinguished from Galtung's typological categories because it "entails not only the negative power of destruction but also the positive power involved in creating something new, and because the destructive power of foundational violence sometimes occurs in "peaceful" guise."[948] The guise of peacefulness and diplomacy is exemplified in the use of treaties between the newly authoritative United States and indigenous Indian tribes. Through treaties Indian tribes were completely dispossessed of land. "The government's recognition of Indian tribes as sovereign subjects was the necessary condition of their dispossession by consent."[949] The treaty was a carrot that allowed the Indian tribes to avoid the stick, which was the threat of overwhelming physical force if they did not consent.

Cocks uses the example of the treaties between the U.S. and Indian tribes to illustrate that "peaceful deliberation, contracts between consenting parties, promises of eternal friendship, and the reciprocal recognition of sovereign independence are sometimes not the

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[944] Cocks, "The Violence of Structures and the Violence of Foundings," 223 quoting; Derrida, "Force of Law," 269 (emphasis in original).

[945] Cocks, "The Violence of Structures and the Violence of Foundings," 223. Cocks does allow that this difficulty may be avoided by referencing Galtung's later definition that incorporates human needs criteria. See her fn. 88.

[946] Cocks, 224.

[947] Cocks, 224.

[948] Cocks, 224.

[949] Cocks, 226.

counter to violence but the form that violence takes."[950] By demonstrating the aspects of difference between foundational violence and the violence categories determined by Galtung, Cocks has revealed an additional means by which violence often exists without violence.[951] The conception of foundational violence is significant to understanding modernity/coloniality's underlying violations.

8.4.3.4.2. Existential Violence

Building upon the taxonomy of violence theorized by Galtung, and supplemented by Cocks, a final additional mode of violence may be named, that is existential violence. Existential violence operates through the dialectic of anti-Black racialization. It may be understood as an intersecting of direct, structural, cultural, and foundational violences, in and through the construction of race, which results in the alteration and diminishment of the ontology of Black being.

8.4.3.4.2.1. Žižek and Black Inferiority

Slavoj Žižek has posited that one's "being" is a socio-symbolic being. Thus, when Black being is treated as racially inferior to White being, actual inferiority is created at the level of Blacks' "socio-symbolic identity."[952] White racist ideology "is not merely an interpretation of what blacks are, but an interpretation that determines the very being and social existence of the interpreted subjects."[953] White racist ideology, Žižek argues, "exerts a performative efficiency"; it inferiorizes Blacks.[954]

8.4.3.4.2.2. Fanon and Black Inferiority

Žižek's intuiting of an inferiorization of Black being echoes sentiments expressed by Frantz Fanon. In *Black Skin White Masks*,[955] Fanon articulates the internalization of the existentialist violence of colonialism (where colonialism serves as a hueristic for race contestations, wherein colonials are Europeans or Whites, and the colonized are natives, or Blacks). He reveals the compound and intersectional nature of the violences committed against Black/colonized persons.

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[950] Cocks, 226–27.
[951] Cocks, 226.
[952] Slavoj. Žižek, *Violence : Six Sideways Reflections* (New York: Picador, 2008), 72.
[953] Žižek, 72.
[954] Žižek, 72.
[955] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox, Revised edition (New York : Berkeley, Calif.: Grove Press, 2008).

Fanon differs from Žižek in that he does not explicitly articulate a theory of ontological being. However, he does, in some sense, adopt this view in his writing. Fanon recounts the dimensions of said violence by detailing the idea of superiority/inferiority that exists and operates in White and Black persons, respectively.

Fanon contests the psychological theory, propounded by a European, that the condition of an inferiority complex in adult colonized natives is related to the natives' individual childhood disposition. On the contrary, says Fanon, "[t]he feeling of inferiority of the colonized is the correlative to the European's feeling of superiority. Let us have the courage to say it outright: It is the racist who creates his inferior."[956] Thus, he makes real the inferiority experienced by the colonized, and concludes that it is a construction of Europeans.

Fanon goes on to describe incidents of the superiorizing and inferiorizing that is enacted along racial lines. He speaks as a Black subject of French colonialism and personalizes inferiorization and his correlative distress:

> Understand, my dear boy, color prejudice is something I find utterly foreign. . . . But of course, come in, sir, there is no color prejudice among us. . . . Quite, the Negro is a man like ourselves. . . . It is not because he is black that he is less intelligent than we are. . . . I had a Senegalese buddy in the army who was really clever. . . .
>
> *Where am I to be classified? Or, if you prefer, tucked away? [Fanon's reaction to the White reaction to himself.]*
>
> A Martinican, a native of 'our' old colonies.
>
> *Where shall I hide?*
>
> Look at the nigger!. . . Mama, a Negro!. . . Hell, he's getting mad. . . . Take no notice, sir, he does not know that you are as civilized as we. . . .
>
> *My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it's cold, the nigger is shivering, the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your bones, the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the*

[956] Fanon, 69 (emphasis in original).

> *nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother's arms: Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up.*[957]

Fanon demonstrates how mundane daily interactions function violently against the Black psyche because of superiorizing and inferiorizing.

Returning to the typology of Galtung, the compound and intersectional nature of the violences imposed are clear. The presumption of a superiority, and the production of an inferiority, and of an inferiority complex, arises through personal exchange. It may be characterized as a psychological wounding. Thus, the inferiorization, through personal exchange, constitutes personal (or direct) violence, whether intentional or unintentional. However, inferiorization is also built into the structure of society, thus it is structural violence. It reflects a moral outlook, shaped culturally by language, historicity, and science, that accepts superior and inferior racial difference, supports superior and inferior racial difference, and does not see, invisibilizes, the harms evident and resulting from superior and inferior racially ordered social systems. Thus, it is culturally violent.

The inferiorization also rests upon foundational violence. In the colonial world, the authority of the colonizer occurred as a consequence of the erasure of the pre-existing order. As Fanon states,

> The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself on him.[958]

Here Fanon notes the ways the sign-making myth-making cultures of Black persons were eviscerated through the colonial encounter. Importantly, Fanon moves here from discussion of purely psychic harm to ontological harm to Black personhood.

Both Žižek and Fanon describe an internal diminishment to the inner and psychic being of Black persons. Fanon's comment about ontological vulnerability expresses the described condition well. Through the experience of multiple violences directed against the colonized/Black person, inferiorization, an existential diminishing, can become constitutive of

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[957] Fanon, 85–86.
[958] Fanon, 83.

Black being. Existenatial violence accounts for the effect of the compounded violations to the the Black/colonized person that are not registered in any single category of violence previously identified.

8.4.4. Conclusion

A typological description of violence, then, has several manifestations. It includes direct acts that cause a diminishing of one's experience in the body or mind, indirect structural acts of such diminution, internalized acceptance of and support for such acts of diminished life experience, and, also, acts of obliteration and pretense connected to founding political entities. It encompasses all of these violences together as they relate to Black life, in its diminishing psychic impact.

8.5. The Violence of Cultural Hegemony

Now that the terrain of violence has been mapped, the chapter turns to an examination of the ways in which violence has operated in society to do harm to women, the colonized, and to Black persons.

8.5.1. Cultural Hegemony Violates Women

As amply demonstrated in feminist theory generally, women have been conceived historically solely in reference to, and as a counterpoint to, men, who were the default and norm of humanity. The woman had no ontology in herself but was that which was not-man, other-than the man.[959] Not only was woman the other, but she was the subordinate other to man. The governing idea throughout the ages was that woman lacked comparable rationality to man, rationality being understood as the definitive characteristic of human beings. Because of woman's deficient capacity for rationality, women were deemed to be inherently and essentially different and lesser humans. This background demonstrates the manner in which the ontological integrity of the woman was violated as a matter of intellectual and quasi-scientific fact, and established as the hegemonic norm.

Daly has pointed out the unchallenged misogyny in theology, "from Augustine to Aquinas, to Luther, to Kant, to Barth."[960] She asserts that women have been alienated from

[959] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 5–6.

[960] Mary Daly, *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation*, Revised edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 22.

their deepest identities, and have accepted this alienation in return for the security found in accepting very limited identities. What is needed, Daly argues, is the confrontation of the human threat of nonbeing, which patriarchal social structures have made particularly debilitating for women.[961]

Ackermann agrees with Daly's theological assessment of misogyny in the tradition. She concludes that as a result, some women have internalized the oppressed image to such an extent "that they are unaware of being deprived."[962] Others are unable to feel whole. The feeling of guilt has become "the basic problem of woman's existence."[963]

> "This confrontation with the anxiety of nonbeing is revelatory, making possible the relativization of structures that are seen as human products, and therefore not absolute and ultimate…Courage to be is the key to the revelatory of the feminist revolution."[964]

In addition to existential diminishment, women have been subject to political compromise. Pateman describes the violation of political subjectivity that was inflicted upon women. According to Pateman, the Enlightenment project is not properly understood as inaugurating a "social contract," but rather a half-social half-sexual contract. This half-social, half-sexual contract was ostensibly meant to bring about an era of freedom from the structure of paternal control for all adults. However, the actual political effect of the advent of the era of the freedom of man, was that woman became more subordinated.

> Civil freedom is not universal. Civil freedom is a masculine attribute and depends upon patriarchal right. The sons overturn paternal rule not merely to gain their liberty but to secure women for themselves. Their success in this endeavor is chronicled in the story of the sexual contract. The original pact is a sexual as well as a social contract: it is sexual in the sense of patriarchal - that is; the contract establishes men's political right over women - and also sexual in the sense of establishing orderly access by men to women's bodies. The original contract creates what I shall call, following Adrienne Rich, 'the law of

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[961] Daly, 22–24.

[962] Denise Ackermann, "Being Woman, Being Human," in *Women Hold Up Half the Sky: Women in the Church in Southern Africa*, ed. Denise Ackermann, Jonathan A. Draper, and Emma Mashinini (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 1991), 99.

[963] Ackermann, 99.

[964] Daly, *Beyond God the Father*, 24.

> male sex-right'. Contract…is the means through which modern patriarchy is constituted.[965]

Pateman's argument is that the woman became politically compromised through the man's claim of freedom. Woman was no longer subordinate to her father, similarly to her male siblings, but was now deliberately subordinated to the fraternity of men generally.

This lack of an autonomous existence, the ontological diminishment, and the installation of women in a subordinated place in the social order, reflects a hegemonic cultural condition that constitutes the normalcy of violence without violence directed against women. Male cultural hegemony created the condition of inequality--patriarchy--and continues to uphold and defend the status quo of the freedom of men being predicated upon the domination of women. Women are normatively enjoined from the freedom enjoyed by men in civil society to fully actualize their personhood.

8.5.2. Cultural Hegemony Furthers the Violations of Colonialism[966]

Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano introduced the concept of "coloniality," as the "invisible and constitutive side of 'modernity."[967] It was the legacy of the period of colonialism that thrived between the 16th and 18th centuries. By coloniality Quijano referred primarily to two axes of power that arose in the "space/time" called America. One axis was the difference between the conquered and the conqueror along differences of "race," which included natural notions of superiority and inferiority. The other, intersecting, axis was a "new structure of

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[965] Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, First ed. (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1988), 2.

[966] Included in this is the ongoing ecological violence of the powerful against creation. The space constraints of this research project, however, prevent my consideration of this aspect of violence. I will note how Galtung engages with ecological violence, however. He does not place it within its own category, but rather sees violence against nature finds a place within the categories already described.

> There is the direct violence of slashing, burning, etc., as in a war. The structural form of such violence would be more insidious, not intended to destroy nature but nevertheless doing so: the pollution and depletion associated with modern industry, leading to dying forests, ozone holes. global warming, and so on. What happens is transformation of nature through industrial activity, leaving non-degradable residues and depleting nonrenewable resources, combined with a world-encompassing commercialization that makes the consequences non-visible to the perpetrators. Two powerful structures at work, indeed, legitimized by economic growth. The buzzword 'sustainable economic growth' may prove to be yet another form of cultural violence. Galtung, "Cultural Violence," 294.

[967] Walter D. Mignolo, "Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-Coloniality," *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2–3 (March 2007): 451, https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162647.

control of labour and its resources and slavery, serfdom, [and] small independent commodity production" on the basis of capital and world market.[968]

> This [race/labor] articulation was constitutively colonial, based on first the assignment of all forms of unpaid labor to colonial races (originally American Indians, blacks, and, in a more complex way, mestizos) in America and, later on, to the remaining colonized races in the rest of the world, olives and yellows. Second, labor was controlled through the assignment of salaried labor to the colonizing whites.[969]

The race/labour colonial axis resulted in capital acquiring a social and geographic identification, which was concentrated in Europe, or the West, among Europeans, or Whites. Consequently, Europe and Europeans "constituted themselves as the centre of the capitalist world economy… Global capitalism was, from then on, colonial/modern and Euro-centred."[970]

The centralized control of capital led to the domination of political and cultural development. New geocultural identities were assigned. "America" and "Europe" emerged, then later "Africa," "Asia" and, finally, "Oceania." Control was effected in three ways. First, cultural practice that was deemed useful was appropriated from the colony to the European centre. Second, colonized forms of knowledge production, symbolic universes, and meaning making were violently repressed. Third, the colonized were forced to submit to and learn European culture in furtherance of reproducing European domination. "Europe's hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony."[971]

The encounter with between the colonized and the colonizer was necessarily violent. Aimee Cesaire's description in his *Discourse on Colonialism*, provided here at length, offers a clear and comprehensive encapsulation:

> …[C]olonization = "thing-ification."
> …They talk to me about progress, about "achievements,"
> diseases cured, improved standards of living.
> *I* am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures
> trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated,
> religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed,
> extraordinary *possibilities* wiped out.

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[968] Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," *Nepantla: Views from South* 1.3 (2000): 533–34.
[969] Quijano, 539.
[970] Quijano, 539.
[971] Quijano, 540–41.

> They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad tracks.
> *I* am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the Congo-Ocean. I am talking about those who, as I write this, are digging the harbor of Abidjan by hand. I am talking about millions of men torn from their gods, their land, their habits, their life-from life, from the dance, from wisdom.
> *I* am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave like flunkeys….
> They pride themselves on abuses eliminated.
> I too talk about abuses, but what I say is that on the old ones - very real - they have superimposed others - very detestable.
> They talk to me about local tyrants brought to reason; but I note that in general the old tyrants get on very well with the new ones, and that there has been established between them, to the detriment of the people, a circuit of mutual services and complicity.[972]

Césaire identifies violence as a part of the founding of the colonies; brutality in daily encounters; relations of domination and submission. He identifies the "thing-ification" of the being of the colonized; culture erased, lands confiscated, populations displaced, and economies destroyed. In all, a totalizing violation against the individuals and communities that have been the objects of colonization.[973]

What Césaire describes as "thing-ification," was a fundamental aspect of European hegemony within the colony. It was construction of a temporality that deemed the colonized to be inferior-raced, "Othered," peoples belonging to a "past," while the modern and the rational were exclusively European. The categories of difference that were assigned included, "East-West, primitive-civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-rational, traditional-modern--Europe and not-Europe."[974] Thus, a circularity of power could be understood: knowledge equalled European, which equalled colonial dominance, which equalled global hegemony, which equalled control of knowledge.

Scholars of Indigenous Studies go further in making a distinction between colonialism and settler-colonialism, in practice and in post-colonial decolonization discourse. Veracini,

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[972] Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 42–44.

[973] As comprehensive as this account of the violence of colonialism is, it does not address the even more severe violence that arises when gender is added to the analysis.

[974] Quijano, "Coloniality of Power," 542.

who founded the journal *Settler Colonial Studies*, makes the distinction clear. He identifies that for the colonizer it is possible for the native to remain; even for some colonized persons to become more privileged than others. The colonizer's aim of "you work for me," allows for this structuring. Yet, the colonizer knows "'that the most favoured colonized will never be anything but colonized people' and that 'certain rights will forever be refused them'."[975] The settler-colonial, on the other hand, does not have the aim of creating labourers, but the aim that indigenous people should "go away." "The successful settler colonies 'tame' a variety of wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish indigenous alterities. By the end of this trajectory, they claim to be no longer settler colonial."[976] The distinction lies, ultimately, in that "colonialism reinforces the distinction between colony and metropole, settler colonialism erases it."[977] The distinction has implications for the violence that is enacted by the (settler-)colonial against the native, as well as the reactions of the indigenous to the violence that they face.

> If the fundamental demand is for labour, opposition must aim to withhold it (or to sustain an agency that could allow withholding it)…multiple resistential strategies and their combination are possible: direct anticolonial attack, sabotage, self-mutilation, insubordination, evasion, non-compliance, ostensible collaboration, mimicry, just to name a few. If the demand, by contrast, is to go away, it is indigenous persistence and survival that become crucial.[978]

Thus, Veracini points out that direct action might be called for to resist colonial demands for labour, but simple survival might be the goal against settler-colonial attempts to eliminate the indigenous.

Quijano also describes an after-life of coloniality; the entrenched patterns of power that remain after the official ending of colonial political regimes. These patterns encompass culture, labour, economics, and knowledge production. Coloniality shapes the knowledge of the self-image of formerly colonized peoples. As Maldonado-Torres states, "modernity as a discourse

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[975] Lorenzo Veracini, "Introducing: Settler Colonial Studies," Settler Colonial Studies 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2011.10648799 quoting Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Revised Edition (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 53.

[976] Veracini, "Introducing," 3.

[977] Veracini, 3.

[978] Veracini, 3.

and as a practice would not be possible without coloniality, and coloniality continues to be an inevitable outcome of modern discourses."[979]

In recognition of the continuing effects of coloniality, a counter-hegemonic periodization has been introduced to rebut the notion of the end of colonialism and its violations of the colonized. Neil Lazarus suggests designation of the periods of colonial, postcolonial, and neo-colonial to situate the relationship between the West and the constructed non-West. He argues that this will allow the perpetually bankrupted moral justifications for Western interventions abroad to be made visible.[980] Wallerstein explains the justifications referenced by Lazarus as including, the 16th century's "evangelizing" mission to the Americas, the 19th century's "civilizing" mission in Africa, the 20th century's "development" mission in the global south, and the 21st century's mission of "human rights and democracy" globally.[981]

Veracini argues that such recurring interventions and depredations, are the result of a decolonization that displaces *colonialism* rather than *settler-colonialism*. When the colonizer is expelled, such as in the case of colonial decolonization, the displacement is theoretical. "[I]n practice structural inequalities remain."[982] Further, the possibility of a colonial return is always there. However, a settler-colonial decolonization must take place where the colonizer remains and lives under the new social order, wherein land and resources return to indigenous control, and indigenous ways of life and indigenous sovereignty is privileged. The colonizer must be reformed from being a colonizer. To this end "the struggle against settler colonialism must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship ongoing."[983] Because there has been an insufficient or non-existent effort at reforming the colonizer and the colonizing relationship in many places, exploitations of the formerly-colonized are ongoing.

As Sexton concludes:

> Democratizing the settler colony as belatedly enfranchised citizens and subjects, or simply creating distance between colonizer and colonized without cancelling both terms, is to forfeit the possibility of genuine freedom for all while contributing to the destruction of 'the lands, waters, and

[979] Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept," *Cultural Studies* 21, no. 2–3 (March 2007): 244, https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162548.

[980] Neil Lazarus, *The Postcolonial Unconscious*, 1 edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16.

[981] Immanuel Wallerstein, *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, 1 edition (New York: New Press, The, 2006), 27.

[982] Veracini, "Introducing," 7.

[983] Veracini, 7.

> ecosystems upon which [native] people [and ultimately all life] must survive'."[984]

When the colonial period ended in the mid-20th century, amidst "insurgent demands for decolonization and self-determination,"[985] and after the apartheid period ended in the late-20th century, hegemonic discourse shifted. Democratic rule was embraced for all--as long as the resulting democracy was open to outsider intervention. Outsider intervention, however, often created new issues and struggles that elicited even greater outside intervention from the West.

As Western hegemonic discourse becomes disenchanted with democratic notions of majority rule, another shift has transpired. In the interest of creating flourishing free markets, neoliberalism has become the newest iteration of European hegemonic discourse, advocated by those in universities, think tanks, media, corporations, and state agencies like treasury departments and central banks. The influential institutions representing global finance and trade, i.e., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, have been staunch proponents of neoliberalism, dictating terms calling for deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from provision of social benefits.[986] Such policies often result in dire consequences for those who live in entrenched poverty in the former colonies.

The effects of colonization, as well as the effects of neo-colonialist neoliberal policies, have had devastating impact on those in colonized regions. This impact, however, is deemed by those in the mainstream as non-violent. It is sought to be preserved, by means of force if necessary, by the normed middle-class, White, (male) citizen of the West.

8.5.3. Cultural Hegemony Fosters Anti-Black Racism

The body of literature detailing the anti-Black nature of modernity is vast and continually growing. One of the most cogent categories of explanation of the violations that have accrued against Black life, within modernity's cultural norms, has been articulated within the category of thought known as Afro-pessimism.

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[984] Jared Sexton, "The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign," *Critical Sociology* 42, no. 4–5 (July 1, 2016): 5, https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920514552535 quoting Waziyatawin, "The Paradox of Indigenous Resurgence At the End of Empire," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 68.

[985] Lazarus, *The Postcolonial Unconscious*, 2.

[986] David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2–3; Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious, 7–9.

8.5.3.1. Orlando Patterson and Social Death

Afro-pessimism builds upon the work of sociologist Orlando Patterson. In his important book *Slavery and Social Death*, Patterson reframes the conceptualization of slavery. While slavery has historically often been accounted for in terms of (forced) labour relations, Patterson argues that it is more accurately understood as a relation of property. The slave herself, not merely her labour-power, as with the worker, is made an object or a commodity to be used or exchanged. In this way the slave is excluded from the category of human.

Slavery, for Patterson, entails a "social death," which is constituted by "the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons."[987] Several issues are key to this definition. First, slavery was permanent and inherently violent. It was a perpetual and inheritable designation. Initially in the British colonies in the Americas there was little difference between White and Black laborers. White indentured persons were referred to both as servants and slaves interchangeably. Ultimately, however, the "Otherness" of those who were not White, English, Christian, or free, resulted in them being vested with the distinguishing mark of perpetual and inheritable servitude.[988] The permanent status of "slave" required and was maintained by an intrinsic and gratuitous violence against the "slave." Violence was existentially and physically wielded as the "person" was transmuted into a "slave." Violence was further necessary to maintain the "slave" in the condition of slavery, and to maintain the institution of slavery itself.[989]

The corollary of the permanence of the designation of "slave," is the second key characteristic of the definition: permanent enslavement was possible because of the "slave's" natal alienation. Patterson argues that loss of natal claims to parents and community, and without claims to pass on to one's own children, is what allowed the master to claim lifetime power over enslaved persons.[990] Slavery's violation entailed the slave losing "ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations…[it was an] alienation from all formal, legally enforceable ties of "blood," and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master."[991]

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[987] Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 14.
[988] Patterson, 7–9.
[989] Patterson, 9.
[990] Patterson, 9.
[991] Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death*.

The third key characteristic was the "general dishonour" inflicted upon the slave. Slaves were always persons who were dishonoured in a generalized way, "because of…the indignity and all pervasiveness of his indebtedness, his absence of any independent social existence, but most of all because he was without power except through another....[The slave] had…no public worth. He had no name of his own to defend. He could only defend his master's worth and his master's name."[992] General dishonour for the slave involved the slave's social stigma independent of conduct.

Patterson also describes the manner in which the attribution of dishonour in the slave is directly related to the ascription of honour to the master.[993] Violation of the dignity of Black life was fundamental to securing the dignity of White life. Indeed, Patterson shows that cultural formation stagnated where White life could not be ascribed as honourable through the degradation of Black life. In societies where there was no class of free White witnesses of the dishonour of slaves, but only a class of masters and a class of slaves, the masters either abandoned claims of honour, and lived as the master in degraded slave conditions, or the master returned to an imperial centre and, by ostentatious display of wealth, secured the desired honour of the master class.[994]

This analysis resonates with the paper's argument that Jesus's teaching was intended to address issues of shame and honour, and reflects the perennial relevance of such a heuristic.

8.5.3.2. Social Death Outside of Enslavement

The concept of race, physically and juridically, became entrenched in the U.S., as well as in colonized lands outside the West. Though permanence of servitude and natal alienation ceased as determinative characteristics of Black life, Black life would continue to be characterized by existential violence of dehumanization, physically violent control mechanisms, and general dishonour. The conceptualization of free Black life as social death remained appropriate.

Following the demise of the slave trade and slavery in the 19th century Western world, freedom, as that term is normatively politically understood, did not seamlessly follow for the formerly enslaved. While formerly enslaved persons did experience an improvement in their

[992] Patterson, 10.
[993] Patterson, 94–101.
[994] Patterson, 99–100.

social condition, vestiges of an imputed diminished humanity remained. As Sadiya Hartmann makes clear:

> It is not…that the differences between slavery and freedom were negligible; certainly such an assertion would be ridiculous. [Yet, one must] examine the shifting and transformed relations of power that brought about the re-subordination of the emancipated, the control and domination of the free black population, and the persistent production of blackness as abject, threatening, servile, dangerous, dependent, irrational, and infectious. In short, the advent of freedom marked the transition from the pained and minimally sensate existence of the slave to the burdened individuality of the responsible and encumbered freed person.[995]

Hartman notes that the end of enslavement shifted the contours of Black diminishment, rather than relieved the Black person of the diminishment.

Saidiya Hartmann's most recent book project examines how the violation of slavery continue into the present day.

> If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because of an antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too long memory, but because black lives are still imperilled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery—skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery.[996]

8.5.3.3. Afro-pessimism

From the period of the Enlightenment, culturally hegemonic ideals have privileged the notions of liberty, equality, and human dignity.[997] However, arising as they did within a context of gender exclusion, anti-Black racialization, and colonial subjugation, these normative ideals mask the reality of both their non-applicability to broad segments of the population, and their inherent violation of those who were excluded from being recognized as "subjects" who might

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[995] Saidiya V. Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 116–17.

[996] Saidiya Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route*, First edition (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 6.

[997] See founding documents of newly organized republics, U.S. Declaration of Independence ("we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html) and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of France ("men are born and remain free and equal in rights, Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good." http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp).

be possessed of the dignity and liberty that were considered core elements of the universal notion of the meaning of human being ("man").[998]

Because Black life has been violently dehumanized, controlled, dishonoured, "Othered," and, thus, imprinted with social death, via the functioning of the normal, ostensibly non-violent political apparatus of state, Afro-pessimism presents a pessimistic theorization of race.[999] Led by critical theorists Frank Wilderson and Jared Sexton,[1000] Afropessimism radically posits that the violence/anti-Blackness of the political structure is irredeemable. It argues that anti-Black violence is an integral part of the very structure of society, and that societal systems can be understood only as corollaries to anti-Blackness. As has been noted,

> the violence of antiblackness produces black existence; there is no prior positive blackness that could be potentially appropriated. Black existence is simultaneously produced and negated by racial domination, both as presupposition and consequence. Affirmation of blackness proves to be impossible without simultaneously affirming the violence that structures black subjectivity itself.[1001]

Thus, the systematic nature of the disenfranchisement, dispossession, and killing of Black life, is not merely evidence of a flawed system, but such oppression is constitutive of the political, economic, and justice systems themselves. Afro-pessimism argues that society *as it is* should not be preserved or reformed, since reform requires reliance upon an anti-Black legitimizing norm, and constitutes displaced hope in institutions—schools, courts, prisons, churches, etc.—that foster and sustain anti-Blackness. "Afro-pessimism posits that the only way out is to negate that negation [of Black life]."[1002]

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[998] Sylvia Wynter maps the development of the human being explicitly construed as "Man." See, Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/ Power/ Truth/ Freedom."

[999] Sexton notes the hostile with which the pessimistic theorization of race has been greeted; "the felt need among critics to defend themselves, their work, their principles and their politics against the perceived threat. In place of thoughtful commentary, we have distancing and disavowal." Jared Sexton, "Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word," *Rhizomes: Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge*, no. 29 (2016): para. 6, https://doi.org/10.20415/rhiz/029.e02.

[1000] Annie Olaloku-Teriba, "Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness," *Historical Materialism* 26, no. 2, accessed November 5, 2018, http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/articles/afro-pessimism-and-unlogic-anti-blackness#_ftn13. Olaloku-Teriba notes these two as chief architects of the theory, from whose work others' work tends to be derived. Sexton points out that the body of afro-pessimist thought is growing due to social media engagement by scholars, and by "the uncontainable categorical sprawl of the epochal transformation that names the emergence of racial slavery as such."Sexton, "Afro-Pessimism," paras. 2, 3.

[1001] R.L., "Wanderings of the Slave: Black Life and Social Death," *Mute*, June 5, 2013, http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/wanderings-slave-black-life-and-social-death.

[1002] "Introduction," in *Afro-Pessimism: An Introduction* (Minneapolis, MN: Racked and Dispatched, 2017), 8–13, http://archive.org/details/AfroPessimismread.

Significantly, Afro-pessimism positions the Black being at the centre of analysis as uniquely constituted, even with respect to other persons of colour. This is not to construct a hierarchy of oppression. This is the assertion that Black being exists as a dehumanized conceptual object, unlike any other. Wilderson argues that the reason for this distinction is two fold. First, the difference of Blackness (and slavery) is that the violence of modernity against Black life is without utility or rationale;[1003] it is intrinsic violence.[1004] Where non-Black post-colonial subjects are concerned, violence has been inflicted "to secure and maintain the occupation of land."[1005] Under a Marxist paradigm, violence against the working class is "to secure and maintain the extraction of surplus-value and the wage."[1006] Against indigenous peoples, violence is a means of "usurpation of cartography, of space."[1007] From a feminist perspective, society's violence against women may be understood as a means of securing and maintaining patriarchal control.[1008] This is not the case, however, with Black persons. "Violence against Black people is a mechanism for the usurpation of subjectivity, of life, of being."[1009]

Making a second point about the distinction of violence against Black being, Wilderson goes further. He postulates that the violence that is intrinsic to the making of the non-being of the Black is necessary for the psychic well-being, and the epistemological security, of the collective unconscious of the non-Black community.[1010] (This is similar to the argument made by Patterson regarding slavery, that the honour of the master is directly related to the dishonour in the slave.) Wilderson illustrates the point anecdotally, referencing film and history. In the film *Twelve Years a Slave*, he states, the beating of the slave Patsy, is made to look like "ordinary sadism and jealousy on the wife's part and so it actually almost becomes a…love triangle." However, in the book, "the violence against the slaves…actually has no utility, it has

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[1003] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," in *Afro-Pessimism: An Introduction* (Minneapolis, MN: Racked and Dispatched, 2017), 24, http://archive.org/details/AfroPessimismread, a transcription of the radio interview, "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," MP3, *KPFA–Against the Grain* (Berkeley, March 4, 2015), https://kpfa.org/episode/against-the-grain-march-4-2015/ radio interview.

[1004] See discussion, *supra*, at 7.33, related to the instrumental or intrinsic nature of violence.

[1005] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," 2017, 19.

[1006] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," 19.

[1007] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," 25.

[1008] Dorothy Coxon, "Violence (2)," in An A to Z of Feminist Theology, ed. Lisa Isherwood and Dorothea McEwan (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996).

[1009] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," 2017, 25.

[1010] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," 26–27.

no rationale."[1011] He then recalls the four hundred or so plantations that formerly existed in California between Berkeley and San Jose, one of which his father was from. On the plantations, entire families--children, wives, and husbands--would "all participate in the regular beating of slaves…It sustains the psychic health of the people…"[1012]

To argue for an Afro-pessimistic unique situatedness of Blackness is also to acknowledge the life- and dignity-stealing violence perpetuated against Black being singularly by all other persons in society.[1013] It is a violence that erases the Black being in a way that others are not erased.

Wilderson discusses the discrepancy between the life of violated Blackness and that of non-Blackness in the context of the freedom struggle in South Africa. Wilderson is an African-American who lived and worked in South Africa, and with the ANC, between 1989 and 1996.[1014] Immersed in the culture, he gained insight on the political, economic, and social climate during the last days of Apartheid. He writes of a particular incident in 1992, "not long after the massacre at Boipatong."[1015] A member of the COSATU central committee, a member each from the ANC and NEC, together with Ronnie Kasrils, white ANC member and a leader of MK, co-chaired a Tripartite Alliance Rolling Mass Action meeting in Johannesburg. There were eighty to ninety Black South Africans, and five or ten White or Indian South Africans present. Wilderson was the sole African-American delegate. He notes the anxiety and quiet tension evident in Kasrils body as the extended period of loud, aggressive singing went on, with the refrains of "Chris Hani is our shield! Socialism is our shield! Kill the Farmer Kill the Boer!"[1016] Wilderson describes Kasrils' distorted face as being "pulled by opposing needs—the need to bring the state to heel and the need to manage the Blacks." A plan was brought forward to drive a fleet of buses filled with demonstrators to the border of the Ciskei, to hold a rally, and then forcibly march through the erected fence and liberate the people inside the "homeland." The meeting co-chairs became concerned, Wilderson reports. After conferring together in whispers, Kasrils left the room and returned with an intelligence report "that should

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[1011] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," 24.
[1012] "Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation," 24.
[1013] "Introduction," 12.
[1014] Frank B. Wilderson, "Biko and the Problematic of Presence," in *Biko Lives!: Contesting the Legacies of Steve Biko*, ed. A. Mngxitama, A. Alexander, and N. Gibson, 2008 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 95.
[1015] Wilderson, 96.
[1016] Wilderson, 96.

give us pause." If such a mass action occurred, Kasrils informed the group, General Joshua Oupa Gqozo would open fire with live ammunition.

> To Comrade Kasrils' horror the room erupts in cheers and applause. This, I am thinking, as I join the cheering and the singing, is not the response his "intelligence" was meant to elicit.[1017]

What the episode made clear for Wilderson was the fundamental difference of *absence* to Blackness, that non-Black persons do not experience. He says,

> The divergence of our joy and what appeared to be his anxiety was expressed as divergent structures of feeling that I believe to be…symptomatic of irreconcilable differences in how and where Blacks are positioned, ontologically, in relation to non-Blacks…Perhaps the bullets that were promised us did not manifest within our psyches as lethal deterrents because they were manifested as gifts; rare gifts of recognition…acknowledgment that we did form an ensemble of Human capacity instead of a collection of kaffirs or a bunch of niggers. We experienced a transcendent impossibility: A moment of Blackness-as-Presence in a world overdetermined by Blackness-as-Absence.[1018]

Wilderson states is that it was not a death wish, but the prospect of being seen, even as a threat warranting death, that elicited the joy in the room. Being seen, even negatively, was preferable to being the unseen and the absent. He concludes that:

> a threat [of death] in response to the gesture of our collective—our "living"—will, made us feel as though we were alive, as though we possessed what in fact we could not possess, Human life, as opposed to Black life (which is always already "substitutively dead," "a fatal way of being alive")—we could die because we lived.[1019]

The violence of the society that unsees and marks as absent, is a violence that is unique to Black being. Thus, the argument that Black being must be centred in conceptualizing the marginalization of the Other gains purchase.

Afro-pessimist theory is engaged here as it represents an unflinching willingness to name and to intellectually confront the cultural hegemonic violence embedded in society, that

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[1017] Wilderson, 96.
[1018] Wilderson, 97.
[1019] Wilderson, 97 citing, David Marriott, On Black Men (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 15 and 19.

cannot be appreciated without interrogation of the imagination that created racial slavery in modernity and the construction of Black being. Further, the foundation discussion of slavery and social death provides insight for the subject of the next chapter, which concerns a metaphysical account of the violation to the human will of the Black person, which has so far been named as a psychological and existential/ontological violence. The discussion of anti-Blackness of culture demonstrates a violence against Blackness that is made to embed the thinking, feeling, and being of Black persons, and also the thinking, feeling, and being of White persons who enact, maintain, and are mystified as to the violence. The history of Black people that continues to bear vestiges of inferiority and to expose them to psychic and physical trauma must not fail to be recognized as intrinsic violence.

8.5.3.4. Anti-Blackness, Afropessimism and the Black Theological Tradition

To make explicit the connection between Afropessimist theory and theology, it is important here to recognize the ways in which the tradition of Black theology has understood and responded to the anti-Blackness of modernity. Further, to explicate the ways in which Afropessimism is the most recent iteration, and inevitable terminus, of theologies of Black life.

8.5.3.4.1. Origins of Black Theology

Black Theology, or theologies of Black life must, first, be understood as those that arise out of the experiences of those who have been raced as Black. Its origins must, then, be situated in the geographies where the transmutation to Black beingness occurred; it must begin with the experience of former Africans in the Americas. Understanding Black theology in the Americas requires, further, acknowledgement of the impact of the intertwining forces of Christianity and geopolitics on the construction of Blackness. Because Brazil, the Caribbean, and the U.S. were predominant sites of Black disembarkation from slave ships, and because, these sites were variously controlled by the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French, and because the practice of trading in human cargo spanned several centuries, the experiences of Blacks in the Americas varies widely. It is clear, however, that throughout the disparate locales and eras, that enslaved existence entailed fatal toil, and also resistance to captivity.

Resistance of the enslaved was evident throughout the period of captivity. From slave ship suicide, to plantation escape and marronage,[1020] to full scale rebellion and insurrection,[1021] there was an impetus to escape bondage. Acts of freedom-seeking evidence a belief system, whether or not related to faith in the Christian God, that upholds the sanctity of humanness as entailing free being. The Christian conception of freeness as part of the *imago dei* was, thus, incarnated in the actions of enslaved persons; actions that were considered transgressive of juridical laws of the day, but that were driven by the human will to be free.

The connection between the acts of the enslaved and Christian theology were made explicit when Christian abolition was joined to the struggle of the enslaved in resisting the practice of human enslavement. During the first Great Awakening there were larger conversions of Africans to Christianity than in times preceding the evangelicalism of the Great Awakening.[1022] The enslaved adapted evangelical Christianity to suit their circumstances. They "[made] Christianity their own, developing a liberation theology that identified with the enslaved Israelites as the chosen people of God and the story of the exodus."[1023] Sinha has demonstrated[1024] that the actions of the enslaved Christians shaped the abolition movement and dictated its goals. Enslaved and formerly enslaved Black Christians, as well as Whites, used scripture to elucidate the evils of slavery and to Christianize the cause of ending slavery.

Rejecting the disparate treatment received within denominational settings, seeking dignity, Blacks founded their own Christian denominations. Later, after slavery's legal end in the U.S., leaders such as Henry McNeal Turner (1834-1915), continued to push for equal treatment using arguments rooted in Christian doctrine. Turner, "used the scriptural mandate

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[1020] See, e.g., Gad Heuman, ed., *Out of the House of Bondage*, 1 edition (Routledge, 2016); Richard Price, ed., *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas*, 3rd edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); N. A. T. Hall, "Maritime Maroons: 'Grand Marronage' from the Danish West Indies," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (October 1985): 476; Linda M. Rupert, "Marronage, Manumission and Maritime Trade in the Early Modern Caribbean," *Slavery & Abolition* 30, no. 3 (September 2009): 361–82.

[1021] See, e.g., Harvey Wish, "American Slave Insurrections Before 1861," *The Journal of Negro History* 22, no. 3 (July 1937): 299–320; Joshua Coffin, *An Account of Some of the Principal Slave Insurrections: And Others, Which Have Occurred, Or Been Attempted, in the United States and Elsewhere, During the Last Two Centuries* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 2004); Monica Schuler, "Ethnic Slave Rebellions in the Caribbean and the Guianas," *Journal of Social History* 3, no. 4 (Summer 1970): 374–85; Leslie F. Manigat, "The Relationship Between Marronage and Slave Revolts in St. Domingue-Haiti," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 292, no. 1 Comparative P (June 1977): 420–38.

[1022] see, Frank Lambert, "'I Saw the Book Talk': Slave Readings of the First Great Awakening," *The Journal of African American History* 87 (2002): 12–25.

[1023] Manisha Sinha, *The Slave's Cause: A History of Abolition*, Reprint edition (Yale University Press, 2017), 28.

[1024] Sinha, *The Slave's Cause*.

for justice one finds in the Hebrew Bible and the teachings of Jesus the Christ in the New Testament to fight against modern injustice. Turner critiqued white and African American Christians alike who did not actively pursue a transformed society."[1025] Throughout the post-civil war and civil rights eras, there was resistance (alongside of accommodation[1026]) in the ethos of the Black church,[1027] which differed from the ethos of the Christianity practiced by Whites.

8.5.3.4.2. Formal Black Theology

8.5.3.4.2.1. Howard Thurman

The immensely influential mystic and theologian, Howard Thurman (1899–1981) expressed the Black/White Christian theological divide in a comment to Ghandi in the 1930s during a journey to India: "I make a careful distinction between Christianity [as practiced by Whites] and the religion of Jesus."[1028] Thurman's work of explicating his "religion of Jesus," in *Jesus and the Disinherited*,[1029] indeed serves as a bridge across both the different racialized understandings of the Christian faith, and a bridge between the informal constructive theologies of earlier centuries of Black religious thought and twentieth century constructions of Black Christian theology. For Thurman, the biblical narratives present a Jesus with three predominate characteristics: Jesus was Jewish, Jesus was poor, and Jesus was a member of the group of oppressed Palestinians under Roman imperial rule. Thurman's Jesus preached a gospel of the kingdom of God that sought to transform the inner being of the oppressed, so that, transformed, they might impact the larger Roman world. Inner transformation, and focus on sacrificial love and redemptive suffering, in furtherance of the ultimate good of building of community, was key to Thurman's theology. Thurman's bridging gospel empathized Christology (of Jesus's lowly estate) and ecclesiology (of community between the disinherited and the privileged) as

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[1025] Anthony B. Pinn, "Black Theology," in *Liberation Theologies in the United States: An Introduction*, ed. Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas and Anthony B. Pinn (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 17.

[1026] Some scholars have argued that following the end of legal slavery, the Black church took on an "accommodationist" posture that embraced Victorian mores. Others have emphasized the ways that an emphasis upon "moral, economic, social, and educational improvement" of the formerly enslaved overlapped with Victorian morals. See, Kendra H. Barber, "Whither Shall We Go? The Past and Present of Black Churches and the Public Sphere," *Religions* 6, no. 1 (March 2015): 247.

[1027] See, C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya, *The Black Church in the African American Experience*, First Edition edition (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1990).

[1028] Howard Thurman, *With Head and Heart: The Autobiography of Howard Thurman* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), 114.

[1029] Howard Thurman, *Jesus and the Disinherited*, Reprint edition (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996).

hallmarks of the Christian good news. The liberative work of the gospel was primarily the work of inner liberation from mental bondage.

8.5.3.4.2.2. James Cone

Publication of James H. Cone's seminal *Black Theology and Black Power*[1030] in 1969, and *A Black Theology of Liberation*[1031] in 1970, was a late-twentieth century extension of the Black Christian tradition of constructive theology. Writing in a post-Martin Luther King, Jr. context of Black Power protest, Cone became the first professional Black theologian of liberation, making links between Black oppression and the Christian scriptural mandate against oppression. For Cone, the heart of the message of the Bible is that God, through Jesus, is principally concerned with the liberation of the materially poor in society, which, in contemporary application, meant that Jesus primarily offered a message of liberation to Blacks. God so strongly identified with the oppressed, argued Cone, that God becomes one with the oppressed. Cone asserted, therefore, that ultimately, God, and Jesus, must be understood as Black.

> [Jesus] meets the blacks where they are and becomes one of them…"Oh, but surely Christ is above race." But society is not raceless, any more than when God became a despised Jew. White liberal preference for a raceless Christ serves only to make official and orthodox the centuries-old portrayal of Christ as white…But whether whites want to hear it or not, *Christ is black, baby*, with all the features which are so detestable to white society.[1032]

Christianity, for Cone, requires equally strong solidarity with the oppressed. "It is the job of the church to become black with [Jesus] and accept the shame which white society places on blacks."[1033] In Cone's early scholarship,[1034] then, paramount to the Christian faith was Christology that held Jesus to be Black, ecclesiology which held the body of the church to be the collective community of black bodies, and a privileging of the message of physical liberation above soteriological spiritual freedom.

[1030] James H. Cone, *Black Theology and Black Power* (San Francisco: Harpercollins College Div, 1989).

[1031] James H. Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation*, 40th Anniversary edition (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 2010).

[1032] Cone, *Black Theology and Black Power*, 68.

[1033] Cone, 69.

[1034] In later work Cone's emphasis shifted to naming Black theology as one of many contextual theologies, to move from a focus on struggle to sources of African-American inspiration and history, See, e.g., James H. Cone, *The Spirituals and the Blues: An Interpretation*, 2nd Revised ed. edition (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992).

8.5.3.4.2.3. Womanist Theology

Later, the work of theologians of differing marginalized backgrounds identified distinct strands of liberative theology. Among these distinctives is the theology advanced by, for, and about, Black women. Black womanist theologians, including the founding voices of Jacquelyn Grant, Katie Geneva Cannon and Delores Williams, drew attention to, not only the racism of the larger White culture, but to the failure of theology to address the sexism and oppression that marked the experiences of Black women; sexism which was pervasive even within Black theological circles ostensibly concerned with liberation. Womanists have argued that Black women have a "tri-dimensional" experience of the oppressions of race, gender, and class.[1035] Williams has likened the layers of oppression to that experienced by Hagar, Abraham's Egyptian slave in the biblical narrative. Hagar experienced slavery, hunger, fugitivity, forced surrogacy, and sexual and economic exploitation. Yet, she was not released from bondage like the Hebrew slaves, instead her deliverance can be read as her survival and as the care.[1036] "Hagar was not engaged by a God who liberated her from the deplorable social circumstances to which she was captive, but rather by a God who provided resources for her to negotiate a quality of life that empowered Hagar to survive the brokenness of her social circumstances."[1037] Grant mediates the womanist positions of Christ as liberator and Christ as caretaker. She shows the ways in which the Black Christ suffers with black women in all of their particularity, and the ways that Christ's resurrection delimits suffering so that it does not finally triumph. Christ, then, is liberator from suffering, caretaker during suffering, and co-sufferer with the suffering. For Grant, "Christ, found in the experience of Black women, is a Black woman."[1038] Additionally, womanists have privileged an ecclesiology that emphasizes the self in the community. As Marshall Turman notes, womanism reflects a concern for the ecclesia, the communal body. There is an "*ethic of responsibility* that…disregard[s] the self as primary concern in order to address the collective reality…an ethic…requir[ing] that individuals always approach the task of justice making as a self-in-community. In this way, moral agency is never

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[1035] Jacquelyn Grant, "Womanist Theology: Black Women's Experience as a Source for Doing Theology, with Special Reference to Christology," in *Black Theology: A Documentary History, 1980-1992*, ed. James H. Cone and Gayraud S. Wilmore, 2nd revised edition, vol. 1 (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1993), 278.

[1036] Delores S. Williams, *Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk*, Anniversary Edition edition (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2013), 19–21.

[1037] Eboni Marshall Turman, *Toward a Womanist Ethic of Incarnation: Black Bodies, the Black Church, and the Council of Chalcedon*, 2013 edition (New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 142.

[1038] Grant, "Womanist Theology: Black Women's Experience as a Source for Doing Theology, with Special Reference to Christology," 287.

activated as an independent endeavour, but, as a "fitting" response, moral agency is always accountable to what proves to be right and good for the entire community."[1039]

Finally, one of the most significant aspects of womanist theology is the privileging of the experiences of Black women, and of radical subjectivity as grounds of normatizing epistemology. "Womanist scholars of religion redefined the term epistemology as the unction to search for truth, interrogating the foundations upon which truth itself is established, and for reimagining truth in a world that denies its existence."[1040] The self is the womanist benchmark for critically engaging others.[1041]

Womanists, then, speaking from the authority of the Black woman's individual subjective experience, identify Jesus as one who is ultimately concerned with the particularity of Black women's struggles, and who practices justice-making for the particular one, but also the community.

8.5.3.4.3. Critiques of Black Theology

Aspects of formal Black Theology have drawn various critiques. Long argues that the adoption of Christianity and of theological discourse, and its linguistic structures, is an adoption of European imperialistic mores. Black Theology's articulation is, thus, not sufficiently constructive of religious thought intended for, and derived from, Black life.[1042] Anderson critiques the ontologics of Black Theology, arguing that "Blackness" has been presented as merely a privation of "Whiteness," which represents the Enlightenment sensibilities of heroic, epochal, culture-advancing genius; and that "blackness [merely] signifies the blackness that whiteness created."[1043] He posits that essentialist "ontological blackness" is theologically empty of meaning, and lacks transcendence, without Whiteness, oppression, resistance, or survival, thus it is incapable of, in itself, offering revelatory communication of Gospel truth. Carter makes a similar charge against essentialized Black Theology. For Carter, "black theology remains beholden to the logics of modern racial reasoning…[such an] ontology

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[1039] Marshall Turman, *Toward a Womanist Ethic of Incarnation*, 53.

[1040] Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas, 'Writing for Our Lives: Womanism as an Epistemological Revolution', in *Deeper Shades of Purple: Womanism in Religion and Society*, ed. by Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas (New York: NYU Press, 2006), pp. 1–14 (p. 3).

[1041] Marshall Turman, *Toward a Womanist Ethic of Incarnation*, 157.

[1042] See, Charles H. Long, *Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion*, 2nd edition (Aurora, Colo: The Davies Group Publishers, 1999).

[1043] Victor Anderson, *Beyond Ontological Blackness: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural Criticism* (New York United Kingdom: Continuum Intl Pub Group, 1999), 13.

disallows transcendence and thus recapitulates the inner logic of modern racial reasoning"[1044] Carter argues that Black theology fundamentally constitutes a response to a reformulated anti-Semitism; that the supersessionism implicit to the modern Christian imagination now (also) appears as anti-Black racism. The supersessionist impulse is not merely a mark of marginalization, it is heresy. Therefore, theologies that do little to disrupt the Christian severance of Jesus from Jewishness, fail to address the root of the problem of race.

The most trenchant critique of essentializing models of Black Theology, however, has been offered by Marshall Turman, a womanist theologian. Marshall Turman argues that the womanist project asserts the experience of Black womanhood as, *in itself*, primary to identity. This primary *in itself* identification mimics that of the *in itself*, "inconceivable," "just is" element of Jesus's identity, as determined by the Council of Calcedon.[1045] Jesus's is-ness, his being, was a reality before there was an incarnation. Jesus's incarnation, his being within socio-political time/space, is only of secondary reality. The inconceivable Jesus has precedence over the conceivable/conceived Jesus. The same precedence exists for the "just is"-ness of the Black woman, over and above her socio-political being. As Marshall Turman argues:

a womanist ethic of incarnation contends that sociohistorical realities [essentialized Blackness] must be negotiated with a primary *in-itself* that is prompted by divine activity "in the flesh." In fact, it asserts that the lone privileging of sociohistorical realities in the search for justice is able to paradoxically reproduce the same empirical problematic that weakens the viability of Social Gospel methodology.[1046]

8.5.3.4.4. Black Theology and Afropessimism

It is at this point that Afropessimist theorization may be understood as a continuation of the development of constructed Black theologies grounded in Black life and experience. While it might appear that Marshall Turman's conception of "just is," *in itself*, being is the antithesis of Afropessimistic *nonbeing*, closer reflection reveals that not an antithesis, but that the arguments are opposite sides of the same coin. Marshall Turman recognizes that, and Black women, possess the mark of human *is-ness*, that cannot be reduced to an externally inscribed category. She nonetheless acknowledges that the concrete social-historical realities do play a

[1044] J. Kameron Carter, *Race: A Theological Account*, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 158.
[1045] Marshall Turman, *Toward a Womanist Ethic of Incarnation*, 158.
[1046] Marshall Turman, 160.

secondary role in one's identity. In other words, it is the *Black woman*, whose concrete reality is secondary to the "in itself" reality that she self-articulates. Afropessimism may be read as making the same assertion in the obverse. It may be read as saying that there does exist an *is-ness* to those raced as Black, however the reality of the Black man's *is-ness* is implacably subsumed by his social-historical concrete reality. The secondary reality (of time and space) has rendered invisible and unreal the primary reality, though the primary reality remains primary and remains real. In other words, the intellectual labour of philosophy and theory of Black persons makes real the *is-ness* of Black being that has, nevertheless, been burdened with social nonbeing. Like Marshall Turman's womanist construction, Afropessimist theory affirms the is-ness of radical subjectivities, and implicitly makes that identity primary, while not denying the concrete realities of the social-historical. Where Afropessimism differs, however, is in the meaning that is assigned to this primary/secondary identification. Marshall Turman's womanism argues for a reconstruction of the corrupted systems of church and state. Afropessimism, on the other hand, argues, in the vein of Carter, that a systems change is insufficient. A metaphysical alteration of the entire underlying social structure is necessary, and further, that such an alteration is not likely, or possible. In other words, womanism argues for removing oppression from the social order. Afropessimism argues that removal of oppression from the social order is impossible without destroying the social order since oppression is so deeply imbedded within it. In this light, Carter might be read as Afropessimist in that, while he identifies the source of the deleterious concrete realities that confront Black persons, and he locates that source as theological in origin (supersessionism), Carter presents his findings without superfluous hope that the diagnosis offered will lead to a cure.[1047]

8.5.4. Cultural Hegemonic Violence Conclusion

When the phenomenon of violence is registered through the experiences of women, those formerly colonized by Western nations, and Black persons, it becomes clear that the experience of violence is not fully accounted for by a narrow "product" definition of the term. The idea that violence is imbedded in structures, institutions, and occurs as a normative feature

[1047] For more on Afropessimism and Christian hope see, Vincent Lloyd, "Afro-Pessimism and Christian Hope," in *Grace, Governance and Globalization*, ed. Martin G. Poulsom, Stephan van Erp, and Lieven Boeve, Studies in Edward Schillebeeckx (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 191–205; Vincent Lloyd, "For What Are Whites to Hope?," *Political Theology* 17, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 168–81.

of cultural hegemonic life of society, reveals the nature of violence as, indeed, "cumulative," "boundless," and "spilling over."

8.6. Conclusion of Theorization of Violence

This chapter reflected on the meaning of violence. It showed the ways that social science has understood violence in the life of human beings from the perspective of anthropology and psychology. The branch of cultural anthropology provides grounds for conception of violence as encompassing more than mere physical aggression or use of force. Rather, scholars have determined that violence involves underlying and interrelated social and cultural constructs. Psychological scholarship has also argued for conception of violence as multifaceted and complex, as a "wicked" problem. The psychological scholarship's more relevant contribution, for the purposes of this paper is the notion of a three-stage cycle of aggression, which includes inputs, internal processing, and outputs. This provides support for the argument of Part One of the paper that Jesus was interested in addressing, not the human output of violence, so much as he was interested in re-orientating human interpretation of inputs, the psychology of violence.

Violence, broadly conceptualized, requires acceptance that violence is not only a "product," a narrowly defined act of force that is episodic or sporadic, but that violence is "process." It is cumulative and boundless and spills over. The process of violence lends itself to understanding by types or categories of manifestations. Galtung's typology of violence names direct, structural, and cultural violence, to which might be added the types of foundational violence and existential violence. Existential violence is a violence committed to the being of Black persons, as discussed by Fanon, Césaire, and the school of Afro-pessimism. It damages one's self-ness; one's self-understanding and self-expression. Existential violence arises for Black persons specifically because of their experiences of slavery and social death that continue into the present. The violence of gender and colonial oppression are also discussed in this chapter.

Connection to Larger Project:

What this discussion of violence shows is that violence is a broad concept, and that the being of Black persons, especially female, formerly colonized black persons, is the subject of violence whether or not there is the presence of coercive physical force. The social death that attends to those who were marked as slaves (despite actual condition of enslavement) is an act of violation that is ongoing. To discuss non-violence under these circumstances is to fail to address the ways that *continuing to exist* in the face of powers that seek to extinguish the

individual's unique humanity, is to be non-violent. Black existence that does not implode or explode *is* non-violence. This brings to the fore the fact that much of the self-damaging pathology that is witnessed in communities that have been "Blackened," excluded from social life or marked for social death, might be viewed as the result of the existential violence that these communities are subjected to without relief. Even where there is no use of force—no guns, no knives, no rape, no killing by gangs, where there is widespread addiction, unrestrained licentiousness, emotionally-rooted obesity, and the like; where there is diminished life without physical violence, in other words, the pathology is a response to a diminishment of existence. It is an inward directed violence responding to the unnamed existential violence that the social order directs against Black being.

In which case, what good news does a non-violent-Jesus narrative offer? The non-violent-Jesus narrative does not speak to issues of existential violence. However, the Jesus-Who-Resists paradigm that I propose does. The Jesus-Who-Resists acknowledges the violences to dignity, which are as damaging as violence to the body. The Jesus-Who-Resists registers that life, salvation, and wholeness do not come from possessing physical weapons, nor is true life taken away by physical weapons. Jesus-Who-Resists urges the cultivation of an inward being, that is lived into by one's actions. Jesus-Who-Resists recognizes the dehumanizing messages and methods of the culture. He tells his followers not to be followers of cultural norms that diminish them, but to accept that they are children of God, loved by God. He endows his followers with the authority and power *to be*, as they are, without shame, debasement, or humiliation. From this place of dignity one can receive the input of disparagement or degradation, and not allow the input to have meaning as to the truth of who one is; one can offer an output, a response, that does not necessitate the use of physical force. One can demonstrate through one's actions the lie of the input, and the truth that one believes about oneself.

The following table (*See, table 7-2, below*) provides a comparison of the different approaches to offense.

Table 8-2 Comparison of (Non)Violent Responses

	Violence	Non-violence	Pacifism	Jesus Resistance
Hit in the face by someone who	Hit the perpetrator back.	Gather with others and protest to the	Walk away; accept the battery as	Demonstrate that you are not afraid, will not

intends to humiliate you.		perpetrator that hitting is bad.	suffering to be endured; hope God intervenes.	back down, or be made ashamed, e.g., look them in the eye, don't cow, stick out your chin out and dare them to hit you again.
"Nigger/Kaffir!"	Punch the perpetrator in the face.	Answer the perpetrator, "Do not dare call me that!"; publicize the perpetrator's words to shame them.	Ignore the insult; let people call you names; endure suffering.	Demonstrate that you are not impressed with their words, n or are you shamed, e.g., reply, "You mean to say, '*Lazy* nigger/kaffir!', since I am about to sit down right here in the sunshine, sip my cool drink, and enjoy the breeze on this fine day."

I use the second example to paint a realistic picture of how outlandish Jesus's suggestions must have sounded to his hearers. My point is to show that Jesus's emphasis in his Sermon was on the power of the individual to refuse to give the perpetrator of violence the

power to humiliate, dishonour, or dehumanize. To show how Jesus's resistance disables the weapons of humiliation.

This example also shows the limited nature of Jesus's instructions. He was not speaking to the matter of corporate and state use of force, or even violence, *per se*, at all. Jesus was offering to his hearers, what continues to be necessary today, a way of acclaiming dignity in the face of those who despise you.

Violence is, ultimately, a vast web. It has been most destructive for Black people in its existential dimensions. Jesus-Who-Resists presents a theology that allows resistance, that allows creativity, that takes into account individual particularities of circumstance, and that refuses to accept the normativized terms of honour and shame, worth and worthlessness.

9. Theological Analysis from the Margins: Violence and Human Will

9.1. Introduction

The last chapter demonstrated the vastness of the concept of violence. It showed how violence appears invisibly in the normalized operation of everyday life. The chapter demonstrated that Black life, beginning with slavery and the social death of the enslaved, has suffered not only physically from violence but existentially from violence. I argued that the Jesus-Who-Resists is deeply concerned with the violence that dehumanizes, rather than with overt acts of force.

This chapter considers how violence, particularly existential violence, provokes violent protest, and why violent protest against existential conditions, is a faithful expression of the *zoë* life for which humanity is created. Relying upon the metaphysical deconstruction of the will of medieval theologian/philosopher Duns Scotus, it will be shown that Black persons' physical violence during acts of protest is an expression of the human will that was disordered by slavery, seeking to re-orient itself to proper function. It is a will that is free to will. I argue that the force of the effort of the will to re-orient itself metaphysically, may at times spill over into physical expression of force. This is not a bad or immoral result. The initial violence that disordered the will is the bad and immoral act. The restoration of the will of Black persons to proper function is a human good.

The chapter first discusses the significance of freedom to human being. It then considers theologian/philosopher Duns Scotus's metaphysical deconstruction of free will--how it actually operates inside the human. I then analyse how the process of enslavement disrupts the operation of free will as outlined by Scotus. I show how the disordered will-ing of Black persons has been accepted as normal. I then discuss the ways that protest against continuing dehumanizing treatment is an example of the will being re-oriented to proper function. I discuss how this process of reorientation requires force of will that oftimes finds expression in physically forceful ways.

9.2. Black Humanity and Unfreedom

The histories of slavery and domination in the U.S. and South Africa have directly contributed to present-day inequalities, most clearly seen in the material conditions in which persons of African ancestry live. Yet these inequalities extend beyond materiality and encompass inequalities of personhood. The Afro-pessimism arguments of the last chapter are

summarized well by Sexton when he asserts of the radical existential violence of the enslavement of Blacks, "[s]lavery is not a loss that the self experiences – of language, lineage, land, or labour – but rather the loss of any self that could experience such loss."[1048]

The want of humanness in the African resulted in human dignity being denied to Blacks as people. An ontological and psychological perennial moment of crisis for Black beings was the result. This crisis has been characterized as an internal struggle of being resulting in a social-psychological "double-consciousness":

> One ever feels his two-ness—an American [or Modern], a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.[1049]

This struggle in the soul of the Black person, centres on the question of how one properly realizes one's self-ness, after legislated enslavement has ended, given one's dual formation as both a modern subject, and also as a Black non-subject object. The ontological and psychological crisis of being for Black persons constitutes an incongruity between existing as human in theory, yet being unable to apprehend the essential human attribute of a free will. The internal and external freedom incongruity operates not only as an external diminishment of the human, but also fractures the will itself, so that the human dignity that is derived from the ability to will freely is impaired in the metaphysical constitution of Black persons.

9.2.1. Theological Constructions of Freedom

9.2.1.1. Freedom is Inherent to the Human

Humans are created to be and to become. Their existence is good, and their existence is progressive. Humans grow, individually, and collectively in communities. Humans grow into beings who are able to create that which is another (humans) and that which is other (cultural artefacts). Human growth leans towards the harmonious flourishing of the created world. The human capacity to create (which is of greater complexity than that of other beings) implies that human beings must have the mental and physical capacity to manifest their propensity to grow, and to create. They must have the capacity both to reason and to act. Like physical variations, the capacity for this "auto-creativity" varies, however the ability to reason and to act, "to will," is central to human personhood.

[1048] Sexton, "The Vel of Slavery," 9.
[1049] W. E. B. Dubois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (Simon and Schuster, 2014), 7.

The human capacity "to will" is made meaningful by understanding it as human freedom. To be free, or to be one who wills, entails, first, an inner disposition of being. To be free, or to be one who wills, is to be one who has inward desires and whose desires become the subject of one's inner ruminations. It also means to be one who makes decisions regarding their desires. One's will-ing derives from ones desiring. The essence of freedom, then, more fundamental than freedoms claimed as part of social-political community, is one's ability to will in accordance with one's desires. The will's freeness is seen in the infant who turns her head in refusal of the breast, and in the toddler's utterance of, "No." To be human entails having a will that is free.

As Kane has described it, freedom is not merely acting or choosing according to one's wishes, but having power over what it is that one wills.[1050] Where persons have the ability to exercise many choices over their lives, there might, nevertheless, be a lack of freedom. This arises where "[o]ther persons [are] pulling the strings, not by coercing or forcing us to do things against our wishes, but by manipulating us into having the wishes they wanted us to have."[1051] Such manipulations (regularly performed by advertisers, parents, and other authority figures) are regarded, by those manipulated, as detrimental and wrong because such manipulations are perceived as interfering with one's agency, one's ability to do or to be the self that individuals themselves determine is good.

Yet natural and social influences upon the human will are inescapable. In light of these influences, it has been argued that an unrestricted freedom of the will is illusory. That genetic, psychological, and social factors are so influential as to be wholly determinative of what a person can will, ("determinism"). [1052] The determinist view has been tempered by compatibilist views, which assert that the human will may not function with complete freedom, due to social and natural forces, yet there is some freedom of the will that is integral to human being.[1053]

[1050] Robert Kane, *A* Contemporary *Introduction to Free Will* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.

[1051] Kane, 2.

[1052] For an extensive overview of determinism, see, Carl Hoefer, "Causal Determinism," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Palo Alto: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016).

[1053] For more on the compatibilist view, which attempts to resolve the tension between determinism and free will, see, John Martin Fischer et al., "Compatibilism," in *Four Views on Free Will* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 44–84; and for a comprehensive bibliography, see, McKenna and Coates, "Compatibilism."

9.2.1.2. Duns Scotus and Freedom of the Will

Christian theology, which has structured Western philosophical writing on free will to a large extent,[1054] has tended toward compatibilism. A balance is sought between the view that God is the source and sustainer of all of creation, the foreknowing and ultimate cause of all that occurs, and the view that human beings have freedom and, thus, moral responsibility. The apex of theological reflection on human free will occurred during the medieval period in Europe. The contributions of Duns Scotus[1055] continue to influence modern thought.[1056]

Theologian/philosopher Duns Scotus (1266-1308) wrote near the turn of the 14th century and married the philosophic traditions of Aristotelian intellectualism with the Christian theological traditions and moral teachings of the Franciscans. Scotus understood the will as having primacy in the human being, and as being superior to the intellect.[1057] Ultimately, for Duns Scotus self-restraint and self-dominion were the highest form of rational freedom in humans.[1058]

Scotus argued that the will determines its own acts by its own control, and is unique in this way among other human faculties. He wrote of the will's self-motivation, that

> nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself… It is in the power of the will that by its command another power act[s] or refrain[s] from acting, for example, that the intellect refrain

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[1054] Timothy O'Connor, "Free Will," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), pt. 4.

[1055] The recent Radical Orthodoxy movement of Anglo-Catholic scholars has much to say in critique of Scotus's theology. See, John Milbank, *The Radical Orthodoxy Reader* (Routledge, 2009); John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (John Wiley & Sons, 2008); Catherine Pickstock, "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 543–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0025.2005.00297.x; John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (Psychology Press, 1999). To which, replies have been offered upholding the integrity of Duns Scotus' thought. See, e.g., Richard Cross, "Where the Angels Fear to Tread: Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy.," *Antonianum*, no. 1 (2001): 7–41; Thomas Williams, "The Doctrine of Univocity Is True and Salutary," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 575–85; Paul Hedges, "The Rhetoric and Reception of John Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy: Privileging Prejudice in Theology?," *Open Theology* 1, no. 1 (January 19, 2014); Wayne J. Hankey, *Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth*, ed. Douglas Hedley, 1 edition (Aldershot, Hants, England Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2005). The critique lodged against Scotus by proponents of Radical Orthodoxy, relating primarily to the concept that being is univocal to God and creatures, and is not immediately relevant to the subject of this paper, thus I have not addressed it. I note this recent renewed interest in Scotus's writing only to indicate his continuing influence upon, and significance to, important questions of philosophy and theology. Scotus's reasoning also benefits from the fact that it preceded the racialized slave trade, and thus reflects bears little trace of racialization in its formulations.

[1056] O'Connor, "Free Will," pt. 4.

[1057] Mary Beth Ingham, "Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom: Duns Scotus' Contribution to the 'Usus Pauper' Debate," *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008): 369.

[1058] Ingham, 369.

> from considering…that object whose consideration is necessary for issuing the command.[1059]

The freedom to will-as-it-will, derives from the will's metaphysical constitution. Following Anselm, Scotus argued that the will possesses a two-fold disposition,[1060] called dual affections. On one side, there is the affection for justice (*affectio iustitiae*), the inclination towards that which is worthy of affection for the sake of the thing itself and not related to any personal gain. On the other side, there is the affection for the advantageous (*affectio commodi*), which is an inclination towards personal enjoyment of, or use of, external goods.[1061]

Of the two affections, the affection for the advantageous is defined as a "natural" affection, while the affection for justice is defined as a "free" affection.[1062] By these categorizations Scotus was emphasizing the distinction between the will as desire, and the will as agency. The natural will, desire, is marked by unsatiety, while the free will, agency, is able to moderate the good.

The natural will, according to Scotus, is the will's inclination towards its own perfection, or optimum realization. The natural will functions in correspondence with the intellectual nature's appetites; it is the natural desire for happiness.[1063] For Scotus, however, the natural will, the *affectio commodi*, is so inclined towards the advantageous that it cannot moderate pursuit of the advantageous. The nature of the *affectio commodi* is to seek what the intellect presents as the best good, and it is not free to do otherwise.[1064] Functioning alone, the *affectio commodi* would elicit beneficial objects to the greatest degree possible. In this way, the affection for the advantageous, operating in conjunction with the intellectual appetite, is not an

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[1059] Ingham, 365–66 citing 67 Quodlibet 16 n. 4, from *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, ed. F. Álluntis and A.B. Wolter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 37.

[1060] Scotus employs here his theory of formal distinction, "which is a distinction between things that are not really distinct, even though there is a real formal basis for this distinction." Thomas M. Osborne, *Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham* (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2014), 21. For more on the formal distinction see, Stephen D. Dumont, "Duns Scotus' Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," *Vivarium* 43, no. 1 (2005): 7–62.

[1061] Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus: An Introduction* (CUA Press, 2004), 157.

[1062] "[T]he will can be considered a certain nature insofar as it has an inclination and natural appetite for its own perfection, just as any other nature does. The first thing to consider about the will, then, has to do with its natural volition, and insofar as it is a certain kind of nature; secondly, we have to consider the will as regards its free volition, insofar as it is a free appetite." Cruz González-Ayesta, "Duns Scotus on the Natural Will," *Vivarium* 50, no. 1 (2012): 41 citing Ordination IV, suppl. d. 49, qq. 9-10; from *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, Allan B. Wolter (Washington, D.C., 1986), 183-185.

[1063] González-Ayesta, 39–51.

[1064] González-Ayesta, 43.

operation of free will. The will is not free when it can seek only its own good things and can do nothing other than this.

Because the natural will is hampered in this way, the *affectio commodi*, the affection for the advantageous, can only desire; it has no power to elicit an act. Elicitation of action is only possible through the *affectio commodi*'s function in tandem with the *affectio iustitiae.* The *affectio iustitiae,* the affection for justice, is not hampered by the necessity to heed the intellect's determination of good. The *affectio iustitiae* is constituted by the ability to act freely; it may incline the will to act either in favour of an object (*velle*) or in rejection of an object (*nolle*). Further, its defining nature is that the *affectio iustitiae* is able to neither favour nor reject an object, but to refrain from choosing altogether (*non velle*).[1065] Because it can affirmatively not will, the acts of the *affectio iustitiae* cannot be determined by any cause or object external to itself and its own act of choosing.[1066] Thus, Scotus brings explication to the maxim that "nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself." Scotus describes the freeness of the affection for justice as having "the ability to grasp and to choose the good in itself and so can rein in the affection for the advantageous."[1067]

The *affectio commodi,* wills toward the personally beneficial while being moderated by the *affectio iustitiae* which elicits actions in furtherance of greater good, or principled good, or love. "It is just because the [dual-affectioned] will possesses the affection for justice that it is free to accept, reject or refrain from acting regarding the inclination of the affection for the advantageous."[1068]

The formal distinguishing of the freedom of the will is here intended only to emphasize the fact that, for Scotus, the will is free, and is the most free of any aspect of human personality. The freeness of the human will is uniquely and necessarily capable of self-restraint. Because of the freeness of the will, one is able to live lovingly, meaning in a restrained and ordered way, and "such ordered loving constitutes true human happiness."[1069]

9.2.2. Metaphysics of Black Unfreedom

The above discussion has shown how freedom, one's ability to will in accordance with one's authentic desire, is understood as inherent to the human person, though one's authentic

[1065] Ingham and Dreyer, *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus*, 149.
[1066] Ingham and Dreyer, 150.
[1067] González-Ayesta, "Duns Scotus on the Natural Will," 46.
[1068] González-Ayesta, 48.
[1069] Ingham and Dreyer, *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus*, 157.

desires may be influenced by external forces. Duns Scotus posits that the human will is free, and that the human will seeks the good, both personal good and good in principle. As this section will show, however, the violence to which the humanity of the African person was subjected, forecloses possibilities of freedom that would ordinarily inure to human persons.

9.2.2.1. Black Beings' Exclusion from Human Ontology

The trajectory of thought on human freedom grounded in the work of Scotus does not account for the racialized reimagination of the human that occurred beginning in the 15th century. It does not account for the degraded position to which the African person was assigned through the creation of racialized slavery. During the early period of modernity, slavery emerged as an economic tool of colonialism which progressed from being "an experience… (which anyone can be subject to)" to an "ontology…[which] becomes the singular purview of the Black."[1070] The novel ideology was developed that the possession of the physical features of Africanness was sufficient to cast one as always already outside of social community (of Christian civilized Europeans), and outside of human community (as beings distinct from European man lacking dignity or rights), without the necessity of a prior occurrence of a transgressive act, such as conquest during war, criminal conviction, etc.[1071] [S]lavery, for those Africans who were denominated as slaves and for those who were not, [1072] became the Black

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[1070] Frank B. Wilderson, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 18.

[1071] Wilderson, 28.

[1072] Slavery in colonial locations outside of the U.S. and Europe was of a different flavour. Often in colonized spaces, such as in Brazil, slavery was not the ontological revision of the African as it was in the U.S. However, as Marx argues, the entrenchment of the slave trade in Brazil for three centuries (1549-1851) created an entrenched culture of inequality and discrimination, "the legacy of which helped to preserve the racial order without later [post-abolition] legal action or racial labour restriction." (Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 63.) It is evident, then, that though some cultures have histories wherein slavery was separate from race, race has functioned within society as if that history did not register a distinction between the two.

This is equally true of South Africa. There are distinctions that can be readily identified between the practices of slavery in South Africa and those of the U.S., which the analysis of slavery is based upon in this paper. Most notably, in South Africa "Europeans were not all masters, [and] non-Europeans were not all servants." (Susan Newton-King, *Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 40.) Further, those who were enslaved were not only Africans, but also those "shipped from all the ports of the Indian Ocean," (R. J. Ross, *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 2). As Marx concludes, this lack of absolute boundaries along racial lines, and the blurring of hierarchy and status for European persons, may have been an underlying factor in introduction of juridical segregation and apartheid. (Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 63.)

Further, to the extent that U.S. and European hegemony has greatly influenced the social and political ordering of Brazilian, South African, and most former colonial societies, despite their historical particularities and distinctions, countries with significant numbers of historically subjugated Black persons operate as if slavery and Blackness are and have always been one and the same. Thus, the arguments that follow can be said to apply to a

person's "banishment from ontology."[1073] …[T]he gratuitous violence of the Black's first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, "wiped out [his/her] metaphysics…his [her] customs and sources on which they are based"…Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks. The former is a Human holocaust; the latter is a Human and a metaphysical holocaust.[1074]

9.2.2.2. Slavery's Defacement of Free Will

Slavery's ontological violence led Wilderson to conclude that it is not exploitative labour that is constitutive of slavery, rather, following the definition of Patterson,[1075] "slavery is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons."[1076] Slavery, then, which constituted the ontological condition to which all Blacks were assigned regardless of condition of servitude, had three elements: violent domination, natal alienation, and general dishonour.[1077]

Most importantly, as part of general dishonour, slavery entailed relationships determined by power and domination. The slave was powerless with respect to the master and with respect to other individuals.[1078] The "brute force" of violence was relied upon to transform the African free person into the slave and to maintain that transformation.[1079] To underscore this point Patterson quotes an 1829 judicial decision which held that the intentional wounding of a hired slave by his hirer did not constitute a crime. The decision makes clear the cultural acceptance of the violent use of force against the African. It also provides crucial insight with respect to our discussion of freedom. Thus, I include the full quotation.

> With slavery ... the end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and

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multitude of contexts, despite their historic dissimilarities to the U.S. context with respect to practices of slavery.

[1073] Wilderson, *Red, White & Black*, 18. This ontological shift was disavowed juridically in the 19th century, as there were court decisions which acknowledged the humanity of slaves. A Tennessee court in 1846 ruled, "[a] slave…is made after the image of the creator. He has mental capacities and an immortal principle in his nature, that constitute him equal to his owner but for the accidental position in which fortune has placed him." Helen T. Catterall and James J. Hayden, *Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro* (Washington, D.C.: William S Hein & Co, 1926), vol. 2, p. 530. However, the human dignity of the slave did continue to be parsed. As in the 1861 Alabama case where the court concluded, "in reference to acts which are crimes [slaves] are regarded as persons. Because they are slaves, they are…incapable of performing civil acts, and, in reference to all such things, they are things, not persons." Catterall and Hayden, vol. 3, p. 247.

[1074] Wilderson, *Red, White & Black*, 38–39 citing Fanon, BSWM, 110.

[1075] Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death*, 13.

[1076] Wilderson would maintain that slave "persons" are more accurately denoted as "beings," as they were not considered persons.

[1077] See, Section 7.5.3.1, *supra*, for the full discussion of Slavery and Social Death.

[1078] Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death*, 4.

[1079] Patterson, 3.

> without the capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap his fruits. What moral considerations such as a father might give to a son shall be addressed to such a being, to convince him what it is impossible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true-that he is thus to labour upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal happiness. Such services can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will in implicit obedience in the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect.[1080]

Here the court articulated that the slave "was doomed in his own person"; that the slave must "live without the capacity to make anything his own"; that the slave labouring "for the sake of his own personal happiness" was an impossibility that could never be true; that the exertions of the slave "can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will" through compulsion by the application of absolute force. This language reveals the violent domination integral to maintenance of slavery. It also lays bare that the ontology of the slave is an ontology in which human freedom is forbidden.

Freedom was previously described as the ability to will in accordance with one's authentic desires, and as inherent to the human being. "To be" entails rationality and choice in the service of growth and becoming. In Scotus' terms the will is most properly free when it is able not only to will in the affirmative or to will in the negative, but to refrain from willing altogether. The will to self-restraint is the essence and highest operation of free will.

If the slave is "doomed in his own person," then the slave's very being is precarious. Free will in this case becomes precarious in the contest between desiring the independently good and desiring the personal good of existence. If the slave is denied "the capacity to make anything his own," then the possibility of the slave will-ing, in service to auto-creativity (growth and becoming) is also denied.[1081] The court determined that it is "impossible" for the

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[1080] Patterson, 4 citing John Spencer Bassett, *Slavery in the State of North Carolina* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1899), 23–24.

[1081] Thomas Aquinas, who is not discussed in this essay, finds great significance in the free will's origin and end. Spiering argues that Aquinas, following the Aristotelean meaning of the maxim *liber est causa sui*, incorporated two senses of the maxim. A free being's actions are *of itself*, or caused by itself, ("*a se")*, and also that the actions of the free person are *because of oneself* or for one's own sake ("*propter se")*. Freedom means acting in a way that is self-caused and that is self-determined or self-interested. Spiering concludes that for Aquinas, and medieval reasoning generally, concern must be shown for both the origins and the ends of action. See, Jamie Anne Spiering, "'Liber Est Causa Sui': Thomas Aquinas and the Maxim 'The Free Is the Cause of Itself,'" *The Review of Metaphysics* 65, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 351, 359–75. In the case of racialized slavery,

slave to live (where the slave's labour is determinative of the slave's life) "for the sake of his own personal happiness." Therefore, it must also be impossible for the will of the slave to elicit action in furtherance of good things, that include personal advantageousness. Finally, where brute force is authorized to be employed specifically to ensure that the slave has "no will of his own"; that he "surrenders his will" to his master, the free will of the slave must be understood to have undergone intentional and radical diminution.

While free will might be said to remain within the self of the African despite the African's ontological recasting of being, what remains of the will is a version of freeness that is malformed. Read in accordance with Scotus's conceptualization of freedom, the tandem work of the affection for the beneficial (*affectio commodi)* and of the affection for the just *(affectio iustitiae)* may be seen as impaired. The damage lies in that the affection for the just fails to work in tandem with and to moderate the inclination towards the personally advantageous. This results in two related conditions; in some cases, the self-will may be destroyed, in others, the self-will may be adulterated.

Where there is *destruction* of the will, psychic and physical pain inflicted upon the slave compels the intellect to prioritize survival and the cessation of pain as the greatest good. The *affectio commodi* desires and wills with the intellect that the inflicted pain cease, but the *affectio commodi* is not capable of eliciting any act to further this desire. The *affectio iustitiae*, wherein lies the power of the will to elicit acts in favour of, against, or to refrain from willing, becomes physiologically impeded from willing freely. Inflicted pain and torture overcome the will's freeness, and compel the slave to will the act that will elicit the cessation of pain and allow survival. The slave's will is forcibly compelled until the slave's will is aligned with the will of

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denying the slave the capacity to make anything of his or her own denies the freedom *of* the slave ("*a se")* and *for* the slave ("*propter se")*.

the one who has the power to remove pain.[1082] The "breaking" of the will of the slave was indeed the intention of the infliction of brutal force.[1083]

In cases of the *deformity* of the will, the will of the slave is not broken. Nonetheless, the will undergoes significant damage. The damage to the freeness of the will lies in the metaphysics of the slave's will-ing, which became a kind of *incurvatus in se*. In such cases the intact but damaged free will elicits acts that, though freely chosen, are against the self's own desire for the good of growth and becoming. The acts elicited instead favour the desire for the good of existing, though existence will be without human dignity, as dignity necessitates auto-creativity (growth and becoming). The damage to the will is reflected in the self's will-ing towards the lesser, rather than the greater good. In Scotus's formulation, the *affectio iustitiae,* the affection for justice, is free in the way that it is free--to will in favour, to will against, or to

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[1082] This damage to the will has been described in psychological literature as "mental defeat."

> Mental defeat is defined as the perceived loss of all autonomy, a state of giving up in one's own mind all efforts to retain one's identity as a human being with a will of one's own. People who experience mental defeat differ in how they describe this experience. Common examples include the feeling that one is not a human being any longer (e.g., "I am an object," "I was destroyed as a human being"), not having a will of one's own any longer (e.g., "He could tell me to jump off a building and I'd jump off a building"), not caring about oneself any longer (e.g., "I don't really care whether I die or not"), or having a complete breakdown of all inner resistance to the perpetrator (e.g., "I was like a ball that they played with. I let everything happen to me from outside"). Anke Ehlers, Andreas Maercker, and Anne Boos, "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following Political Imprisonment: The Role of Mental Defeat, Alienation, and Perceived Permanent Change.," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 109, no. 1 (2000): 45, https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-843X.109.1.45. See also, Charlotte E Hazeldine-Baker et al., "Understanding the Link between Feelings of Mental Defeat, Self-Efficacy and the Experience of Chronic Pain," *British Journal of Pain* 12, no. 2 (May 1, 2018): 87–94, https://doi.org/10.1177/2049463718759131; and Laura Jobson and Richard T. O'Kearney, "Impact of Cultural Differences in Self on Cognitive Appraisals in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder," Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, May 2009, https://doi.org/10.1017/S135246580900527X. Troop makes the distinction between mental defeat and behavioral defeat, "where an individual may give up physical resistance to minimize further injury or to bring an assault to an end…[D]isplays of behavioural defeat are deliberate and can indicate a sense of control." Nicholas A. Troop and Syd Hiskey, "Social Defeat and PTSD Symptoms Following Trauma," *British Journal of Clinical Psychology* 52, no. 4 (November 2013): 367, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjc.12022. This distinction is relevant, as it is not unreasonable to suppose that in some instances the mental defeat that was perceived by those inflicting torture upon slaves, was in fact feigned by the slaves, and agency in this way was retained.

[1083] This goal is recognized in psychological literature. A study by Ehlers notes that "…one of the goals of torture is to break the will of the tortured person." Anke Ehlers, Andreas Maercker, and Anne Boos, "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following Political Imprisonment: The Role of Mental Defeat, Alienation, and Perceived Permanent Change.," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 109, no. 1 (2000): 45, https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-843X.109.1.45 citing *Duncan, Forrest. A Glimpse of Hell: Reports on Torture Worldwide* (London: Biddles, 1996).

refrain from willing--so that the highest good of human freedom might be attained, the good of self-restraint.[1084] Here, the important point is not whether self-restraint is the willed choice of the slave, but that the free will is ordered such that it can will that which results in greater humanity, rather than lesser. It can, and is perfected when it does, will the highest good for itself. Through physical and psychic violence, the will of the slave becomes malformed; it is bent away from seeking the good that is of the higher order. Instead, pain contorts the will towards will-ing the good of the lesser order, e.g., to self-will the good of existing over that of becoming. When the will is shaped so that it cannot will towards its highest good, but can only will *against* its own perfection, it is indicative that the freedom of the will is damaged.

In both instances, where the slave undergoes a broken will, and where there is the bastardized will-ing of lesser humanity, the brokenness of the will of Black persons becomes normativized. The abnormal functioning of the will can come to be regarded as a free will that is optimally functioning. Both the will that is completely effaced through slavery and the will that is disordered through slavery, become self-reproducing of disabled will-ing, unless and until there is an intervening event in the operation of the will.[1085]

What may be concluded is that African persons were overdetermined to be lesser or other than human, and instead deemed Black, during the historical moment when the concepts of humanity and human dignity were formally constructed. To be Black was to be ontologically

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[1084] Ingham, "Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom," 369.

[1085] The self-reproduction of the disordered will might also be understood within an African ubuntu ontological conceptualization. As du Toit and Forster write:

> A central element of *ubuntu* in relation to identity, is the understanding that personhood…is never understood without reference to the community of dignity…. identity is developed through interaction, over time. As a person participates with others and the environment, the person's identity (who the person is in society, who the person sees him or herself to be, and the community's relation to the person) changes…Thus participation [in community], from birth, through life, and beyond this life, is key to the identity and role of the human person. C. W. Du Toit and Dion A. Forster, "Identity in Relationship: The Ethics of Ubuntu [in African Theology] as an Answer to the Impasse of Individual Consciousness," in *The Impact of Knowledge Systems on Human Development in Africa: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Conference of the South African Science and Religion Forum (SASRF) of the Research Institute for Theology and Religion Held at the University of South Africa Pretoria, 7-8 September 2006*, ed. C. W. Du Toit (Pretoria: Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa, 2007), 261.

Because personhood is understood as being-in-community, and personhood is defined by participation in community, being in the community of "*les damnés de la terre*" (the damned of the earth), within an environment that overdetermines that damnation, creates personhood that is constituted by damned-ness, or wretchedness.

constituted as a being that is a slave--natally alienated, generally dishonored, and subject to permanent violent domination. Part of the consequence of this ontological disfigurement of African personhood, was that the human will was disfigured. The will of the Black being, instead of will-ing its own optimal good, towards the perfection of personhood and humanity, instead came to will the lesser good, towards mere survival.

9.3. Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance

As light must illumine, so the will of humans must be free to will. Because the properly functioning human (will), being free, cannot be unfree, and cannot not will, when the freeness of the will is impinged, the will must function in resistance to, it must will against, impingements upon its freedom.[1086] To be human being is to be so constituted.[1087] To have freedom, or to have death, is often literally the human condition.[1088] Since free will-ing is inherent to the human, when there is cognizance of unfreeness the free will acts in

[1086] Nielsen argues that for this reason freedom has a *telos*. Freedom's intended end is the location of a space "in which it can flourish and express itself concretely in social and political life with others." Cynthia Nielsen, "Duns Scotus and Multidimensional Freedom," in *Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue* (Proquest Ebook Central: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 105.

[1087] This may be the active principle when the biblical text speaks of one "doing the very thing that [one] hates." (Romans 7:14 NRSV) The law, which are rules restricting freedom, provoke the will to resist. "For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members." (Rom. 7: 22-23 NRSV) It is only by the Spirit of God, that the human will is able to resist the will to resist. In Scotist terms this might be viewed as the moral freedom (not mere metaphysical freedom of Thomas) that enables the human to will toward the perfection for which humanity was created by God.

[1088] The phrase "give me liberty of give me death" is attributed to Patrick Henry, uttered in his 1775 speech to revolutionary minded political delegates in the American colonies. See, Judy Hample, "The Textual and Cultural Authenticity of Patrick Henry's 'Liberty or Death' Speech," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 63, no. 3 (October 1, 1977): 298–310, https://doi.org/10.1080/00335637709383390. It is the principle of the imperative of human freedom that is protected and defended by modern social and political systems, and that leads to revolution and foundings in pursuit of freedom.

The imperative for human freedom, however, can lead not only to death through warfare, but through, suicide. After a detailed analysis using set theoretical models of freedom and unfreedom, Madhu concludes, "[s]uicide is a dramatic case point that illustrates unfreedom. The act of suicide is just one among many other forms of unfreedoms… Unfreedom is suicidal. It will wipe away life from the planet." P. Madhu, "Suicide as Unfreedom and Vice Versa," *SSRN.Com*, February 19, 2011, 15, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1764389. Suicide as an act of unfreeness in communities experiencing marginalization not explicitly related to race, e.g., LGBTQ communities, is of particular noteworthiness. See, Brian Mustanski and Richard T. Liu, "A Longitudinal Study of Predictors of Suicide Attempts Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth," *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 42, no. 3 (April 1, 2013): 437–48, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-012-0013-9. Mustanski and Liu determine that hopelessness, the feeling that "I might as well give up because I can't make things better for myself," is a significant factor in LGBT youth suicide.

resistance.[1089] The perception of unfree-ness triggers resistance. Where there is no perception there is no resistance.

Where free will-ing equalled death for Black persons, the will was broken, and lost its freeness. The will lost the ability to will acts that resisted impositions upon its freeness. Where free will-ing equalled not death but cruel misery for Black persons, the will was shaped to prefer for itself less-than-freeness, which was to will for itself diminished humanity.

Thus, for Black persons, to live was to will a diminished or dehumanized life. Such a disfigurement of the will requires an insensitivity to, or nonrecognition of unfreeness. The Black persons' experience of life as an ongoing survival strategy, leads to the perception of willed unfreeness as freedom, a misperception that is reinforced by systems and structures of power. When free-willing becomes impossible and unfamiliar, the lack of freeness also becomes imperceptible. When there is a failure to fully perceive the lack of freeness, then the will towards freeness is not triggered, resistance of unfreeness is not triggered and acts toward freedom are not prompted. Any act of resistance against restricted freedom, then, are evidence of a will that is able to perceive a lack of freedom, and that is capable of eliciting acts towards the good of optimizing its own freeness. In other words, acts of resistance against restricted freedom, are evidence of a properly ordered will.

Those whose lives have been marginalized by structural inequality and injustice relative to the material conditions of their housing, education, employment, health, bodily safety, policing and incarceration, etc., have been culturally conditioned to regard the degraded conditions of life as normal and to accept these conditions. As Steve Biko has commented:

> [T]he black [person] is subjected to two forces…[The Black person] is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalized machinery, through laws that restrict [them] from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very difficult living conditions, through poor education, these are all external to [the Black person], and secondly, and this we regard as the most important, [Black persons] in [themselves] ha[ve] developed a certain state of alienation…[Conditions for blacks are entirely inferior to conditions for whites.] The homes are different, the

[1089] Examples of resistance that this research does not address include the resistance of feigned compliance, the subversion of the master's authority, and the redirection of the will's freeness towards self-willed acts, or acts of creativity, such as music, dance, art, cooking, sewing, carpentry, masonry, engineering, sexual expression, acts of anger or destruction, etc. Further research is warranted as to extant and ways in which the slave's impaired will, found external outlets for free-will-ing.

> streets are different, the lighting is different, so you begin to tend to feel that there is something incomplete in your humanity, and that completeness goes with whiteness[1090].

As Biko's comment reflects, degraded material conditions of life can come to be viewed as a reflection of the quality of Black personhood in itself. Again, the perception of a lacking, or "incomplete" Black personhood is reinforced by social structures and systems.

When a specific event occurs, related to the degraded material conditions of Black living and being, and that event results in protest by Black persons, it is indicative that despite conditioning and historic deformation, the human will of the Black persons has been, or is being, properly re-ordered. Protest indicates perception of unfreeness, and also indicates the will's elicitation of acts in resistance to unfreeness and towards the good of optimizing the will's own freedom. The protest and resistance of Black persons, then, is a sign of a rehabilitation of the dignity and humanity of Black personhood.

The Black person's rehabilitation of human dignity through protest follows from their ability to perceive unfreeness, which is directly related to the intellectual apprehension of freeness. But how does a Black person go from nonrecognition and misrecognition of freeness to clearly recognizing freedom's freeness? One apprehends freedom by habituation to freedom; being in its close proximity. Freedom is apprehended through encounter with ideas through books or media, or through association with peers, those who are like oneself, who live in freedom, or by associating with those whose wills elicit acts in the interest their own highest good.[1091]

I also do not diminish the possibility of the knowledge of freedom being divinely revealed. If we are exhorted as Christians to take action that claims and asserts our human dignity, then the Spirit must be expected to aid the human will in desiring and doing just that.

[1090] Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like: A Selection of His Writings* (Heinemann, 1987), 110–11.

[1091] By this I am contemplating those who lives, by virtue of their wealth, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or some combination of these, enjoy opportunities for choice-making, and will-ing, that appear to be desirable. It must be noted that among those with desirable apparent freedom, it may be the case that there is nonetheless a disorder of the will. The fact of the persistence of unequal systems and of politics of oppression, indicate that the will of many with apparent freedom is not functioning towards its highest moral good, which is that of self-restraint. The will's ability to choose that which is advantageous (*affectio commodi)*, and to not will that which is good in itself (*affectio iustitiae)*, indicates a will that is free in a way that is unlike the Black person's will, which has a diminished ability to choose that which is the highest good. However, the human will's optimal function, it's perfection, is found in not only having the ability to choose, but in making the choice for self-restraint, for choosing that which is good in itself rather than that which is merely personally advantageous. Thus, the desirable apparent freeness that is apprehended in non-Black others by Black persons, may be seen as itself, also, not fully free.

Thus, the revelation of freeness must be possible. Not only possible, but the testimony of at least Nat Turner, leader of historic rebellion of slaves, was that his rebellion was an act that was inspired by the visions from the Spirit.[1092] For most, however, this is likely not the way that the will towards free-willing is apprehended. By living near, working for, studying with, watching video images of, those whom one recognizes as akin to oneself, who are oriented towards eliciting acts in furtherance of their desires for their own highest good, one is caused to apprehend qualities of freeness that were previously not known or recognized.[1093]

Once there is knowledge of freeness, cognition of the dimensions of one's own un-freeness arises. At the apprehension of one's own unfreeness, and in the absence of external police and penal measures that discourage self-will-ing, a force of will intensifies sufficient to shift the orientation of the will. The will shifts from will-ing what is less good to properly willing one's greatest good. The intensity of force necessary to accomplish such an existential reorientation of the will, is an intensity that will not be constrained from elicitation of forceful external acts. Which is to say that because a violent inner force is requisite to the freeing of free will, the acts of the will elicited through that force might also be violent. Further, the intensity of the force necessary to overcome impediments to free will-ing is determined by the extent of the perceived restriction upon the will's freeness. The greater the stifling of freeness, the more intense, and aggressive, the inclination towards resistance.

The highest act of the will is self-restraint, in the interest of moral perfection.[1094] Thus, the possibility and ideal hope, is that as the will is properly reordered to seeking the greater and not the lesser, that appropriate restraint will be exercised in one's actions, whatever actions are willed. Under the circumstances of rehabilitating the will, however, it may be that the will's right-ordering, becoming inclined to will more than marginalized existence, reaches the limit

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[1092] See, Stephen B. Oates, *The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turner's Fierce Rebellion*, Reprint edition (Harper Perennial, 2014).

[1093] There is much that could be said regarding the role that recognition plays in the experience of freeness, however such a discussion exceeds the scope of this essay. I note, however, Vosloo's argument that the desire to be recognized, can be satisfied through acts of mutual recognition, an example of which is the symbolic gesture, e.g., Willy Brandt (1913-1992), former Chancellor of Germany, kneeling at the foot of the Jewish Memorial in Poland. Acts of mutual recognition, he argues, offer strong potential for peace and mitigation of eruptions of violence. Robert Vosloo, "Between the Prose of Justice and the Poetics of Love? Reading Ricœur on Mutual Recognition in the Light of Harmful Strategies of 'Othering,'" *Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies* 6, no. 2 (2015): 105–17.

[1094] Ingham, "Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom," 369.

of the will's capacity. Attaining the highest act of the will, which is self-restraint, might go beyond the newly re-ordered will's ability.

9.4. Conclusion of Freedom of the Will and Violence

Modern European knowledge systems fostered conceptions of the human, of "Man," that excluded African persons, and that resulted in the denial of the humanity of Africans. Additionally, the freedom of Black persons was effaced. First, freedom was defaced through the bondage in which Africans were held. Defacement of freedom also occurred by the psycho-social violence wrought against the ontology of the African person, and against the will of the African person. Ontologically the African went from being a human to being a slave. The will of the African went from being ordered to incline towards its own perfection and greatest good, to being inclined toward mere survival, and toward the lesser good of mere existence. When persons of African descent protest against inequality and marginalization it is an instance of rehabilitation of the will. The inner force that is necessary to accomplish proper ordering of the will, may possibly result in outward expressions of physical force, or violence. This violence may be the necessary cost of the restoration of Black persons' human dignity.

Key Implications:

This presents the urgent task of revisioning of the Christian command to love. The love command has two parts. The first is to love God utterly, which is not of concern to this discussion. The second part is that which must be re-visioned. In the second love command Jesus instructs that the great task of the Christian, after loving God, is to love one's neighbour as oneself. Matthew and Mark, where this verse appears, use the exact same language, "You shall love your neighbour as yourself." (Matt. 22:39, Mark 12:31) Typically the verse is seen to focus on love of the neighbour. The biblical texts of various translations nearly all cross-reference the verse with verses that highlight Jesus's teaching on "the neighbour." This is not improper. It is, however, incomplete. Such an interpretation eliminates the significance of the latter part of the verse. Both the Gospel teaching and the Hebrew teaching of the law, upon which the commandment is based, are concerned not only with the neighbour who is to be loved, but with the individual who is to do the loving.[1095] The command is not simply to "love

[1095] The Gospel command is based upon Lev. 19:18, "17 You shall not hate in your heart anyone of your kin; you shall reprove your neighbour, or you will incur guilt yourself. 18 You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbour as yourself: I am the Lord." In Leviticus, the focus is the conduct of the individual, and the ways that treatment of the neighbour impact the individual. Jesus's

your neighbour," as Church tradition is guilty of too frequently abridging it. It is to love the Other "as yourself." This makes the love of self the basis of the command to love the Other. Without a love of self it is not possible to render to the Other the love that they are due. The love of myself allows me to love you.

This has implications for the reading of the "non-violence" in the Sermon on the Mount as connected to the instruction to love the enemy. Typically, the passage is understood as meaning that the Christian should use no force against the Other because the Christian must love the Other. This reading fails to emphasize the self-love and self-concern upon which love for the enemy depends. It does an injustice to the meaning of text. When Jesus speaks of "turning the other cheek," etc. and when Jesus says to "love your enemies," he makes his assertations for the benefit, the good, the maximizing of the humanity of the individual who is the actor towards the Other. Thus, it is not merely, "love your enemies," it is "love your enemies… so that you may be children of your Father in heaven."

That church tradition has failed to offer this fuller reading of the text is meaningful. It reflects what those who have read and rendered the text have deemed the most significant aspect of the teaching. Those who have translated and interpreted the text have been primarily those who are propertied, White, European men; persons for whom no instruction or encouragement is necessary to assert and claim self-worth and dignity. For such interpreters the emphasis may be rightly placed upon the first clause of the texts; the emphasis may rightly attempt to cultivate a deep concern for the Other. However, Jesus's teaching was not directed at those who occupied a place of privilege in the society. His concern was for those whose honour and dignity, through family, church, political and economic relationships (which were all connected and intertwined), were daily threatened. Jesus's teaching was a lesson to the people in who they were, and how they were to relate to Others in light of their own identity as beloved, worthy, children of God.

Finally, another key feature of the section should be highlighted, the brilliance of Scotus's theorization. The insight of Scotus is in his determination that the highest operation of the will is the possibility of *non velle*, to will neither yea or nea, but to refrain from willing altogether. It speaks to the possibility that Jesus proposes that the essence of the fullness of dignity is that dignity does not entail the will-ing of a response issued in the same manner as

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restatement of the command in the gospel retains this emphasis on the individual by the inclusion of the words "as yourself."

the provoking offense. It is not a will-ing of a debasing response that allows the offense to stand. The fullest expression of dignity is being not willing to will at all in situations that seek one's own complicity in one's debasement, but to freely will differently, and ideally, towards one's self-realization as worthy.

Connection to Larger Project:

The argument of this chapter, that the re-orientation of the will is positive and self-healing of humanity, finds alignment with the previously asserted argument that Jesus is deeply concerned with, and promotes the reclamation of, one's human dignity.

Because Jesus is concerned with people attaining their full humanity and with individuals resisting the attempts of the powers to diminish them, it follows that the overflow of a self-healing humanity would be supported by Jesus. This is even more apparent when the reading of key texts of scripture is expanded to highlight the significance of the self to the teaching about the Other. It becomes clear that the re-orientation of one's will, towards human flourishing of the individual is consistent with Jesus's teaching.

Jesus does not have more concern for the function of a violating social order than he has for individuals being and becoming fully themselves in community. Indeed, Jesus's directives to resist the powers' dehumanization anticipates and requires transgression of the social order.

While Jesus never utilized lethal coercive force during his tenure on earth, the teaching of scripture leaves open the exact means and methods that are potential sources of resistance to the powers. Jesus uses specific examples of resistance, but only as a means of urging that concrete acts be undertaken in one's everyday life. He does not use the examples of offering one's face for further slapping, going naked in the streets, and giving even more when you are exploited, to assert that the particular acts and responses that he offers are those that are required when such situations arise. Jesus leaves room for creative defiance, that more important than being grounded in the non-use of force, is grounded in the claim and assertion of dignity and self-respect—the level of self-respect that is implied by being able to walk naked through the streets without shame, which is a deep affront to the pietistic social order of Jesus's era. Jesus leaves room for individuals to determine what the best course of action is under the particular circumstances of debasement that they are facing. What is crucial is that action be taken to assert one's dignity, not that non-forceful action be taken, or passive acceptance be shown. Thus, the overflow of will-ing in the healing of the self, will-ing that leads to action

that reflects self-determination of one's value and worth, is consistent with a Christian ethics of love.

10. Theological Analysis from the Margins: Violent Protest in South Africa

10.1. Introduction

The journey through Part III began with consideration of the expansiveness of the concept of violence. It showed how violence at the structural, cultural, and existential level was normalized in the social order. It described how Black life is specifically subject to violence, being subjected to the direct, structural and cultural violence and then by bearing violence in Black being itself because of the mostly invisible violations of systems and culture. I argued that the Jesus-Who-Resists is deeply concerned with the violence that dehumanizes, moreso than with the overt use of force.

The last chapter demonstrated the ways that the violence to Black being entailed an impairment of the functioning of the will. I argued that when the will is seeking to be re-oriented to proper function, the force necessary for that re-orientation, may spill over into a physical expression of force. I further argued that this is not a moral wrong. Instead, Jesus is greatly interested in the will of the individual properly functioning in freeness, and with enabling the individual to act in furtherance of their own dignity. I argued that the aim of Jesus was not non-violent action, but action that claims and asserts dignity in spite of the powers that seek to deny dignity and affirm worthlessness.

In this final chapter, I make the argument that physical violence in South Africa during moments of protest exemplifies the assertion of the will acting in furtherance of human dignity, in a context of humiliation. That such protest, far from being occurrences that should be overlooked or "excused," by the Christian church, or that are outside of the bounds of Christian integrity, is a faithful attempt to lay claim to long denied human dignity that must be affirmed.

The chapter begins by describing the context of inequality that exists in South Africa currently. It then discusses recent protest actions that have occurred, before providing a brief background of the social and protest history of the country. The heart of the chapter reviews the positions of South African icons Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela and Stephen Bantu Biko, who both accepted the possible use of coercive physical force in South Africa's struggle for freedom. I discuss the use of violence in the South African context as a faithful engagement with the history of the country, and the ongoing dehumanization of the people.

10.2. History of Colonization and Subjugation

Like first century Palestine, the contemporary context of South Africa involves multiple layers of violence. There was foundational violence with the arrival of Europeans to southern African shores. Erasure of cultures, of what was right and accompanying social orders, both for the indigenous and for those imported as slaves. Violence progressively increased in South African history and eventually encompassed direct, structural, and cultural violence perpetrated by and between ethnic groups, and most egregiously against Black Africans. Hundreds of years of violence climaxed in the mid-20th century with the imposition of Apartheid rule. Under Apartheid there was extreme direct violence, in addition to the extreme cultural and structural violence of Apartheid. The policing and jailing of those deemed subversive, the shooting of unarmed protesters, and the forced removals of entire communities to new areas are typical examples. There was structural violence in the establishment and maintenance of the system of "apartness" that enshrined as law the non-equality of life chances and control of resources. There was cultural violence symbolically mediated through the church, through schools, and through the arrangement of space and structures. The culture of violation included the general obliviousness of the White majority to the violences being perpetrated. The foundational, direct, structural, and cultural violence combined to effect an existential violence against Black persons, in particular.[1096] The existential violence resulted in severe impairment of the will of those raced as Black.

10.3. Current Context of Inequality

Apartheid ended in 1994, and twenty-eight years later, in 2018, the effects of Apartheid continue. Apartness largely remains. Over 7 million people, nearly all Black South Africans, live in township dwellings, which consist, primarily, of shacks.[1097] Over 60% of the population do not have piped water inside their dwellings.[1098] Economic disparities also endure. A study in 2013 revealed dire inequality, not merely in income, but of wealth. "[T]en percent of the

[1096] Steve Biko, and the Black Consciousness movement were interventions against the existential violence. Biko's program of Black consciousness countered the violence perpetrated to Black self-hood. Biko might, indeed, be regarded as a Christ-figure and his message as one of healing and deliverance. It could be argued that it was the threatening counter-violence engaged in by Biko, and his words, that resulted, ultimately, in the State's repressive, lethal violence against him.

[1097] Statistics South Africa, "Community Survey 2016 Statistical Release," *Stats SA Statistics South Africa* (Pretoria, 2016), 59.

[1098] Statistics South Africa, 64.

population own more than 90 percent of all wealth while 80 percent have no wealth to speak of."[1099]

Educational disparities reflect similar inequalities.[1100] A 2007 study showed 41% rural Grade 6 children, largely Black South Africans, were functionally illiterate.[1101] 2011 study showed that 50% of children whose home language is not English or Afrikaans, could not read by Grade 4.[1102] Other data shows that only 44% of Black and Coloured youth graduated high school, while 88% of Whites graduated.[1103] "We could also look at…a host of other [educational studies]– they all show the same thing–systemic inequalities and underperformance."[1104]

Added to these disparities are the staggering instances of gun violence, as well as gender-based violence, including rape.

These statistical quantifications of inequality have the potential to inure us to the reality of the lives represented by the numbers. We are numbed to the diminished humanity that results when a child lives in a shack, with no running water, and has not been empowered to read, while at the same time she witnesses the material beauty and brilliance of a neighbouring South African's lived experience. Without question, the South African context involves a ferocious complex of violences--direct, structural, cultural, foundational, and existential.

10.4. Context of Protest

10.4.1. Contemporary Protest

Against this complex of violences, physical violence as a feature of South African protest has become ubiquitous.[1105] The ongoing struggle for provision of public services to the poor, often results in transit trains, schools, roads and other public properties being obstructed

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[1099] Research Project on Employment Income Distribution and Inclusive Growth and Anna Orthofer, "Wealth Inequality in South Africa: Evidence from Survey and Tax Data" (Cape Town, 2016), 4.

[1100] See, Nic Spaull, "Education in SA – Still Separate and Unequal (Extended Version of CityPress Article)," *Nic Spaull* (blog), January 12, 2014, https://nicspaull.com/2014/01/12/education-in-sa-still-separate-and-unequal-extended-version-of-citypress-article/.

[1101] Spaull, referencing SACMEQ study of 2007.

[1102] See, Spaull, referencing prePIRLS study of 2011.

[1103] See, Spaull, referencing General Household Survey of 2011.

[1104] Spaull.

[1105] See, *Business Tech*. June 21, 2016. "This Is What's Driving Angry South Africans To Violent Protest." Retrieved October 21, 2017. https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/126775/what-the-government-doesnt-want-you-to-know-about-violent-protests-in-sa/

and destroyed by protesters in the articulation of grievances.[1106] Such protests have become customary. Within this decade, however, at least two significant events occurred which have become touchstones in the protest history of South Africa. First, in 2012, union members engaged in a wildcat strike, protesting for a wage increase to R12,500 per month (about US$880/month).[1107] The workers' protest was met by police infliction of a lethally forceful response.[1108] Second, in 2015 students galvanized and formed a protracted nationwide protest movement.

In March 2015, Chumani Maxwele, a student at the University of Cape Town, staged a protest in which he collected feces from a communal toilet in the Black African township of Khayelitsha and threw it at a statue of British industrialist, John Cecil Rhodes, that was installed in the centre of the university campus.[1109] His action birthed the #Rhodesmustfall protest movement to decolonize higher education. In solidarity, students around the nation, and internationally, joined the protest. #Rhodesmustfall, or #RMF, quickly and successfully culminated in the removal of Rhodes's statue from the university's campus in April 2015.[1110] Nonetheless, the student protest movement on university campuses continued to gain momentum.

Months after the #Rhodesmustfall movement began, a related movement was organized in response to a planned fee increase at South African universities. Throughout the nation,

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[1106] Online searches for 'news' of the terms "service delivery protest South Africa" returns thousands of results, which document the ongoing occurrence of protests every year for the period between 2012 and 2017. When search parameters are examined by year the results returned show marked yearly increases during this time frame as well. See, e.g., *Times Live.* June 13, 2017. "Cape Town Commuters rebel as Metrorail Fails." Retrieved September 20, 2017. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-13-cape-town-commuters-rebel-as-metrorail-fails/; *EWN Eye Witness News*. May 26, 2016. "Violent Service Delivery Protests on the Rise." Retrieved September 20, 2017. http://ewn.co.za/2016/05/26/86-percent-service-delivery-protests-characterised-by-violence---Municipal-IQ; *IOL News*. May 15, 2015. "14 740 service delivery protests in 2014/15." Retrieved September 20, 2017. https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/14-740-service-delivery-protests-in-201415-1859009; *IOL News*. September 16, 2014. "Service Delivery Protests Twice close N2 [Highway]." Retrieved September 20, 2017. https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/service-delivery-protests-twice-close-n2-1751386; *News24*. October 23, 2013. "Violent Delivery Protest in Bekkersdal." Retrieved September 20, 2017. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Violent-delivery-protest-in-Bekkersdal-20131023; *Mail & Guardian*. August 14, 2012. "One Dead in Cape Town Service Delivery Protest." Retrieved September 20, 2017. https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-14-one-dead-in-cape-town-service-delivery-protest.

[1107] Peter Alexander, "Marikana, Turning Point in South African History," *Review of African Political Economy* 40, no. 138 (December 1, 2013): 607, https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.860893.

[1108] Alexander, 608.

[1109] Fairbanks, Eve. 2015. "Why South African Students Have Turned On Their Parents' Generation," *The Guardian,* November 18. Retrieved October 21, 2017.

[1110] *BBC*. April 9, 2015. "Rhodes statue removed in Cape Town as crowd celebrates." Retreived October 21, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32236922

South African university students resisted this pronouncement. By gathering, organizing, sitting-in, and marching, students declared that a university fee increase was not acceptable. Their protests reached an apex in October 2015, when thousands of students, from multiple universities, marched on the South African Parliament demanding that university #feesmustfall. Riot police quelled and disbursed the protesters using stun grenades, rubber bullets, tasers, and truncheons.[1111]

The following school term, January 2016, the University of Cape Town's campus was again alight with protest. This time the protest was due to a shortage of student housing that resulted in some students resorting to shelter in township shacks. As part of the protest, a shack appeared in the centre of campus, and was emblazoned with the name "Shackville." The #shackville protests built upon the momentum of the previous protests, and soon viscerally linked the #shackville, #feesmustfall, and #rhodesmustfall issues. In February 2016, a bonfire was lit near the erected shack, and paintings of colonial forbearers were taken from the walls of university dormitories and placed on the bonfire to burn.[1112] Security services was called and used stun grenades to disperse the protesters. After the dispersal, a car and a student shuttle bus were also set on fire.[1113]

Damage, burning, breaking, inclusive of vehicles, libraries, and buildings,[1114] and total disruption became routine and expected features of protest on South African University campuses in 2015-2016. Protest demands encompassed continued decolonization,[1115] free

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[1111] See, Simon Allison, "South African Police Fire Teargas at Students in University Fees Protest," *The Guardian*, October 21, 2015, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/21/riot-police-tear-gas-student-protest-south-africa-university-fees-cape-town, and see also, ; Lynne O'Connor, "FeesMustFall Arrested Students to Face Serious Charges," *ENCA*, October 22, 2015, Digital edition, /south-africa/students-held-cape-town-central-police-station-released.

[1112] See, Raborife, Mpho. 2016. "UCT Students Set Paintings Alight," News24, February 16. Retreived October 21, 2017 (http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/uct-students-set-paintings-alight-20160216).

[1113] http://www.groundup.org.za/article/rhodes-must-fall-protesters-destroy-uct-artworks/ 17 Feb 2016. Accessed 20 Nov 2016.

[1114] See, Chabalala, Jeanette. 2016. "Burning Books, Buildings, Cars: University Fee Protests Reach Boiling Point," Biznews.com, September 7. Retrieved October 21, 2017 (https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2016/09/07/burning-books-buildings-cars-university-fee-protests-reach-boiling-point/).

[1115] Beginning in 2015 students protested and occupied buildings at the University of Cape Town demanding the removal of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes from its prominent place on campus grounds. The statue was viewed as emblematic of the colonial legacy surviving at the institution, which contributed to the ongoing alienation of Black students. The protest soon spread to other institutions of higher learning in South Africa. See, e.g., Glazebrook, Dan. 2015. "Decolonizing Education: Rhodes Must Fall," *RT,* November 23. Retrieved September 20, 2017 (https://www.rt.com/op-edge/323094-decolonizing-education-cecil-rhodes/); and Sosibo, Kwanele. 2015. "#RhodesMustFall Protest Spreads To Other Campuses," *Mail & Guardian,* March 26.

education,[1116] and an end to sexual assault of womxn,[1117] among others. Such was the extent of the turmoil, that affected universities closed down for extended periods, including the University of Cape Town, which was largely closed for 6 weeks.[1118] Because of the negative media portrayals, the official State news agency initiated a media-ban of all "violent protest."[1119] Ultimately, this ban was deemed illegal.[1120]

In contemporary South Africa, whether protest action relates to social issues, as with service delivery, economic issues, as with unions, or education, as with Rhodes/Fees/Rape Culture Must Fall, violence has become a tool routinely used by social activists.[1121] The engagement in physical violence destabilizes the social order. Roads are blocked, schools and universities are shuttered, trains and buses are destroyed, which means alternate routes of

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Retrieved September 20, 2017 (https://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-26-rhodesmustfall-protest-spreads-to-other-campuses).

[1116] See, Baloyi, Basani and Gilad Isaacs. 2015. "South Africa's 'Fees Must Fall' Protests Are About More Than Tuition Costs," *CNN,* October 28. Retrieved September 20, 2017 (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/27/africa/fees-must-fall-student-protest-south-africa-explainer/index.html); and *Daily Maverick*. Jan 12, 2016. "Fees Must Fall: Reloaded." Retrieved September 20, 2017. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-01-12-fees-must-fall-reloaded/#.WcIt3sgjGUk.

[1117] Protests against "rape culture" on university campuses and in communities in South Africa made use of hashtags such as #RUReferenceList, which named alleged serial rapists and abusers on Rhodes University's campus, #Campusrape, which raised challenged the way that policies on university campuses responded to complaints of sexual assault, and #rememberKwezi, which recalled the name of the woman whom South Africa's sitting president, Jacob Zuma, was acquitted of raping in 2006. See, e.g., Seddon, Deborah. 2016. "'We will not be Silenced': Rape Culture, #RUReferencelist, and the University Currently Known as Rhodes," Daily Maverick, June 1. Retrieved September 20, 2017 (https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-06-01-we-will-not-be-silenced-rape-culture-rureferencelist-and-the-university-currently-known-as-rhodes/#.WcI30cgjGUk); Corke, Emily. 2016. "#Campusrape: Universities Overhaul Policies Amid Rape Culture Protests," *Ewn Eye Witness News*, May 17. Retrieved September 20, 2017. http://ewn.co.za/2016/05/18/Universities-overhaul-policies-amid-protests-over-rape-culture; Dayimani, Bulelwa. 2016. "#1in3 Silent Protest Leads to Rape Victims Speaking Out," *DestinyConnect.com*, August 6. Retrieved September 20, 2017 (http://www.destinyconnect.com/2016/08/08/1in3-silent-protest-encourages-victims-speak/).

[1118] See, Nathan Adams, "UCT Had to Shut Again," *The Daily Voice*, October 18, 2016, digital edition, https://www.dailyvoice.co.za/news/western-cape/uct-had-to-shut-again-6416337, and see also, Lizeka Tandwa, "Universities Divided on Campuses Reopening," *News24*, October 26, 2015, digital edition, https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Universities-divided-on-campuses-reopening-20151026.

[1119] See, "SABC Bans Broadcast of Protests, Destruction of Property," *ENCA*, May 27, 2016, digital edition, /south-africa/sabc-bans-broadcast-of-protests-destruction-of-property.

[1120] See, Genevieve Quintal, "SABC Ban on Protest Coverage Overruled by ICASA," *Rand Daily Mail*, July 11, 2016, digital edition, sec. Political, https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2016-07-11-sabc-ban-on-protest-coverage-overruled-by-icasa/.

[1121] There has been speculation that the violence of university protests is instigated not by student activists, but by members of the national political opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters ("EFF"). The EFF denies this charge. See, https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1308343/if-you-believe-eff-is-behind-protests-youre-a-fool/ It is clear that some student leaders on various South African university campuses have also been members of the EFF, see, http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/universities-who-is-behind-the-havoc, and thus activism and EFF membership seem to be co-occurring features of student leaders on campuses. Whether the EFF practices instumentalization and politicization of students' grievances, and creates physically violent conditions that would otherwise be absent, is contested.

transport become dangerously overcrowded, longer commute times and later arrivals home then compromise the safety of commuters. These are violences that are endured by the marginalized that generally go unnoticed. Protest leads to destruction of property, and often involves injury to persons involved. This is generally the point at which society takes notice of violence and reacts with additional violence against those damaging or threatening damage to property.

The turn to physical violence, like the inequality that underlies much protest by Black persons in countries around the world, is inseparable from the racialized, gendered, and colonial histories of the context of South Africa.

10.4.2. South Africa's Tradition of Protest

South Africa's tradition of protest goes back nearly as far as the beginning of colonization in the country. This section will present a brief overview of the protest moods that contribute to the contemporary protest moment, and then discuss two significant personages who influenced the development of Black self-determined protest in the 20th century, Nelson Mandela and Steve Bantu Biko.

This section spans the settlement of the Cape to the Twentieth Century's ending of Apartheid.

10.4.2.1. Settlement Protest in the African Cape Colony

Because indigenous peoples were not subject to the laws and governance of the settlers, there was no organized protest *per se* to European law and authority. Nonetheless, indigenous resistance to the settlers[1122] often took the form of armed attack and cattle raids in retaliation for raids conducted by the settlers.[1123] These interactions are more properly characterized as warfare among differing societies, rather than protest movements occurring as a facet of the re-ordering of one society. Violence and warfare were accepted by all parties as normative for

[1122] Conflict between the indigenous and the settlers began early and continued fairy steadily as the trading post evolved into a colony. As Marks notes, a Khoi war with the Europeans first arose in 1659, due to the Khoi being accused of harboring escaped slaves. Shula Marks, "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *The Journal of African History* 13, no. 01 (January 22, 1972): 64, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700000268. Another war began in the early 1670s, due to the rivalries fostered by settlers among the native people groups (by now inclusive of distinct communities in locations further north east, including the Chainouqua, Hessequa, Nama, Attaqua, and Cochoqua) as well as continued encroachment by settlers. 66.

[1123] Marks, "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," 69.

establishing dominance and control of the means of production of economic materiality, which typically meant land and cattle.

The enslaved in the Cape colony under Dutch control, a minority of whom were indigenous Africans, engaged in limited acts of protest and resistance. The peoples imported from distant lands of South India lacked a cohesive cultural identity as slaves. They were often isolated on farmsteads with small labour forces and, therefore, prevented from taking collective action.[1124] Despite this, there were acts of individual slave resistance. There was "the spontaneous attack by a slave on his master or the *knecht* (overseeing servant) in the face of punishment, but also planned acts of sabotage, murder or theft."[1125] Resistance also commonly took the form of escape, aided by native Africans, since the enslaved were generally unfamiliar with the surrounding territory.[1126]

10.4.2.2. Nineteenth Century Protest in the Cape Colony

The law in the early 1800s, under British rule, proactively enabled native Africans and enslaved Asian-transplants to gain access to justice and more equal relations with Europeans, e.g., legislation ended the slave trade, reduced work hours and introduced the office of Guardian of Slaves, etc.[1127] Nevertheless, protest against inequality did occur among the native and enslaved peoples. There were occasions of revolt and banditry,[1128] and also protest communicated through labour practices. These included "flight, theft, destruction of private property, [and] 'go slows.' These multiple patterns of resistance…concerned the control of the very character of work in a developing economy, the organization of space and time…and the transmission of social knowledge about the wider world."[1129]

Another different stream of protest was exemplified during the nineteenth century by the Voortrekkers' formal physical and political separation of themselves from British imperial rule. British control of the Cape, beginning near the turn of the nineteenth century, brought great change to the region. This included language, religious practices, social customs,

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[1124] Nigel Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1985), 120.
[1125] Worden, 120.
[1126] Elizabeth A. Eldredge And Fred Morton, *Slavery in South Africa: Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier* (iUniverse, 2010); Robert Ross, *Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750–1870: A Tragedy of Manners* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12; Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa*, 123–24.
[1127] Caroline Quarrier Spence, "Ameliorating Empire: Slavery and Protection in the British Colonies, 1783-1865" (Dissertation, Harvard University, 2014), 214–15.
[1128] Clifton C. Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1865* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 64.
[1129] Crais, 64.

education, urban vs. rural lifestyle, and laws prohibiting slavery.[1130] Finding the governance of the British to constitute untenable encroachments on their liberty and property rights, thousands of Dutch settlers, Voortrekkers, fled British colonial boundaries, and settled their families on frontiers previously unsettled by Europeans, in areas northerly and easterly of the Cape colony.[1131] The British did not prevent them from leaving. This "Great Trek," as it came to be known, resulted in the formation of independent Boer Republics that bordered the British colony: Natalia Republic, established in 1837, the South African Republic (or Transvaal), established in 1852, and the Orange Free State, established in 1854.[1132]

In the next decades of the nineteenth century protest took the form of war. Britain annexed the Transvaal in 1877. This had the effect of ending the border disputes that had been the subject of battles between the Transvaal and the Zulu kingdom. Britain, as colonial authority over the Transvaal, went to war against the Zulu in 1879, and defeated them. The Zulu kingdom was then also brought under the control of the British.[1133]

In 1880 the Transvaal Republic rebelled against colonization and regained its independence in the First Boer War. The discovery of gold in the area, however, led Britain to wage another war to gain control of the Transvaal, as well as the Orange Free State, which stood between British territory and Transvaal territory. This Second Boer War (1899-1902),

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[1130] See, Eric Anderson Walker, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire* (CUP Archive, 1963), 265–66; Alan Lester, "Reformulating Identities: British Settlers in Early Nineteenth-Century South Africa," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 23, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): 517–19, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-2754.1998.00515.x; Ross, *Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750–1870*, 45.

[1131] See, John L Comaroff, "Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models of Colonial Domination in South Africa," *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 4 (1989): 673, https://doi.org/146.232.129.75; Wim A Dreyer, "South Africa: The Early Quest for Liberty and Democracy," *HTS Theologies Studies/Theological Studies* 71, no. 3 (2015): 6, https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v71i3.2873; Andre Du Toit, "No Chosen People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology," *The American Historical Review* 88, no. 4 (1983): 925.

[1132] The Great Trek emerged as a crucial historical event in the identity formation for Afrikaners, in their self-conception. The Great Trek was conceived as a moment of Divine unction and calling, whereby the those of Dutch descent were separated and called out from the British and native African peoples. "The British administration had stood in the shoes of Pharaoh and oppressed [the Voortrekkers] in Egypt-a country that they had to forsake to seek freedom. And so the exodus to the Promised Land was undertaken. The Voortrekkers and their descendants in their new home (Israel) felt that they were waging a struggle for survival against 'Pharaoh' and 'the black Canaanites.'" Du Toit, "No Chosen People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology," 925 citing Van Jaarsveld, 9-10.

[1133] Richard L. Cope argues that in annexing the Transvaal a provocation of the Zulu was anticipated. The independence of the Zulu was regarded as an "insuperable obstacle to confederation…The purpose of confederation was…a comprehensive political and economic reconstruction of South African Society in which an independent Zulu kingdom could have no place" Richard Cope, "The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879" (PhD Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1995), ii–iii. Zululand was annexed to Britain's (previously colonized) Natal territory in 1887. For detailed treatment of the process leading to annexation, see, Philip Warhurst, "The Colonial Office and Natal's Annexation of Zululand," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History* 19, no. 1 (December 10, 2001).

inflicted much death, devastation and destruction,[1134] before being won by the British. By 1902 the former independent Boer republics had been ruthlessly brought under British dominion, as was all native African territory. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was created, which consolidated the former Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal Colony, and Orange Free State Colony into one entity existing as a dominion of Great Britain.

The history of brutal warfare, in resistance to domination and control, between the Dutch and the English, and between Europeans and Africans, is a large factor in the "normatization" of violent resistance in South African culture.

10.4.2.3. Early Twentieth Century Protest in South Africa

Black South African protest methods of the early 20th century reflected the British political and ideological dominance of the early 19th century, which was marked by the implementation of "civilizing" colonial reforms.

The early strategy of the South African Native National Congress ("SANNC"), which later became the African National Congress ("ANC"), provides a notable example. British ideology, which was rooted in civil rights, the rule of law, and respectable Christian character, dominated early 19th century South Africa and influenced subsequent generations as to ideas of what constituted proper conduct of citizens. By the early 20th century, though the disputes of the early 19th century regarding territory and political control had been resolved, questions of racial hierarchy and inclusion continued to be contested. In 1912, the SANNC was formed in response to discriminatory laws enacted by the newly formed Union of South Africa.[1135] In response to the onslaught of legislative depredations, "[n]early all the leaders and greater chiefs supported the movement for a congress that would give them an effective means of making their grievances known to the government and South Africa at large."[1136] The primary native African strategy of resistance to ongoing discriminatory treatment involved organizing for protest.

[1134] See, Emily Hobhouse's Report to the Committee of the Distress Fund for South African Women and Children, of a visit to the camps of women and children in the Cape and Orange River colonies, a contemporaneous account of the conditions of life resulting from the war. Emily Hobhouse, Report of a Visit to the Camps of Women and Children in the Cape and Orange River Colonies (London: Friars, 1901).

[1135] Oppressive legislation included the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act, which changed a breach of contract by African workers into a criminal offense, as well as the 1911 Mines and Works Act, which allowed job reservation by regulation. Willie Hofmeyr, "Agricultural Crisis and Rural Organization in the Cape: 1929-1933" (University of Cape Town, 1985), 3.

[1136] Hofmeyr, 4; see also, H. J. Simons and R. E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1983), 133.

The act of organization was an expression of the inculcation of the discourse of the British Empire. It was, after all, the British organized protest of slavery that led to the abolition of the slave trade a century earlier. By choosing organization as a strategy, those who were politically located among the lower echelon of colonized subjects, demonstrated an internalization of the British idea of organized protest as a means of obtaining redress of wrongs.

Furthermore, leadership of the SANNC, and later the ANC, embraced a Constitutional approach to protest.[1137] As Hofmeyr notes, "[t]he approved methods of struggle were to ventilate grievances at public meetings and through the press, and make representations for redress by means of resolutions and deputations."[1138] The African leaders, who were the most privileged class of native Africans, were convinced that their respectability would be respected by those in power, and their demands given fair consideration.[1139] There was a "belief that African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advance gradually to full political rights."[1140] Thus, despite being subjected to discrimination, exclusion, and cruelty, native African protest of the early 20th century, which included the filing of resolutions and peaceful discussion, embodied the British ideology of civility, respectability, and the rule of law. The protest strategy was almost entirely ineffective.

There were also instances of less conservative protest by the non-elite class of native Africans. These included labour strikes,[1141] the Transvaal Native Congress (an affiliate of the ANC) strikes for wage increases and against pass laws,[1142] and passive resistance marches by

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[1137] Dennis Davis and Robert Fine, "Political Strategies and the State: Some Historical Observations," *Journal of Southern African Studies Special Issue on Law and Politics in Southern Africa Journal of Southern African Studies* 12, no. 1 (1985): 27.

[1138] Hofmeyr, "Crisis and Rural Organization," 5, citing; Simons and Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950*, 169.

[1139] See, Simons and Simons, "The conservatives…persisted in believing that liberation would come through reasoned argument, appeals to Christian ethics, and moderate constitutional protest." Simons and Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950*, 429.

[1140] Davis and Fine, "Political Strategies and the State: Some Historical Observations", citing Nelson Mandela, "The Struggle is My Life." See, also, e.g., Brian Willan, "Sol Plaatje, De Beers and an Old Tram Shed: Class Relations and Social Control in a South African Town, 1918-1919," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4, no. 2 (1978): 195–215. Sol Plaatje, the key figure of Black African leadership in Kimberley, was a founder and the first General Secretary of the SANNC. He served as a native African civic leader during times of unrest, and functioned as a mediator between native Africans and White State and White Capital authority.

[1141] Hofmeyr, "Crisis and Rural Organization," 8.

[1142] Andrew Hayden Manson and Bernard Mbenga, "The African National Congress in the Western Transvaal/Northern Cape Platteland, c. 1910–1964: Patterns of Diffusion and Support for Congress in a Rural Setting," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 3 (September 2012): 475–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/02582473.2012.661449.

the Native and Coloured Women's Association ("NCWA").[1143] However, native African leadership consistently repudiated methods of protest that deviated from the genteel norm that they established.[1144]

During the period between the World Wars, Black Consciousness was being birthed internationally,[1145] and was influential in revitalizing the dormant Black protest culture in South Africa. Those who would lead the late twentieth century struggle for freedom were born during this period. Parented by a generation of men steeped in idealized notions of British respectability, they had no struggle with attaining legitimization as "civilized" Africans. Rather their struggle was to see realized European political ideals of freedom, justice, equality, etc. for the mass of Black South African peoples. By the time that the Apartheid government came to power in 1948, a new generation, with different strategies of protest were leaders of native Africans.

[1143] Hofmeyr, "Crisis and Rural Organization," 9–10.

[1144] The example of Sol Plaatje, is instructive. Willan's documents that:

> Both before and after [the strikes of] 1918 Plaatje consistently expressed his opposition to the involvement of Africans in strike movements. In the 1920s he was actively involved in supporting De Beers' candidates in parliamentary electoral campaigns…And in 1929 he was still involved in 'the stupendous task', as he told the De Beers General Secretary, of combatting Mr Bunting's work after he had visited Kimberley 'and left his agents to spread his communistic propaganda'. Willan, "Sol Plaatje, De Beers and an Old Tram Shed," 211.

Plaatje's outlook reflects the large degree of ideological consensus between Black African leaders and the White leaders of the day. Willan, 211–12. Which significantly informed Plaatje's conceptualization of legitimate methods of protest.

[1145] 1919—The first Pan African Congress where W. E. B DuBois affirms Marcus Garvey's "Back to Africa movement". The oppression of black people is no longer perceived as location specific. DuBois links the struggle of black people all over the world. 1920s—The Jazz Age arrives with an explosion of creativity among Black people, and travels around the world. Being Western, but not white, it became a model for cultural change that incorporated the African heritage, the Africanness, of its creators. Huge signifier of the potentiality of the liberated Black soul. 1940—Richard Wright publishes *Native Son*. The book shifts global conversation, not merely because of the power of the story of Bigger Thomas, nor the depiction of the traumas of life as a young Black man oppressed by a white supremacist culture, nor because it gives voice to a rage, an impotence, and a fear that has never been articulated. The race conversation shifts due to Wright's ability as a Black man, in a publishing world that is for the most part closed to Blacks, to articulate a counter-narrative to the narrative provided by the White majority. Wright exposed the irrationality of racialized democracy and capitalism. Wright's book was banned in South Africa until Apartheid fell. 1945—Allies in WWII triumph over authoritarianism and genocide; 5th Pan African Congress was held. W. E. B. Dubois, West Indian anti-colonialist Marxist George Padmore, later heads of state Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya were all in attendance. "The Pan-African Congress manifesto…positioned the political and economic demands of the Congress within a new world context of international co-operation, arising from `the grim ordeal of the war of liberation against Fascism'." Simon Katzenellenbogen, "The 1945 Pan-African Congress and Its Aftermath," World history Archives, 1995, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/058.html. 1948—U.N. adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

10.4.2.4. Post-WWII Protest Strategy in South Africa

Where constitutional struggle had been the main strategy pursued in the early 20th century, following World War II, and the advent of a platform of explicitly racial discriminatory legislation, the protest movement embraced the principles of mass mobilization and passive resistance. This program of civil disobedience led to the Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws in 1952, which garnered dramatic support among the most marginalized people in South Africa.

After extensive organizing at the grassroots level, a Congress of the People was convened in 1955.[1146] The Congress was meant to gather "the widest possible representation from the whole country to draw up a charter of freedom, embodying the peoples' demands."[1147] Proposals were submitted from organizational leaders throughout the country. These were organized and compiled into what became the Freedom Charter, which was significant for its articulation of the will of the people as to governance.[1148]

The civil disobedience of the ongoing Defiance Campaign was responded to with ruthless opposition by State security forces. In 1960, a nationwide march against the Pass Law resulted in 69 persons being killed and hundreds injured after the police fired upon unarmed protesters who had gathered in Sharpeville. [1149] As a result of Sharpeville, State suppression in South Africa grew severe with the arrest of opposition leaders, and the banning of opposition political parties. Thus, the Defiance Campaign came to an end.

Though anti-colonial movements, which advocated for Black African governance of Black African people, bore fruit in countries all over the African continent throughout the mid-20th century,[1150] and though the rights of Black people were being fought for and expanded in

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[1146] The Congress Alliance, composed of the Executive Committees of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation, together agreed upon the need for such a mass congress.

[1147] Hilda Bernstein, "The Freedom Charter (With a Note by Hilda Bernstein)," *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1987): 676.

[1148] The Freedom Charter, also known as the Kliptown Charter, was adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, South Africa, on 26 June 1955. For full text of the Freedom Charter, as well as an account of its formation, see, Hilda Bernstein's "The Freedom Charter." Bernstein, "The Freedom Charter (With a Note by Hilda Bernstein)." For insight as to the "spirit" of the Freedom Charter in its context, see, Allan Aubrey Boesak, *Pharaohs on Both Sides of the Blood-Red Waters: Prophetic Critique on Empire: Resistance, Justice, and the Power of the Hopeful Sizwe - A Transatlantic Conversation* (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2017), 18–20.

[1149] See, Tom Lodge, *Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and Its Consequences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and also, William Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa (New Edition*, 2nd ed. edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 165-167;

[1150] Independence from European colonial power was achieved in numerous countries, including Ghana (1957), Guinea (1958) Republic of Congo , Senegal (1960), Tanganyika (1961), Uganda (1962), Kenya (1963), etc.

the U.S. Civil Rights movement, organized mass protest activity in South Africa quieted following the state repression and removal of organizational leadership in the 1960s.

During this period Steve Biko embarked on a mission to communicate a message of Black Consciousness to Black South African youth. These seeds of Black consciousness sprouted and grew into organized resistance against Black oppression. In 1976 high school and secondary school students in Soweto staged a march and protest, which turned into a scene of staggering bodily assault. Police responded to the gathering of protesters with lethal force, triggering what came to be called the Soweto Uprising. Some students were killed, some were injured, and property was vandalized and burned. The event in Soweto inaugurated the most sustained period of resistance to Apartheid since the period that culminated in the Sharpeville Massacre over a decade before.

Students began to incorporate violence into protest. The violence was used strategically in some cases, but in some cases viewed as warranted retaliation for the brutal treatment meted out by the police. I quote here at length one student leader from 1976 to describe how the drive for retaliation was experienced at the time:

> For the last four months of protest in Soweto and other areas, apart from the destruction of the White man's property in the Black man's ghetto, Blacks have neither killed nor harmed any Whites. We took our demonstration right into the heart of Johannesburg City, we shed no White blood. We proved our degree of discipline, dignity, and value of human life whether it be Black or White.
> …But, the White South African Police have shot and killed hundreds of my Black brothers and sisters; they shot, wounded and maimed thousands of Black school children and adults; their prison cells are teeming with hundred thousands [sic] of Black students and leaders detained or imprisoned for having dared to oppose the Monster-Policy Apartheid.
> ….Our fathers know what [good things] the White man has done for them…Our fathers may forgive Whites. But, there is only one thing that I, as a Black student and Youth of this country, know. That is: the White police shot and drove a bullet through the head and brain of my 10-year old brother. That the White police shot and killed hundreds of my colleagues; that they shot, wounded and maimed my father, mother, brother,

> and sister at the graveyard; that they terrorize the streets of my ghetto and I can find no peace to rest my head.[1151]

Here, student leader, Khotso Seatlholo, communicates his frustration with protracted protest that did not yield mutual respect, but instead yielded the death of his 10-year old brother at the hands of the police, as well as similar death to hundreds of others. The embrace of violence in protest during the struggle period between 1976 and 1994 certainly reflects that his sentiment was shared by others.

10.4.2.5. Conclusion of History of Protest Tradition

The protest tradition in South Africa is long. It shows that for nearly as long as South Africa has been occupied by Europeans who imposed oppressive conditions, Black and indigenous persons have resisted being oppressed though various means. These means included fleeing enslavement, using the law to seek redress, and organizing mass boycotts and protest. They also included, in the late nineteenth century, going to war. The model of warfare to resolve disputes with the state was used by all interested parties during the period of industrialization when the modern formation of the nation took form. Industrialization worsened the dehumanizing life conditions of Black people. It divided the population into elites and workers, and created an industrial lifestyle for African workers that enforced as policy their imposed diminished social status. Attempts for redress were unheeded. Conditions worsened until the informal policy was legislated into law in 1948. Conditions worsened further for Blacks in South Africa at a time when Black Consciousness was blooming all over the world. The violent repression of attempts by Blacks to assert their human dignity in the 1950s and 1960s were met with a conscientized Black leadership that was "prepared to die" rather than live in humiliation. The dignified resistance of these leaders led to them being exiled, jailed, and killed. The awakened consciousness of Black persons, their will to be free, was left without any guidance as to how to channel the will-ing of the will to freedom, when freedom appeared impossible, except the guidance that trickled down from the master classes on how to endure and love.

The Black elites who had been resurrected into the cultural social life from social death, were inculcated with the values of the masters of the social order. Their protest arose from an

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[1151] Thomas Karis, Gwendolen Margaret Carter, and Gail M. Gerhart, "Press Release by Khotso Seatlholo, Chairman of the Soweto Students Representative Council, October 15, 1976," in *From Protest to Challenge : A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990; Vol. 5: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979*, ed. Thomas Karis and Gail M. Gerhart (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 1997), 589–90.

expectation that the values of the masters—liberty, justice, equality--would be fully applicable to them. Their protest did not consider, however, that the values that they had been taught, were selective. Liberty, justice, and equality were values reserved for the propertied, White, man. Hard work, obedience, submission, suffering, forgiveness, and love were the values that most others were expected to adopt; with long-suffering being of particular importance for Blacks.

The leaders born to elites, who experienced a measure of freeness from birth, were those who were found by the message of Black Consciousness and who sought to lead the people to experience the freedom that they knew and dared to claim more of. Without leaders, following their purge in South Africa, violence in protest, and violence as protest, ensued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

10.4.3. Protest Icons of the Twentieth Century and Violence

Stephen Bantu Biko and Nelson Mandela, are two leaders from the mid-twentieth century struggle whose ideas have been integral to movements for social justice both in former years as well as in the present. In this section of the research I will show that Biko and Mandela espoused a philosophy that foremost sought to claim the human dignity of the people. They concluded that the planned use of violence, could be utilized under existential warrant.

10.4.3.1. Nelson Mandela

Nelson Mandela is revered as an iconic visionary of political peace and reconciliation. What is less often recalled about Mandela is his advocacy of protest against oppression through use of physical aggression. Yet his position on the employment of tactics involving physical violence was explicit and unambiguous.

The victory of the National Party in 1948, and the enforcement of apartheid as official government policy meant that "racial hatred had just been legally permanentized, officially legitimized, and politically institutionalized."[1152] This action by the political powers provoked the progressive adaptation of the Black protest movement during this period. Instead of Constitutional struggle of the previous generation, the movement embraced the principles of mass mobilization and passive resistance. The Defiance Campaign Against Unjust Laws implemented in 1952 involved "persistent mass actions of civil disobedience."[1153] It "aimed to clog the jails, bring the administration of unjust laws to a halt, and to demonstrate to the people,

[1152] Boesak, *Pharaohs on Both Sides of the Blood-Red Waters*, 16.
[1153] Boesak, 16.

the effectiveness of mass non-violent action."[1154] The movement was made up of volunteers from the common masses of people, who were available to act. During the campaign their role was to "distribute leaflets, to organize strikes, or do whatever the campaign requires. They…volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts."[1155] As Boesak notes, the adoption of mass protest action was a recognition that "obeying apartheid laws was not a sign of civil politics but complicity in their own oppression and lending legitimacy to laws that destroyed their humanity. They now understood that…mass civil disobedience was in fact the dignity they owed themselves and the generations to come."[1156] As a leader within the African National Congress ("ANC") in the 1950s, Mandela implemented strategies of "militant African nationalism and mass action…[with] tactics of boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience."[1157] This became the predominant strategy of resistance to Apartheid by Black Africans up to the 1960s.

However, it became clear that such actions were inadequate to reform the economic and political structure. In 1960, the South African police opened fire on a crowd of thousands in Sharpeville, outside Johannesburg. The next day, on March 30, 1960, the Apartheid government declared the country's first state of emergency and a week later, banned the Pan-African Congress and the African National Congress. The Sharpeville Massacre was forceful evidence of the lack of effectiveness of non-violent protest. Like the first generation of constitutional civil protest actions, non-violent resistance did not result in dialogue, discussion, or change. Further, the strategy of mass action was made impossible by sweeping state crackdown on strikes and demonstrations, and by the banning of organizations, such as the ANC, that planned such actions. As Mandela later wrote, "all lawful modes of expressing opposition…had been closed by legislation…the Government had decided to rule by force alone."[1158] Thus, after 12 years, 1949 to 1961, the methods of exclusively non-violent resistance were jettisoned.

[1154] Rob et al Davies, *Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide to Movements, Organizations and Institutions Volume Two* (Zed Books, 1984), 286.

[1155] Nelson Mandela, "Nelson Mandela's Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial," ANC Famous Speeches, 1964, http://www.anc.org.za/content/nelson-mandelas-statement-dock-rivonia-trial.

[1156] Boesak, *Pharaohs on Both Sides of the Blood-Red Waters*, 17.

[1157] SAHO, "Defiance Campaign 1952," Text, South African History Online, March 21, 2011, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/defiance-campaign-1952.

[1158] Davis and Fine, "Political Strategies and the State: Some Historical Observations," 28, citing Mandela speech, "The Struggle is My Life."

In 1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe or "MK" ("Spear of the Nation"), was created as the armed wing of the ANC. Nelson Mandela was a founder and chief proponent of this branch of the political party. When Mandela was later arrested and tried for crimes of violent insurrection, he gave an extensive statement.[1159] In his statement he explained his reasons for turning to armed resistance. He identified, first, that community leaders were compelled to channel the rage being experienced by growing numbers of people in the Black community in order to prevent wanton expressions of "terrorism."[1160]

Secondly, Mandela argued that armed resistance was the best means of communicating a message. The message was that Blacks were human, possessed of human value and human dignity. It was also the message that Black people would not allow or accept the dehumanizing violences of the social order.

> [W]e felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law….
> Our problem…was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the fight…fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights….it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violence had achieved nothing....
> At the beginning of June 1961…I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence…was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force… the Government had left us with no other choice.[1161]

Here Mandela argued that the South African history of attempts to assert the dignity of Black persons was futile, since it increased the dehumanizing violence perpetrated against Black persons. Accordingly, a different tactic was necessary to lay claim to the inherent dignity of Black people.

[1159] Mandela's "I Am Prepared to Die," statement from the dock during his trial was over 3 hours long.
[1160] Nelson Mandela, "I Am Prepared to Die Speech," Nelson Mandela.Org, 2018 1964, http://db.nelsonmandela.org/speeches/pub_view.asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS010&txtstr=prepared%20to%20die.
[1161] Mandela.

Quoting the MK Manifesto, Mandela continued,

> "The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices - submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom."[1162]

Thus, the existential necessity of fighting for the humanity of the people and for freedom, compelled Mandela to endorse organized resistance "by all means in our power," including acts of physical violence.

Mandela's adoption of an ideology that allowed for the use of physical violence was a means, not of physical force as a product, an end in itself. His acceptance of the use of physically coercive force was intended as an acknowledgement that violence is a wide-reaching process, and that the form of physical violence was needed to counter dehumanization with an assertion of humanity, and to defend "our people," the most marginalized in the social order. Mandela's intent was not wanton vigilantism but an intentional and thoughtful application of physical force that was not lethal, but consisted of "properly controlled sabotage." This strategy was, in Mandela's consideration, the means likely to bear the desired outcome without loss of life. It allowed for the possibility of continued relationship between the races while opposition to the White race's violence against Blacks was being forcefully pressed.

To this end MK's plan for sabotage was formulated.

> We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone communications would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.
> Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people and encourage them to participate in non-violent mass action such as strikes. In addition, they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line, and we were fighting back against Government violence….[S]trict instructions were given to [MK]…that on no

[1162] Mandela.

> account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations.

Mandela's use of coercive physical force then, was based on assertion of dignity, was intended to preserve relationship with the violator, and was adamant that the use of force be non-lethal. It demonstrates a will that is rightly ordered and fully aware of the subversive tentacles of violence in the social order and what was necessary to resist it.

10.4.3.2. Steve Biko

Steve Biko has been called the Father of Black Consciousness in South Africa.[1163] His work, which is concerned with the identity and being of Black people, oppressed subjects with legacies of slavery, colonization, and racism, is the work of Africana existentialist philosophy.[1164]

Biko's thought and written critiques of Apartheid were strongly influenced by the writing of Frantz Fanon. Like Fanon, Biko acknowledged the everyday recapitulations of existentially-diminishing conditions within which Black South Africans, specifically, were enmeshed.

He notes:

> [T]he black man is subjected to two forces in this country. He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalized machinery, through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very difficult living conditions, through poor education, these are all external to him, and secondly, and this we regard as the most important, the black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation…[Conditions for blacks are entirely inferior to conditions for whites.] The homes are different, the streets are different, the lighting is different, so you begin to tend to feel that there is something incomplete in your humanity, and that completeness goes with whiteness.[1165]

Biko understood his task as that of rehabilitating the psychic selfhood of Black people, as the preliminary step to securing their political and economic self-actualization. Unlike Mandela, his public statements did not explicitly recognize the necessity of acts of physical violence as a means of resistance. Indeed, Biko has often been framed as an advocate of non-

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[1163] Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like* (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2004), 2.

[1164] Mabogo P. More, "Biko: Africana Existentialist Philosopher," *Alternation* 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 82–83.

[1165] Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 2004, 110–11.

violence. He seemed in some cases to state an opposite position. For example, he gave testimony at trial that his organization was different from other organizations on issues of violence:

> "[W]e have groups that are known in this country, who have opted for another way of operation, who have opted for violence. We know that the ANC and PAC have done this in the past; they have taken this step. Now we don't believe it is the only alternative. We believe that there is a way of getting across to where we want to go, through peaceful means"[1166]

Nonetheless, there is sufficient cause to be sceptical of the "non-violent" framing of Biko. First, language expressing commitment to "peaceful means" is language used by Biko under conditions of close monitoring. Being a banned person,[1167] repeatedly facing charges of terrorism, under house arrest on unspecified charges, and confronted with the knowledge of routine assaults and murders of Black activists by the State,[1168] Biko was hardly likely to offer self-incriminating statements of an intent to incite insurrection, or to make any statements that could be construed in such a way. For the same reason, documents of the organizations with which Biko was involved,[1169] must be read in light of the heightened state of security that controlled the lives of those involved in activism.[1170]

Two short examples of Biko's responses to questions are instructive. When asked, "Is BPC a strong organization at the moment?" He replied, "I wouldn't say it is strong; I don't

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[1166] Biko, 151.

[1167] Banning Steve Biko meant that he could not: enter an educational institution, write anything for publication, speak in public, be quoted in the press or in any publication. He could not attend any gathering other than "a bona fide church service," or have visitors to his home except a doctor, or ever be in the company of more than one person at a time. Biko, *I Write What I Like,* 1987, 183.

[1168] Biko was banned from Durban in 1973 and confined to his hometown of Kingwilliamstown, due to his activism with Black Community Programmes ("BCP"). His activism nonetheless continued, and in 1975 his banning orders were amended to prohibit his work with BCP. In 1976 he was detained for 101 days under the Terrorism Act in 1976, and was then released without being charged. His repeat detention in 1977 culminated in his assassination at the hands of the security forces Biko, 1–2..

[1169] During Biko's trial much attention is paid to the written documents of the organization which describe the group's goals, methods, and intentions for their operation. At one point Biko relates that the Black People's Convention documents make clear statements of the organization's intention of obeying the existing laws without confrontation and without provoking a police response. Biko, 154.

[1170] See, e.g., an interview he gave where he described his impression of the Government's view of SASO, the student organization he founded: [The government is] obviously watching. You see, unlike the old movements, which they could easily associate with communism-or violence, which they still define as communism-their initial analysis of SASO was that it sounded like an organization which was going to function along the kind of lines they wanted to see…They haven't outlawed black consciousness as a philosophy in the same way that they've outlawed socialism. So that nobody can be held to ransom for preaching black consciousness. In any case it would be extremely untenable for them to preach white power and outlaw what they regard as black power." http://abahlali.org/files/Interview%20with%20Steve.pdf Gerhart byline.

know what strength you are using; for instance, I would not compare it to the Nationalist Party," which was the controlling political party of the country at that time.[1171]

When asked if he was "building up a hostile power bloc…oriented for action….[that his work was] conscientization pointing out to [Black people] what enemies they have in the white people?", Biko responded, "…this is just a common starting point…you move from there to create some kind of hope, some kind of opportunity, and in fact I think you are giving them some kind of psychotherapy to move away from being a defeated society to being a hopeful society…" His responses appear tailored to his audience of prosecutors.

Despite Biko's claim that the Black Consciousness Movement's aim was nothing more than to provide hope, it is clear that the ultimate goal of BCM, was that of securing respect for the human dignity of Black persons; that through the psychological rehabilitation of Black people their political and economic rights would be demanded and secured.

However, even if the threat of the Black majority actively securing their rights were not Biko's intent, his consciousness raising, and rhetoric of inherent human dignity and equality of Black people, was itself a dangerous aggression against the laws, culture, and hegemonic discourse of South Africa, which normalized the inferiority of the Black person. As Bahktin's theory of "authoritative discourse,"[1172] makes clear, the act of questioning authoritative discourse "is itself a transgressive and treasonous act, a sign of rebellion."[1173]

Second, Biko regularly noted that Fanon was an intellectual influence. That influence is clear with respect to both Fanon and Biko's concern with Africana existentialism. Though there is not an express affirmation of Fanon's theorizing around the use of physical force in revolutionary movements in Biko's writing, there is also no express repudiation, distancing, or declared divergence of understanding from Fanon in Biko's writing. Without such a distinction between where he differs from Fanon, at best the assessment of his position is that he may have

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[1171] Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 2004, 152.

[1172] Authoritative discourse, says Nielsen, is more than simply a set of rules, directives, and fact-like information; it "strives rather to determine the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world, the very basis of our behavior." It "is located in a distanced zone, organically connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers"; it "is given (it sounds) in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact. its language is a special (as it were, hieratic) language…it is akin to taboo, i.e., a name that must not be taken in vain" Cynthia Nielsen, "Resistance Is Not Futile: Frederick Douglass on Panoptic Plantations and the Un-Making of Docile Bodies and Enslaved Souls," *Philosphy and Literature* 35 (2011): 260–61 citing Bakhtin..

[1173] Nielsen, 261.

been in full agreement with Fanon with respect to revolutionary necessities, or he may not have been in full agreement.

It is certainly clear that in his own life and personal struggle against the Apartheid apparatus of State security, Biko was no pacifist. In an interview shortly before his final detention, he recalls an arrest where, "some guy tried to clout me with a club. I went into him like a bull."[1174] He describes a philosophy of dealing with his interrogators that included his meeting of physical force from them, with his own even greater physical force, so that his tormentors would have to overcome him using much greater force than they had planned. "I'm afraid you may have to kill me in the process even if it is not your intention," he would advise.[1175] His autopsy revealed just such an excessive beating.

Finally, the culture's propensity to craft innocuous narratives around resistance leaders, narratives of non-violence, moderation, and preservation of order, should make us cautious about the framing of Biko's message as wholly non-violent. Recently, the former President of South Africa, who faces a number of criminal complaints for acts committed during his tenure in office,[1176] likened himself to Steve Biko, saying "we are there, some of us, hated as he was hated." [1177] The leadership contributions of both men, however, are entirely opposite. Such reframings are a sharp demonstration that the memory of historic figures, such as Biko, can be an ongoing matter of contestation.[1178]

Like Martin Luther King, Jr., whose image is employed globally as a non-violent change agent despite the radical stance he made against systems of poverty and war, a stance that resulted in his assassination; and like Mandela, who was the principle proponent of

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[1174] Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 2004, 173–74.

[1175] Biko, 175.

[1176] Lodged against President Zuma have been charges of rape, as well as allegations of influence peddling, corruption, and misappropriation of funds. See, The Guardian. May 8, 2016. "Jacob Zuma Cleared of Rape Charges." Retrieved October 5, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/08/aids.southafrica, Reuters. June 15, 2017. "Public Protector Launches Probe Of Influence-Peddling In State-Owned Firms." Retrieved September 30, 2017. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/public-protector-launches-probe-of-influence-peddling-in-state-owned-firms/, Tran, Mark. 2016. "South Africa's High Court Rules Jacob Zuma Should Face Corruption Charges," *The Guardian*, April 29. Retrieved September 30, 2017 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/29/jacob-zuma-corruption-charges-review-south-africa-high-court), and Smith, David. 2014. "Jacob Zuma Told to Repay Cash Spent On Private Home," *The Guardian*, March 19. Retrieved September 30, 2017 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/jacob-zuma-watchdog-report).

[1177] Virginia Keppler, "I'm like Steve Biko, Says Zuma," The Citizen, September 13, 2017, http://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1651023/im-like-steve-biko-says-zuma/.

[1178] See, Athi Mongezeleli Joja, "The Quiet Violence of Steve Biko," *Sunday World*, September 15, 2014, http://www.sundayworld.co.za/talk/2014/09/15/the-quiet-violence-of-steve-biko.

inaugurating armed struggle as a tactic of resistance to the oppressions of the South African state, Biko's image is sought to be captured by those who would neuter voices that have the potential to revive the will of the marginalized and thereby to arouse the vigorous spirit of resistance.

Biko was a Fanonian existentialist, who was well versed in the power, and also the limitations, of rhetoric of the struggle for liberation. For Fanon, and for Biko, psychological reinvention, would necessarily lead to action. To assert, "Black man you are on your own!"[1179] must mean just this.[1180] That understanding oneself as Black, equal in value and dignity to those who are White, is a preliminary movement; full understanding of who and what it means to be Black requires understanding that action must be taken to secure one's Black being.

> The philosophy of Black Consciousness therefore expresses group pride and the determination of the black to rise and attain the envisaged self. Freedom is the ability to define oneself with one's possibilities held back not by the power of other people over one but only by one's relationship to God and to natural surroundings. On his own, therefore, the black man wishes to explore his surroundings and test his possibilities---in other words to make his freedom real by whatever means he deems fit.[1181]

[1179] Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 2004, 100, 108.

[1180] Biko used this phrase, which was originated by Barney Pityana Don Makatile, "Black Man Was Truly on His Own - Sowetan LIVE," Newspaper, Sowetan LIVE, September 13, 2010, http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/columnists/2010/09/13/black-man-was-truly-on-his-own, memorably in one of his more popular articles, "Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity." It concludes a paragraph that is highly suggestive of the thought of Fanon:

> We must learn to accept that no group, however benevolent, can ever hand power to the vanquished on a plate. We must accept that the limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress. As long as we go to Whitey begging cap in hand for our own emancipation, we are giving him further sanction to continue with his racist and oppressive system. We must realise that our situation is not a mistake on the part of whites but a deliberate act, and that *no amount of moral lecturing will persuade the white man to "correct" the situation*. *The system concedes nothing without demand*, for it formulates its very method of operation on the basis that the ignorant will learn to know, the child will grow into an adult and therefore demands will begin to be made. It gears itself to resist demands in whatever way it sees fit. *When you refuse to make these demands and choose to come to a round table to beg for your deliverance, you are asking for the contempt of those who have power over you. This is why we must reject the beggar tactics that are being forced on us by those who wish to appease our cruel masters. This is where the SASO message and cry " Black man, you are on your own! "* Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 1987, 100 emphasis added.

[1181] Biko, *I Write What I Like*, 2004, 92.

It would seem that the images of Mandela and Biko have been framed as fully infused with a non-violent ethos. This attempt at non-violent framing constitutes an attempt by hegemonic culture-forming systems, to appropriate the memory of figures who wield cultural influence, and to affix to them the language-label of "*non-violent*" to symbolically code them as *nonthreatening* to the established social order. For Mandela, who as President of a democratized South Africa, became a symbol for the legitimacy and possibility of the established social order, a re-coding as non-threatening may be valid. However, it is not a valid re-coding with Biko, who died resisting, as it is not a valid re-coding often when it is employed.

This "non-violent" coding represents a re-conception of the identity of such influential figures. It is an imagination of their persons that represents them as having ideals that legitimized and accepted the terms of engagement prescribed by those in power. Precisely the opposite of the ideals for which these figures were actually proponents. What Mandela and Biko symbolize are a twentieth century incarnation of the theoretical conceptualization of human freedom's telic movement towards being free.

10.4.4. Protest, Freedom of the Will, and South African Activists

Mandela's adoption of tactics that were morally prescribed in the culture, overcomes the cultural and structural violence that refuses to be named as violence. It overcomes the systems that prohibit and outlaw any overt resistance by the violated. It overcomes the volatility of the violated, who might allow their emotional response to unfreedom to physically do harm to others, and to their own dignity. Finally, it overcomes the cultural, structural, and existential violence that is inherent in a system that dictates the parameters of how the violated are allowed to express the fact of their violation; i.e., the gathering in church to pray is allowable, the gathering in the public square to be arrested is not. Mandela recognized what Jesus recognized, that dignity demands action, and that action must reflect the dignity of the person undertaking the act. Theirs is a power that determines for itself, without regard for what culture approves of, what is necessary under the particular circumstances to love, honour, and value, one's own self-identity and one's neighbours, especially the marginalized. What neither insisted upon was that resistance not include the use of physical force. This is the thesis of the project.

10.4.4.1. The Student Protests of 2015-2016 in South Africa

Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko are examples of the working out of the human impetus to be or to become free. The same may be said of the protests of South African "born-free" student activists. The protests of South African students are iterations of this same manner of human freedom needing to be free.

Students in university in 2015-2016 are living in the shadow of a democracy that seems to have failed to fulfil its promises of equality and dignity for all. Over twenty years after the transition in governments, there has been little change in the lived experience of the daily lives of many. Presence on university campuses where the possibility of freedom is apparent, together with the actual limitations that are imposed by one's economic, cultural, and racial social location, may be cause for the development of frustration and hostility. It may be cause for refusing to accept the legitimacy of the limitations to being, and for challenging the system that creates and maintains the limitations.

In the spaces meant for freeness inside the university students encountered a reality that imposed restrictions upon their free being, i.e., human being, in ways that they did not before realize that they were limited and restricted, the existential impediment may be seen as leading to contemplation of, and conduct of coercive acts of force simply to allow the will-ing to move towards its *telos*; a space where the will can do the act of will-ing. This is particularly so when students have histories of marginalization, where desire and will-ing towards one's greatest good has been strongly suppressed, in favour of willing survival or aversion to penalization; and where these methods of not-will-ing, or willing against one's own greatest good, have been deeply internalized. In these cases, to resist the powers that represent the system of oppression, by all means one deems appropriate within one's power, is a mark of fully alive humanity. Such protest is to be witnessed with understanding, it is to be responded to on its terms.

10.4.4.1. Critique of the Contemporary (Boesak) Paradigm of Non-violent Resistance

Allan Boesak provides a valuable and necessary, detailed apology for the deployment of physically violent resistance by Christians, particularly those who endorsed armed struggle in South Africa, in his *Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid*.[1182] His position warrants consideration as his words make clear a sympathetic understanding of those who seek to obtain freedom through the use of physical force. Nonetheless, after careful consideration, he articulates a disavowal of the use of physical force. Boesak's views are significant to, and merit analysis in, this project because he is a South African who was deeply involved in the struggle for justice prior to 1994, and because he is now based in the West and undertakes theological

[1182] See, Boesak, *Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid*, 175–97.

work that encompasses the struggles of the marginalized globally. Thus, his views might be seen as representing a Western, African, and global sensibility.

10.4.4.1.1. Boesak's View of (Non)Violence

Boesak's position is one that is not infrequently adopted by Christians who are committed to the work of justice and reconciliation. Contemporary Christian sensibilities generally do not oppose political protest, and often support it. Forster has concluded that the church is "called to protest, to bear witness, wherever we see God's hope, but also where we see it as absent."[1183] The Boesak paradigm supports protest by Christians, however concludes is that the legitimization and use of "violence" (by which he means coercive, and possibly lethal, physical force), whether it is by the imperial powers or by those "freedom fighters" seeking justice on behalf of the marginalized, is morally wrong. In his view, violent acts trivialize the pain of the innocent who are wounded by such violence.[1184]

Participation in acts of physical violence must, then, be repudiated by all, though such repudiation is contrary to the core tenets of our social order.

> To question…violence is to question not only the efficacy of it; it is to question its salvific power, which, in situations where violence is glorified, always becomes an article of faith. It is to question the belief that violence is the god we need, to whom, in the first and the last resort, we turn for liberation, to whom we bow in submission and worship.[1185]

Boesak views violence as the god of this age; as an idol whose worship must end.

Boesak's theological heuristic is one that I regard as compatible with the arguments that I have made in this paper, to the extent that his theology is deeply concerned with the marginalized and with transformation of the culture. However, our theology diverges on the matter of (non)violence. Ultimately, the broad strokes painted by the Boesak view are unsuited for capturing the details involved in discussions of the Christian use of force during protest.

Boesak's articulation of the mainstream Christian view collapses the concept of violence into one broad category, regardless of what the violence consists of, who enacts the violence, and who is affected by the violence. Because of this, no allowance is made for the particularities of circumstance that shade what the use of force represents for those who choose

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[1183] Dion A. Forster, "What Hope Is There for South Africa? A Public Theological Reflection on the Role of the Church as a Bearer of Hope for the Future," HTS Teologiese Studies 71, no. 3 (December 2015): 5.

[1184] Boesak, *Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid*, 195.

[1185] Boesak, 195.

it, nor is there a possibility offered of the Christian integrity of pursuing the use of force when conscience dictates such a course of action.

The Boesak view insists that justice and love require a radical and revolutionary engagement with situations akin to a neighbour being robbed in our presence (e.g., encountering the robbery in progress in the Good Samaritan parable).[1186] It insists that the humanity of both the robber and the victim be recognized, as both are likely victims, on some level, of a system of violence. It insists that what is required "is not the turn to violence, it is in fact the embrace of compassionate, combative love."[1187] What is required is transformation of the "Jericho Road" itself. Which entails working for economic justice, a spiritually infused struggle, revolutionary neighbourliness, and a Spirit-filled Jericho Road ministry that is able to see the victims along the road.[1188]

10.4.4.1.1. Limitations of the Boesak View

These are necessary responses to the systemic Jericho Road situations around the world. However, they do not offer much guidance as to what the Christian travelling on the road is to do about looming attackers.[1189] Is one to accept the risk of travel on the road, and the threat of bodily injury, trusting that there will be Spirit-filled ministry to aid one's recovery after one is attacked? Can a woman carry mace and stun her attacker? Can a brother, and his friends, escort a sister along the road, with all prepared to defend and protect themselves should the need arise? Can a child walk along the road with a large dog that will allow no harm to befall the child? Are these acts of violence that a Christian must turn from? And what is the principle, or analytical frame, at work that determines if they are or are not? Is it love? Is one to love her attacker more than she loves herself? Surely that moves outside the teaching of Jesus.

The too-common shortcoming of the Boesak view (that it does not make clear what course of action the victimized Christian traveller is to follow, and why)[1190] is the willingness

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[1186] See, Boesak, 180–92. Boesak poses the question of Jean Cardonnel, "What would have happened if the Samaritan had come upon the scene while the robbers were still attacking their victim?"

[1187] Boesak, 196.

[1188] Boesak, 197.

[1189] See, also, Motlhabi, who argues that Boesak provides an ethics lacking in specificity. Analyzing Boesaks' constructed ethics in *Farewell to Innocence*, Motlhabi questions, "On what norms, principles and values is it based? What is its method of decision-making? What guidelines does it give for moral practice? Indeed, what he provides is a vision of an ethic of liberation without giving any content to such an ethic." Mokgethi Motlhabi, "The Problem of Ethical Method in Black Theology," *Black Theology* 2, no. 1 (January 2004): 64.

[1190] Boesak's prescription for what must happen when robbery is witnessed in our presence is that there must be love and neighbourliness, which demands one's intervention.

to provide a universal prescription based on this parable, while failing to consider the Jericho Road from the perspective of victim. Those who are not victimized on the Road should certainly be engaged in aiding victims, and in transforming the Road to make it safe for all travellers. But perhaps their ministry also entails helping, or at least in no way interfering with those helping the often-targeted learn how not to be targeted, or learn what to do if they are targeted.

10.4.4.1.1.1. Primarily Only Addresses Physical Violence

What can be learned from the Boesak view are ways that teaching about love of neighbour are not helpful to those who are historic victims of cultural violence. First, the dictation of what measures are appropriate, and what acts of force or non-use of force are allowed, is but a re-instantiation of the operation of hierarchical power that resulted in victimization in the first instance. Deciding for targeted persons who travel the road the best means to navigate it without assault, is to impose upon those who are personally at risk, the parameters of behaviour that are allowed and acceptable. It is to impose this set of boundaries in the name of Jesus and religion. It is to participate in a system that victimizes, and then to insist upon limits to the means that the victim may use to escape victimization. In addition to allowing room for the creative and ingenious work of the Spirit in transforming the culture, that same freedom must be allowed for the Spirit to inspire the traveller on the violent road.[1191]

Second, Boesak's paradigm of (non)violence does not take into account the existential violence perpetually undergone in the being of Blackness. A robber does not need to have a weapon of "violence" to do violence on roads around the globe when the victim is Black. The

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> Combatant love and revolutionary neighborliness…cannot look away, cannot stand aside, cannot wait for intermittent, safe charity…[I]ntervenes, steps into the breach, takes the risk of attack and retribution, taking upon itself the violence intended for the victim. It wrests control of the wheel out of the hands of the violent perpetrator and stops the cycle of destruction. That is the combative love that leads to the revolutionary neighborliness that Jesus talks about. Boesak, *Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid*, 193.

[1191] This reminds me of a church I visited once in Brooklyn, NY, many years ago. I do not remember the context of this story but will never forget the story itself. The preacher described how on one occasion he was preaching energetically when a man came to the front of the church and assaulted him. The man yoked the preacher from behind. Using his arm, he squeezed the preacher's neck preventing him from breathing. The preacher was paralyzed in shock when it happened, first trying to figure out what was happening and why it was happening, before beginning to send up frantic prayers to God. The preacher said as he was gasping for breath, praying, "Lord, help!" he had a moment of epiphany. A thought came to him: "You grew up in Red Hook [a rough section of Brooklyn]. Help yourself." Suddenly he remembered that he could get out of a head yoke, and that he knew how to subdue an attacker. So he did. The attacker was not seriously injured, but his attack was foiled, by the use of physical force.

"highway robbery" can exist in making the Black person's mere presence on the road, or even visibility *from* the road, an act of transgression. Because of the transgression of *being* the robber then punishes/penalizes the Black person in a way that leaves the Black person, especially if she is a Black woman, bleeding and wounded on the road that she should have known better than to trespass upon, or be seen from, in the first place. Boesak's paradigm fails to account for that violence that does not recognize violence against the Black person as violence.

The Boesak paradigm does not see the violence that determines that a Black woman's body lying in the road is a violated body. It does not name as violence what happens to the Black woman's body that is daily troubled by pain of indeterminate origin that appears here, there, and also there, after her transit, and labour, and going to market, and cooking, and cleaning, washing, and ironing, and caring for children, and praying and worshiping; after her heartbreak. Her body in pain that has no time for recuperation, nor means for recreation, much less time or means for consultation with a medical professional to investigate or cure the pain, which she, then, has no choice but to endure. It does not name as violent the existence she experiences that causes her to self-medicate with food to numb her pain. The invisible Black woman is fine, she is strong, she slays, but she lives--hands raised in praise--in a condition of invisible violation. Her life consists of being left prone on the road. Her Black body in pain and unable to move (from the ghetto, or township, or out of abusive exploitation) is not even remarkable to those passing by.

Boesak poses the question that was posed first by Jean Cardonnel, "What should we do if we come upon the scene while the robbery is still underway?" It is a question that merits the considered response that he provides, but the answer proposed, which turns to "non-violence" as a solution, tends to miss the nuance of the parable. What Jesus's parable recognizes is that the violence often perpetrated against persons is often perpetrated by those who are not seen. Indeed, the violence that is committed, is not committed by anyone that *can* be seen. The question posed by Cardonnel is valuable for this very reason. It asks us passers-by on the road, to be aware of the violent robberies that are wounding and killing our neighbours. It asks us to see *violence*, even when the robber is not a person who can be seen, and the victim is one whom we usually choose to overlook.

Third, the Boesak paradigm, which does offer a cogent articulation of a Christian ethics of justice, critiques systems of injustice. Yet at the same time, it uses the same rationale, to suggest that the violence that happens on the road of life that Jesus is concerned about is the violence that involves the use of a weapon. The paradigm suggests that the peace that Jesus

cares about is justice, but then makes the condition of justice dependant upon the absence of physical force of the violated. This ignores the fact that the absence of physical force of the violated is often a symptom of, or evidence of, the violence that has been perpetrated against them.[1192]

There is a categorical distinction that must be maintained between the use of violence of the powers and the use of physical force by the powerless. Focusing the Gospel on the use of force in the life of the Christian, places the emphasis on the symptom, but not the cause of the problem. What those who are marginalized by the powerful (including the marginalized earth) know for certain, is that men in suits, and who make deals on golf courses and in private rooms, are the initiators of violence in the world that often has the residual effect of denying people the necessities of life, which then leads to petty physical violence. Such physical violence is not the heart issue that Jesus seeks to resolve. Rather it is the heart issue of greed, and of damaged self-hood that allows one to participate in their own diminishment, by engaging in acts of petty violence and submitting to acts of violence large and small.

10.4.4.1.1.2. The Concept of "Violence" is Discursive

Finally, what the Boesak paradigm overlooks is that violence is what those in power name as violence. One person's non-violent act of subversion or omission is another person's act of sedition or treason. "Non-violent" is coded language for acts that affirm the social structure. "Violent" is coded language for acts that undermine the social structure. What the powers are against is not the use of coercive force; this is sanctioned every day in multiple ways. Parents disciplining children, brawls in drinking and sporting establishments, men protecting and defending "their" women and children, etc. There are also ample occasions when there is no use of coercive force, yet a "peaceful" act is construed as unlawful, such as

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[1192] Boesak has in his writing acknowledged that the psyche of Black persons has been impaired by anti-black racism. See, e.g., *Farewell to Innocence*, where he notes, "the greatest ally of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed. Gettng rid of an implanted slave mentality is central to the philosphy of Black consciousness." Allan A. Boesak, *Farewell to Innocence: A Socio-Ethical Study on Black Theology and Black Power*, Reissue edition (Wipf and Stock, 2015), 5–6. Later in this text he writes, "[Apartheid South Africa is] a country where blackness is non-beingness, where black people have no rights, *dignity, or self-respect*, where an extremely refined system of laws shouts "inferiority"at the black person at every level." Allan A. Boesak, *Farewell to Innocence: A Socio-Ethical Study on Black Theology and Black Power*, Reissue edition (Wipf and Stock, 2015), 139–40. However, paragraphs later he explicitly defines Black Consciousness as relating to Black collective economic and political power only, with no mention of the actual "consciousness", or psychic healing. See, Boesak, 142. Boesak, therefore seems to express a affirmation of psychic violence, however an ambivalence with respect whether the redress of this violence is the task of Black Consciousness. See, also, DeYoung, "From Resistance to Reconciliation," 14–15, wherein Boesak's co-author DeYoung explicitly relays the concept of the impaired Black psyche, which presumably Boesak affirms as co-author.

when Martin Luther King, Jr. organized marches, or Steve Biko spread the message of Black Consciousness.

The violence that the powers recognize as deeply harmful, is not that induced by the use of coercive force, rather it is that violent threat posed by the self-will, self-definition and self-determination of the masses, and most especially of the Black marginalized masses. A Black person with a weapon is not a cause for concern in the same way as he would be if he also had a self-determination to be free of domination and oppression. What the culture reflects is that self-will and self-determination is considered *to be the weapon* which must be disarmed. This is the lesson of Steve Biko's assassination and Robert Sobukwe's internment. It is the lesson that one's unmasking of the system is not tolerable by the system. One who unmasks the lie of the innate dishonour of the Black person, and the lie of the innate honourableness of the White person, must be eliminated. Martin Luther King, Jr. unmasked the lie of the honourableness of Southern White people and the dishonour of Southern Blacks, and he was reviled. When he began to unmask the lie of the U.S. being a force for peace in the world and to reveal the U.S. as a force for war and devastation, he was assassinated. Jesus unmasked the lie of the holiness of some people and the profaneness of other people, and the powers had him crucified. The powers would have Christians focus on preventing the use of coercive physical force. The powers' intent is for those with the hegemonic and discursive power in the culture (Christians) to privilege the values of suffering, forgiveness, and love, which allow for the powers' control, instead of privileging the values of dignity, self-respect, defence of the dignity of Others, and commitment unto death to the truth that one adheres to; values which are not susceptible to the control of the powers.

10.4.4.1.1. Critique of Kingian Nonviolence that Informs the Boesak Paradigm

10.4.4.1.1.1. The Inflence of Martin Luther King's Nonviolence

As he regularly makes clear, Boesak is a proponent of MLK's views on nonviolence.[1193] Boesak even references King's treatment of the Samaritan parable in Boesak's own consideration of the text.[1194] Boesak concludes with King that the parable points to the need

[1193] Boesak has described himself as "…more a spiritual child of…Martin Luther King, Jr., than of Franz Fanon and Ché Guevara." Allan Aubrey Boesak, *Dare We Speak of Hope?: Searching for a Language of Life in Faith and Politics* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2014), 94.

[1194] Boesak, *Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid*, 177.

for systemic change. Because it is clear that the Boesak paradigm is influenced by the nonviolence ethics of MLK, a brief comment on MLK's ethics is warranted.

10.4.4.1.1.2. Martin Luther King and "Nonviolence"

King pursued the tactics of nonviolent resistance to effect societal change beginning with the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott of 1955-1956, to his assassination in 1968. King began his work of nonviolence as a man in his mid-twenties, a preacher within an historic denomination, and engaged with activist work against *de facto* segregation in the U.S. South. By the time his life ended King was older, his work had split his denomination, and the activist task had transitioned to resisting "separated integration" in the U.S. North, economic inequality, colonization, and U.S. imperialist wars and ambitions. King's message had originally been grounded in his optimistic belief in the goodness of all humanity.[1195] He emphasized the important of love and understanding, as well as forgiveness, of Whites, and the redemptive suffering of Blacks. King was concerned that Blacks and Whites would equally participate in the "American Dream." However, as a result of his encounter with northern Black rage during the Watts riots of 1965,[1196] King's emphasis underwent a shift. King began to question the reality of the American Dream. He began to work to change the systems that America was built upon, and that moved away from talk of common humanity, towards talk of Black pride and embrace of power. This is exemplified by his speech delivered at the eleventh annual convention of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1967:

> …[W]e must honestly face the fact that the movement must address itself to the question of restructuring the whole of American society…There are forty million poor people here, and one day we must ask the question, "Why are there forty million poor people in America?" And when you begin to ask that question, you are raising a question about the economic system, about a broader distribution of wealth. When you ask that question, you begin to question the capitalistic economy…We are called upon to help the discouraged beggars in life's marketplace…But one day we must come to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring.[1197]

[1195] James H. Cone, *Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare*, 20th Anniversary edition (Orbis Books, 2012), 213–20.

[1196] Cone, 222–23.

[1197] Martin Luther King, Jr., "Where Do We Go From Here," in *A Call to Conscience: The Landmark Speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.*, ed. Clayborne Carson and Kris Shepard, Reprint edition (New York, NY: Grand Central Publishing, 2002), 193.

King advances a complete restructuring of America, based on a restructuring of capitalism. Elsewhere in the speech he even calls for a "guaranteed annual income."[1198] King told his audience that to continue moving forward, "[f]irst, we must massively assert our dignity and worth." Further, that, "one of the great problems that the Negro confronts is his lack of power… we've had it wrong and mixed up in our country…Negro Americans…[sought] their goals through love and moral suasion devoid of power, and white Americans [sought] their goals through power devoid of love and conscience."[1199]

It is the post-Watts Riot King said that "the vast majority of white Americans are racist, either consciously or unconsciously,"[1200] and that "however difficult it is to hear…we've got to face the fact that America is a racist country."[1201]

early writing describes the manner in which his views regarding nonviolent resistance evolved over time.[1202] He was exposed to the idea of pacifism for the first time in seminary. Encounters with Ghandi and the work of Reinhold Niebuhr were large influences of King that moved him toward an ethics of non-resistance that did not equate to passivity. Upon beginning a pastorate and being asked to lead a protest in Montgomery, AL, King was caused to put his ideas into practice. "Living through the actual experience of the protest, nonviolence became more than a method to which I gave intellectual assent; it became a commitment to a way of life. Many of the things that I had not cleared up intellectually concerning nonviolence were now solved in the sphere of practical action."[1203]

King's emphasis in his later years on the perniciousness of anti-Black racism, on the imperative need for a recovery of Black personhood, on riot violence being a response to structural violence; his insistence on "militant, massive nonviolence" (including "disruptive dimensions," that would "[bring] the nation's capital to a halt"),[1204] to exact government response to the activists' demands, and most especially his commitment to radically altering the economic and relational structure of the country, make stark the need for re-evaluation of how the term "violence" is understood. If it is, a I have argued, understood broadly, as more

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[1198] King, Jr., 187–89.
[1199] King, Jr., 185–87.
[1200] Cone, *Martin & Malcolm & America*, 233.
[1201] Drew Dellinger, "The Last March of Martin Luther King Jr.," The Atlantic, April 4, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/mlk-last-march/555953/.
[1202] King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 77–95.
[1203] King, 89.
[1204] James A. Colaiaco, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: Apostle of Militant Nonviolence* (New York: Springer, 2016), 189–90.

than the physical act of force; if it encompasses structural, cultural, and foundational influences on social relations, then it is difficult to regard King's later activism as "nonviolent." It is undisputable that King was staunchly anti-riot. However, his intention to use the force of bodies gathered *en masse* for militant disruption, is not so clearly identifiable as "nonviolent." I suggest that if a leader advancing the same claims as King (whom I'll refer to as KingSouth for the purposes of this example), for Black dignity and complete social transformation, rose to prominence in South Africa; and if KingSouth gained a mass following throughout the country; and if KingSouth organized a massive, militant march on Parliament, led and participated in by primarily Black Africans and other marginalized persons of color; and if such a march was led with the express intention of disrupting government operations until the government responded to the demands of KingSouth, then it is doubtful that KingSouth would be championed as a beacon of nonviolent change. Fear of Blackness, specifically South African Black rage, would more likely result in KingSouth being villainized as a dangerous militant threat to the safety, security, and order of the nation. A KingSouth who preached a message of Black honour and dignity, and of economic equality, and of *action* in support of both, who had mass popular support against the governing order, would likely meet the same fate as MLK, the same fate that met Jesus; and KingSouth would meet that fate for the same reasons. As "nonviolent" as his actions might appear (to some), they constitute responsive structural and cultural violence to the prevailing system.

10.4.4.1.1.3. Howard Thurman and Nonviolence

An important, but often unacknowledged,[1205] influence on King's thought and methods was Howard Thurman. Thurman's views aligned more with the *ahimsa* philosophy of Ghandi than with the social justice agenda of King. For Thurman nonviolence was an inward disposition meant to transform the individual. Nonviolence is a creative, positive response to a violent act towards oneself that meets the need of the perpetrator to be cared for, to be understood, and to be loved.[1206] Violence, in contrast, is an attempt to force one's will upon another; it is to express one's own need to be cared for and loved.[1207] For Thurman, without

[1205] For evidence of Thurman's influence, particularly echoes in their work, see, Quinton Hosford Dixie and Peter R. Eisenstadt, *Visions of a Better World: Howard Thurman's Pilgrimage to India and the Origins of African American Nonviolence* (Beacon Press, 2011), 190–93.

[1206] Howard Thurman, *Disciplines of the Spirit*, Reprint edition (Richmond, Ind: Friends United Press, 1963), 112.

[1207] Thurman, 112.

addressing one's opponent and convincing them of the need for changed values, nonviolence is counterproductive, destructive, and a weapon of violence. Thus, when nonviolence is employed as a practical necessity, by those who are inwardly not at peace:

> it has the same moral basis as violence. This is one of the ancient weapons of the weak against the strong and is part of the over-all tactic of deception…Because nonviolence is an affirmation of the existence of the man of violent deeds, in contradistinction to the fact that violence embodies a will to nonexistence, the moral impact which nonviolence carries, may potentially realize itself in a given situation, by rendering the violent act ineffective, and bringing about the profoundest kind of change in attitude.

For Thurman, the purpose of nonviolence is always the redemption of the other with the goal of creating community.[1208] Thurman was firmly committed to the idea of redemptive suffering, which he found was demanded by the Christian call to love. The violated must forgive as, ultimately, vengeance belongs to the Lord.[1209] Thurman's overall conception was that social structures are remade by individuals, and individuals are remade by love.[1210]

The objections that might be made to Thurman's spiritualized stance have been frequently made by those who have no spiritual dimension to either their refrain from physical violence, or to their acts of physical violence. With respect to nonviolence, the practical effectiveness of the tactic is often key to its use, and is deemed ethical simply due to its greater respect for biological human life than alternatives that engage the use of physical force. With respect to violence, such as war, revolutionary war, or revolutionary counter-violence, it is often asserted, in a Niebuhrian vein, that justice—and love for the oppressed (e.g., the Jews in the Holocaust)—dictates that physical action be taken against the aggressor. As Smith points out, Thurman gives little attention to the possibility that redemptive consequences may not be possible through nonviolence.[1211]

10.4.4.1.1.4. Conclusion of Kingian Critique

What the arguments from the perspective of King and Thurman demonstrate, is that much greater attention is needed to the language of violence and nonviolence, and that distinctions, e.g., spiritual motivation, effectiveness, etc., are often readily apparent in the "nonviolence" ideologies of its Black proponents. What is also seen is that the pursuit of dignity

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[1208] Thurman, 118–19.
[1209] Thurman, *Jesus and the Disinherited*, 98.
[1210] Luther E. Jr Smith, *Howard Thurman: The Mystic as Prophet*, 1st edition (Richmond, Ind.: Friends United Press, 2007), 147.
[1211] Smith, 153.

for Black persons is often seen as a key necessity for any program of liberation, however the "nonviolent" protocol is framed.

10.5. Conclusion of Violent Protest in South Africa

What this chapter has shown is that South Africa continues to experience inequality that is related to its history of colonial racial segregation and oppression. Black South Africans have endured generations of dehumanization and indignity.

In the course of a long tradition of protest, the mid-twentieth century produced a Black public whose Black Consciousness was awakened and who would not accept conditions of degradation. They organized and transgressed public norms to assert and claim the human dignity that belonged to them. Their protests were met with the physical violence of state repression, and even murder. The will-ing of Black persons for collective power was opposed fiercely. Nonetheless, the awakened consciousness of freedom could no longer accept imposed societal limitations. The will insisted, and in some cases the insistence became a physical act of coercive force. Ultimately, the will of the people prevailed and the system of government, that legislated dehumanity, fell.

Twenty plus years after its fall, students again insisted on realization of the ability to will their desires for their own highest good. Again, the will to freedom would not be restrained and in some cases became a physical act of coercive force.

The protests of the students should not be seen as morally reprehensible. Instead, they must be appreciated for what they are: necessary transgressions against systems of injustice by the freely operating will of those who have a long history of being oppressed and marginalized. It must be accepted that a possible consequence of the resuscitation of the will is the expression of coercive physical force.

Obviously, the destruction of property, and damage to life, is not optimal. To that end, the typical response would be to counsel to desist from exercising the will in a way that damages. This attempt at restriction only contributes to the will will-ing its freedom, however. Instead, the will must be freed to imagine, to exercise options, to plan with well thought out intention the course of action that it deems best. This process should be facilitated, without policing or censure. Following this, the essence of the cry, whatever it is, must be heard. My sense is that the process of allowing protestors to *be*, on their own terms, and to experience the self-worth that comes from insisting upon one's own terms of engagement, as much as having the inequitable conditions ameliorated, the facilitation of the protestors being made visible can

contribute to the ending of ongoing protest and to the ending of the eruptions of physical violence.

Yet an even more important measure may be implemented to quell the coercive use of force that results from the will seeking full expression. This involves proactively anticipating and providing an outlet for the will that may imminently be resuscitated to will-ing freedom. This includes, on university campuses, providing spaces for unfreeness to be candidly discussed, and fostering the discussions of what freedom is being witnessed that appears to be off-limits to Black students. It includes leading discussions with students in which they are encouraged to imagine what their apprehension of such long- denied-freedom would entail. It includes helping students to see how they might make their imagination of freeness a reality. In other words, helping students to channel the will to be free in practical, personal terms. Most importantly, making the students visible, by affirming and encouraging them that their sense of unfreeness is based in fact, and that their freeness and dignity is of utmost importance; that it is imperative for them to know their value and worth; to exemplify that knowledge in their choices. The goal is to water the planted seeds in the minds of the students that they have power and that possibilities exist for their unique and creative participation in the community without shame or diminishment.

To ascribe the claim of humanity, and the operation of the will-that-is-being-freed to moral iniquity, is to misunderstand the needs of human being, and to deny compassion to the repairing human will. Critiques of protest violence, such as that presented in the Boesak paradigm, must be careful to distinguish the harms and the harmed when it comes to judging violence. The silenced victims who are harmed by Black being, must have their violation accounted for as a matter of pre-eminence, and must be free to will the appropriate response to their violation. The relevant question for those in the Christian tradition is not whether South African students may legitimately use violence during protest actions. The more relevant question is how long South Africans with Christian faith commitments will disregard the complex violences embedded in the social order, with which they are complicit, while expecting continued support and legitimation from the violated.

11. Part III SUMMARY: Violence, Freedom of the Will, and Black Being

11.1. Introduction

This section is a **compilation** of the different "Conclusion" sections from chapters included in Part III. No new research is presented. It is included for ease of reference, and for tracking the argument that is presented in detail in the three chapters of the section.

11.2. Summary of Conclusions for Theorization of Violence

11.2.1. Violence and Black Being

Understanding the ways that "violent" phenomena have been observed by social scientists provides a helpful way of beginning to understand how the concept functions. Towards this end, a limited overview of the social scientific treatment of "violence" will be undertaken in this section. This section will present an overview of the study of violence from specialized fields of anthropology and psychology.

11.2.1.1. Conclusions of Social Science Fields of Anthropology and Psychology

The review of the literature of anthropological and psychological fields of study reveals that, in the social sciences, violence is primarily understood as physical aggression or the coercive use of physical force. Cultural anthropologists alone have identified the social and political elements, including colonialism, that constitute phenomena of violence. This void in the canon of scholarship in itself suggests the reifying role that academic knowledge plays in the invisibilisation of violence in society. Within anthropology, cultural anthropologists have identified the ways that social structures constitute violence. However, within the same field this knowledge is not absorbed. The academy of the social sciences fails to fully interrogate culture, and fails to appreciate, as cultural anthropologists have pointed out, the role that they themselves play in creating and maintaining systems that are violent and that do violence. Instead the violence goes unseen, unreported, unlearned, and untaught. It remains a consistent invisible force in the social ecology. The ongoing non-acknowledgement of the violence embedded in the social structure, means that often only the results are studied, while the root of the phenomena goes unaddressed.

The social science scholarship has great implications for the subject matter of this project. First, it provides evidence that the view of structural and cultural violence, invisible violence, that is argued for in this paper, is supported by scholarship. The research itself

confirms the nature of the violence that is named. Second, the study of the social scientific purview of violence makes clear the utter radicality of Jesus's teaching in the first century, as argued in Chapter Two. Jesus made a connection between psychology and violence that seems to be unnamed some two thousand years later. Those in the academic study of psychology and violence primarily identify violence as being related to human proclivity towards aggression, as a result of natural/biological and environmental factors. Jesus's teaching, in contrast, makes a connection between one's inner life, and inward sense of self-worth, and how an intact and uplifted psychological perspective can lead to a diminution in one's engagement in acts of physical violence. For the post-modern scientist there is genetic grounds for violence. For Jesus, there is a psychology that is able overcome the power of social forces, and also to overcome the internal natural/biological impulses triggered by those social forces. Ultimately, the psychological reorientation results in overcoming the inclination to use aggressive or coercive physical force. Further, because it insulates the individual from socially determined notions of worthiness and unworthiness, it disarms the powers that create violent structures and that instrumentalize violent systems to diminish and destroy the human beings that it deems to have disposable lives. Jesus's psychology was far ahead of its time.

11.2.1.2. Conclusions from Broad Conceptualization of Violence

Violence is known according to specific acts, is best understood as process and not product, and may be either instrumental or non-instrumental, with both having damaging outcomes. This theorization is helpful in establishing a broad framework for thinking conceptually about violence. The framework does not account for every instance of violence, nor for every violent practice. Neither is it desirable for a theory to do so. As Enderß and Ramp have observed, prematurely narrowing down the phenomenal domain "can lead to the danger of overlooking central aspects. Instead…it is sensible to begin by conceiving violence as openly as possible in order to do justice to its historical manifoldness."[1212] The next section of this chapter will examine the work of Johan Galtung to construct a framework upon the theoretical ground that has been discussed.

11.2.1.3. Conclusion from Galtung's Typology of Violence

A typological description of violence, then, has several manifestations. It includes direct acts that cause a diminishing of one's experience in the body or mind, indirect structural

[1212] Endreß and Rampp, "Introduction," 3.

acts of such diminution, internalized acceptance of and support for such acts of diminished life experience, and acts of obliteration and pretence connected to founding political entities. It encompasses all of these violences together as they relate to Black life, in its diminishing psychic impact.

11.2.1.4. Conclusion from Cultural Hegemonic Violence Analysis

When the phenomena of violence is registered through the experiences of women, those formerly colonized by Western nations, and Black persons, it becomes clear that the experience of violence is not fully accounted for by a narrow "product" definition of the term. The idea that violence is imbedded in structures, institutions, and occurs as a normative feature of cultural hegemonic life of society, reveals the nature of violence as, indeed, "cumulative," "boundless," and "spilling over."

11.2.1.5. Final Conclusion of Theorization of Violence

This chapter reflected on the meaning of violence. It showed the ways that social science has understood violence in the life of human beings from the perspective of anthropology and psychology. The branch of cultural anthropology provides grounds for conception of violence as encompassing more than mere physical aggression or use of force. Rather, scholars have determined that violence involves underlying and interrelated social and cultural constructs. Psychological scholarship has also argued for conception of violence as multifaceted and complex, as a "wicked" problem. The psychological scholarship's more relevant contribution, for the purposes of this paper is the notion of a three-stage cycle of aggression, which includes inputs, internal processing, and outputs. This provides support for the argument of Part One of the paper that Jesus was interested in addressing, not the human output of violence, so much as he was interested in re-orientating human interpretation of inputs, the psychology of violence.

Violence broadly conceptualized requires acceptance that violence is not only a "product," a narrowly defined act of force that is episodic or sporadic, but that violence is "process." It is cumulative and boundless and spills over. The process of violence lends itself to understanding by types or categories of manifestations. Galtung's typology of violence names, direct, structural, and cultural violence, to which might be added the types of foundational violence and existential violence. Existential violence is a violence committed to the being of Black persons, as discussed by Fanon, Césaire, and the school of Afro-pessimism. It damages one's self-ness; one's self-understanding and self-expression. Existential violence arises for Black persons specifically because of their experiences of slavery and social death

that continue into the present. The violence of gender and colonial oppression are also discussed in this chapter.

Connection to Larger Project:

What this discussion of violence shows is that violence is a broad concept, and that the being of Black persons, especially female, formerly colonized black persons, is the subject of violence whether or not there is the presence of coercive physical force. The social death that attends to those who were marked as slaves (despite actual condition of enslavement) is an act of violation that is ongoing. To discuss non-violence under these circumstances is to fail to address the ways that *continuing to exist* in the face of powers that seek to extinguish the individual's unique humanity, is to be non-violent. Black existence that does not implode or explode is non-violence. Which brings to the fore the fact that much of the self-damaging pathology that is witnessed in communities that have been "Blackened," excluded from social life or marked for social death, might be viewed as the result of the existential violence that these communities are subjected to without relief. Even where there is no use of force—no guns, no knives, no rape, no killing by gangs, where there is widespread addiction, unrestrained licentiousness, emotionally-rooted obesity, and the like; where there is diminished life without physical violence, in other words, the pathology is a response of a diminishment of existence. It is an inward directed violence responding to the unnamed existential violence that the social order directs against Black being.

In which case, what good news does a non-violent-Jesus narrative offer? The non-violent-Jesus narrative does not speak to issues of existential violence. However, the Jesus-Who-Resists paradigm that I propose does. The Jesus-Who-Resists acknowledges the violences to dignity, which are as damaging as violence to the body. The Jesus-Who-Resists registers that life, salvation, and wholeness do not come from possessing physical weapons, nor is true life taken away by physical weapons. Jesus-Who-Resists urges the cultivation of an inward being, that is lived into by one's actions. Jesus-Who-Resists recognizes the dehumanizing messages and methods of the culture. He tells his followers not to be followers of cultural norms that diminish them. But to accept that they are children of God, loved by God. He endows his followers with the authority and power *to be*, as they are, without shame, debasement, or humiliation. From this place of dignity one can receive the input of disparagement or degradation, and not allow the input to have meaning as to the truth of who one is; one can offer an output, a response, that does not necessitate the use of physical force.

One can demonstrate through one's actions the lie of the input, and the truth that one believes about oneself.

The following table (*See, table 11-2, below*) provides a comparison of the different approaches to offense.

Table 11-1 Comparison of (Non)Violent Responses

	Violence	Non-violence	Pacifism	Jesus Resistance
Hit in the face by someone who intends to humiliate you.	Hit the perpetrator back.	Gather with others and protest to the perpetrator that hitting is bad.	Walk away; accept the battery as suffering to be endured; hope God intervenes.	Demonstrate that you are not afraid, will not back down, or be made ashamed, e.g., look them in the eye, don't cow, stick out your chin out and dare them to hit you again.
"Nigger/Kaffir!"	Punch the perpetrator in the face.	Answer the perpetrator, "Do not dare call me that!"; publicize the perpetrator's words to shame them.	Ignore the insult; let people call you names; endure suffering.	Demonstrate that you are not impressed with their words, n or are you shamed, e.g., reply, "You mean to say, '*Lazy* nigger/kaffir!', since I am about to sit

				down right here in the sunshine, sip my cool drink, and enjoy the breeze on this fine day."

I use the second example to paint a realistic picture of how outlandish Jesus's suggestions must have sounded to his hearers. My point is to show that Jesus's emphasis in his Sermon was on the power of the individual to refuse to give the perpetrator of violence the power to humiliate, dishonour, or dehumanize. To show how Jesus's resistance disables the weapons of humiliation.

This example also shows the limited nature of Jesus's instructions. He was not speaking to the matter of corporate and state use of force, or even violence, *per se*, at all. Jesus was offering to his hearers, what continues to be necessary today, a way of acclaiming dignity in the face of those who despise you.

Violence is, ultimately, a vast web. It has been most destructive for Black people in its existential dimensions. Jesus-Who-Resists presents a theology that allows resistance, that allows creativity, that takes into account individual particularities of circumstance, and that refuses to accept the normativized terms of honour and shame, worth and worthlessness.

11.2.2. Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance

11.2.2.1. Introduction

This chapter considers how violence, particularly existential violence, provokes violent protest, and why the violent protest against existential conditions, is a faithful expression of the *zoë* life for which humanity is created. Relying upon the metaphysical deconstruction of the will of medieval philosopher Duns Scotus, it will be shown that Black persons' physical violence during acts of protest is an expression of human will that was disordered by slavery, seeking to re-orient itself to proper function. It is a will that is free to will. I argue that the force of the effort of the will to re-orient itself metaphysically, may at times spill over into physical expression of force. This is not a bad or immoral result. The initial violence that disordered the will is the bad and immoral act. The restoration of the will of Black persons to proper function is a human good.

11.2.2.2. Conclusion from Black Humanity and Unfreedom

11.2.2.2.1. Conclusion of Theological Constructions of Freedom

The human capacity "to will" is made meaningful by understanding it as human freedom. To be free, or to be one who wills, entails, first, an inner disposition of being. To be free, or to be one who wills, is to be one who has inward desires and whose desires become the subject of one's inner ruminations. It also means to be one who makes decisions regarding their desires. One's will-ing derives from ones desiring. The essence of freedom, then, more fundamental than freedoms claimed as part of social-political community, is one's ability to will in accordance with one's desires.

According to Duns Scotus, the will possesses a two-fold disposition. The *affectio commodi*, wills toward the personally beneficial while being moderated by the *affectio iustitiae* which elicits actions in furtherance of greater good, or principled good, or love. "It is just because the [dual-affectioned] will possesses the affection for justice that it is free to accept, reject or refrain from acting regarding the inclination of the affection for the advantageous."[1213]

The formal distinguishing of the freedom of the will is here intended only to emphasize the fact that, for Scotus, the will is free, and is the most free of any aspect of human personality. The freeness of the human will is uniquely and necessarily capable of self-restraint. Because of the freeness of the will, one is able to live lovingly, meaning in a restrained and ordered way, and "such ordered loving constitutes true human happiness."[1214]

11.2.2.2.2. Conclusion of Metaphysics of Black Unfreedom

What may be concluded is that African persons were overdetermined to be lesser or other than human, and instead deemed Black, during the historical moment when the concepts of humanity and human dignity were formally constructed. To be Black was to be ontologically constituted as a being that is a slave--natally alienated, generally dishonored, and subject to permanent violent domination. Part of the consequence of this ontological disfigurement of African personhood, was that the human will was disfigured. The will of the Black being, instead of will-ing its own optimal good, towards the perfection of personhood and humanity, instead came to will the lesser good, towards mere survival.

[1213] González-Ayesta, "Duns Scotus on the Natural Will," 48.
[1214] Ingham and Dreyer, *The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus*, 157.

11.2.2.3. Conclusion from Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance

Once there is knowledge of freeness, cognition of the dimensions of one's own un-freeness arises. At the apprehension of one's own unfreeness, and in the absence of external police and penal measures that discourage self-will-ing, a force of will intensifies sufficient to shift the orientation of the will. The will is shifts from will-ing what is less good to properly willing one's greatest good. The intensity of force necessary to accomplish such an existential reorientation of the will, is an intensity that will not be constrained from elicitation of forceful external acts. Which is to say that because a violent inner force is requisite to the freeing of free will, the acts of the will elicited through that force might also be violent. Further, the intensity of the force necessary to overcome impediments to free will-ing is determined by the extent of the perceived restriction upon the will's freeness. The greater the stifling of freeness, the more intense, and aggressive, the inclination towards resistance.

The highest act of the will is self-restraint, in the interest of moral perfection.[1215] Thus, the possibility and ideal hope, is that as the will is properly reordered to seeking the greater and not the lesser, that appropriate restraint will be exercised in one's actions, whatever actions are willed. Under the circumstances of rehabilitating the will, however, it may be that the will's right-ordering, becoming inclined to will more than marginalized existence, reaches the limit of the will's capacity. Attaining the highest act of the will, which is self-restraint, might go beyond what the newly re-ordered will's ability.

11.2.2.4. Final Conclusion of Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance

Modern European knowledge systems fostered conceptions of the human, of "Man," that excluded African persons, and that resulted in the denial of the humanity of Africans. Additionally, the freedom of Black persons was effaced. First, freedom was defaced through the bondage in which Africans were held. Defacement of freedom also occurred by the psycho-social violence wrought against the ontology of the African person, and against the will of the African person. Ontologically the African went from being a human to being a slave. The will of the African went from being ordered to incline towards its own perfection and greatest good, to being inclined toward mere survival, and toward the lesser good of mere existence. When persons of African descent protest against inequality and marginalization it is an instance of rehabilitation of the will. The inner force that is necessary to accomplish proper ordering of the

[1215] Ingham, "Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom," 369.

will, may possibly result in outward expressions of physical force, or violence. This violence may be the necessary cost of the restoration of Black persons' human dignity.

Key Implications:

This presents the urgent task of revision of the Christian command to love. The love command has two parts. The first is to love God utterly, which is not what is of concern here. The second part is that which must be re-visioned. In the second love command Jesus instructs that the great task of the Christian, after loving God, is to love one's neighbour as oneself. Matthew and Mark, where this verse appears, use the exact same language, "You shall love your neighbour as yourself." (Matt. 22:39, Mark 12:31) Typically the verse is seen to focus on love of the neighbour. The biblical texts of various translations nearly all cross-reference the verse with verses that highlight Jesus's teaching on "the neighbour." This is not improper. It is, however, incomplete. Such an interpretation eliminates the significance of the second part of the verse. Both the Gospel teaching and the Hebrew teaching of the law, upon which the commandment is based, are concerned not only with the neighbour who is to be loved, but with the individual who is to do the loving.[1216] The command is not simply to "love your neighbour," as Church tradition is guilty of too frequently abridging it. It is to love the Other "as yourself." This makes the love of self the basis of the command to love the Other. Without a love of self it is not possible to render to the Other the love that they are due. The love of myself allows me to love you.

This has implications for the reading of the "non-violence" in the Sermon on the Mount as connected to the instruction to love the enemy. Typically, the passage is understood as meaning that the Christian should use no force against the Other because the Christian must love the Other. This reading fails to emphasize the self-love and self-concern upon which love for the enemy depends. It does an injustice to the meaning of text. When Jesus speaks of "turning the other cheek," etc. and when Jesus says to "love your enemies," he makes his assertations for the benefit, the good, the maximizing of the humanity of the individual who is

[1216] The Gospel command is based upon Lev. 19:18, "17 You shall not hate in your heart anyone of your kin; you shall reprove your neighbour, or you will incur guilt yourself. 18 You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbour as yourself: I am the Lord." In Leviticus, the focus is the conduct of the individual, and the ways that treatment of the neighbour impact the individual. Jesus's restatement of the command in the gospel retains this emphasis on the individual by the inclusion of the words "as yourself."

the actor towards the Other. Thus, it is not merely, "love your enemies," it is "love your enemies… so that you may be children of your Father in heaven."

That church tradition has failed to offer this fuller reading of the text is meaningful. It reflects what those who have read and rendered the text have deemed the most significant aspect of the teaching. Those who have translated and interpreted the text have been primarily those who are propertied, White, European men. Persons for whom no instruction or encouragement is necessary to assert and claim self-worth and dignity. For such interpreters the emphasis may be rightly placed upon the first clause of the texts; the emphasis may rightly attempt to cultivate a deep concern for the Other. However, Jesus's teaching was not directed at those who occupied a place of privilege in the society. His concern was for those whose honour and dignity, through family, church, political and economic relationships (which were all connected and intertwined), were daily threatened. Jesus's teaching was a lesson to the people in who they were, and how they were to relate to Others in light of their own identity as beloved, worthy, children of God.

Finally, another key feature of the section should be highlighted, the brilliance of Scotus's theorization. The insight of Scotus is in his determination that the highest operation of the will is the possibility of *non velle*, to will neither yea or nea, but to refrain from willing altogether. It speaks to the possibility that Jesus proposes that the essence of the fullness of dignity is that it is not a will-ing of a response in the way that the offense provokes. It is not a will-ing of no response that allows the offense to stand. It is the not willing to will at all in situations that seek one's own complicity in one's debasement. But to freely will differently, and ideally, towards one's self-realization as worthy.

Connection to Larger Project:

The argument of this chapter, that the re-orientation of the will is positive and self-healing of humanity, finds alignment with the previously asserted argument that Jesus is deeply concerned with, and promotes the reclamation of, one's human dignity.

Because Jesus is concerned with people attaining their full humanity and with individuals resisting the attempts of the powers to diminish them, it follows that the overflow of a self-healing human will would be supported by Jesus. This is even more apparent when the reading of key texts of scripture is expanded to highlight the significance of the self to the teaching about the Other. It becomes clear that the re-orientation of one's will, towards human flourishing of the individual is consistent with Jesus's teaching.

Jesus does not have more concern for the function of a violating social order than he has for individuals being and becoming fully themselves in community. Indeed, Jesus's directives to resist the powers' dehumanization expects and requires transgression of the social order.

While Jesus never utilized lethal coercive force during his tenure on earth, the teaching of scripture leaves open the exact means and methods that are potential sources of resistance to the powers. Jesus uses specific examples of resistance, but only as a means of urging that concrete acts be undertaken in one's everyday life. He does not use the examples of offering one's face for further slapping, going naked in the streets, and giving even more when you are exploited, to assert that the particular acts and responses that he offers are those that are required when such situations arise. Jesus leaves room for creative defiance, that more important than being grounded in the non-use of force, is grounded in the claim and assertion of dignity and self-respect—the level of self-respect that is implied by being able to walk naked through the streets without shame, which is a deep affront to the pietistic social order of Jesus's era. Jesus leaves room for individuals to determine what the best course of action is under the particular circumstances of debasement that they are facing. What is crucial is that action be taken to assert one's dignity, not that non-forceful action be taken, or passive acceptance be shown. Thus, the overflow of will-ing in the healing of the self, will-ing that leads to action that reflects self-determination of one's value and worth, is consistent with a Christian ethics of love.

11.2.3. Violent Protest in South Africa

11.2.3.1. Introduction

In this final chapter, I make the argument that physical violence in South Africa during moments of protest exemplify the assertion of the will acting in furtherance of human dignity, in a context of humiliation. That such protest, far from being occurrences that should be overlooked or "excused," by the Christian church, or that are outside of the bounds of Christian integrity, is a faithful attempt to lay claim to long denied human dignity that must be affirmed.

11.2.3.2. Conclusion from History of Colonization and Subjugation

Like first century Palestine, the contemporary context of South Africa involves multiple layers of violence. There was foundational violence with the arrival of Europeans to southern African shores. Erasure of cultures, of what was right and accompanying social orders, both for the indigenous and for those imported as slaves. Violence progressively increased in South African history and eventually encompassed direct, structural, and cultural violence perpetrated

by and between ethnic groups, and most egregiously against Black Africans. Hundreds of years of violence climaxed in the mid-20th century with the imposition of Apartheid rule.

11.2.3.3. Conclusion from Current Context of Inequality

The statistical quantifications of inequality have the potential to inure us to the reality of the lives represented by the numbers. We are numbed to the diminished humanity that results when a child lives in a shack, with no running water, and has not been empowered to read, while at the same time she witnesses the material beauty and brilliance of a neighbouring South African's lived experience. Without question, the South African context involves a ferocious complex of violences--direct, structural, cultural, foundational, and existential.

11.2.3.4. Conclusion from Context of Protest

11.2.3.4.1. Contemporary Protest

In contemporary South Africa, whether protest action relates to social issues, as with service delivery, economic issues, as with unions, or education, as with Rhodes/Fees/Rape Culture Must Fall, violence has become a tool routinely used by social activists.[1217] The engagement in physical violence destabilizes the social order. Roads are blocked, schools and universities are shuttered, trains and buses are destroyed, which means alternate routes of transport become dangerously overcrowded, longer commute times and later arrivals home then compromise the safety of commuters. These are violences that are endured by the marginalized that generally go unnoticed. Protest leads to destruction of property, and often involves injury to persons involved. This is generally the point at which society takes notice of violence and reacts with additional violence against those damaging or threatening damage to property.

The turn to physical violence, like the inequality that underlies much protest by Black persons in countries around the world, is inseparable from the racialized, gendered, and colonial histories of the context of South Africa.

[1217] There has been speculation that the violence of university protests is instigated not by student activists, but by members of the national political opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters ("EFF"). The EFF denies this charge. See, https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1308343/if-you-believe-eff-is-behind-protests-youre-a-fool/ It is clear that some student leaders on various South African university campuses have also been members of the EFF, see, http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/universities-who-is-behind-the-havoc, and thus activism and EFF membership seem to be co-occurring features of student leaders on campuses. Whether the EFF practices instumentalization and politicization of students' grievances, and creates physically violent conditions that would otherwise be absent, is contested.

11.2.3.4.2. Tradition of Protest

The protest tradition in South Africa is long. It shows that for nearly as long as South Africa has been occupied by Europeans who imposed oppressive conditions, Black persons have resisted being oppressed though various means. These means included fleeing enslavement, using the law to seek redress, and organizing mass boycotts and protest. They also included, in the late nineteenth century, going to war. The model of warfare to resolve disputes with the state was used by all interested parties during the period of industrialization when the modern formation of the nation took form. Industrialization worsened the dehumanizing life conditions of Black people. It divided the population into elites and workers, and created an industrial lifestyle for African workers that enforced as policy their imposed diminished social status. Attempts for redress were unheeded. Conditions worsened until the informal policy was legislated into law in 1948. Conditions worsened further for Blacks in South Africa at a time when Black Consciousness was blooming all over the world. The violent repression of attempts by Blacks to assert their human dignity in the 1950s and 1960s were met with a conscientized Black leadership that was "prepared to die" rather than live in humiliation. The dignified resistance of these leaders was exiled, jailed, and killed. The awakened consciousness of Black persons, their will to be free, was left without any guidance as to how to channel the will-ing of the will to freedom, when freedom appeared impossible, except the guidance that trickled down from the master classes on how to endure and love.

The Black elites who had been resurrected into the cultural social life from social death, were inculcated with the values of the masters of the social order. Their protest arose from an expectation that the values of the masters—liberty, justice, equality--would be fully applicable to them. Their protest did not consider, however, that the values that they had been taught, were selective. Liberty, justice, and equality were values reserved for the propertied, White, man. Hard work, obedience, submission, suffering, forgiveness, and love were the values that most others were expected to adopt; with long-suffering being of particular importance for Blacks.

The leaders born to elites, who experienced a measure of freeness from birth, were those who were found by the message of Black Consciousness and who sought to lead the people to experience the freedom that they knew and dared to claim more of. Without leaders, following their purge in South Africa, violence in protest, and violence as protest, ensued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

11.2.3.4.3. Protest Icons of the Twentieth Century

What Mandela and Biko symbolize are a 20th century incarnation of the theoretical conceptualization of human freedom's telic movement towards being free.

11.2.3.4.4. Protest, Freedom of the Will, and South African Activists

Boesak's theological heuristic is one that I see as compatible with the arguments that I have made in this paper, to the extent that his theology is deeply concerned with the marginalized and with transformation of the culture. However, our theology diverges on the matter of (non)violence. Boesak's mainstream Christian view mistakes what the use of force represents for those who choose it, and it misrepresents the Christian integrity of those whose conscience dictates that course of action.

The protests of the students should not be seen as morally reprehensible. Instead, they must be appreciated for what they are, necessary transgressions against systems of injustice by the freely operating will of those who have a long history of being oppressed and marginalized. It must be accepted that a possible consequence of the resuscitation of the will is the expression of coercive physical force.

11.2.3.5. Final Conclusion of Theology of Violent Protest in South Africa

What this chapter has shown is that South Africa continues to experience inequality that is related to its history of colonial racial segregation and oppression. Black South Africans have endured generations of dehumanization and indignity.

In the course of a long tradition of protest, the mid-twentieth century produced a Black public whose Black Consciousness was awakened and who would not accept conditions of degradation. They organized and transgressed public norms to assert and claim the human dignity that belonged to them. Their protests were met with the physical violence of state repression, and even murder. The will-ing of Black persons for collective power was opposed fiercely. Nonetheless, the awakened consciousness of freedom could no longer accept imposed societal limitations. The will insisted, and in some cases the insistence became a physical act of coercive force. Ultimately, the will of the people prevailed and the system of government, that legislated dehumanity, fell.

Twenty plus years after its fall, students again insisted on realization of the ability to will their desires for their own highest good. Again, the will to freedom would not be restrained and in some cases became a physical act of coercive force.

The protests of the students should not be seen as morally reprehensible. Instead, they must be appreciated for what they are, necessary transgressions against systems of injustice by the freely operating will of those who have a long history of being oppressed and marginalized. It must be accepted that a possible consequence of the resuscitation of the will is the expression of coercive physical force.

Obviously, the destruction of property, and damage to life, is not optimal. To that end, the typical response would be to counsel to desist from exercising the will in a way that damages. This attempt at restriction only contributes to the will will-ing its freedom, however. Instead, the will must be freed to imagine, to exercise options, to plan with well thought out intention the course of action that it deems best. This process should be facilitated, without policing or censure. Following this, the essence of the cry, whatever it is, must be heard. My sense is that the process of allowing protestors to *be*, on their own terms, and to experience the self-worth that comes from insisting upon one's own terms of engagement, as much as having the inequitable conditions ameliorated, the facilitation of the protestors being made visible can contribute to the ending of ongoing protest and to the ending of the eruptions of physical violence.

Yet an even more important measure may be implemented to quell the coercive use of force that results from the will seeking full expression. This involves proactively anticipating, and providing an outlet for the will that may imminently be resuscitated to will-ing freedom. This includes, on university campuses, providing spaces for unfreeness to be candidly discussed, and fostering the discussions of what freedom is being witnessed that appears to be off-limits to Black students. It includes leading discussion with students in which they are encouraged to imagine what their apprehension of such long- denied-freedom would entail. It includes helping students to see how they might make their imagination of freeness a reality. In other words, helping students to channel the will to be free in practical, personal terms. Most importantly, making the students visible, by affirming and encouraging them that their sense of unfreeness is based in fact, and that their freeness and dignity is of utmost importance; that it is imperative for them to know their value and worth; to exemplify that knowledge in their choices. The goal is to water the planted seeds in the minds of the students that they have power and that possibilities exist for their unique and creative participation in the community without shame or diminishment.

To ascribe the claim of humanity, and the operation of the will-that-is-being-freed to moral iniquity is to misunderstand the needs of human being, and to deny compassion to the repairing human will. Critiques of protest violence, such as that presented in the Boesak paradigm, must be careful to distinguish the harms and the harmed when it comes to judging violence. The silenced victims who are harmed by Black being, must have their violation accounted for as a matter of pre-eminence, and must be free to will the appropriate response to their violation. The relevant question for those in the Christian tradition is not whether South

African students may legitimately use violence during protest actions. The more relevant question is how long South Africans with Christian faith commitments will disregard the complex violences embedded in the social order, with which they are complicit, while expecting continued support and legitimation from the violated.

Final Conclusion

12. Conclusion

This project has accomplished several tasks. It has examined biblical texts that are often used to establish that Jesus was principally concerned with non-violence in the lives of his followers and with the necessity of suffering; it has demonstrated the misreadings of such texts. It has offered an alternative understanding based upon the first century context, which is more fitting to the contemporary context of a social order that intrinsically maintains the racialized dishonour and marginalization of many.

The project has reviewed the Christian tradition for assessment of how non-violence has been conceived and practiced from its origin two thousand years ago, and has concluded that the term and idea of non-violence has been mutable. It has taken on different meanings during different periods in church history. Most importantly the historic overview has demonstrated that there has never in the history of the church been a period when the coercive use of force has been fully delegitimized. Nor has there ever been a period when the church has fully practiced non-violence as that term is more broadly construed, including respect for the dignity of all human persons, eschewing slavery, respecting women, and allowing the unmolested co-existence of the "foreign" Other.

The research used the scriptural and historical findings that non-violence is not pivotal to the Christian tradition to then consider the meaning of violence, with a special focus on the lives of the marginalized. This analysis showed that violence is not a "product" or a singular event, but is a wide-ranging process. Johan Galtung's typology of violence provided categorizations for the types of violence that exist in the culture. Added to that was the conceptualization of foundational and existential violence. Existential violence, which impacts the being and identity of Black persons by racializing them as Black, and thereby dishonoured and less- or non-human, was discussed at length. The link between existential violence and Orlando Patterson's idea of slavery and social death was made. The cultural violence that is perpetrated against women and the colonized was also discussed. Because violence functions primarily in an existential way against Black persons, the good news of the Gospel must address violence, primarily, in an existential way. A reading of scripture that focuses on the non-use of force fails to do this. What is required is a reading, of scripture and history, that privileges Jesus's concern for the dignity of despised persons. Such a reading is that which I have proposed.

The research then demonstrated, using the metaphysics of the will outlined by medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus, the ways that the existential violence against Black persons

resulted in impairment of the will of Black persons. The will of the Black person, through torture and social control, was disfigured so that it became normal for Black persons to will against their own highest good, and instead to will towards survival or the cessation of pain. I argued that when Black persons engage in acts that transgress established systems, which perpetrate existential violence against them, it is evidence that the will is re-orienting into proper function to seek its own highest good. My central argument has been that the force of energy that is required to re-orient the internal operation of the will, may spill over from internal force to external force, and become an outward expression of the physical use of force. My argument is that Jesus is deeply concerned with the wellness and regenerative possibilities underway in the will of the marginalized person. Because his message seeks to bring life to the person, Jesus's message is consistent with supporting and encouraging the resuscitation of the will of Black persons, rather than insisting upon the undisturbed operation of social structures that do violence to the marginalized.

Finally, the research demonstrated a history of Black oppression and a tradition of protest in the South African context that influence the contemporary protests of students who are seeking the freedom to fully *be* in society. These protests, which at times include the use of physical force, are an example of the will of the marginalized being re-aligned to seek its highest good. The protest is contextually normative, as it is consistent with the tradition of South African protest, as well. Such protests against marginalization should not be condemned or "excused" by the church. Instead, evidence of will-ing to be free should be engaged, accommodated, and encouraged.

The ethos of non-violence as an end goal in itself generally fails to aid the Christian, particularly the Black Christian, in the task of honouring oneself and one's neighbour. Particularly with respect to protest violence, it gags on the gnat of damaged property, and swallows the camel of degraded lives. This ethos is inconsistent with the Gospel of Jesus, which has its foremost concern for the abundant life of the person. I do not assert in this project that Jesus promoted the use of force, or that Jesus opposed the use of force. I argue that the issue of the use of force was not as central to the teachings of Jesus as the tradition has made it. Ultimately, Jesus's ethics allow for either the use of force or the non-use of force; the choice of acts depends upon the person and the circumstances. Jesus's utmost concern was the internalization and assertion of one's dignity, not as an upright citizen, but as a child of God. The goal of this research is to shine a light on the violence that goes unnamed that is perpetrated against Black being in ways that debilitate and destroy life. Being raced as Black is to be always already violently acted upon, and also to be made a threat or perpetrator of violence by virtue

of *being*. Until Blackness becomes the center of theologies of (non)violence, such theologies will remain incomplete, and operate in complicity with the violence of the culture against Black life.

When students, or workers, or those at the bottom of society's social order protest their dehumanizing treatment, their protest is not deserving of objection even where property is destroyed. What matters is whether the protest evidenced a self-determined dignity for themselves, or the upholding of the dignity of other marginalized people.

It is my hope that the ideas that are developed in this project serve the human family, and cause the people of God to grow in love, in the grace and knowledge Christ, and in maturity in our practice of loving the Other, which, in the end, is to love ourselves.

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